
Defense Planning for the 1990s

edited by

William A. Buckingham, Jr.

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and the Changing International Environment

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October 7–8, 1983

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for International Security Affairs

Edited by

William A. Buckingham, Jr.

1984

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Foreword

I take special pride in introducing this volume based on the proceedings of the Tenth National Security Affairs Conference. During the last decade, National Security Affairs Conferences have helped policymakers to explore major issues affecting national security.

This year's theme—"Defense Planning for the 1990s and the Changing International Environment"—harks back to the first NSAC, which centered on the defense environment in the 1980s. Surveying the topics of that first conference, I was struck by the foresight of its organizers: they chose issues which foresaw the central security issues of the decade. For example, a 1974 panel on "new forms of violence" relates directly to this year's discussion of low-order conflict and terrorism; an early discussion on the 1973 Middle East War and the oil crisis is again reflected in a 1983 panel. The observer is reminded that although personalities and events may change, fundamental security questions do not.

On the other hand, ten years have provided a new emphasis and new perspective on past issues. Two of this year's panels focus on South and East Asia, a manifestation of growing interest in these regions and such problems as Indo-Pakistani tensions, nuclear proliferation, and improved Sino-American relations. A striking example of new perspective is the possibility of normalizing relations with Vietnam—a subject which could not have been discussed seriously in 1974. Finally, the years have presented us with entirely new situations, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—also a panel topic of 1983.

I am pleased to recognize the work of former NDU President, Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, under whose administration much of the 1983 conference planning took place. I would also like

to thank my cosponsor, the Honorable Richard L. Armitage, and his staff in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; and finally, all those who participated in the conference.



Richard D. Lawrence
Lieutenant General, US Army
President, National Defense University

Preface

In 1974, the first National Security Affairs Conference met at Fort McNair in Washington, DC. A distinguished group from government and academia assembled to discuss the national security challenges the United States was likely to face in the 1980s. In October 1983 the *Tenth* National Security Affairs Conference convened, again at Fort McNair. Its theme, "Defense Planning for the 1990s and the Changing International Environment," echoed that of its first predecessor.

Following the format that has proved to be successful for previous NSACs, experienced national security experts from government, the academic and business communities, and the media were brought together in a forum where competing and sometimes controversial points of view could be aired, critiqued, and modified. There was no attempt to censor or dilute strong views expressed in either the papers or in the discussions during the conference's deliberations. The hope, as in all NSACs, was that the free discussion of ideas for improving our handling of national security problems might result in insights and new approaches to be used by the policymakers charged with addressing these issues.

Chapter 1 of this volume presents the opening remarks and keynote address—both of which set the general context for the various panel themes. Chapters 2 through 6 correspond to each of the five panels. Each chapter starts with the challenge given to the panelists, follows with a summary of panel discussions, and concludes with the texts of the papers that were presented to stimulate debate. For a quick overview of the major themes and conclusions, readers are directed to the panel summaries. The papers themselves, however, are both informative and provocative, and will amply reward those who care to read them in full.

Panel 1 of the 1983 NSAC dealt with the question of whether the United States shouls attempt to normalize its relations with the present government of Vietnam. Ably chaired by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, the panel members struggled with a variety of issues, particularly the problem of Americans still missing in Southeast Asia. Panelists agreed that Hanoi probably has from 300 to 400

sets of warehoused remains, but were much more ambiguous on the question of whether any living prisoners exist. Panelists felt that humanitarian issues should be kept separate from the process of normalizing diplomatic relations. They concluded that, for the foreseeable future, no pressing national interest would be served by either pressing forward toward normalization or avoiding the question.

Major General Perry M. Smith chaired Panel 2, which examined the NATO Alliance, one of the keystones of postwar American foreign policy. Panelists did not foresee a significant change in the actual political and military threats the alliance was created to counter. While American perceptions of this threat would probably stay the same, our European allies would likely view the threat as decreasing over time. Also addressed were the questions of nuclear weapons policy, the scope of cooperation to be expected from alliance members, and domestic constraints on NATO programs. The panel, in addition to its examination of the future of NATO, lamented the fact that long-range planning is neglected by the Pentagon, and recommended more attention be paid to this function.

The discussions in Panel 3 on low-order violence were spirited and free-wheeling, as might be expected on such a controversial subject. Terrell Arnold led the panel, which concluded that the United States must improve its ability to handle this type of conflict. Panelists agreed that it is usually wise to act quickly in a crisis before vital interests are threatened. Early action may avoid allowing a situation to deteriorate to the point where the resources needed to deal with it reach an unacceptable level. However, this presents a dilemma: the level of public support for US action will be low *until* vital national interests are threatened. Accordingly, the panel saw a need to educate the public concerning the dangers posed to the nation by low-order violence in the international system.

The final two panels focused on regional issues in Asia. Panel 4 dealt with foreign policy options in East Asia during the coming decade. Ambassador Richard L. Sneider charged the panel to think in terms of developing policies which would serve overall United States objectives in the region, as well as relate to specific countries. The panel concluded that a middle course in relations with China is appropriate, involving technology transfer initiatives and economic

assistance but not extending to implicit defense commitments. A lengthy discussion of relations with Japan concluded that the totality of the bilateral relationship is more important than its components, many of which the panel addressed. Concerning the remainder of East Asia, the panel concluded that as with China and Japan, it is easier to outline problems than reach coherent solutions.

Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen chaired Panel 5, which took on South Asia as its topic. The panel tended to view South Asia as a region in which the average American has little knowledge or interest. Although lack of popular interest does not reflect a diminished view of the importance of the area, it does parallel the limited influence the United States has in the region. In their discussion of Afghanistan, the panelists were not optimistic over the prospects of a successful settlement, and they characterized the present situation there as a "standoff" rather than a "stalemate." Concerning Pakistan, they expressed concern over the possibilities of internal instability and nuclear proliferation. The panel concluded that India prefers not to have any significant outside influence in the region and that US policy toward that country is appropriate. Panelists cautioned that in the process of improving relations with China, the United States should be careful not to harm its relations with India.

This conference could not have taken place without the contributions of many people. Conference cosponsors were Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, President of National Defense University, and the Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Thanks is also due to Lieutenant General John S. Pustay, General Lawrence's predecessor as President, whose help during the planning and organizing phases of the conference was very valuable. Dr. Hans Mark, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, sounded highly appropriate themes in his keynote speech. Colonel John E. Endicott, Director of the NDU Research Directorate, and all his staff worked hard to make the conference run smoothly, as did a number of people from other NDU staff elements. This volume of Proceedings would not have been possible without the dedicated and capable work of Mr. George Maerz of the NDU Press and Mr. William Mizelle of Editmasters, Inc., who prepared the final manuscript for publication.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to each panel

chairman, rapporteur, paper writer, participant, and observer. Your excellent work and spirit of cooperation made both the conference and these Proceedings possible.

William A. Buckingham, Jr.
Washington, DC
November 1984

Chapter 1

Introduction: Defense Planning for the 1990s and the Changing International Environment

Opening Remarks: The Current Environment and US Interests

Honorable Richard L. Armitage
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure for me as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to cosponsor this Tenth Annual National Security Affairs Conference. It represents a decade of useful dialogue among the Department of Defense, academia, research centers, and business; provides at DOD a fresh look with new insights and ideas; it gives you an opportunity to engage with your colleagues in interesting discussions of important national security topics and to make your ideas known to us in Government.

I hope you will make your discussions useful as well as interesting by focusing them toward producing results with utility for policymakers. This may require that you resist the not uncommon temptation to pursue a topic because it is intellectually stimulating, even though it may be irrelevant to the task at hand.

This conference returns to the theme of the first by addressing "Defense Planning and the Changing International Environment." Then, we were in the era of detente, for which we had high hopes and which remains in principle a worthwhile goal. But we learned that detente is not solitaire; one side cannot achieve it alone. Now, we are in an era in which the growth of Soviet military power has given our principal adversary a multiple-option offensive capability—that its leaders have demonstrated a willingness to use. What changes in the international environment will the next decade bring?

We have asked you to look ahead and focus on defense planning for the 1990s. To set the stage for that, I would like to share with you my assessment of the current environment and the state of United States security interests in the regions of the world outside of Europe.

My stress on the importance of non-European interests and threats should not obscure the fact that American and West European security remain indivisible. European and American partnership is still the centerpiece of our efforts to deter Soviet aggression and to build a more stable and constructive relationship with Moscow. But our security interests in other parts of the world are much more important now than when the Soviet Union was only a continental power and world affairs were more compartmented.

United States interests have shifted in recent years from being largely Euro-centered to reflect our growing interdependence with other regions. And, they have become more sensitive to the needs and concerns of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

The growing economic and political influence of the former colonies of the Third World has increased the number of independent actors who count on the world stage. At the same time, the national and multinational economies which constitute the world economic system have become more interdependent.

As the world has become more diverse and interdependent, the international interests of the United States have become more truly global. Our trade with Asia and the Pacific now surpasses that with Europe. The fastest growing export market for United States products is Latin America. We are dependent for raw materials, including strategic materials needed by our defense industries, on trade with nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Americans are attuned to their responsibilities as citizens of the world. We have acquired more global interests as a nation because our citizens have become more interested and concerned about what is happening elsewhere in the world. Famine in Bangladesh, apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Kampuchea, terrorism in Italy, and political oppression wherever it occurs are matters of United States interest because they offend the sense of justice and humanity of the American people.

The major threat to our worldwide interests has also become global in its scope. The ambition of the Soviet Union to remake the world in its image is nothing new; it has remained the same since 1917 with a single-minded dedication to hegemony unmatched in modern history. What has changed is the ability of Soviet military

power to back that ambition with the threat or use of force in far-flung locations around the world.

Although the United States has lived under the threat of Soviet nuclear attack for three decades, the conventional threat for many years was confined principally to the periphery of the USSR. In recent years, increased Soviet military capabilities combined with increased confidence from that military buildup have enabled the Soviet Union to seize opportunities to expand its influence, either directly or through surrogates, in many parts of the world.

The threat encompasses all mission areas. Soviet ships and planes enjoy access to far-flung ports and airfields (in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and elsewhere). Soviet military supplies fuel conflicts in almost every region of the world (in the hands of Vietnamese in Kampuchea, Libyans in Chad, and guerrillas in El Salvador, among others). Soviet strategic force improvements have eliminated our advantage in nuclear forces; conventional weapons improvements have steadily eroded our qualitative advantage. We pursue our foreign policy goals in an increasingly unstable environment where a growing number of nations, allied and nonaligned alike, are threatened by Soviet and surrogate military coercion.

I would like to share with you some of the impressions we gained during Secretary Weinberger's recent trip:

- In Japan, horror over the Soviet destruction of KAL 007.
- In China, clear awareness of the threat.
- In Pakistan, immediate problems of how to deal with the bear moving in next door.
- In Rome, concern about how we deal with the INF issue.

As we look throughout the world today we see that the common element in most of the global "hot spots" is the involvement of the Soviet Union or Soviet-supported nations. As the principal arms supplier to Libya, Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam, Syria, and the puppet regime in Afghanistan, the Soviets have either provoked or taken advantage of regional tensions and seized upon existing divisions

and vulnerabilities wherever they exist to advance their own interests.

I am not sure why the Soviets act as they do. Recent events have clearly shown that citizens of the civilized world find it difficult if not impossible to achieve by introspection an understanding of Soviet motives. Asking "What would I do in a similar situation?" doesn't help us understand the decision to murder 269 innocent people in a commercial airliner. Soviet official lies do not assist our understanding.

Moreover, if we could discern why the Soviets feel they must act as they do, I am not sure we would find the information relevant. There are those who argue that Soviet actions have defensive motivations, that their military buildup is responsive to perceived threats from China, Western Europe, and the United States. But to the Soviets, security requires that the rest of the world be remade in their own dismal image and defense is a heartless concept with no room for human values or regard for human life. The citizens of Afghanistan show by their resistance that they find little comfort in the possibility that the Soviet invasion of their country may have been motivated by defensive considerations. The families of the passengers of Korean Airlines Flight 007 are certainly not consoled by Soviet statements that they were acting legitimately to defend their airspace.

The facts are better explained by a different hypothesis: that the Soviets remain committed to their goal of world socialism and base their pursuit of that goal on military power. Instead of being driven by perceptions of external threat, the Soviet military buildup appears to be for its own sake, constrained only by the Soviet budget. The opportunistic use of those forces similarly appears constrained only by their capabilities and the strength of their opposition.

As I look toward the remainder of the decade, I see little hope of a change of heart by the Kremlin leaders about their ultimate goals or their commitment to continued improvement of their military capabilities. This conference does not have a panel which expressly deals with United States-Soviet relations. However, a major focus of your panel discussions about Vietnam, NATO, low-level violence or terrorism, East Asia, and South Asia naturally must be how we

should deal with the Soviet challenge in the context of other changes in the international environment we can expect during the balance of the 1980s.

There is a tendency in conferences of this type, no matter what the stated theme, for discussion to focus on today's policy issues. Historians apply lessons of history to current policy; conferences about the future speak of the year 2000, but discuss 1983.

I have little doubt that some of this tendency will be displayed during the next two days. It is almost irresistible. And, I welcome the insights and constructive criticism from such discussions. However, I hope you will apply the bulk of your attention to a serious attempt at looking ahead to the 1990s.

Many of the more crucial challenges which face us are those generated by the interplay of North-South and East-West developments. The North-South issues alone present policy questions which will task our ingenuity and our credibility. We face formidable tasks in the efforts we have joined to adapt international economic and political institutions in ways which contribute to the continued development of the nations of the Southern Hemisphere and to their smooth integration into the international system.

Unfortunately, for many of those nations the development process itself remains anything but smooth. It generates dislocations within societies and pressures on political systems which too often produce instability and violence, both domestically and internationally.

Soviet adventurism, directly or through surrogates, exacerbates these pressures and the instability they produce and overlays the already complicated challenges of the development process with the additional complication of making them part of the East-West struggle. Moreover, the growth of Soviet military power and ability to project it, coupled with the Brezhnev Doctrine as exhibited in Afghanistan, skew the development process by injecting into it a note of irreversibility. President Kennedy once described this trait of Soviet policy as, "What's mine is mine, and what's yours is negotiable." We could amend that today to say, "What's yours is contestible by whatever means are available."

This generates special problems for us in dealing with instability in the Third World as it affects our interests and policies. We recognize that instability is usually symptomatic of more fundamental problems and that it often reflects the frustration of legitimate popular aspirations. And we recognize that in the long run, those who respond with repression rather than reform are probably doomed to failure and overthrow.

However, diagnosis does not suggest the prescription. To suggest disassociation from certain governments because they are repressive is to ignore the benefits such a policy might give the Soviets. To suggest that we should be more relaxed about that because then the Soviets would be the ones associated with repression is to ignore the lessons of Afghanistan and of KAL Flight 007 about Soviet readiness for the callous use of force to protect what they see as theirs.

How then should we deal with the trends of development in the context of the East-West struggle? How can we provide assistance, where it is clearly in our interest, to a country without thereby sharing the vulnerability of its incumbent government? I challenge you to address these difficult questions in all of your panels. How we deal with such issues is germane not just to the Asia panels. It is a NATO problem as well when we consider from where the Alliance obtains critical oil supplies and strategic materials.

Our government may not always do as well as everyone would like, but the thing we do best in our national security policy planning is deal with the present and the immediate future. We often are not as good in our long-range planning.

I hope you can help us do better as we look to the 1990s. Your panels will look at current trends in the international environment and identify the probable changes which will affect the type of challenges we will face in the next decade. You will address how in our planning we can best prepare for those challenges. But in addition, I would charge you to look at how our actions in the near term might influence or change the trends to provide a more favorable environment for our policies and interests as we begin the next decade. I look forward to the results of your discussions.

Keynote Address: The Position of the United States in the World

Dr. Hans Mark
National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Colonel John E. Endicott: *Our guest tonight, Dr. Hans Mark, has been intimately associated with the nuclear program of the United States Navy. For his Ph.D. thesis from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, he wrote about the neutron shield for the reactor of the* Nautilus. *He worked very closely with Admiral Rickover at that time and later in his career. And he was, in his own words, "midwife" to the F-16 during its development when he was at the Ames Center in California.*

Dr. Mark was Under Secretary of the Air Force and later Secretary of the Air Force. Since then as Deputy Director for NASA he has also been closely associated with our space projects.

Dr. Hans Mark: Thank you, John. I am, ladies and gentlemen, very pleased to be here tonight. I agreed to come here to talk about something that John and I have been doing for the last four years now. It all started on the trip to the Far East that every Service Secretary must make. The Air Staff suggested that I take John along to help me. We got to talking on the trip about the state of the world and developed a theory. The next day on a plane to the Philippines, John said, "You know, I think we ought to write up that speech."

What we were asking ourselves was the very fundamental question that all of us who are interested in national security have to ask; namely, what is the position and function of the United States in the world? What I'd like to do in the next half-hour or so is to sketch for you and perhaps test in discussion the paper which we did, in fact, write.

In thinking about the position of the United States in the world today we started out with history and we tried first to simplify our position, because we felt that any foreign policy should be stated in simple terms that people could understand. We tried to be simple but not simplistic and at the same time detailed enough so that there was some substance to it.

We have been in existence as a nation, now, for two centuries, and the major thrusts that have dominated the policies of this country are really only two, I think. One which took up perhaps the first century of our existence was the effort to establish a continental nation—a country that occupies the most important part of the North American continent. Our history from, say, 1780 to 1880 really was the pushing back of the frontier and the establishment of the United States on the continent of North America.

In the 1820s and the 1830s a phrase became popular that perhaps simplified that thrust: "manifest destiny." That meant it was the manifest destiny—the obvious destiny—of the United States to become the dominant nation on the continent. All the wars we fought during that period were more or less related to achieving that objective. The Mexican War, even the War of 1812 had some relation to it. And the Civil War, of course, was the centerpiece because the fundamental question there was whether there would be one which would be the principal political power on this new continent, or whether this power would have to be shared between two.

Another thing that John and I injected into that paper was a feeling that the interaction between what we call politics and foreign policy, and technology, is closer than we normally think. The framework within which politics is conducted is determined by various technological capabilities; that is, the ability to do things determines the range of choices that people have. And so it's important to understand not only the political objectives that you might want to achieve, but the technological means that you have to achieve them.

Establishing the United States as a continental power was closely related to a technology that was developing very rapidly in the 19th century, namely the technology of railroads. Without railroads there would be no continental United States. The railroad came into being in the early years of the 19th century as a tech-

nique. But as in so many cases in the development of new technologies, it took a war to make it really work. The Civil War was really the driving force of this new technology of railroads. It was during the Civil War that people learned how to lay track quickly and how to use railroads to achieve mass transportation—not only of a few people, but of massive amounts of people, equipment, and supplies, indeed, of whole armies.

In the campaigns of the Civil War, the basic strategy was to blockade the Confederacy on the East Coast and then to drive down the Mississippi and move east. But the rivers in this country, which were the main transportation routes in those days, tend to run north and south. The history of the Tennessee Campaign, for instance, is the problem Union armies had moving east through Tennessee because there weren't any rivers that flowed in that direction. And so they had to build railroads, and they did.

The Union Army developed the techniques to build railroads that enabled them to actually advance with the fighting fronts. And the group of Engineer generals who actually built the railroads turned these same talents after the war to the construction of the railroads that achieved the objective of making the United States a continental power.

Now, the railroads were subsidized by the government as national policy. What would today be called the "veterans' benefit measures" passed during the Civil War, such as the Homestead Act of 1862, were basically measures that gave land to people. And this land was way out somewhere in the West, about which nobody really knew except for very fragmentary information. And it was the construction of the railroads through those territories that allowed the government to live up to those promises. Homesteads were thus given to veterans and literally millions of people in a very short period occupied this more or less empty continent with the help of railroads developed during the Civil War.

It was the political objective of making the United States a continental nation along with the technology of railroads that did the job. There were, by the way, a few prophets who—even before the Civil War—saw the critical role railroads were soon to play. One of the most interesting characters was Thomas Hart Benton, a Senator from Missouri, who foresaw all of this in the 1840s and

1850s. He knew that the railroads would be the means for attaining the objective, but somehow could never get the political system organized to do it all. It took the war to create the pressures to make it happen.

Some time around the 1880s—a hundred years or so ago—there was a watershed in the history of our nation. The frontier was declared closed; that is, the objective of making the United States a continental power was achieved. And at that time people were already beginning to think about the next step: what would be the driving force for the second century of the existence of our nation? Personally I've always felt that the intellectual foundation of what we did for the second hundred years came from Alfred Thayer Mahan. In 1890 he wrote a classic milestone book, *The Influence of Sea Power on History*. The reason it was influential is that shortly after he wrote his book, a New York politician by the name of Theodore Roosevelt became Assistant Secretary of the Navy and picked up Mahan's ideas. And later when Roosevelt became President he implemented them.

The basic thrust of Mahan's thinking was that, having achieved the objective of becoming a continental nation, the United States now would become a world power, and that the instrument to achieve the objective would be technology related to seapower. And, of course, when he became President, Roosevelt made this idea a reality by creating the first genuinely blue-water navy of the United States.

It's abundantly clear that the objective we set for ourselves in the last years of the 19th century, achieving status as a world power, succeeded. In fact, I would say we succeeded in 1945 beyond the wildest dreams of the originators of the idea. We were not only a world power, we were *the* world power. And by and large, with apologies to the gentlemen from the other services who are here tonight, it chiefly was through seapower that we achieved that objective. In the Second World War nothing we achieved could have been done without the naval power that Mahan and Roosevelt fifty years earlier understood had to be created.

In 1945, then, we were faced with the question of "What do we do now?" And a number of people at the time thought through the problem of our position in the world as not "a" world power, but

"the" world power; and conceived again a very simple and very effective foreign policy for the United States.

Incidentally, the means for achieving the second objective of becoming a world power really had to do with the technology of the steamship. Again, interestingly enough, that technology was to a large extent born during our Civil War. The first engine-driven warships used in combat were developed during those years and the technology continued to grow from that period on.

We maintained what by and large became naval supremacy through the supremacy of our ability to create better warships, more warships, and new techniques—notably seapower's extension by the use of airpower at sea, which was crucial in the Second World War. And again, an integral part of the story is that when you decide to adopt a certain policy you'd better have the technical means to implement it. And that is one of the points I want to make; if we talk about developing a foreign policy for the coming years we'd better make sure we understand what technology this policy requires, and then also judge whether we indeed can master that technology.

In 1945 the United States as a world power formulated a simple foreign policy made up of just two major points. One was the Marshall Plan. It said that we would aid the recovery of anybody who wanted help—former enemies or former allies. The notion that this country was committed to help those people who had suffered in the Second World War was a central element of our foreign policy.

The other central element was called the policy of containment. It was clear that Soviet Russia was the major opposition that we would be facing in the world after World War II. President Truman, shortly after the war, announced that we would coexist with the Soviet Union, but we would not countenance the expansion of its influence.

I would assert that the foreign policy we adopted in 1945 was very successful indeed. In fact, the success of the foreign policy that we formulated 40 years ago to some extent causes the problems that we face today. It presents us with the new problem of where we go for the next hundred years. We are now entering our third century of existence as a nation and I believe the time has come to rethink

the reason for our existence in the broadest possible terms. We need a rationale for what it is that we do, and we must have the technical means to accomplish our objectives.

Why do I say our policy was successful? Well, certainly the Marshall Plan was successful beyond the wildest dreams of its originators. We created a world with economic prosperity in many countries at levels never before experienced in human history. And, we did it very consciously. In doing so, we also broke up and are still breaking up a structure of alliances that we created after the Second World War. Because by making people strong we also encourage them to become more independent. This is a natural consequence of the Marshall Plan—of the policy of aiding former friends and enemies alike.

The policy of containment was also, I think, more or less successful. After the war one of our great fears was that Western Europe, the centerpiece of postwar US foreign policy, would become Communist. But we have succeeded without any question in preventing that. If anything, it's more obvious now than ever that containment there has worked. Even in the rest of the world one can argue that what successes the Communists have had were achieved by mostly military force and not by the power of ideas. And the power of the political ideas which we propagate is the only final measure of success.

So both US postwar policies, the policy of containment and the policy of aiding recovery from World War II, have been successful. But that time has passed. The nations we aided have recovered so well that they are now our economic competitors. They are also chafing at the bit for political freedom of movement, if you will. With respect to containment, I would argue that while the Russians clearly still have enormous military and aggressive potential, they are also showing signs of a very serious weakness to some extent brought about by the containment policies that we have pursued.

This Soviet weakness is not in military hardware. I think their weakness is political. I think that possibly the political system in the Communist world is beginning to break down, and Poland is an obvious example. The Communist Party of Poland has collapsed, in my judgment, and that's why the military rule there.

And I think the Soviets themselves are headed in the same direction. I'll take an eight-to-five bet that the next President of the Soviet Union will be from the military. Such a turn of events would not be so bad, by the way; the ascendency of the military in Russia is going to be larger for a while than that of the Communist Party. And you can only deal with people who are in power if they feel—and if their people feel—that they have effective power. As you know, that happened in Poland with General Jaruzelski, and I'll bet that more than one Russian general is walking around thinking that he might become the Jaruzelski of Russia.

Consider Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Khrushchev clearly was a politician and he had a political constituency. He was a genuine political leader in the Western sense and he had power through consent—through the leadership of a well-defined constituency. Brezhnev was less so, having come up through the industrial establishment. Andropov I don't think has any constituency at all. But that's a little bit beside the point because I don't want to talk about their problems, I want to talk about ours.

What's next for us? We have achieved the status that President Theodore Roosevelt and others had in mind; we are a world power. In 1945 we were faced for the first time with the question of what to do with this world power that we have. And we formulated some answers. These policies have been by and large successful, but we are now faced again with the problem of what do we do next? What are the trends that will dominate the next two or three decades and how do we deal with them?

One trend I've already mentioned is that, having recovered from World War II, people all over the world have achieved a standard of life that in some ways rejects dependence on others. In Japan and in Europe there is much talk of anti-Americanism, and by those people who used to depend on us. But is it truly anti-Americanism? I think not. Perhaps what we are witnessing is a feeling that now, at least two generations since the war, these people are in control of their own destinies. Therefore, the alliance structure that was established after the Second World War is to some extent decaying; it's no longer as valid as it was in 1945. That's not to say the alliance is not *useful*—but it's no longer the same.

A second thing that's happened is technical. If seapower was

the key to establishing status as a world power in the first half of the century, then clearly, nuclear weaponry is the key today. In 1945 the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and, for may years thereafter, only two powers fielded nuclear weapons. But the truth is that nuclear technology is not very difficult to master. And something that will clearly be important in the next century is that nuclear weapons have proliferated; everybody can build them. I don't believe there's any secret to that. We try to maintain policies and treaties of nonproliferation, but many nations in the world today have built nuclear weapons and more could if they wanted to. Nuclear capability has proliferated; that is a technical fact.

A third trend—probably the most controversial, a very hazy thing right now—seems to me to be a fragmentation of humanity into a number of reasonably defined ethnic, religious, or geographic blocs or groups.

Perhaps the most startling bloc behavior was triggered in the Moslem world by the recognition that the Arab countries owned a virtual monopoly on oil for a while. In 1973 that realization produced the first so-called "oil crisis" and gave a tremendous shot in the arm to the people in the Moslem world. For the first time, they felt that they had a hold on the rest of the world. And even though technically, I think, we have overcome the problem and will continue to overcome it, the psychological impact in the Moslem world was greater than we tend to believe. And in spite of all their fighting with each other, the idea that they were able to become a force in the world somehow was new and important. I suspect that this experience will not be unique, but reflects a long-term trend in Africa, South America, and elsewhere in the world.

I would argue—admittedly based on much conjecture—that one can conceive of a future world—perhaps 20 years from now—divided not among 130-odd nations, but among 8 to 10 major blocs that all have some common features, with regional centers of power and decision.

An interesting example is what's going on in Lebanon. What's interesting is not the influence of the United States there (which I think is in the long term, minimal), but the influence of Saudi Arabia. A Saudi Cabinet Minister had a major part in trying to arrive at a settlement.

These, then, are trends, or at least hypotheses. One is toward a relative weakening of both the United States, and of the other side—the Russians—not because we are getting any weaker but because the rest of the world is getting stronger, weaned on our aid since the Marshall Plan. Trend two is a proliferation of nuclear weapons so that everybody can play that game—everybody will have them. And three is perhaps the coalescing of states and mini-states into a few blocs—North America, Western Europe of course, the Communist Bloc, Islam, Latin America, Africa. And although they will have internal disputes and problems, each may begin to formulate common bloc views and common policies with respect to how they deal with states outside these blocs.

In a world of that kind, what is the role of the United States and what technical means can we bring to bear to help us carry out the role that we may decide upon?

Let me talk about technology first and then try to translate that into politics.

One of the things John and I said in our seminal paper back in 1980 was that although nuclear weapons will proliferate, developing defenses against people who like to throw nuclear weapons at other people will not be difficult. We felt that the notion of building defensive systems was something that was coming within the realm of technical possibility. By the way, not all agreed with this notion; the Carter administration didn't: it was something they didn't want to believe. Up until March 1983 this administration didn't want to believe that either, but that's one of the controversial things we said.

In March of 1981 when I was out of political office I was a senior scientist at the Naval Research Lab. I wrote a version of this paper, dated May of 1981, which goes into the possibility of creating defenses against ballistic missiles. Three paragraphs mention "the availability of new sensitive detection devices coupled with compact and high-accuracy information processing that will, for example, make a nonnuclear antiballistic missile system possible now, whereas clearly it was not possible to do so ten years ago."

If you believe as I do that technology creates the boundary conditions in which you conduct politics, then the possibility of ABM

defense makes new political arrangements possible that were not possible before.

There has been an awful lot of confusion about the President's so-called "Star Wars" speech and what it meant. And let me be very, very clear about the point here. There are two separate questions in considering antiballistic missile defense, both of which are terribly important in order to extrapolate what I have just said. Let me distinguish between those two. One is this: What can we do about point defense? That is, what can we do about defending missile silos and things of that kind? The other is area defense of population centers and this is a much more difficult proposition.

The first, point defense, is technically feasible in the next decade whereas the other will take longer—perhaps twenty or thirty years. Now, what does all this have to do with Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD—which is a poor acronym for an important concept)? First, the point defense system preserves MAD because each side can still hold the other's populations hostage. The area defense would destroy the MAD concept but that is still in the future. What does MAD mean? What happens if MAD is dropped as a concept? Is MAD still technically feasible? What are the reasons why MAD may not continue? There are two; the other guy can kill you before you have a chance to shoot back. That is now technically possible. And with apologies to my naval friends here, it is true about submarines too; we can find them. And if we can't find them today it will be five to eight years, but we will find them. They're still roughly invulnerable but they'll have a hard time penetrating. So, in essence, the problem of maintaining stability under the old theory of what we've called "mutually assured destruction" is no longer true.

It is technically feasible today to put together a point defense system that is, shall we say, 50 percent effective; in other words, a point defense system that will protect half of your land-based missiles. That means that even if the other guy has missiles accurate enough you can shoot at least half of them down, which is enough to maintain the balance. That technology I believe is pretty much here today. We could field such a system in the next decade. With such a system one can maintain the balance that we've had in the past. Since an adequate fraction of your nuclear force would survive to retaliate, the other guy could not afford to attack. That's a standoff.

The other part of the defensive argument has to do not with point defense, but with the ability to build systems that are not 50 percent effective but, say, 99.9 percent effective. That proposition is more difficult; in fact, you might argue that it could *never* be done. Although one could never prove beyond a doubt that such highly effective systems are achievable, certain analogies are perhaps encouraging. Take the switching system of a telephone system; what are the chances of getting the number that you dial? Extremely high, obviously, but, not *100* percent. Similarly, you can't prevent *all* bombs from getting through, but you can prevent, in the end, *enough* from getting through, so that area defense in 20 or 25 years could also become a technical feasibility. After all, area defense is basically the same technology as point defense, only expanded to cover a wider area. Once you've achieved the one, the other will in one way or another eventually follow. But this remains a highly debatable issue and so, for the time being, I am personally willing to argue only for point defense because it's so highly feasible. I'm willing to put area defense systems into the future bin, and bet that the naysayers will be wrong as they always have been. And I think it's important for the people who worry about political balances to begin to think in terms of what happens when area ABM defense becomes possible. It may be ten years from now; it may be fifteen; it may be fifty; but it will happen. And therefore, somebody should start thinking about it now.

What this boils down to is that the importance of nuclear weapons is diminished. Suppose it becomes possible to build a good area defense system 15 or 20 years from now. People who have no nuclear bombs but who are good at technology could build such a system—the Japanese, for instance. Suppose the Japanese had a good area defense system against nuclear weapons; what does that mean with respect to our relations with them? When they no longer depend on us for protection, they might say, "We'll do it ourselves. Furthermore, we'll do it in a passive way; we're not going to hurt anybody else. But nevertheless we will protect ourselves." That changes the nature of the game; it changes the nature of the alliances.

The technology that will govern the framework of politics for the next 50 years is the technology that I've just talked about, the technology that will make the systems I have talked about possible. The rapid handling of information is really what ABM systems are

based on. This in turn is based on microelectronics and the things that go with it, such as accurate sensing and the ability to deploy complex systems in space. And none of these things is possible without a very sophisticated space-based system to detect the other guy's missiles.

These are all technologies at which the United States today is in the lead. We have the opportunity to guide the next development in world politics through our dominant lead in these technologies, in a world that has a small number of independent power blocs—not two the way it has been for the last 40 years, but more. Each of them will have their nuclear weapons; each of them will have some kind of defensive systems so that there will be a rough parity.

What's our role in that world? Geography promises we will have an easier time living in that kind of a world than most other nations because we are still an island unto ourselves; we don't have common boundaries with neighbors with whom we have old, historical conflicts or problems.

I think it's not too much of an extrapolation to say that we could act as a referee or as a balancer of such a system, because we are less burdened with boundary problems and because, if we do things right, we can continue to maintain the lead in the important technologies to achieve that objective.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Question: Based on your analogy of the railroads during America's first century versus the steamships—the warships—in the second century, is it correct to say that you are implying the third century is one that is going to be the mastery of space, i.e., that the nation able to function effectively to dominate events in space is going to be the one that will be able to dominate the political agenda?

Answer: Certainly, if you want to deal with the problem of ballistic missile defense you're going to have to do space operations, yes. But it's not only that; it's also computers; it is also sensors. And that depends on technologies that will be developed for reasons that have nothing to do with space, that have to do with building

wristwatches, radios, and things of that kind. Right now the commercial profit motive actually drives that technology more than national defense.

Question: Will it be possible to function effectively in the next century without the ability to dominate space?

Answer: I don't think so. After 1945 the situation slowly shifted to one where the dominant technology in which we conduct politics was determined by the nuclear strategic balance. The balance of terror between the Russians and ourselves limited military actions that each side was willing to risk. That technology is based on aerospace technology—the rockets, the airplanes, the nuclear weapons; what John Von Neumann called "intercontinental artillery." And I'm extrapolating from that into an era where that artillery will be, to some extent, compromised by the ability to reduce its effectiveness. That's why I think the two-power balance we've had will change, because other people learn how to neutralize that artillery too.

I can imagine a bloc of countries existing with a defensive system alone, without offensive weapons. And then they can say, "Let's see you do something to us."

Question: What do you see as the future of NATO, and if NATO is not going to continue will Western Europe form one of your power blocs? And if so, who will provide the nuclear weapons?

Answer: I think Western Europe is already one of the power blocs. As you know, there are certain broad issues of substantial disagreement between what this country wants and what goes on in Europe.

Let me put a proposition to you. We're about to deploy the Pershings and the cruise missiles in Europe at some political risk. Political problems will be created for our allies by that deployment. Suppose that the Europeans themselves had built the Pershings and those cruise missiles, and deployed them in answer to the Russian SS-20s without the United States being involved at all. Would there be similar political problems? Do you think there would?

Question: I don't think the problem would be as severe, but wouldn't there still be elements in Europe that would protest?

Answer: Yes, I agree with that. But would they be as strong as they are when we're doing the deployment? Therefore, I would argue it would be to our advantage—to the advantage of the United States—if the Europeans somehow could be induced independently to create and then deploy weapons of that kind. But we're not there yet. There's great resistance among their governments to that. But I think we'd be better off if they could eventually do that.

I'd like to see a strong European alliance. I would like to see it more independent of the United States because I think that's the direction in which the ultimate stability of the world will go. And I have argued, more or less strongly depending on the fluctuations of European politics, that the whole thing depends on a strong French-German connection.

Curiously, Germany is the key to this whole thing, and the Germans are on the horns of a dilemma. I have talked to my German friends ad infinitum about this. Some of them say, yes, that's the future, Western Germany and France. The other group says, oh no, we've got to reunify. And there are ethnic, and religious, and all kinds of complicated historical problems that go with that. The reunification proponent tends to be Protestant—the North Germans—by total accident Socialist; by accident, not by design. And the pro-French tend to be Catholic Rhinelanders. And I don't know which way it's going to go.

It would be easiest for us if it went Western Germany and France. But I've also felt that the situation in Poland is something that may eventually force the reunification of Germany. You know, if Poland can actually create a quasi-independence from Russia—and I think they've got a better than even chance of doing that—next the East Germans are going to say, "Hey, it's our turn." And you know as well as I that there are people in West Germany who are going to East Germany now and planning for that.

So, it may be that what we're talking about is a Western Europe that has a boundary 250 miles farther east than it is today. But fundamentally we're still talking about a bloc of nations that call

themselves "Western Europe" and all we're arguing about is where the boundary will be.

Question: With all the talk concerning either the reunification of East and West Germany and all that it would imply, or a union of West Germany with France, would you say the thinking is evenly divided between the two, or are fewer people now interested in reunification?

Answer: Oh more, more people. I'd say more than three out of every five are for reunification.

Question: You sound rather ethnocentric when discussing our foreign policy, but isn't it a question of whether our foreign policy will be compatible with that of other countries? Won't that have a direct bearing on the use of nuclear weapons as to if—and when—they will actually be employed? I don't see the relationship between our politics and the state of our technology.

Answer: First of all, I plead guilty; you bet I'm ethnocentric; I'd better be. You know, if we're talking about formulating American foreign policy I don't know what else I want to be. I want to start with us. I want to start with our strengths and I want to start with objectives that we can formulate that will hopefully be good for this country. So, as I say, to that I plead guilty. I don't presume to stand here and formulate French, or Russian, or Angolan foreign policy.

With respect to the question of the use of nuclear weapons, I think you're quite right. We are going to see nuclear weapons used in anger some time. People ask me, "When do you think that will happen?" And, of course, I don't know. I can give you likelihoods: three nations in the world today that have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons and may already have them also have their backs to the wall in a certain sense. They are Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan. I think that nuclear weapons will be used by one or another of those some time before the end of the century. I've asked myself what the effect of the use of that kind of a nuclear weapon might be, and let me, if I may, try to develop in some detail what I think would happen.

What these three powers have in common is that they are relatively high-technology countries located in areas where their enemies are what you might call low-technology.

We are living in an era where our perceptions of nuclear weapons are governed by the first use, namely the use we put them to in 1945 to end the Second World War. The perception is that the nuclear weapon is always decisive militarily because we believed—wrongly, I think—that the use of nuclear weapons ended the war against Japan. Now, the fact of the matter is, I believe, that Japan was already defeated when nuclear weapons were used; all the nuclear weapons did was to save some lives that would have been used up had we had to go through the rest of the war conventionally.

Now, what will happen the next time they're used? Well, take South Africa; a problem is building there that you're all familiar with. I can imagine a situation where South Africa with its back against the wall uses nuclear weapons against an insurgent group. It is very unlikely, in my view, that they will be a good target. It is very unlikely, furthermore, in my view, that the use of the nuclear weapons will be successful; that is, the users will not achieve their political objectives, which are to stop the opposition from taking over.

Now, suppose something like that happens. Suppose that the South Africans use some bombs against their enemies and fail to achieve the objectives; what will that mean? It will mean that the perception of nuclear weapons in the world will change; it will mean that people will say, "Is that all?" I'm not now talking about the explosion of thousands of bombs; you know, that's a different kind of cataclysm which I don't think will happen. I'm talking about a more likely use in a foreseeable time frame. I think it will contribute to what I've been saying, namely that people come to believe that nuclear weapons are less important, perhaps, than we believe they are. And so, I think the likely use of nuclear weapons would reinforce what I have said, not go against it.

Of course, this is all speculation and you can argue with it, but I think that's what's most likely to happen.

Question: Doesn't our superiority in technology pretty much

determine the direction and assure success of our political decisions in foreign affairs?

Answer: Technology is never an end in itself and it never has much to do with politics. It's a means to an end in that at best it provides a framework in which you conduct politics; it does not give you any guidance as to what choice you may make within that framework. It tells you what you can't do but it still leaves open a wide choice of things within which you can operate. The nuclear balance is a boundary condition. Now, you can fight wars within that up to a limit when you believe things will go nuclear and you don't want that to happen. And you can do other things within that balance.

So, I think these very broad technologies I'm talking about do nothing but determine boundary conditions; they do not give you any real guidance as to what you can do within those boundary conditions. And the technologies I've talked about are those that tend to determine the boundary conditions, not to make the choices as to whether or not you will do something in Central America, or what you're going to do in Chile, or what you're going to do in Lebanon.

So, you're right; I'm talking about something that will perhaps limit only the intensity of how you apply force or decisions of that kind, but not necessarily the choices of where you do what you do.

Question: Dr. Mark, would you say something about how the current US public is coping with the fact that we are no longer the world power but simply one of a group of world powers in series of blocs; how that change of mindset—from being an ascendant world power to being just a world power—will affect the American public?

Answer: Well, I honestly don't think that's much of a problem. I think the American people, by and large, are way ahead of the leadership on that point. I've talked to many, many groups about what I've just said and I have been attacked for perhaps seeing catastrophes that people don't like to talk about, or for talking about things that people don't like to think about—such as offensive weapons; that's been very unfashionable. But I've never been told that I am projecting a future of which this country isn't worthy, which is really what that would be saying. Because I can always answer by saying, "Look, we are a small fraction of the

world's population and we have some very real strengths. We have enormous strength in agriculture—which is basic, by the way. We are one of the few nations in the world that has no problem feeding itself—and we feed half of the rest of the world, by the way, which is saying something.

We are, roughly, independent of the rest of the world on energy. By and large we're independent in raw materials if we're willing to do some substitution when push comes to shove. So we have enormous strengths to bring to bear on this. But I've never heard anybody say, "Well, we've got to be the leading power like we were in 1945." I think what people want is the ability to retain our freedoms and the ability to play, by and large, a more or less benign role in the world; to keep the peace and allow other people to develop the way they want to develop. I really think that's kind of fundamental in what I've heard in going around and talking about this.

Question: I have no problems with the ethnocentricity question, but inasmuch as the Russians have made such enormous progress over the past number of years in weaponry, and we hear more and more about their Soviet commercial advances based upon their almost unlimited natural resources, doesn't it seem logical that they will soon overtake us commercially just as they have militarily?

Answer: Well, maybe; I don't know. I'm not sure which is really more important elsewhere in the world than in Poland and Russia, where we have relatively little influence and it doesn't matter too much. I'm speculating that Russia's internal problems are deeper than is realized generally. And I base that mostly on fragmentary conversations with people who have dealt with the Russians not diplomatically but commercially—that is, people who have traded with them, people who have done business with them and have seen the economic part of their system work. That may be optimistic, but I don't think it very much matters. I'm very, very optimistic about the future of our own country because I think we are in fact very strong and I think we more or less have our act together.

Whether I'm being optimistic now that the Russians are really as weak as I think they are, I don't know. It's less important.

Question: It has been suggested that the era of mutually assured destruction wasn't as bad as it at first appeared to be; in fact,

it now seems preferable to the situation which we experience today. However, conditions have changed and it is now considered less feasible than previously. In consequence, the argument has been offered that in parallel with the advanced development of various weapons systems on the part of both the East and West there should be a simultaneous effort toward agreement on the conduct of a satisfactory arms control process. It nevertheless occurs to me that with such an arrangement the East and West would tend to cancel each other out. Therefore it might assure us more safety to rely upon the logic of a satisfactory arms control process than on continued development of future weapons systems.

Answer: I agree with some of the things you've said and I don't agree with others. I think, when you say that the era of mutually assured destruction was a good one, yes, that was an important step and an important theory. What I am asserting is that it is no longer technically possible to do that, or it won't be technically possible in a few years. I'll argue with ASW—and I am privy to some things and not to others—I'll argue on the time scale. But I know it can be fixed at some point or other. We'll get to the point where you can get the other guy's submarines. And so, you're in the soup.

All right. Now, I think that the conduct of an arms control process in parallel with the development of the means to defend yourself is the right approach; I agree with you there. I think the debate we might have is on the relative expectations that we have of each of these processes. Okay; I want to see them both carried out. I suspect I have more faith that the technical process will succeed, and I suspect you have more faith that the other one will succeed. I want to do both. And I might remind you that's exactly what the President is doing. You know, he *is* doing them both.

Maybe arms control will come to something. In other words, I am not willing to write off either process, and I disagree with those people who say that the creation of defensive systems is dangerous, because I think that's necessary. I disagree equally with those people who say pursuing arms control is dangerous because I think that's necessary too. I don't know what will win. I know one thing—and this is now important—that the defensive system is something we can do alone without anybody's agreement, whereas the arms control process is one where it takes two to tango; that

much I know. And since I don't know what the other guy will do I want to make sure we develop our defensive systems as well.

I recognize the danger in that but this is unfortunately a dangerous world.

Chapter 2

Vietnam and US Policy in Southeast Asia: What Steps Toward Normalization?

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"One of the fundamental international relationships that has resisted attempts at rationalization has been that of the United States toward Vietnam. This panel will address the key issues that thwart US-Vietnam normalization and overall stability in Indochina and Southeast Asia. It will assess the benefits and liabilities of some form of normalization in terms of impact on other regional relationships as well as in terms of our own domestic restraints. Is there a path that can be pursued? Is it in our national interests to attempt it at this time?"

Panel Summary

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman
Washington, DC

Lieutenant Colonel Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., USA, Rapporteur
National Defense University

In international relations, the act of granting diplomatic recognition to a government does not automatically convey approval of that government. Recognition is a technical act that facilitates communications. However, as the panel noted, since World War II the United States has tended to withhold recognition from governments of which it disapproves. Because of this tendency, many Americans associate the prospect of recognition of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) by the United States with approval of that government, an endorsement to which they are opposed. Yet many also recognize the importance of the eventual normalization of relations with the SRV if issues involving Southeast Asia are to be effectively addressed. To inform discussion of this dilemma, the panel listened to three well-expressed opinions of the prospects for normalizing of US-Vietnamese relations.

Douglas Pike defined the term normalization, described the positions of the United States, the SRV, and other countries affected by US-SRV relations, and outlined the four major issues that stand between the US and Vietnam: regional unity, Kampuchea, Soviet presence and Vietnam's threat potential, and the accounting for casualties and other humanitarian and economic issues. Pike concluded that Washington and Hanoi have minimal interest in each other, that the danger of recognition is that Hanoi might misread it as confirmation of its hard-line policies, and that recognition must be followed by the exchanges of a series of mutual confidence-building measures. Although the "establishment of US-SRV relations in the final analysis is not a question of whether but when," clearly, "recognition is no panacea for the problems between the two countries."

Allan Goodman presented the case for establishing relations with the SRV, but cautiously. He argued that establishing relations could facilitate accounting for casualties and resolving other humanitarian issues, enhance regional stability, and support the interests of our ASEAN allies. United States-Vietnam relations would enable Hanoi to lessen its dependence on Moscow, aggravate US-PRC relations to the SRV's advantage, and enhance the SRV's image in the nonaligned Third World. Since the establishing of relations is probably more important to Hanoi, Washington should indicate its willingness to explore relations with the SRV as a function of progress on humanitarian issues. This approach should be made through our ASEAN allies. Once the US receives proper SRV assurances, "liaison offices," not "interest sections," should be opened in Hanoi and Washington.

Frederick Kiley assumed that diplomatic recognition is inevitable because of pressures from Americans, who, encouraged by implied SRV promises, see recognition as the means to resolve humanitarian issues, to stop the SRV's belligerent acts in Indochina, and to nurture stability in Southeast Asia. However, he argues, unless the US has an effective step-by-step plan for moving from recognition to normal relations (including economic assistance), recognition will benefit only the SRV. To ensure that bilateral negotiations are mutually beneficial, he proposes a number of measures tied to specific SRV actions.

BILATERAL INTERESTS

The panel session began with brief presentations of the three papers. A vigorous discussion followed, reflecting the intense emotion and divisiveness that the authors warned would arise in the United States should an administration seek to normalize relations with Vietnam. Similarly, the relative lack of interest in this subject during the conference multipanel wrap-up session illustrates the plausibility of the observation that Washington and Hanoi have minimal interest in each other.

The panel debated, at great length, the missing-in-action (MIA) issue. A consensus quickly emerged that the SRV probably has 300–400 sets of remains in Hanoi warehouses as reported by the DIA, but disagreed as to how the US should convince Hanoi to

release them. A few felt that Hanoi would return all these remains to the US following recognition. Most panelists felt, however, that, irrespective of recognition, Hanoi would seek to use this and other humanitarian issues to pry further concessions from the US, just as the North Koreans did after the Korean War and the PRC did with the civilian prisoner issue at Geneva. One panelist reported learning during a recent visit to Hanoi that the French acknowledge even now, several decades after their war in Indochina, they are paying $50,000 per set of remains returned. Several panelists noted cultural differences in US-Vietnamese perceptions of war casualties, in part evidenced by the SRV's very limited system for accounting for its casualties.

There also was disagreement on whether or not recognition of the SRV should be tied to the return of the remains. A majority tended to agree with the present United States government policy of separating the two issues because Hanoi is beginning to understand the need to move ahead on resolving the MIA issue. This understanding is evidenced by the SRV's September 1982 agreement to quarterly technical discussions with the US concerning missing persons and the June 1983 return from Vietnam of the remains of nine individuals. Hanoi may see the continued—though gradual—return of remains as a way to improve relations with the US by degrees, while ensuring the continued interest of the US in the process. However, the panel clearly indicated that tolerance of this approach is a function of progress.

There was greater ambiguity on the issue of prisoners of war (POW). No one asserted that there are surviving POWs still in Indochina, but few are willing to rule out the possibility, particularly in Laos. Several had heard of Americans living by choice in Vietnam as Communist workers and felt there may be a few deserters, possibly the source of some of the refugee reports. Of the 500 sightings of American captives reported by refugees, 180 reports remain unsubstantiated. The panel agreed with US government policy that these reports should continue to be investigated on the assumption that some Americans may still be held captive in Indochina. However, it was noted that if the SRV were to release any POWs in the future, the result would be devastating for US-SRV relations, as the Americans would then assume that other MIAs were also alive and held captive.

While discussing the humanitarian issue of obtaining permission for Amerasian children to leave Vietnam for the US, the panel noted that, when approached through the UN, the Vietnamese blamed US laws for the problem. After the law was changed, 52 children left Vietnam for the United States.

Most panelists agreed, therefore, that the mechanisms are in place for dealing with the humanitarian issues of MIAs, POWs, Amerasian children, and divided families and that for the time being these issues should be kept separate from the normalization process. These mechanisms would not be enhanced by a diplomatic presence in Hanoi, such as an interest section or a liaison office.

The case was made that prior to proceeding toward recognition, the United States and the SRV should first "test the waters" by establishing liaison offices (not interest sections) in each other's capital. The panel concluded that the idea had merit because such a liaison office would not be limited by the policies and good will of a third nation as would a typical diplomatic interest section. The actual term "liaison office" would be inappropriate for a US office in the SRV because it has been used and become identified with US-PRC normalization—however, it was felt that the *concept* of a liaison office had merit.

The panel discussed the economic interests of the US and the experience of other nations in the SRV, concluding that the US has very little near-term economic interest in Vietnam. One panelist noted that there are many Japanese investments in the SRV, but very little profit, although Japan is developing experience of possible value in the future. A Citibank conference in 1977, it was noted, concluded that there is a big market potential, if the US would lend the money. Philippine offshore and Russian onshore oil drilling experiences coupled with the experiences of a Canadian-European oil consortium in dealing with the SRV bureaucracy have not encouraged foreign energy investors. The Swedes and Russians are also reportedly frustrated with the SRV's extremely weak infrastructure.

In terms of bilateral interests the majority of the panel concluded that:

- Humanitarian issues should be kept separate from the normalization process

- Normalization is not a panacea for our bilateral problems
- For the forseeable future, there is no pressing national interest that is best served by the normalization of US-SRV relations or by the avoidance of normalization.

MULTILATERAL INTERESTS

Despite domestic resistance to recognition, most panelists felt that domestic interest in normalization primarily for foreign-policy considerations would lead the US to normalization, possibly within the decade.

The panel noted a tendency in Southeast Asia toward subregionalism, specifically toward an Indochina federation. Some indications discussed are the tacit acceptance of the Laos government by the PRC and Thailand, and the immigration of Vietnamese into areas of Kampuchea. There was limited agreement as to how much of this trend was by design, but it was clear to all that the ASEAN nations are not thinking seriously enough about the future of Indochina. Most felt that the limited staff resources committed by the foreign ministry of each of the ASEAN states to the problems of the region indicated this lack of attention.

US support for the three-party coalition in Kampuchea was felt to be a major problem for the United States and the UN, because of the implied approval by the United States of a Pol Pot regime, anathema to basic principles to which the United States is pledged. PRC support for Pol Pot was also felt to be a problem, as would be efforts at bilateral negotiations with the PRC concerning its support for Pol Pot. Such negotiations would have to be requested by ASEAN.

Several panelists challenged the present US government policy of punishing the SRV through the use of such sanctions as the trade embargo and restrictions on visas, including those for the press. Others suggested that these sanctions could be removed for something of less value than the SRV's withdrawal from Kampuchea, as currently demanded by the US government. Still others opposed these recommendations as bilateral actions not supportive of ASEAN. These sanctions, carried out in support of ASEAN, can be

modified or removed if ASEAN wants the change in support of its policy.

In terms of multilateral interests the panel found general agreement in the recommendations that the ASEAN nations be encouraged to assume a greater responsibility for finding solutions to the problem of Indochina and that the US exercise its leadership by encouraging and supporting ASEAN in this effort.

American-Vietnamese Relations

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This paper examines the factors involved in relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), and the policy issues raised by the proposal that normal relations be established. It is divided into three parts, following an introduction. First there is a brief run-down of the positions of the various countries concerned: those of the United States and SRV of course, but also the views of others in the region whose interests would be affected by the establishment of relations. This is followed by a consideration of four major issues of primary importance: regional unity, Kampuchea, Soviet presence, and Vietnam threat potential; and of the singular issue of the resolution of US casualties in Southeast Asia. The final section discusses the policy implications for the United States.[1]

I. What "Normalizing" Would and Would Not Mean

The term *normalization* is a slippery one when used in international relations and is best avoided. The United States has "normal" relations with the USSR, Israel, Canada, South Africa, and Japan—but consider the enormous variety within each of these sets of associations. In truth there is no such thing as a "normal" relationship in world affairs today.

What is meant by the term properly used, is establishment of an official government-to-government connection at some specified level, which can range from the lowly interest section to the fully staffed embassy. As used here, establishment of normal relations means the United States and SRV exchange embassies and engage in at least a minimum level of diplomatic intercourse of the kind common among nations throughout the world.

"Normalizing" relations would not mean a new ambiance between us, or that either has changed its opinion of the other. It does not *necessarily* mean US economic assistance would be provided Vietnam or that Hanoi would open its POW files to us.

A word here in defense of diplomatic relations in general. As a working principle it is, I believe, better for a country to have a formal relationship with another than not (even with an enemy), just as it is more valuable to talk and listen (again even with one's enemy or potential enemy) than not to do so. The problem, in those cases in which there is no recognition, always is the initial act of establishment, the getting from here to there. Once this is accomplished, most would agree that national interest is being better served.

However, diplomatic recognition is almost always regarded as a political statement. It can be argued logically that diplomatic relations are merely facilitative—that recognition is neither a gesture of approval nor an endorsement of past behavior. Despite this flawless logic, the fact remains that diplomatic recognition is almost universally seen as conferring legitimacy, if not honor. In the case of Vietnam, probably few Americans would argue we should never under any circumstances have diplomatic relations with the present Hanoi government. Such a position in fact is irrational, since it reflexively precludes serving American national interest in the emergence of circumstances in which it would be in our interest to have an embassy in Hanoi. Many Americans, possibly even the majority, are opposed to formal relations (based on public-opinion polls of the late 1970s), but probably most of these would not object if relations were already in place.

Parenthetically, I would at the outset dismiss out of hand various moral, ethical, and philosophic arguments for diplomatic recognition of Vietnam, first, because diplomatic intercourse follows only from perceived national interest (on both sides) and not on abstraction or sentiment; and second, because the United States *owes* Vietnam nothing, has no sins to atone for, nor has it incurred any debt or obligation either as a result of its earlier presence in Vietnam or its conduct during the Vietnam War.[2]

A cautionary note should be sounded early in this paper concerning the anticipated benefits that would accrue from establishing a formal relationship with Hanoi. There has been for several

years a tendency among advocates to surround the act with unwarranted assumptions. In discussing normalization they list hoped-for developments—diminution of Soviet influence in Indochina, more benign behavior by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), economic investment opportunities for American business—and imply these will come about more or less automatically once an American ambassador arrives in Hanoi. Those who hold this idea should be disabused of it as strongly as possible. Diplomatic recognition is no panacea for the problems between the two countries. This is not necessarily an argument against recognition, only counsel that representation is one thing and problem-solving another.

The experiences of various noncommunist countries dealing diplomatically with Vietnam in the postwar years validates this assertion. These also suggest some of the limits the United States might expect if it were to establish relations. About 85 countries now have formal relations with Hanoi. Much of this diplomatic association is nominal. In many instances the ambassador accredited to a nearby country—Thailand or China—is also accredited to Vietnam, an extra duty requiring the envoy to make periodic trips to Hanoi and tending to hold intercourse to a minimum.[3]

The cut-off of foreign aid by most noncommunist countries after Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea of course chilled Hanoi's relations with these countries. Six European countries are now providing aid and seem to have fairly good working relations, particularly Sweden and France.[4] The Japanese and Indian missions are active but the associations do not appear to be particularly deep. For most nations Hanoi is considered primarily as a listening post. Diplomats posted in Hanoi find their surroundings extremely trying and often regard their assignment as an exile.[5] Those who have worked in Hanoi counsel every arrival to do two things. First, to guard against high expectations; second, to remember that they are dealing not with people but with a system. This can be difficult, for appearances can deceive. Surrounded by generally helpful individuals, it is easy to believe that to succeed one need only get to the right people. But in this sense there are no "right people"; there is only the system. To enter Vietnam some commercial visitors must fill out 14 separate application forms and supply 16 photographs for nine different SRV governmental agencies. It is the system which determines whether anything will come of an association. The system throws up the barricades and provides the inertia, victimizing Viet-

namese and foreigner alike. It is the system that in the end doles out success or failure, resolves problems or makes them worse. This is not to say that the system cannot be dealt with, but it does mean that the chance for progress is diminished and comes only at glacial speed.

Finally, by way of scene-setting, it is well to recount a bit of history. Vietnam had the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with the United States shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, but threw the chance away in a gesture that in retrospect was pure leadership blunder. This missed opportunity is worth examining briefly for the insight it offers on possible future relations.

The Carter administration, soon after taking office, dispatched the Woodcock Mission (named after its chairman, Leonard Woodcock) to Hanoi to explore official thinking there. Hanoi leaders took a hard-line approach—they spoke of American economic obligations, mentioned the figure $3.25 billion,[6] even made use of the term "war reparation" in the Hanoi press. The Americans explained the US foreign aid process, how it required congressional authorization and involved domestic politics that are part of the democratic process. They suggested that embassies be exchanged first, and that then the newly arrived Vietnamese ambassador in Washington begin soliciting economic assistance by making representations at the Department of State and lobbying on Capitol Hill, since that is the way it is done. The Hanoi Politburo, however, stood by its "precondition"—aid before recognition. The Americans demurred and the mission ended inconclusively. There the matter stood for the next year or so, marked by occasional UN-level meetings and talks at the deputy-assistant level in Paris.[7]

But this was a dynamic period. During the year 1977-78 Vietnam relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) deteriorated, finally to the point where Hanoi officials were sufficiently fearful of the rising China threat to drop the precondition on establishing relations with the United States. Also during this period, however, US-PRC relations were solidifying—it was the time of the "opening to China" and the Carter administration increasingly became convinced that the matter was coming down to a choice between Vietnam and China—for the United States no hard choice to make.[8] The United States took no action on the new signals and overtures out of Hanoi. Then, at Christmas-time 1978, the Viet-

namese invaded Kampuchea, killing entirely the idea of establishing relations.[9] That is where the matter stands today. The point to note here is that Vietnam at the end of the year 1978 was denied what almost certainly it could have had at the beginning—and would have had, but for the poor judgment of its Politburo leadership.

II. POSITIONS OF THE NATIONS CONCERNED

To provide a framework for examining this question of US-Vietnamese relations, it is necessary to set forth the positions of the various actors in the drama—principally, of course, the United States and Vietnam, but secondarily others in the region and around the world with a vested interest in any change in the US-Vietnamese relationship.

Vietnam

The Vietnamese position on relations with the United States is not entirely clear at the moment, despite what many outsiders tend to believe. Some observers assert that Hanoi is nearly desperate for recognition, but that contention does not hold up under scrutiny.

The most reliable analytical approach here is to try to look at the idea in Politburo terms. The two general national-interest goals which the leaders obviously seek to serve are national security and economic development. These have been badly pursued in recent years by the leadership, but still represent basic priorities. The Politburo will evaluate the prospect of normal relations with the United States in these terms, asking: will relations enhance our security (or at least not decrease it), and will relations contribute to the nation-building task?

The Vietnamese answer to this question at the moment appears to be in the affirmative, but without enthusiasm. Vietnamese leaders from time to time say publicly they want establishment of diplomatic relations, and of course, when asked point-blank by visiting journalists, are obliged to sound forthcoming. Hanoi media treatment of the subject is infrequent and then usually diffident or so densely ideological as to forestall sure conclusions. Were these editorials and theoretical articles pointedly negative, we could infer

something from them, but being what might be called morally affirmative, they tell us very little.

From an analysis of Vietnam's national-interest needs—security and nation-building—one can reasonably assume that the Politburo is of the opinion that, all other things being equal, relations with the United States would serve these two interests, if only modestly. On that basis we can conclude that a firm proposal from Washington (through strictly government-to-government channels, of course) that embassies be exchanged would be accepted by Hanoi.

We cannot, however, be entirely sure that the decision would be based on national-interest considerations. As with other governments, domestic influences are at work in Vietnam. The political system operating at the Politburo level in Hanoi, as in the Sinic political system from which it is derived, is rooted in factionalism. The decisionmaking process within this system is characterized by—some would say cursed by—factional infighting: what the Vietnamese call *bung-di*, or *faction-bashing*. In the struggle for power among factions of the ruling group, the most common weapons are doctrinal arguments and policy issues. Thus a Politburo debate on whether or not to recognize the United States would in part be a factional struggle, carried on without reference to the merits of the issue. One faction might oppose it simply because another faction favored it. That being the case, no outsider (nor even most Vietnamese insiders) could ever be sure of the outcome of a policy proposal.

Other internal Vietnamese factors also would be at work in such a decision, the key ones being the Party's determination to maintain ideological purity, the various ongoing programs aimed at solving Vietnam's many economic problems, and internal security threats or the counter-revolution. Part of Hanoi's evaluation would be whether US presence would affect these factors. Probably the leadership would conclude that the arrival of the American ambassador and his staff would: (a) slightly compromise the Party's ideological purity; (b) carry at least some promise of contributing to the improvement of the Vietnamese economy; and (c) have negligible meaning in terms of internal security.

United States

The Reagan administration's enunciated position as of this writing is that the question of diplomatic relations with Vietnam is simply being held in abeyance and that this is a pragmatic position, not one born of dogma or punitiveness. Establishing diplomatic relations is treated chiefly as a matter of timing, of when the correct conditions might obtain. One of the correct conditions, perhaps the only one, is withdrawal of People's Army of Vietnam troops from Kampuchea. The implication is that if this does not happen, there will be no change in present US policy. (See discussion of Kampuchea below.) Actually this is not so much a policy as a holding operation—or one might say a nonpolicy. In the longer run the US choice will come down to three policy options: roll-back of communism, presumably by funding and backing the resistance in Vietnam; determined containment of Vietnamese influence, what might be called the China recommendation; or minimal "normal" relations. The present holding operation, however, has not yet run its course and could last another few years.

Within the US Government there is a somewhat broader spread of policy opinion than the official Reagan administration position. The hardest line taken appears to be in the State Department, principally because recognition is seen as damaging US relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) capitals, and with the PRC; and the softest on Capitol Hill, where a few Senators and Representatives forthrightly advocate US recognition. The issue within the congressional scene is complicated by cross-purpose interests involving the resolution of Vietnam War casualties. The Pentagon, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, seems to fall between State and the Hill. The rationale employed by those favoring recognition within the Pentagon is that it would offer opportunities to offset to some extent Soviet presence in Indochina. However, as far as can be determined, these differing opinions do not approach anything like an internal policy split.

On the broader American scene—with respect to public opinion throughout the United States—the range of outlooks is similar to that in the Government. There is spirited difference of opinion with no real fire in it. A few years ago, passions ran higher, but these seem now to have cooled. Then there was more organized political pressure within the American system—pressure both pro and con—

to act on the idea of diplomatic relations with Vietnam. To some extent this division was along traditional liberal-conservative lines, although there were numerous crossovers—conservatives who wanted recognition as a means of inducing Hanoi to account for American MIAs of the Vietnam War, and liberals who opposed it because they wanted to punish Hanoi for its postwar aggression. For a period in the late 1970s, elements of the business community, spearheaded by the US Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong, pressed for US recognition of Hanoi. However, that pressure group dried up with the breach of relations between Hanoi and China when most of these businessmen, who were in the export-import business, were told by Beijing to choose, and sensibly most of them chose China. Antiwar activists, once monolithically dedicated to embracing Hanoi, split down the middle after the war, over the human-rights issue in Vietnam (re-education camps, new economic zones), and over causes of the holocaust that developed in Kampuchea. In the past year or so we have seen the rise of a new pressure group in the United States, the emigre Vietnamese. These number about 600,000 and while most of them remain apolitical, they are becoming increasingly organized; and most of their organizations are opposed to US recognition.

In sum, American public opinion remains divided with only a minority favoring US relations with Vietnam, the remainder being indifferent or opposed. Without the saliency of view that would seem to dictate policy in Washington, a decision to recognize Hanoi probably would draw no particularly strong or sustained reaction from the country.

Other Nations

A consideration for the United States, and presumably also for Vietnam, in contemplating diplomatic recognition is the impact it would have (or not have) on respective allies and adversaries.

China's position, it is generally assumed in the US, is to stand against US recognition, even though China itself has an embassy in Hanoi. As far as can be determined, the United States has never formally put the matter to Beijing on the grounds that Beijing would reply it was none of China's business. Those familiar with Chinese attitudes say this is in fact the standard reply received in

Beijing, although they put it down to evasiveness more than indifference and believe China hopes the United States will not act until the Kampuchean question is settled.

Some ASEAN states—chiefly Thailand and Singapore—privately advise against a change of status in the US-Vietnamese relationship at present, meaning until there is a resolution in Kampuchea. The Philippines appears to concur but without strong feelings. Indonesia and Malaysia are somewhat equivocal as attitudes fluctuate; frequently there is disparity between what is said publicly and privately in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. All five ASEAN nations, however, appear to operate on the overriding principle that the issue should not be permitted to cause a division within ASEAN. In none of the five countries does the issue of US recognition of Hanoi seem to be considered a highly important one.

Japan takes something of the same attitude as the ASEAN states. There is mild interest and some concern lest US recognition become a disruptive factor in the region. Australian policies toward Vietnam in general appear at this writing to be undergoing re-evaluation.

The USSR may have firm opinions on the matter, but if so they are well hidden. Moscow officials tell Americans in avuncular fashion that the United States ought to recognize Hanoi, possibly hoping the USSR will get credit for this in Vietnam. Some observers argue that Moscow is dissembling, that it would prefer continuation of the present isolation of Vietnam in the international arena, for this increases Vietnamese dependency and engenders fewer problems for Soviet diplomats in Hanoi. Clearly the USSR does regard the United States as a future competitor in Indochina, but probably it does not regard the presence of a US mission in Hanoi as appreciably changing the geopolitical balance.

France and Sweden presumably would welcome US recognition of Vietnam, as would India. The rest of Europe (and the world) seem more or less indifferent to the matter.

III. THE MAJOR ISSUES—WITH OR WITHOUT RECOGNITION.

A number of issues stand between the US and Vietnam, some of

them fairly important and others not. These, of course, exist aside from whether there are formal relations between the two countries. A few are germane to the question of recognition, but most represent conflicting interests and divergent views. Their existence is not an argument against formal relations—after all the basic purpose of diplomacy is to resolve outstanding issues and, if this is not possible, to ensure that the other side clearly understands the position being taken and why. In any event these issues will continue, and continue to plague the United States and the region, and presumably Vietnam, whether or not diplomatic relations exist.

Regional Unity

The fact of regionalism in Southeast Asia—both with respect to ASEAN and to the informally unified three Indochinese states—is central to much foreign-policy thinking in both Washington and Hanoi. This is a major issue, not necessarily a contentious one, but one that does imply competing regional organizations.

If there is for the United States any single overarching principle that will guide foreign-policy design in the region in the next decade or so, it will be expressed in an effort to move toward sociopolitical, economic, and military equilibrium within the framework of regional institutionalization. The institutions—ASEAN and the fledging Federation of Indochina—are already in place, and to a large extent will be the forum in which both the struggle for power and ordinary day-to-day diplomatic activity will be conducted in the decade ahead.

Vietnam appears to have tacitly accepted this gauntlet of regional competition that has been thrown down. As a result, its major goal is to secure a cooperative, nonthreatening Indochina peninsula—that is the main reason it is in Kampuchea today. It also seeks to prevent development of a regional anticommunist front, either a militant ASEAN, a revived Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (which China has implied is necessary), or any other regional group hostile to Vietnam. In the same spirit, it seeks to limit super-power activity in the region, not only by the United States and China but also (without appearing to do so) by the USSR.

The struggle for power in Southeast Asia in the years ahead may vary—among three, four, or possibly only two major competitors—but it will be conducted largely in the context of regionalism, between and among regional organizations. This will, of course, go on whether or not the United States and Vietnam have formal relations.

Kampuchea

The sad, bloodied little land of Kampuchea currently is the central issue in American-Vietnamese relations, as it is the touchstone of policy for all of the nations in the region. Kampuchea may not be the cause of all the instability in Southeast Asia, but it contributes to all. Nor will there be much progress towards any sort of regional stability until the Kampuchean issue is settled one way or another.

The Reagan administration's position, as noted above, is that there can be no formal relationship with Vietnam until PAVN troops leave Kampuchea, which is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future. This is a comfortable position for the United States, for it minimizes the danger of getting into trouble in Indochina. And it pushes ASEAN into taking more initiative and assuming more responsibility for war and peace in the area, long a US objective. Its chief drawback is that by definition it abrogates a US leadership role, since it says in effect the United States will follow the ASEAN-China lead. As noted earlier, in actuality it is only a holding operation.

The most likely prospect for Kampuchea in the foreseeable future—that is, in the next year or so—is simply more of the same. The struggle will go on with neither side being able to prevail, but with neither so weak as to be in danger of collapse, and without any decisive developments. The second most likely prospect is Vietnamese success, that is, the PAVN's breaking the back of the resistance and more or less "pacifying" the country, or at least confining armed resistance to the more remote parts of the Cardamom Mountains. The third and least likely prospect is a political settlement, the establishment of a new governing structure in Kampuchea that provides equitable representation for the major contending elements: on one hand the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) consisting of the Khmer Rouge,

the Sihanoukists, and the Son Sann and other "third force" elements, and on the other hand the Hanoi-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK).[10]

A united-front government composed of these elements would be only the first step toward a truly viable government, one that functions at the provincial, district, and village levels and not simply at cabinet level in Phnom Penh. Few realize what a vastly difficult task creating a government in Kampuchea will be, under any circumstances.[11] The Vietnamese troops are not now in Kampuchea for altruistic reasons, but the PAVN military government there represents the only government there is. Its precipitous withdrawal without a new governing system ready to move into place would plunge the country into total anarchy in which the power struggle would devolve to the 13th-century warlord level, and the suffering of the Kampuchean people would be worse than anything yet experienced.

Soviet Presence

The rather widespread presence of the USSR throughout Indochina is an issue standing between the United States and Vietnam, although not to the extent that it is an issue between Vietnam and China.

An analysis of Soviet geopolitical objectives in the region (and worldwide) is beyond the scope of this paper. However, passing mention should be made of those Moscow objectives pursued regionally to which Vietnam contributes or plays a part. These appear to be: (a) to dominate the region ideologically but to achieve this by measures short of Soviet involvement in war (in fact that theme—dominance without war—explains most Moscow moves in the region); (b) to intimidate Japan and curtail its efforts to move more deeply into the region; (c) to block resurgent US presence in Southeast Asia, or shut out the United States entirely if possible; (d) above all, to contain and neutralize China and isolate it from the region, militarily and psychologically; (e) to woo ASEAN states (and keep them nonmilitary) with a view to increased Soviet influence, and (f) in principle, to increase Soviet air/naval/military presence in the region.

Some of these objectives do not directly involve Vietnam (and indeed some are counter to Vietnamese interests). The USSR's desire to increase its capacity to project force over long distances in Southeast Asia does involve Vietnam and possibly even endangers it. Moscow's motives in this—whether benign and normal for a nation with regional interests, or something more ambitious and ominous—can only be surmised. In any case, Vietnam now cooperates fully. The USSR and SRV have a military alliance in all but name. They conduct combined defense planning and presumably are prepared for combined operations. Soviet Navy ships and Soviet Air Force planes make full use of Vietnamese facilities and appear to be granted anything they want. Moscow has paid a rather high price for this, both economically and diplomatically, for its stock in Southeast Asia is the lowest in a decade, but apparently it feels it is getting its money's worth.

This Soviet-Vietnamese defense arrangement does constitute a strategic threat, but one essentially psychological and in conditions short of total war.[12] Most analysts believe that Moscow's military planners concluded early that Soviet bases in Vietnam would be excessively vulnerable in a war with the United States; therefore they have not incorporated their use in US war scenarios. Short of total war, however, the bases have greater utility. They help encircle China and would be useful in any limited war involving the USSR. They would be essential for Soviet intervention in the region, Afghan style. And the bases do intimidate Asia, not only by representing direct Soviet military action, but by associating Vietnam with Soviet military power and thus enhancing the threat offered by Hanoi.

I do not believe that the current Soviet-Vietnamese association is either as close or as durable as most observers contend. It is based on Soviet opportunism and Vietnamese dependency (for food and weapons), and will last at least as long as the USSR considers it useful and, on Hanoi's part, as long as Vietnam is unable to feed itself and while the China threat continues. In any event, I do not believe that a nominal change of US-SRV relations, as in the establishment of diplomatic relations, would have any effect, plus or minus, on the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.

Vietnam Threat Potential

As is implicit in the discussion above, much of the military threat which Vietnam represents for Southeast Asia, which causes primary concern for the United States, derives from its association with the USSR. With the exception of Thailand, Vietnam by itself is not a credible threat to Southeast Asian countries because it does not have the air and sea power to project force over long distances, to Indonesia for instance.

The People's Army of Vietnam, of course, is formidable—the third largest armed force on earth. Vietnam today has under arms, including its paramilitary troops, at least three to four million persons, with the main-force elements now topping one million. Although the PAVN could invade and occupy Thailand in a matter of days, there are many compelling reasons not to, not the least of which is that Vietnam probably would find its present Kampuchean impasse extended to all of the Indochina peninsula, and greatly worsened. In terms of limited orthodox war, the PAVN probably could hold its own against an invasion by China for a lengthy period, although not indefinitely.

Besides the orthodox military threat to parts of the region, Hanoi offers a second kind of threat, an indirect one, to the more distant reaches of Southeast Asia. It could fund and support insurgencies in any of the ASEAN countries. These might not in the end be successful but with Vietnamese guidance and aid they could prove troublesome and costly to suppress.

Hanoi would like to see the countries of ASEAN move ever leftward until finally all become "people's republics." Theoreticians writing in Party journals in Hanoi assert this will happen whether or not there is any action by Vietnam. They hold the governments and societies of noncommunist Southeast Asia to be illegitimate and transitory, and soon to be swept "into the dustbin of history," as the communist phrase-makers put it. The doctrinal problem for Vietnam is only a tactical one: whether to let history take its course as predicted by Marxist doctrine; or to push this process along, either by organizing and funding left-wing insurgencies and subversion, or by supporting some other means.

For the moment at least, Hanoi has ruled out the insurgency

approach. There is reason to believe that shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, PAVN generals took a long hard look at the region's insurgents—concentrating on the Thai (actually there are three insurgent groups in Thailand)—and concluded that the guerrillas did not have the required qualities to be successful. Since then Vietnam has largely ignored insurgent appeals for assistance. This policy may change, of course, but clearly Hanoi must be convinced that an insurgent force has real prospects before it will back it with money and weapons.

There is a third threat which Hanoi could offer in that grey area between war and politics—what might be called a cold war or a psychopolitical threat. The idea first surfaced in the late 1970s, when confidence was still high in Hanoi and the lure of expansionism still strong. Party theoreticians began developing a kind of economic security strategy for use in Southeast Asia. Its basic concept was that Vietnam should induce and pressure the ASEAN countries to cut their capitalist-multinationalist ties in exchange for guaranteed regional peace made possible by a cooperative, nonaggressive, nonexpansionist Vietnam. The strategy was worked out in an elaborate rationale of doctrine, having to do with nationalism, collectivism, and nonalignment. After the time of troubles began in Vietnam little was heard of the idea, but it is still there in the wings and we may not have heard the last of it.

We should be careful neither to understate nor exaggerate the threat potential Vietnam represents for Southeast Asia. The determinant—and it is here we should maintain our attention—is the USSR, which can either facilitate or inhibit military action by Hanoi. Moscow continually should be reminded by the nations of the region that they hold it accountable for the behavior of its surrogate.

Resolution of Casualties

In addition to the major issues standing between the United States and Vietnam, there are a number of lesser magnitude. These include the entire clutch of economic problems such as frozen assets, nationalized property, and demands for indemnification on both sides. There are humanitarian problems involving divided families

and other difficulties that arose with the exodus of some 600,000 Indochinese to the United States.

Also persisting is the knotty, most difficult resolution of casualties issue, that is, the need for an accounting by Hanoi, to the extent it can, for the fate of some 2,500 American military listed as "missing in action" or as "fate unknown" in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. This is a singular issue, not one that normally arises in foreign affairs. Traditionally and logically, nations treat assuaging of bereavement as a humanitarian matter, not something to be bargained over by diplomats. For complex reasons this issue—which now has a long and somewhat peculiar history—has become an impediment standing between the two countries, one that has at times assumed a disproportionate importance in terms of national interest. The issue cuts to the political bone in America, for it has taken on a deep psychological meaning. It affects the fundamental sense of responsibility in our highest officials, both in the executive and legislative branches. Professionals in foreign affairs commonly hold that most issues are negotiable, but not this one, and they become unsure how to deal with it. What should be done is clear. In the interests of both the United States and Vietnam, Hanoi should become convinced that the issue must be lifted from the foreign-affairs level to the humanitarian level and must be independent of the foreign policy of either country. However, this would require a changed mind-set by the myopic, anachronistic men of the Hanoi Politburo, which is highly unlikely. Solving this problem may have to wait for a generational change in Vietnam.[13]

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

We conclude with some thoughts about US policy and the implications of establishing formal US-SRV relations.

In US policy terms, Southeast Asia, of which Vietnam is part, does not have the importance of most other regions of the world, certainly less than North Asia, for example. It does not loom large in daily defense and foreign-policy thinking at the highest levels in Washington; probably Vietnam has never been on the agenda of a Reagan cabinet meeting. The net meaning of this is that Washington and Hanoi have only minimal interest in each other—

neither can be particularly useful to the other, nor offer much by way of credible threat. The chief US policy interest in Southeast Asia in general appears to be access to the region and the freedom to traverse it, which Vietnam could not prevent although it could destabilize the region if it chose to do so. Hence, it is a safe conclusion that the operational assumption in both Washington and Hanoi is that in the foreseeable future neither will become for the other a truly serious foreign-policy or strategic problem.

Looking beyond the present policy of the holding operation, what can we expect eventually—what is feasible?

If (or when) diplomatic relations are established with Hanoi it will later be recognized that the first step, the initial move, was the hardest. This is because of the danger that any change in US policy, even some limited overture, may be misread in Hanoi as confirmation that the SRV's hard-line policy is succeeding, bringing on an even harder Hanoi line with additional demands for concessions. The central problem in achieving any sort of forward progress is to get past this Politburo mind-set.

Once past this barrier, the exploratory process could proceed expeditiously, become easier, even mechanical. It would involve, on both sides, a series of confidence-building measures, to use a favorite Marxist term, exchanges, one by one, in sets of two, one pair at a time. Like a tennis match, the exchanges of bilateral gestures would continue.

What are these confidence-building measures? At first they would be the simple and trouble-free, gradually moving towards the more complex and significant. On the US side these could include an end to the US economic embargo, cultural exchange, academic/intellectual relations, joint health-medical research projects, technology transfer, and economic aid-investment. On Hanoi's part they could include resolution of casualties, orderly departure procedures, simplified entry/currency exchange, tourism, and cultural and academic relations.

Once this process is underway, and only then, can we address ourselves to the more finite US geopolitical objectives: regional stability, benign Hanoi behavior (with respect to our allies and friends, and even others in the region), an Indochinese political configura-

tion (Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea) acceptable to all, and less USSR intimacy in Indochina.

One cannot be sure that these goals will be advanced by establishment of more or less normal relations with Vietnam, and their pursuit should not be advertised or sold on the basis that they will. Still the promise our interests may be served is great enough to make it worthwhile to pursue this approach.

As the United States moves more deeply into the 1980s therefore, it seems probable that it will, in part by design and in part as reaction to the rush of events, increasingly be guided in its Southeast Asia-Indochina policies by the principle of equilibrium within the framework of competing regional institutions. Creation and maintenance of this equilibrium will require an entire matrix of organizations, some large and some small, some of broad general purpose and some of narrow specific objective, some governmental, some private and multinational. It will be a vast organized arena in which the struggle for power will be conducted. In such a context, diplomatic intercourse of every country with every other country will become virtually mandatory. This means that establishment of US-SRV relations in the final analysis is not a question of whether but when—strictly a matter of timing.

The Case for Establishing Relations with Vietnam

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In the days following the signing of the ill-fated "Paris Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace to Vietnam," Richard Nixon told a number of close associates that he was going to push hard for postwar aid to North Vietnam and for the normalization of US-DRV relations. Nixon said he was prompted to do this by the US experience with Japan and Germany after World War II. "It paid off," he told one adviser whom I interviewed in 1974, "to help these countries. They were the sources of the war and could very well be again. We helped them recover with the Marshall Plan and had an influence on their political systems and their whole evolution. North Vietnam is a power in regional terms. We have to reckon with that and do our best to prevent the leaders in Hanoi from playing a spoiler role. The only way we can do that is to recognize them and use our aid to get them hooked on the benefits of living in peace."

Later, it was learned that Mr. Nixon had sent a letter in February 1973 to Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dong indicating that "the appropriate programs for the United States contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of $3.25 billion over five years." Such aid was to be granted, Mr. Nixon wrote, "without any political considerations." [1]

Ironically, these arguments are more valid today than they were in 1973. It is the US leverage over Hanoi—if ever there were such—that has changed.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) is a regional power. Its armed forces are the third largest in the world,[2] and its intentions and actions are "a central focus of most of the policies of the parties that are involved in Southeast Asia." [3] Within the next 12 to 24

months, moreover, the SRV's armed forces are likely to consolidate their control of Indochina to such an extent that the leadership in Hanoi will be faced with the question of "What or where next?" American interests in the region are going to be directly affected by the answer to that question; US policy should, consequently, aim at assuring that what Hanoi does neither poses a threat to Thailand or the People's Republic of China, nor provides the Soviet Union with any more (and hopefully less) access to southern Vietnam as a forward operations military base. The best way to do this is to get Hanoi "hooked" on peace and on contributing to stability in Asian international relations.

The purpose of this paper is to try to present the best case possible for establishing relations with the SRV as a key step in the process of integrating Vietnam into the international system and to outline the steps that could be taken to assure that improved relations with Vietnam served American interests. The case against such a change in US policy toward the SRV—one that is very compelling in the short term—is the subject of a companion paper at this conference. I will not, consequently, dwell on the negative side of the topic here.

The phrase "establishing relations" refers to a process that should include diplomatic recognition of the SRV (though probably as a last step towards improved relations, as was the case in the evolution of the US-PRC relationship) and reflects a judgment on both countries' parts that their interests are best served by conducting business with each other *directly*.[4] As such, the establishment of relations advocated here would be consistent with the general US practice; [5] it would not be a seal of approval of SRV policies.

US-SRV RELATIONS SINCE 1975

How US-SRV relations have evolved since the fall of Saigon in 1975 is summarized below (see box).[6] The starts and stops in these developments and especially the contrast in tone between Vietnam news broadcasts and press interviews and their private talks with US negotiators are reminiscent of the Paris talks days in which Hanoi used public opinion to whipsaw the United States and whittle down its basic demands.[7] Throughout the "postwar" period, in fact, US officials have remained doubtful that the Vietnamese are sincere

Key Developments Affecting the Evolution of US-SRV Relations in the Wake of the Fall of Saigon

1975

Saigon surrenders to Communists (30 April) . . . all financial and commercial transactions with communist Vietnam blocked (16 May) . . . United States vetoes Vietnam's bid for UN membership (August and September).

1976

Washington and Hanoi exchange notes about possibility of holding talks on normalization of relations (March–April) . . . details on Hanoi's "re-education camps" begin to leak (May–June) . . . Vietnam unified as SRV (July) . . . Kissinger rules out "improved relations" until "a wholly satisfactory accounting for all missing Americans" (July) . . . Hanoi, at nonaligned nations summit, confirms interest "in normal diplomatic relations with the U.S." (August) . . . SRV granted membership in IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank over US opposition (September) . . . US-SRV talks on the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations (November) . . . United States vetoes SRV's UN membership (November).

1977

United States changes position at UN on SRV admission (January) . . . United States ends restriction against refueling of foreign ships and planes calling in Vietnam and announces end to restrictions on American travel to Vietnam; US Presidential Commission visits Hanoi and reports that Vietnamese authorities maintained that US postwar aid, MIA accounting, and normalization of relations "interrelated" (March) . . . US Postal Service begins accepting mail to Vietnam (April) . . . US-SRV negotiations resume; Vietnamese announce that SRV will refuse normalization and demands for information on MIAs unless United States grants aid; House and Senate prohibit United States from "reparations or aid" (May–June) . . . US-SRV talks continue (June) . . . SRV admitted to UN (September) . . . US-SRV talks resumed (December).

1978

SRV ambassador to the UN, named as an unindicted coconspirator in espionage case, asked to leave United States and recalled (February) . . . Hanoi announces willingness to separate aid and normalization issues (August) and confirms this in subsequent meeting with Secretary Vance (September) . . . Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty signed (November) . . . SRV armed forces invade Kampuchea (December).

1979

Hanoi charges United States approved Chinese invasion of Vietnam (February) . . . and hardens line on necessity and desirability of normalization (August).

1980

House adopts legislation that would bar aid to Vietnam (June) . . . UN Secretary Kurt Waldheim attempts to bridge gap between Vietnam and Kampuchea during visit (August) . . . first American tourists visit South Vietnam since merger with North . . . US State Department's annual report charges Hanoi with forcing exodus in unfit boats . . . United States and Vietnam reach agreement permitting immigration of up to 1,500 Vietnamese families (December).

1981

President Carter signs bill for Vietnam Memorial (January) . . . State Department's annual survey singles out Vietnam for persistent violations of human rights (February) . . . US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs John H. Holdridge says United States is interested in normalizing relations in hope of Vietnam's moderating its policies (May) . . . Secretary Haig declares United States will not normalize relations with a Vietnam that occupies Kampuchea (June) . . . Deputy Foreign Minister Minister Vo Dong Giang says United States is welcome to open embassy in Hanoi immediately despite Reagan administration's attempts to deny international development aid . . . Vietnamese government invites delegation of American war veterans to visit to discuss Agent Orange and MIAs . . . Facing economic crisis, Vietnam repeatedly seeks to open contact leading to diplomatic ties with the United States.

1982

USSR agrees to reactivate US-built nuclear power plant . . . First Reagan administration officials visit . . . US Refugee Assistance $503 million for fiscal 1982 (January) . . . UN condemns Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea (February) . . . China charged with systematically sabotaging Vietnamese economy with US collusion (April) . . . Vietnam veterans of America second visit to Hanoi (May) . . . Vietnam joins treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons . . . 3 US ships believed fired upon by SRV . . . Foreign Minister Thach in CBS "Sixty Minutes" interview acknowledges presence of 100,000 political prisoners (June) . . . US MIA/POW experts meet with counterparts in Hanoi . . . First American crash site investigation (December).

1983

Fifty-one Amerasian children allowed to leave Hanoi marking the 10th Anniversary of the Paris Agreement (January) . . . Secretary of State Shultz returns from Asia reporting that Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea are "outside the pale" and that United States remains dedicated to goal of getting Vietnamese troops out of Kampuchea (February) . . . Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach denies presence of American POWs in Vietnam (March).

about seeking improved relations with the United States and wary of placing themselves and the administrations they represent in a position to be humiliated by propagandists in Hanoi. By 1980, in any case, the issue of normalization was deadlocked by US congressional resolutions against aiding the SRV (something that would almost certainly be part of what Hanoi would seek out of normalization), Hanoi's war in Kampuchea, and by the Politburo's slow progress in responding to US inquiries about the fate of the MIAs and the return of their remains.

The Reagan administration came to power extremely skeptical of SRV motives for seeking the normalization of relations with the United States and of the US interests that would be served by such a development. Mr. Reagan has made a full accounting of the MIA remains a top national priority and a virtual precondition for normalization, along with the end of Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea. US and SRV officials meet regularly on the MIA remains issue and the United States has followed the ASEAN (Association of South East Asia Nations) states' lead in calling for Hanoi to negotiate over Kampuchea and withdraw its troops. To date, Hanoi seems far more anxious about and interested in normalization than does the administration in Washington.

Why does Hanoi attach "great importance" (a phrase recently used in several key SRV press communiques) to normalizing relations with Washington?

Establishment of relations with the SRV is a very painful subject. The victory of the North Vietnamese army over the forces and people of the government in Saigon in 1975 was a bitter harvest for all. When communism came to Saigon, no "*third force*" of neutral-

ists was allowed to flourish, hundreds of thousands of persons were exiled to the Gulag of political re-education camps and so-called "new economic zones," and even many southern members of the Viet Cong found themselves suspect as the arrogant but inexperienced military and political action cadres from the North took over. What emerged shortly thereafter was a repressive police state which alienated even the most pro-Hanoi US antiwar activists. In 1982, the SRV was considered the "single most repressive government in the world," according to Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights Elliott Abrams.

The authorities in Hanoi have also failed to satisfy US demands for a full accounting of the 2,500 now believed missing in action. Only 88 sets of remains have been returned to the US since the war ended and US and North Vietnamese negotiators started bargaining over an issue which the Communist authorities have treated with considerable cynicism. Hence, at first glance, the establishment of relations with the SRV could well be one of the most unpopular acts on the part of any US President.

To make improved relations with the SRV a politically realistic objective of US policy, therefore, this paper will have to demonstrate both that it is in the long-term US interest and that there are sufficient bases for flexibility in both Washington and Hanoi on the issues (mentioned above) which presently separate them.

AN ARGUMENT FOR NORMALIZATION

It is in the US interest to establish relations with Vietnam for three basic reasons. First, such relations would facilitate the handling of the MIA remains problem as well as of the myriad other humanitarian issues arising from the separation of American-Vietnamese and Vietnamese refugee families in the wake of the fall of Saigon. Second, establishing relations with Vietnam would buttress regional stability. Finally, our ASEAN allies would favor such a move on our part.

With respect to the first reason, resolving the MIA issue, nearly all experts agree that joint US-Vietnamese teams operating in Vietnam would be considerably better than the status quo (i.e., occasional US visits to sites in the SRV) and that in any case, whatever

progress there is to be made on the MIAs requires the cooperation of the Vietnamese.[8] Such cooperation is only likely to come through improved relations. Joint MIA investigation teams would, presumably, be part of any agreement on establishing relations as Hanoi has hinted.

But we should be under no illusions about several things connected with this issue. There are, as numerous US government investigations have determined, *probably no* American POWs still alive in Vietnam, held there by cliques of sadistic guards. And even with the most extensive of searches, no more than a fraction of MIA remains (perhaps five to ten percent) are likely ever to be located and returned for proper burial in the United States. As in the case of the fate of the French POWs and MIAs in the 1946-54 war, when only a fraction (less than a third) of those captured were ever accounted for,[9] the US public must be prepared for closing the war-years chapter in its relations with Vietnam on this sour and tragic note. To put it another way, if other US interests can be shown to be served by establishing relations with the SRV then they should not be held the hostage of something that is unlikely to happen—i.e., full accounting for the fate of the American MIAs.

In the issues associated with *re-uniting separated* and lost members of US-Vietnamese families, moreover, there can be no question but that this task would be aided by consular and immigration services being available on the spot.[10]

A second reason for establishing relations with the SRV is that the US interests in regional stability would be promoted. Over time, detente with Vietnam could have a positive impact on Hanoi's policy toward the withdrawal of its military forces from Kampuchea, its willingness to negotiate a solution to the conflict there, and its general intentions with respect to Thailand and the *rest of* Southeast Asia. These expectations are presently held by ASEAN leaders and the evidence underlying them was presented directly to President Reagan by President Suharto, who visited Washington in the fall of 1982. They will likely be reiterated when Mr. Reagan visits the region this fall. It is also easy to overstate this aspect of the case for improving relations with Vietnam.

There is, of course, no actual evidence that the ASEAN perspective is right. And there is a good deal of evidence that the current

and projected leadership in Hanoi have a worldview shaped largely by the exigencies of maintaining their hold on power and not on the behavior and policies of superpowers, friend or foe. Much will depend on how long a time period can be tolerated between the establishment of relations and Hanoi's demonstration of its regional intentions as to whether US interests will actually be served. Tied up in this question, too, is the issue of whether relations with the United States will in any way change Hanoi's policy toward Soviet use of the port and aviation facilities in Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Thus, in making the case for the establishment of relations with Vietnam, some gradual change on Hanoi's part in the direction that Washington would want simply has to be assumed. US policymakers, consequently, have to be willing to accept the risks that either Hanoi will not change in the direction preferred or that it will not do so within the time frame desired and essential to promoting regional stability. Since I do not think that we can or should make such policy change a precondition for at least trying to improve relations, I clearly fall into the group who thinks the risk is worth taking.

I do so in part because of the third reason that establishment of relations with Vietnam would be in the US interest. As noted, this reason is that it now appears to be favored by our ASEAN allies, who believe there is some basis for hope for the policy changes in Hanoi outlined above. Indeed, ASEAN leaders believe that a relationship with the United States would not only reduce the potential for superpower conflict (again) in the region but would presage an end to the SRV's confrontation with Thailand and its relentless criticism of the ASEAN states' social and economic systems and bilateral security links with the United States. These premises are based largely on assumption rather than evidence, and constitute risks at least some ASEAN leaders feel the United States would lose little by taking.[11]

In sum, each of the US interests noted above could be served better by the establishment of relations with the SRV and in dealing with the leadership there regularly and directly. My case for a relationship with Vietnam is, thus, not built on any assurance that Washington will succeed in influencing Hanoi to behave in ways we would like. It is built on the premise that the chances of Hanoi's doing what we want are better with a relationship than without one

and that the interests (primarily humanitarian) of American citizens would be better served.

There is no question in my mind that at present and probably over the medium term Hanoi has far more to gain from the establishment of relations than Washington. This has profound implications for how the United States should signal its interests in such relations and the process by which they should be established.

Hanoi would gain in several important ways. First, establishment of relations with the United States would provide an opportunity for those in the leadership in Hanoi (whoever they are) who favor less dependence on and identification with the Soviet Union to accomplish their objectives (whatever they may be). There is no hard evidence on who favors what or why in Hanoi or on whether anyone in the Politburo would welcome such an opportunity.[12] However, there were hints that this may have been behind Hanoi's February 1983 expression of interest in improved US relations. *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent Paul Quinn-Judge was told by one Hanoi official that "if the Americans are really interested in limiting the influence of a certain other big power in the region, perhaps they should start talking with us."[13] The reference was to the Soviet Union. So the case for this benefit to Hanoi has to be based on the assumption that some Vietnamese leaders are quite concerned about the long-term effects of the present dependence on the Soviet Union (for thousands of technical advisers, as much as $3 million per day in aid, and between 20 and 30 percent of the rice it consumes.)[14] We could assume that some leaders are skeptical at best about how compatible Soviet foreign-policy objectives are with those of the SRV. There are also possibly some in the Politburo who believe US aid would be preferred in Vietnam and that it would come in handy. And, finally, the case assumes that there are some in the Politburo who think that even if no aid were forthcoming, Hanoi could use the prospect of accepting American aid to gouge the Soviets for more. There is some evidence carefully developed by Doug Pike (in a series of conference papers in 1980–81) that Hanoi's leaders have been dissatisfied for some time with the level and terms of Moscow's support.

Furthermore, some in Hanoi would believe that movement on Washington's part toward establishing relations would further aggravate Sino-American relations and that such a development

would redound to Vietnam's advantage. Such a scenario could not be tested in advance and so must also be treated as a major assumption that would be part of the case made in Hanoi for establishing relations with Washington. From a US perspective, actual stress in the US-PRC relationship is neither to be hoped for nor encouraged. In making the case for establishing relations with Vietnam, therefore, I again have to assume that this could be done in a way which would minimize such negative fallout. This implies that the US-PRC relationship would have to be in good repair and probably that the sensitive issue of the US relationship with Taiwan had been resolved.

Also, movement toward relations with the United States could improve Hanoi's image in the Non-Aligned Nations Movement and other Third World organizations. Since US aid to Vietnam would be small in any case, and because of the feelings engendered by the war on both sides, diplomatic relations would not be seen as a move away from one superpower and toward another's camp but as part of an effort by Vietnam to distance itself from all, and as one consistent with General Secretary Le Duan's report to the Fifth Party Congress in 1982, which reaffirmed "the policy of establishing and expanding normal relations . . . with all countries regardless of their political and social regimes." Again, on the questions of who in the Politburo would want to develop such an image—and why—there is no hard evidence. Nor is any likely to come to light.

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO?

What then should the United States do? In the short run, the case outlined above suggests to me that the establishment of relations is likely to be more important to Hanoi than to Washington. This is a proposition we can (and should) test and in a way that is well within the constraints of current domestic American political sensitivities.

The Reagan administration should indicate its willingness to explore establishing relations with Vietnam only if we can be sure that such relations facilitate progress on accounting for US MIAs and related humanitarian problems. On the question of how best to get these assurances, I do not favor approaching the Vietnamese directly. Instead, I think we should use the good offices of the

ASEAN states—to whose apparent preferences we would be responding—to ascertain whether Hanoi is in fact interested in relations with the United States on realistic terms. Such terms would include a clear understanding that no aid could be considered for the SRV until congressional prohibitions were removed and that this was unlikely unless and until more progress was made on the issue of accounting for the MIAs. Once these assurances were obtained, the next step should be the opening of "liaison offices" (and not "interest sections") in Hanoi and Washington.

The risks associated with such steps are nil. Tangible American interests would be served and all our options would be protected. Surely, Hanoi can be no worse a place than Havana for two governments who share a painful past to attempt to heal some of the wounds of war and, more importantly, gain insights about each other that could prevent future ones.

Recognizing the Hanoi Government: Whose Advantage?

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It seems less practical to argue whether or not the United States should extend diplomatic recognition to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam than to assume that diplomatic recognition is coming, sooner or later, and spend our energies determining how that political act can serve the national interest.

Forces of humanitarianism, pacifism, and regionalism are pushing us toward the gesture of diplomatic recognition. Humanitarians view recognition as the vital step toward receiving an accounting for the missing in action and settling the issue of Americans who may still be under control of the SRV or its puppets in Laos or Kampuchea, as Cambodia is now named. They also view recognition as the means through which the United States could encourage the Vietnamese government to speed the release of Amerasian children of American and Indochinese parents, and formalize a program of releasing or at least freeing on travel visas the many Vietnamese citizens whose relatives have escaped to the United States and other countries. The Vietnamese government has suggested that once diplomatic recognition is a fact, these humanitarian matters can then be dealt with.

The pacifists believe that recognition by the United States will, by legitimatizing the government in Hanoi, appease that government's savage program of invading and subjugating the rest of Indochina to "protect its own borders." They feel recognition could create an atmosphere in which more civilized nations could draw the SRV into ever-increasing cooperation, thereby ending the slaughters in Kampuchea, the oppression in Laos, and the daily misery and terror in South Vietnam, as well as reducing the threat that Vietnamese armored columns begin grinding across the soil of Thailand.

The regionalists—those whose interests support a healthy ASEAN alliance—want the United States to normalize relations out of general concern for stability across Southeast Asia. They believe such normalization would reduce the dangers of wider war and soften Hanoi's paranoia about nations allied with the United States.

Like it or not, these three forces exist, and they have power. The first has power to influence internal politics within the United States because the humanitarian issue has popular and emotional support. The second has power to affect both national and international affairs because its rhetoric, praising or damning, could influence the United States' actions toward that most sacred of all matters, world peace. The third has power to influence the positions of American administrations and the Department of State, which could be thrust into an undesirable or unprofitable arrangement simply by trying to please its regional allies.

THE HUMANITARIAN ARGUMENT

What's in it for the United States? What national interest would recognition serve? If opening missions, consulates, and eventually embassies spurred the Politburo in Hanoi to release more remains of dead Americans, the US government would discharge a long-time obligation by securing a final accounting for MIAs. But how many? And at what price? The Defense Intelligence Agency reports that Hanoi holds at least 400 sets of remains of dead Americans. Will the Vietnamese release them all? Small chance. They will probably dole them out as they have with the 75 or 80 returned since 1973, and they will certainly continue to exploit such releases for propaganda or political warfare advantages—which is to say they will continue their cynical extortion.

The record of the present Vietnamese government is clear on the matter of accounting for prisoners of war and men missing in action. For 30 years they have denied any moral responsibility or legal obligation because, by their definition, they held no prisoners of war—only criminals. Therefore even the basic matter of seeing to their captives' health was neither a responsibility nor an obligation. When they fed prisoners, or allowed them 10 minutes a day outside their dismal cells, or reduced the severity of torture, or permitted

them to write an occasional message to their families, they did so only because of the "human and lenient nature characteristic of the benevolent and heroic Vietnamese people," a people so "advanced and charitable that they set such a paternal example for the criminal, barbarian, outlaw pirates of the warmongering, capitalist, imperialist colonial powers"—phrases familiar to all the repatriated American prisoners. They never agreed to an exchange of prisoners, especially not during the period of American involvement, because, again by their own definition, they had no troops outside their own borders; therefore, the Republic of Vietnam could hold no North Vietnamese prisoners. The repatriation of more than 500 Americans in 1973 was not an exchange, but a unilateral release, motivated briefly by fear that the United States had lost its restraint and was prepared to devastate North Vietnam. Once a formal diplomatic relationship occurs, why should the Hanoi government release more remains of dead flyers or allow teams of specialists to search crash sites for clues to the fates of a few hundred men who plunged to earth between 10 and 19 years ago? Is such an accounting—and it will be a minimal one—worth it to the United States?

Some Americans think it is. Recognition, they say, is such a hollow gesture anyway that any return in terms of casualty resolution information is worth the price of exchanging ministers, consuls, or ambassadors. Besides, they say, Hanoi has promised its cooperation when normal relations—an imprecise expression—exist. Some Americans think recognition of the SRV would be a heinous, despicable, shameless, spineless act—yet another surrender by the Paper Tiger, another abandonment of principle, another downward glance before the unwavering glare of the fierce-eyed enemy. Emotions run high on this issue. Any American administration faces a choice between pleasing a majority of the citizenry that opposes recognition of the government in Hanoi and pleasing a majority of Americans who demand an accounting for MIAs and POWs.

What US national interest is served by opening diplomatic relations so that Hanoi will allow Vietnamese citizens to join their relatives already in America? It's a difficult judgment. Let's say 700,000 Vietnamese now live in the United States, two-thirds of them recent refugees. Many of these Vietnamese have become American citizens. They deserve the help of our State Department and other agencies the same as other Americans. Is it in the national interest to represent these Americans by agreeing to recognition of

the SRV in the hope that Hanoi will, in reciprocation, permit its citizens to migrate? Another hard question. The Communists would probably release a few of their aging, ailing, maimed, and unskilled, with appropriate media fanfare, purging themselves of problems and adding to our burden, just as Castro's Cuba did via Mariel. Advantage Hanoi.

And what effect will normalization have upon the sad plight of Amerasians in Vietnam, most of them the progeny of wartime liaisons? Outcasts in their own country, many of them do not know who their American parents are. Nonpersons in the communistic system, they face only misery, hopelessness, and probably early deaths unless they emigrate to the United States. Hanoi has promised to liberalize its policy toward releasing these people once normalization occurs. But what good is that promise? What US national interest is served by accepting these thousands of unfortunates, most of whom are teenagers? Hanoi passes a burden to Washington and basks in self-righteousness. America picks up the burden of its wartime bastards and finds a way to cope because it is the humanitarian thing to do. Yet the political warfare advantage in this issue, as with the MIA accounting issue, is Hanoi's.

THE PACIFIST AND REGIONALIST ARGUMENTS

Is US national interest served if diplomatic recognition is perceived for the clearly political symbol it is? Recognition lends a legitimacy to the Hanoi government—at least in the popular mind—which might cause the SRV to reduce its savagery, but which might also embolden it to advance for other conquests, most particularly in Thailand. Recognition could also send a message to certain of our allies like the Republic of Korea that we intend to back away from long-term commitments. That message would not be lost on North Korea and the Soviet Union. Ironically, the civilized act of recognition could encourage barbarism. Having abandoned Vietnam to the Communists, having apparently abandoned Taiwan to work out its future with the People's Republic of China, may the United States not also be expected to abandon the Republic of Korea and the nation of Thailand?

In the great balance of powers which controls the political structure of our world, the Soviet Union has nourished the Communist

government in Hanoi since the end of World War II. By doing so, the Soviets have successfully diverted the energies and drained the treasuries of the West, especially and most recently of the United States. Actions of their client state have also disrupted and diverted the People's Republic of China. The "punitive war" along the Chinese-Vietnamese border a few years ago revealed the strength of the SRV's military. The Chinese took heavy losses, most of them inflicted by Vietnamese reserve units as the regular divisions deployed to Kampuchea.

Thousands of Russian advisers now live and work in Vietnam. The Vietnamese may not like it, but they need this Russian presence and the economic aid for which it is the cost. South Vietnam's standard of living since the 1975 invasion has sunk to one of the lowest in the world. The price for supporting the vast military machine of the SRV (third, fourth, or fifth largest in the world) is continued economic hardship for both northern and southern Vietnamese. The Russians would be pleased for the United States to recognize the Hanoi government both for the obvious legitimization that act symbolizes and for the economic aid likely to follow.

Recognition not only could embarrass the United States—for it is American admission of guilt or acknowledgment of error in the American role in Southeast Asia from 1960 to 1975—it would also relieve the Soviet Union of part of its burden in supporting Vietnam. Furthermore, recognition, especially recognition followed by substantial economic aid, could encourage the Russians to exploit Vietnam as they have exploited Cuba.

Recognition might initially support stability, reduce bloodshed, and open avenues for discussion of differences—old aims of the pacifists—but it also could have an opposite effect eventually. The SRV could become the secure base camp for revolutionary development in Thailand, the archipelagoes of Malaysia-Indonesia, and the Philippines. Perhaps larger wars may not develop, but the decline of democratic governments most certainly could. Democracy is challenged by repressive right-wing movements and governments as well as by communism. A point the pacifists sometimes ignore is that right-wing repression is a fledgling democratic government's immediate, most obvious, or only method of reacting to a serious Communist threat growing within its borders and fueled by a Soviet client state like the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. So diplomatic

recognition could serve Russian aims by furthering the spread of communism, bringing pressures on the immediate neighbors of Vietnam, extending ideological influence without Russian military occupation, and signalling another capitulation by noncommunist nations. And it could serve Hanoi's aims by symbolically justifying its self-righteous truculence. It would reassure the doctrinaire leadership of the single-minded rectitude of their position. It could very well encourage them to continue their expansion and exploitation and their programs of murder and enslavement. Once Washington woos Hanoi, it's "advantage Hanoi." That success could very well motivate the SRV to embark on a program of intimidation in the region, a program which would have consequences for ASEAN, the new federation of regional states, and even for a revitalized SEATO.

FORCES OPPOSING RECOGNITION

More than 80 nations have already recognized the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, among them many allies and treaty partners of the United States. The force of momentum, the desire to avoid inconvenience in dealing with international matters, and the tendency of this Nation to mend the wounds of war quickly all act to impel the United States towards recognition. Perhaps those general forces do represent the national interest in tangible ways. But what forces oppose the normalizing of relations? A primary one is the attitude of the American people and the codified representation of that attitude in Congress.

Although opinion polls have shown a decline in the strength of popular opposition to recognition, a large percentage of Americans interviewed oppose recognition, and many of them oppose it fiercely. It would be difficult for any administration to convince a large segment of the people that recognition is in the national interest. Furthermore, Congress has prohibited aid; so recognition involving the offering of economic aid would require congressional action, first to reverse its earlier stand, then to approve the new aid proposal. However, a number of Congressmen have taken firm and vocal and popular positions on resolving the MIA situation at any cost. Their influence is strong. They would challenge the ban on aid and urge recognition before a full MIA accounting. Once again, the divisiveness of 1965–1972 could hinder American action.

The Reagan administration opposes, both on principle and out of distrust for Hanoi's Politburo, extension of normal relations. Although a change of administration—especially the victory of a new Democratic administration—could lead to diplomatic recognition as a gesture toward settling the humanitarian issues, such a change does not appear likely at this writing. A general international repugnance for the SRV—one of the most repressive regimes in this century—tends to reinforce the present administration's attitude. But, all-in-all, those forces opposed to recognition are gradually losing strength. The question arises how can the United States turn this problem to its national advantage.

A POLITICAL-WARFARE PLAN

Let's drop our "keep-the-losses-down" or "time-to-bite-the-bullet" attitude and drive a hard bargain. Let's put Hanoi's Politburo on the defensive and maneuver in ways they respect. First of all, the United States should insist that no economic aid be available until *embassies* are functioning and the MIA/POW issue is settled to our satisfaction. Use their tactics. Demand the MIA accounting by joint US-SRV and joint US-Laotian teams as simple matters of good will accomplished under some sort of mission arrangement short of formal recognition. Insist on this as fundamental. Indicate it is the will of the people. Explain that if the SRV wants recognition, it must win over the American people.

The program could begin in Laos, where the United States does have diplomatic relations at the charge d'affaire's level. About one-fourth of our Southeast Asia MIAs were lost in Laos. The Laotians have recently shown a willingness to cooperate. They treated a private delegation from the National League of Families of POW/MIA with courtesy, took them to caves where POWs had been held, and to crash sites. They expressed a willingness to cooperate further, specifically in crash-site examinations. (Their cooperative attitude had been damaged two years ealier by zealous private soldier-of-fortune operations claiming US official support in the search for MIAs. Efforts to convince Vientiane that the government did not back the private commando operations have followed, including a congressional resolution commending the Laotians for their humanitarian spirit.) If matters proceed satisfactorily in Laos, the Congress could lift its ban on aid to that country—a clear signal to Hanoi.

Next, the United States could pursue the other humanitarian issues—emigration for the Amerasians and the reuniting of sundered Vietnamese families—but always demanding evidence of goodwill first. The release of another 51 Amerasian children is not enough, especially when used to Hanoi's propaganda advantage. We should insist on a *program* of release for those children. Reunion of families would need to wait for a higher-level development, one that could grant visas and deal with sophisticated emigration-immigration matters.

As success in humanitarian matters reaches acceptable levels, the United States could upgrade its diplomatic exchange—say to consulate level. Establish the consulate or its equivalent in Ho Chi Minh City first, not Hanoi, and continue to withhold aid. As relations develop sufficiently to consider establishing embassies, the United States and its regional allies should insist on SRV withdrawal from Cambodia. If Hanoi balks, Washington can delay upgrading its representation to the embassy level or even shut down its consulate. Why not? It's the Vietnamese who have most to gain from normalization. If Vietnam disengages from Cambodia, then discussions about embassy representation can resume. All this would serve to stabilize the region as well as support humanitarian ends, especially if, through some diplomatic magic, teams of ASEAN observers could assure that the Vietnamese respect Thailand's borders.

How will the SRV leaders react? They will try to get as much return on each investment as possible. They will, for example, suddenly "discover" ten sets of MIA remains, releasing them in anticipation of a major US concession. The American government must insist they do better—for example, by releasing 300 or 400 remains at the same time they open crash-site investigations. When the SRV fails to comply, the United States must be ready to use the media as the SRV uses it. Washington must denounce that failure to the world—as a failure on *humanitarian* grounds. That tactic would strike the Vietnamese leaders where they are sensitive. The United States must expect them to use the same extortion or blackmail tactic which has characterized their treatment of prisoners since 1950, and it must turn the tables. No profuse thanks for patronizing handouts. American leaders should point out the shortcomings in each instance, especially the broken promises. In fact, if American negotiators could arrange promises for them to break, it

would, for once, be "advantage Washington" in the cold-eyed contest of political warfare.

If the humanitarian matters could be nudged along successfully, the United States could begin to seek redress or compensation for the lost investments caused by the 1975 invasion. Farfetched as that sounds to a street-wise American, it might work because it could trap the ever legalistic-minded Vietnamese trying to justify their invasion and their stealing of private property. It would put them on the defensive especially when international law sided with US interests, and then the United States would have leverage for other matters. This political negotiation is no matter for temperance. The United States must overload the demands, exaggerate this humanitarian issue, and thereby, perhaps, shock the Vietnamese into mistakes.

From such modest beginnings in the humanitarian concerns could develop the major goals—regional stability, an end to the daily bloodshed, release of some of the political prisoners in the so-called reeducation camps, and an offset to Russian influence in the area. But the United States must not approach this matter hat-in-hand, eyes downcast, voice timorous. If we make America look like a Paper Tiger again—especially if we do so to gain a few sets of remains and to accept another 51 children of American GIs—then the hard men in Hanoi will bully us for further concessions and we will have served neither our own people nor our allies in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3

NATO in the 1990s

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"The papers and participants will generally address NATO and its role and function in the 1990s. NATO's posture regarding the Middle East is an important question. The participants may also wish to address the problem of technology transfer from West to East, as well as the relationship among arms producers within NATO itself. Will NATO be able to meet the Warsaw Pact challenge in the coming decade in light of domestic constraints which may complicate formulating an agreed-upon NATO-wide policy? What impact will strains within the Eastern Bloc have upon NATO?"

Panel Summary

Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF, Chairman
Commandant, The National War College

Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Dellerman, USAF, Rapporteur
National Defense University

The future of NATO has always been a topic of intense and lively debate. With the impending deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing IIs, the ongoing Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force negotiations, and the recently concluded negotiations between the United States and Greece over basing rights, NATO and its future have received significant attention from many different audiences. Accordingly, the prognoses of NATO's current state as well as its future have varied widely from one analysis to the next.

The charter of the panel was to look at the future of NATO into the 1990s, and to ascertain what would characterize the role and function of NATO in the next decade.

Three papers were presented to spark the discussion. Each approached the topic from a different perspective and presented the panel with a number of rewarding avenues of approach to the question. Dr. George H. Quester approached NATO's future from the perspective of American political philosophy. Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., viewed NATO from an alliance perspective, noting areas of historic continuity and contemporary uniqueness. Dr. John E. Reinertson described the future of NATO from a European perspective and, more precisely, from the perspective of Egon Bahr, a leading philosopher of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

Dr. Quester asserted that Americans have lost their consensus on US foreign policy. Currently there are three significant, contending philosophies. The "radical" or Marxist perspective holds that the United States is worse than most countries in terms of being a

threat to peace and the other good things of life precisely because it is the most capitalist country in the world. The "power-politics" view assumes that all countries in the world are equally guided in their foreign policies by a pursuit of power. The United States is considered to be the same as all other countries. The third attitude is the "American liberal" perspective. This view holds that America is, and has been, better than other countries and has an unusually successful and appropriate model to offer the world. This last philosophy maintains that our foreign policy has been primarily directed toward helping other peoples achieve happiness through freely elected regimes and the economic successes resulting from political democracy.

Dr. Quester asserts that the American liberal interpretation is the most appropriate with respect to US relations with our NATO allies. Americans will remain tied by liberal sentiments to the outside world and particularly to Europe, because Europe is the case which best exemplifies the relevance of such sentiments. Therefore, while there are, and will continue to be, problems and conflicts that will cause discord between the United States and its NATO allies, Quester concludes that pessimism about an erosion or termination of the American commitment to NATO could be very premature.

Dr. Pfaltzgraff emphasized the factors shaping the security environment of NATO to the 1990s. There has been a continuity of issues within the history of the alliance: out-of-area issues, discord over East-West issues, technology transfer, and defense burden-sharing. The distinguishing feature of the present period is the coincidence of these issues. These issues are apparent in the current debates over INF modernization and arms control, the demand from some quarters for a greater conventional emphasis in NATO, the whole nuclear/conventional dilemma faced by NATO, and the trend toward political decoupling on issues related to the policies of one or more members of the Alliance toward the Soviet Union.

The United States and its NATO allies remain united by the realization of a shared interest in the prevention of the extension of Soviet hegemony over Western Europe. Yet the question to be faced is the extent to which transatlantic military coupling can be sustained if members of NATO go their separate ways on political issues with vital security implications to other Alliance members. To address this is to begin a process that forms the indispensible

precondition for slowing, if not halting, the disintegrative forces within NATO. These forces in recent years have converged to create for the transatlantic relationship a series of simultaneous challenges unprecedented in its troubled history and which, taken together, do not augur well for the durability of the Atlantic Alliance in the remaining years of this century.

Dr. Reinertson describes the political thinking of Egon Bahr—the intellectual force behind West Germany's and Western Europe's *Ostpolitik*. The Bahr conception constitutes the theoretical base of the challenge that currently faces the Alliance. It is also the ongoing challenge for the Alliance in its readjustment to the Soviet achievement of overall nuclear parity. Bahr's conception of European security encompasses two political principles, labeled *change through rapprochement* and *transformation through stability*; one military/strategic principle tagged *common security*; one ideological principle christened *fruitful coexistence*; and one proposal for the future termed *regional detente*. The latter is a transitional step to Bahr's European security system, and addresses the mutual interests of European nations in detente as opposed to the mutual, global interests of the superpowers.

Bahr's proposal has three points: (1) all nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from the European states which do not themselves possess nuclear weapons; (2) in the area of conventional forces, an appropriate balance should be attained between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and (3) both alliance systems, with their obligations and guarantees, should remain unaltered. Bahr suggests that the developing sense of a European identity can be the bearer of an expanded bridge across the ideological confrontation line that currently divides Europe. With his proposal, Bahr maintains he is reflecting the global interaction of the superpowers and the more regional focus of interaction of the European states. However, it contains the potential for a major shift of power from the two superpowers to a European consensus. Dr. Reinertson sees Bahr as having captured the middle ground between the unilateralism of the European peace movement and the traditional pro-NATO stance of the governments. This gives his proposals the swing-weight influence in the middle and, when the current INF controversy is resolved, will place Bahr's proposals on the diplomatic agenda.

After the presentation and discussion of each paper, the subse-

quent panel discussion focused on the scope of the NATO consensus, the interactions among both NATO and Warsaw Pact European states, the domestic constraints in NATO programs, NATO's specialization of forces and arms-production relationships, NATO's future strategy: the technological factors and the conventional/nuclear force relationship and threshold, and the US role in NATO. In addressing these issues, the panel attempted to discuss the most probable aggregated future of NATO rather than to posit a multitude of "possible" alternative futures together with their unique impacts on NATO.

A minimalist view of what should be expected of NATO was proposed. This view would require that NATO agree only on basic matters. This would avoid "overloading" the Alliance with extraneous matters such as out-of-area common actions. It was proposed that in matters outside of Alliance core interests a "coalition of the willing" be used. The coalition would not require formal NATO support but would be formed of NATO members. A number of benefits were seen accruing from such a coalition. It could make US involvement in certain areas more palatable, e.g., in Lebanon. Knowledge of such a coordination effort among NATO allies could have a deterrent effect on others whose actions might prove inimical to NATO's interests. Such a coalition could help avoid a direct US-Soviet confrontation by allowing the use of proxies in regions having conflicts.

Some problems were indicated by panel members concerning such a "coalition of the willing." Often the United States has not wanted allied aid, especially if it perceived that such aid would require consultation and thereby limit US freedom of action. Domestic and economic constraints would often limit the European states' participation. The exact role of each state in such a coalition could itself become a contentious issue, ultimately harming NATO. Finally, any agreed-upon "division of responsibility" might work to the ultimate detriment of NATO. For example, if a division of labor delegated the responsibility of securing NATO interests in the Persian Gulf to the US, then West Germany would have to take up any resulting "slack" on the Central Front, due to withdrawal of US forces. Both the ensuing debate and the policy itself could weaken NATO.

The specialization of forces as an aspect of the coalition of the willing emerged as an independent topic. Panel members noted that

specialization of forces within NATO is a widespread current phenomenon that is often given its impetus by economic factors. It was noted that the term "specialization" is a misnomer. Rather, it is often a process of divestiture of missions by a member of NATO. Often certain of a member's areas of capability are eliminated without a compensatory increase in funding for the missions still maintained by the country's armed forces. Currently specialization is being accomplished on an ad hoc basis with little or no planning or coordination with other NATO states. Panel members emphasized that while specialization cannot be stopped, at least it could be planned by the NATO states and conducted in a manner causing the minimum debilitation of NATO's military capability.

It was noted that specialization normally contradicts the idea of NATO out-of-area activities. As states divest themselves of certain capabilities, their ability to take out-of-area actions is circumscribed. However, coalitions of the willing can, in some cases, complement the concept. France's special responsibilities in Chad and other African states (supported by US airlift capabilities) were pointed to as an example of successful specialization.

The panel subsequently addressed the central aspects of NATO's future. The majority of the panel saw little change in the actual political and military threat from what it is today. However, the majority of the panel did believe that while the American perception of the threat would remain the same, the European perception would be of the threat's decreasing. Such a dichotomy of views could further strain the Alliance in the 1990s.

To maintain unity within NATO, it was commonly believed that NATO strategy would at least formally remain unchanged in the future. Flexible response and "MC 14/3" would remain as official NATO policy despite any unofficial changes in NATO strategy. The problems and dangers of the debate entailed in any formal change of strategy would appear to outweigh any advantages to be gained.

The panel also agreed that the debate over the employment of conventional versus nuclear weapons (and the resultant strategy) will continue into the 1990s. However, it was agreed by a majority of the panel that while a no-first-use doctrine for nuclear weapons

would continue to be rejected, a no-*early*-first-use of nuclear weapons will be a policy accepted by NATO.

It was noted that, in addition to the conventional-nuclear debate, future manpower problems may affect strategy choices as well. Some saw the demographic trends of Western Europe as causing potentially severe problems for NATO. Others, however, maintained that the shrinking manpower pool could be fairly easily offset by a number of measures such as inducting women and lengthening conscripts' time in active service.

The panel also considered sustainability and readiness to be serious problems that NATO must address. The debate on these issues has a direct impact on NATO strategy and the question of whether NATO should concentrate its efforts on repelling the first echelon of attacking Warsaw Pact forces or on attempting to disrupt or destroy the forces of the second and third echelon before they engage in battle. Relative to this debate, some members noted that the role of nuclear weapons in NATO may change from battlefield usage to rear-echelon destruction. In discussing the future use of nuclear weapons, it was noted that a possible response to the continuing deployment of SS-20s by the Soviet Union would be the use of antitactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs). However, it was clear that the debate would be both sharp and intense over whether such a NATO deployment would be a stabilizing factor or a destabilizing factor in the East-West confrontation.

In line with the ATBM issue, it was noted that not all proposed changes in NATO are equally acceptable to all. For example, air strikes against rear-echelon targets deep in enemy territory may be generally accepted in NATO, while proposals for corps-sized cross-border operations may cause strong disagreements within NATO. It was observed that the controversies surrounding particular weapons, such as binary-chemical weapons and enhanced-radiation weapons, could be somewhat defused by building and storing these weapons in the United States until they were needed in Europe. However, the controversy surrounding their introduction into Europe during a time of crisis or war was not addressed by the panel.

There was seen to be a significant debate over the connection between such weapon advances and arms control. Some maintained

weapon introduction in NATO would be dependent on attempts to eliminate the weapon through arms control. These panelists indicated that Europeans would not find any new weapon acceptable if it was not first or simultaneously offered up in arms-control negotiations. Others viewed the introduction of weapons into NATO as the prerequisite for productive arms-control negotiations.

In addition to the lively and fruitful discussions on NATO and its future, the panel also examined the important issue of long-range planning within DOD. It was agreed that such planning is vital to developing coherent and practical policies for the United States. It was noted, however, that neither the Office of the Secretary of Defense nor the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff possesses an organization that accomplishes long-range planning on a continuing basis. While conferences are held and occasional committees are formed to address long-range issues of military interest, there is little, if any, continuity from one effort to the next and no continuous review of such issues. The panel generally concurred that this is a serious deficiency in both OSD and OJCS, and it would strongly recommend that both organizations establish offices whose assignment would be to conduct long-range planning on a continuing basis.

The Atlantic Alliance: Looking Ahead

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The future is seldom a straight-line projection of trends from the recent or distant past. Those who seek to understand the future by reference solely to past events are likely to fall short of an understanding of the forces shaping the emerging environment. In one sense, however, an alliance resembles a vast convoy of ships which moves at a pace determined by the characteristics and capabilities of its various components. Fundamental changes in speed and direction are likely to be gradual unless, of course, some unanticipated event or force intervenes to alter drastically its pace and course.

Such an analogy may be appropriate to the discussion of an alliance such as NATO, whose present circumstances are the result of forces that have existed for longer or shorter periods since its founding in 1949. Like the convoy, moreover, the shorter the time span during which we project, the easier it becomes to forecast the future, and the more distant in the future the timeframe upon which we focus, the greater the number of unknown factors that would necessarily have to be taken into account. It is easier to suggest the defense issues likely to face the Alliance in 1985 than it is for 1995. The focus of this paper is the next decade—into the early 1990s—with major emphasis on the factors shaping the security environment of the transatlantic relationship in the remaining years of the present decade.

THE PRESENT CONTEXT IN BROADER PERSPECTIVES

The idea of NATO in disarray is by no means a phenomenon peculiar to the circumstances of the 1980s. Even a cursory examination of the history of the transatlantic relationship reveals that NATO, almost from its founding in 1949, has confronted a series of

formidable problems related to such familiar issues of the present decade as the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces; the levels of forces to be contributed, respectively, by the United States and its European allies; the response of the Alliance and its members to security threats whose locus lies outside the formal Treaty area; and the management of relationships with the Soviet Union.

From the time of the creation of the Atlantic Alliance, the security of the North Atlantic area has been affected directly by the global security environment. In fact, the entry of the United States into the two World Wars that had their origins in Europe and the events leading to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance with the United States as the leading member symbolized the direct dependence of nations in Europe upon a non-European state for their security and illustrated that, to an extent unprecedented since the Age of Exploration, Europe was affected by events and trends in the outside world. The Korean conflict, for example, gave rise in the early 1950s on both sides of the Atlantic to a broadly perceived need to build a forward defense of NATO Europe based on the contributions that, in territory and manpower, only the Federal Republic of Germany could provide. Hence it became necessary to integrate West Germany into the Atlantic Alliance.

Apprehension about the possibility of a massive invasion of Soviet land forces across the inter-German frontier, comparable to the North Korean attack that almost overran all of the Republic of Korea in 1950, not only led to a greater emphasis in NATO upon conventional forces, but was the motivating factor in the formation of the integrated command structure of the Alliance. However, the Suez Crisis of 1956, together with the Middle East War of October 1973, and the Vietnam War, each in its own way, highlighted the divergence in perspective between the United States and at least some of its allies in responding to security problems outside the official perimeter of NATO.

A decade after the Korean Conflict, the security debate in NATO was centered on the command and control of nuclear weapons under the novel conditions that had resulted from the acquisition by the Soviet Union by the end of the 1950s of the means to launch atomic munitions against targets in the United States. One effect of this changed circumstance was the growth of impetus to-

ward raising the threshold of a NATO nuclear response to a Warsaw Pact attack, embodied in the flexible response strategy, officially adopted in 1967 after protracted and acrimonious debate; another effect was the acceleration of nuclear weapons programs in Britain and France leading to the establishment of national nuclear deterrent forces. The formation of such national nuclear forces in Europe represented a response to the question of burden-sharing, for it symbolized the unwillingness of Britain or France to accept a division of labor in which nuclear deterrence was provided exclusively by the United States, with Western Europe furnishing only conventional forces.

Throughout the history of NATO, the issue of burden-sharing, including especially the question of who is to provide what levels of conventional forces for any forward defense of Europe, has been high on the Alliance agenda. Originally, the United States, in the Truman administration, envisaged an Alliance in which the US commitment of ground forces would be minimal. At the time of the Korean Conflict, the United States increased greatly its conventional force levels deployed on the NATO Central Front, but so did the European allies, although the ambitious Lisbon goals established in 1952 were never reached and proved to be as unattainable in the early 1950s as they would have been in all subsequent periods in the history of the Alliance. In the early years of NATO, the allocation of resources for defense competed with the domestic economic priorities of European states still in the process of completing their recovery from World War II.

THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP IN THE 1980s

Such a cursory examination of the issues facing the "troubled partnership" (the term used by Henry Kissinger to describe the Atlantic Alliance a generation ago) provides the necessary perspective for an assessment of the transatlantic relationship in the 1980s. If there is a substantial element of continuity from one decade to another, the distinguishing feature of the present period is the coincidence in time among each of these issue categories. Never before in its "troubled" history has the Atlantic Alliance at the same time confronted, as it has in recent years, differences with respect to out-of-area issues (Persian Gulf, Middle East, Afghanistan, Central America); discord over East-West issues (the meaning and utility of

detente, the extension of credits, technology transfer, and energy supply); and defense burden-sharing, including the contributions respectively of the United States and Western Europe to NATO defense and the implications of the out-of-area interests of one or more Alliance members for the levels and types of contributions.

THE INF CONTROVERSY

We have confronted in recent years a controversy about the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) that has brought into prominence the complex and often contradictory questions of the "coupling" between the strategic-nuclear force of the United States and battlefield deterrence in NATO Europe. While proponents of the NATO modernization program have seen the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles as serving to reinforce the strategic coupling, those opposed to the installation of such systems have argued that they merely symbolize the determination of the United States to launch nuclear systems, in the event of war, against the Soviet Union from territory other than its own. However, Soviet statements suggest that Moscow would draw no such distinctions between nuclear systems launched by the United States from NATO Europe or from the United States itself. The inference for US-NATO strategic coupling and escalation control is clear: the modernization of NATO intermediate-range nuclear forces, as part of a reinforcement of such coupling, has as its necessary counterpart steps to modernize, and especially to enhance the survivability of, the US central strategic force.

The debate that has surrounded the NATO "double track" decision of December 1979 to modernize the theater nuclear forces of the Alliance, to be sure, has its origins in an earlier period of the transatlantic relationship. The coupling issue, it will be recalled, emerged at the end of the decade of the 1950s when the Soviet Union attained the means to launch nuclear warheads against targets in the United States. The raising of the nuclear threshold and the building of national nuclear forces in Europe represented responses to this problem. The greater the growth of the Soviet strategic-nuclear capability in relation to the United States, the more the American nuclear guarantee—a raison d'etre of NATO—would necessarily rest on foundations of uncertainty.

The Soviet Union first deployed large numbers of inaccurate strategic nuclear systems (the SS-4 and SS-5) against Western Europe by the early 1960s, followed by the development of long-range capabilities targeted in increasing numbers against the United States, as codified in the SALT I Interim Agreement and later by the unratified SALT II Treaty. Next, the Soviet Union turned to the modernization of its Eurostrategic forces, namely the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber, both of which entered production in the mid-1970s. What distinguishes the security context in which such systems have been deployed is the altered balance of military forces and specifically the qualitative changes that have accompanied the quantitative growth of Soviet military capabilities in the last 15 years, the cumulative effect of which is to weaken the escalatory chain upon which NATO deterrence has been based. Under conditions in which the perceived ability of the Atlantic Alliance to escalate credibly to higher levels is diminished, the need has become greater to deploy more adequate forces at levels below the nuclear threshold. This is the essence of the discussion of NATO's conventional options that ranks high on the Alliance agenda of the 1980s, but which emerged as a logical outgrowth of changes in the superpower strategic-nuclear relationship, and specifically the resulting consequences for the ability of the United States to continue to extend strategic deterrence to allies.

First developed in order to increase the conventional and nuclear escalatory options in light of changes in the superpower strategic-nuclear balance, NATO's flexible response strategy itself faces a series of complex questions as a result of the altered circumstances of the present decade. Although NATO has proceeded with conventional force improvements during the last decade, it is the Soviet Union more than the Atlantic Alliance that has gained enhanced flexibility of options at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The deployment of the SS-20, with counterforce-potential accuracy, has reinforced a Eurostrategic imbalance favoring the Soviet Union at a time when central strategic forces are deteriorating and will not be improved until the Reagan administration's modernization program nears completion.

Thus the American nuclear advantage that has helped to compensate for the deficiencies of US-NATO conventional forces has all but vanished. The ongoing deployment by the Soviet Union of its SS-20 force, set in the context of other elements of the Soviet stra-

tegic-military buildup, and Moscow's effort to exploit sentiment in Western Europe in opposition to NATO nuclear modernization, must be viewed as part of an effort to sever the escalatory link upon which the strategic-military planning of the Alliance has been based since its founding. In this sense, moreover, the SS-20 furnishes for the Soviet Union a weapon of political intimidation, whose utility lies in the influence that it already has given to Moscow in the NATO official and public debates about arms control and nuclear modernization. It should be recalled that no Warsaw Pact "double track" decision preceded the Soviet decision to deploy the SS-20, whose emplacement has gone forward without regard for arms-control negotiations. In the NATO debate of recent years, the United States has been urged (notably of late by the left of the SPD in the Federal Republic of Germany) to defer well beyond the present schedule the beginning of Pershing II and GLCM deployment pending the outcome of arms-control talks. But no such voices were raised calling for the Soviet Union to slow its installation of SS-20 systems, whose cumulative firepower against Western Europe already exceeds the megatonnage that would be available to NATO in the Pershing II and GLCM even after completion of the program envisaged in the NATO "double track" decision.

A principal conclusion to be drawn from the debate that has accompanied the unfolding NATO deployment plans is that the Soviet Union has sought a major role in NATO modernization decisions that thus far has been denied the Atlantic Alliance with respect to Soviet nuclear modernization decisions. Soviet success in retaining this one-sided indulgence, of course, is to be measured by Moscow's ability to alter or defer NATO modernization programs without commensurate effect on the force deployments of the Soviet Union.

INF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL

Conceivably, it was a mistake to link the modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces to the failure of the United States to reach an arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union for the limitation, or elimination, of such systems. If they have a clearly stated military rationale, then presumably an agreement prohibiting their deployment in return for the dismantling of Soviet SS-20s would still leave NATO with the need to resolve the military problem for which such Alliance systems were intended. Other than simply

countering—more politically and psychologically than militarily—the SS-20, the purpose of the NATO nuclear modernization program was to target certain categories of military installations that necessarily would be struck in the early stages of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack.

The manifestation of American intent actually to use such systems for that purpose, symbolized by their deployment, would carry with it the perception of coupling with the central United States strategic deterrent that would presumably serve to deter a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack by miscalculation. In the event, unlikely as it may be, that the United States were to reach an arms-control agreement with the Soviet Union on the basis of the zero-zero option, the problem of ensuring deterrence at the level in the ladder of escalation represented by the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile would remain unresolved. However appealing as part of the necessary consensus-forming process served by US arms-control proposals, would it not be preferable to deploy some of the intended Pershing II and GLCMs rather than none if they indeed have an important military function and under the assumption that an equitable agreement could be obtained?

Given the large number of other Soviet-Warsaw Pact capabilities and the geopolitical and psychological circumstances of the Federal Republic of Germany, nondeployment would increase the risk of a decoupling of West Germany from the deterrence framework of the Alliance. This would be true especially without—but perhaps even with—an agreement prohibiting the Soviet SS-20 as well. Both the present Bonn government and President Francois Mitterrand of France have issued warnings to such effect. As Mitterrand has reminded the West German government, neither the British nor the French national nuclear forces extend a nuclear umbrella automatically over the Federal Republic of Germany.

In the absence of a reinforced American-NATO nuclear guarantee, therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany, and thus the NATO Central Front, stands increasingly exposed to the political-psychological, and perhaps ultimately the military, effects of the continuing growth of Soviet military power in the years just ahead. Even the more powerful national nuclear forces to be built by Britain and France in the next decade will not provide more than what has been termed deterrent forces of last resort, presumably to be

launched only if British or French territory were to be attacked by Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional or nuclear forces.

Such analysis leads logically to the question of whether the strengthening of existing national nuclear forces or the development of other nationally controlled nuclear forces in Europe would furnish an alternative to the present NATO deterrent framework. Specifically, a nuclear alternative for the Federal Republic to the deterrence framework represented by Pershing II, GLCM, and the triad of US strategic forces, would seem to lie in either of two directions: (1) the formation of a national nuclear force in the hands of the Federal Republic of Germany; or (2) the evolution of the British and French nuclear forces into a European nuclear force capable of providing a substitute for, or more credible supplement to, the extended security guarantee of the United States. In the current and prospective European political environment, neither option holds great plausibility.

The reason antinuclear sentiment has been largely lacking in France, some have suggested, is that France has a truly independent national nuclear force and French destinies are not as fully in the hands of NATO or the United States as are those of Bonn. If this is true, then the unique national circumstances of Germany furnish some of the root causes for the nuclear debate of recent years in the Federal Republic. Hence the extension of the discussion of the deployment of nuclear weapons controlled by the United States to a consideration of a force targeted and launched directly from Bonn could be expected to evoke a deeply divisive debate in West Germany. It would probably arouse equally strident discussion elsewhere in NATO Europe.

Likewise, the development of a European nuclear force, by no means a novel idea, is fraught with political problems, but of a substantially different kind. Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate means for national security. Because of the consequences inherent in their use, their command and control has been vested only in the hands of national political authorities. No possessor of such weapons has yet been prepared to vouchsafe the decision to use them to control other than its own, the various "double key" arrangements of NATO notwithstanding. As de Gaulle so fully understood when he insisted upon building an independent French nuclear force, the command and control of nuclear weapons is nationally indivisible as

long as the nation-state remains the sovereign unit providing for the defense of its inhabitants.

If this logic is correct, the necessary condition for the formation of a European nuclear deterrent is the creation of a European political unit that replaces the nation-state in providing for the defense of its inhabitants. In the absence of such a transcendent solution to the "European" security problem, the question is how to deter a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack against a series of West European nations. It is complicated in that (1) two of those nations have nuclear forces that will continue, by Soviet and American standards, to be miniscule; (2) other European NATO states are unable or unwilling for various reasons to build their own nuclear deterrents; and (3), all of the defending nations depend to some degree on preserving a security relationship with the United States. And paradoxically, the latter is non-European, an Atlantic maritime power confronting the world's largest land power, the Soviet Union, from some 3,000 miles away.

In essence, this is the security problem that the deployment of modernized INF systems, no less than the Atlantic Alliance itself, has been designed to address. It is equally the issue that lies at the core of the unfolding discussion, presently more in the United States than in Western Europe, of the appropriate tactics for the conduct of a hypothesized conflict on the NATO Central Front. What remains uncertain is the direct relationship in doctrinal terms between the military rationale for the INF deployment, necessary as it is for reasons already adumbrated, and the renewed emphasis being placed upon increased conventional options for the Alliance. Presumably, one of the logical consequences of the zero-zero solution at the level of land-based INF systems would be the need for NATO to place greater emphasis on conventional force modernization.

TOWARD A GREATER CONVENTIONAL EMPHASIS?

It has been suggested that, by means of annual real increases in defense expenditures of four percent for the next several years, European NATO members might build a conventional capability which would raise the nuclear threshold and thereby increase the conventional options available to NATO at least in the early stages

of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack. Increasingly discussed is the modification of existing flexible response strategy to furnish not only the means, as at present, to halt the first echelon of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact offensive as early as possible (forward defense), but also to undertake air and ground missions in order to attack and destroy, with conventional means if possible, the following, reinforcing echelons of Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces. NATO planners should study carefully the idea of NATO's moving from a seemingly static and strictly defensive effort to halt advancing Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces to meet and engage the enemy's military units, it is to be hoped under conditions more favorable to NATO than to its adversary. If Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces in an actual military engagement would surge forward against NATO lines like the waves that successively crash against the beach, it would be important to the ultimate defeat of such an attack to break up the follow-on echelons. Like the waves that breach and destroy the storm wall in this imagery, however, if the first echelon has broken through NATO front lines and defeated the forces of the Alliance's forward defense, strikes against second-echelon and third-echelon forces will either not be possible or will not have their intended effect.

The idea of conducting deep strikes behind Soviet-Warsaw Pact front lines against second-echelon and third-echelon Soviet-Warsaw Pact military units presents numerous military and political problems that must be resolved if such a strategy is to achieve the intended purpose of reinforcing the deterrent capability of the Atlantic Alliance. They include the issue of political acceptability, especially to European publics, who have been conditioned to believe that NATO flexible response strategy is (as it in fact is) entirely defensive.

The conduct by NATO forces of substantial military operations on Warsaw Pact territory is not a familiar idea in discourse about Alliance strategy. The allies' desire to ensure that large numbers of American ground forces will remain stationed on the NATO Central Front raises at least a remote possibility that European allies, including the Federal Republic of Germany, will not object strenuously to changes in flexible response strategy such as those that provide for the use of conventional capabilities against following echelons of Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces.

European acquiescence in exclusively *American* innovations to

emphasize maneuver as a necessary part of the flexible response strategy would undoubtedly prove easier than the achievement of an *Alliance* consensus providing for its adoption by the most immediately important members (i.e., those with military forces deployed on the NATO Central Front). Nevertheless, it may be equally true that the intended effect of such changes is not attainable in the absence of a consensus providing for the inclusion of all or most European NATO forces as well. To inject this consideration into the present discussion is to ask whether deep strike in the absence of an agreed NATO approach that includes West European allies can provide a credible option for the Atlantic Alliance. If it is to be exclusively an American innovation applicable to US air and ground forces, what does this mean regarding the size and composition of US military capabilities stationed in NATO Europe? And, of equal importance, how would the operations of US units be related to the forces of other NATO allies, especially those of the Federal Republic of Germany? Would it be politically acceptable, to publics in both the United States and Western Europe, for deep strikes to be conducted principally, or exclusively, by American military units? In brief, what additional burden-sharing issues do the present discussions of deep strike and Airland Battle introduce into the transatlantic consideration of the tasks to be undertaken and the levels of capabilities to be contributed by NATO members? Could the capabilities needed for such conventional force innovations be restricted to annual real increases of four percent? What are the implications, specifically, for the US military contribution to NATO at a time when an increase in NATO European defense efforts has been sought in order to enable the United States to allocate greater resources to out-of-theater contingencies, as in the Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia?

Already there exists the beginning of a transatlantic discussion, which it is fervently to be hoped will not become a protracted, divisive debate about Alliance strategy and tactics. In the Federal Republic of Germany new-technology weapons for the conduct of conventional strikes against targets as part of Airland Battle are regarded as interesting but as yet uncertain because they are untested and, in any event, considered unlikely to become fully operational before the end of the century, even if national governments were prepared to allocate necessary funds for their development. Will Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces, in their echelon and command/control structure remain vulnerable to the effects of deep strikes and Air-

land Battle, especially if the Soviet Union has a long period of time to make changes, given the substantial lead time for the modernization of US and other NATO capabilities? It seems unlikely that, aware of impending changes in US-NATO tactics that allow substantial time for reaction, the Soviet Union would not take whatever steps it could to minimize the consequences. There is evidence that the Soviet Union has already begun to anticipate such changes in US-NATO strategy. Last but not least, does the conduct of deep strikes with conventional means accord with the military missions to be assigned to the Pershing II and GLCM as nuclear systems and what is the conventional-nuclear targeting doctrine to be applied to the relevant NATO capabilities?

The manpower requirements of Airland Battle arise in the special context presented by demographic trends that will become manifest in the Federal Republic by the end of the present decade. Official studies in Bonn have projected a decline in total West German strength, between 1990 and 1994, to 450,000 personnel at most and, at worst, as few as 420,000, well below the presently authorized *Bundeswehr* strength of 500,000. Even with changes such as the use of women in noncombat tasks, greater employment of civilians, longer terms of conscription, and increased incentives for extended service, the *Bundeswehr* will face a formidable personnel problem that will probably limit the utility of NATO conventional force options.

If such projections are accurate, they would have obvious implications for any American initiative either to reduce the US conventional force commitment to NATO or to develop tactics calling for increased manpower. Among the inferences to be drawn from declining numbers of available military personnel are the aforementioned need to rely more on women and civilians to perform noncombat tasks than in the past and to make more efficient use of European NATO reserve capabilities and to address the issues of NATO force readiness and sustainability. Of equal importance is the potential that can be afforded by new technologies that should be explored both in light of manpower trends and in the context of the types of military missions specified in present and proposed NATO tactics.

Because of demographic trends, there is skepticism in the Federal Republic that, despite the declared commitment of the

United States to maintaining a forward defense, a reordering of NATO's tactical planning concepts to emphasize deep strikes would not eventually mean, because of lack of adequate resources, a de-emphasis on forward defense and the sacrifice of substantial amounts of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany in the early stages of a hypothesized Soviet-Warsaw Pact attack. Thus the manpower requirements for the Airland Battle must be addressed if skeptics are to be satisfied that the price of deep strikes will not be to concede to the Soviet first-echelon forces the opportunity to break through NATO front lines and occupy large tracts of West German territory before a reinforced forward defense could be mounted.

Moreover, it is suggested in the Federal Republic of Germany that the anticipated manpower attrition from deep strike missions undertaken by NATO air power, which remains the most technologically proficient means of attacking rear-echelon targets, will be great because of Soviet-Warsaw Pact antiair capabilities. What would the conduct of deep strikes mean for the ability of the United States Air Force to maintain its existing assigned missions of close air support? How could a satisfactory division of labor, in the air no less than on the ground, be worked out between the United States and its NATO allies?

Such questions are intended not to cast doubt upon the Airland Battle and the deep strike idea but instead to set forth issue areas that can be expected to emerge in the years ahead in increasing intensity as part of the transatlantic security agenda. The need both to anticipate such issues and, if possible, to reach a consensus acceptable to the United States arises from the implications of the failure to do so.

One such implication would be the strengthening of the case for withdrawal of US ground forces stationed on the NATO Central Front, an issue of defense burden-sharing that already confronts the Alliance to the extent that the United States refocuses its interests and security commitments on regions outside the North Atlantic area. The consequences of a failure of the Alliance to maintain agreed concepts for the deterrence of war in Europe, and especially for the use of American ground forces stationed there, should furnish in itself an important incentive for an intensified transatlantic effort to find answers to the fundamental questions raised by the

present discussion of conventional options available to NATO.

THE NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL DILEMMA

In the present decade the Atlantic Alliance faces simultaneously a condition in which the deployment of modernized nuclear weapons has become politically more difficult and the willingness to bear the burden of greater conventional forces as a means of raising the nuclear threshold is not readily apparent. Few NATO members have been prepared even to contribute the agreed three percent annual real increase in defense spending, let alone to make the extra budgetary sacrifice (and contribute the increased manpower) that would be needed in support of a greater reliance on conventional deterrence.

As long as the United States enjoyed a margin of superiority, and a residual advantage even during years when the Soviet Union was narrowing the gap in strategic capabilities, it was possible to deploy nuclear weapons on the NATO Central Front as a relatively cheap substitute for the conventional forces that otherwise would have been needed in order to achieve at that level a balance with the Soviet Union. One of the effects of the strategic-nuclear trends of the last decade, adverse as they have been for the West, is to lessen the attractiveness of nuclear weapons as the basis for NATO deterrence.

Although the implications of this changed circumstance were first evident in the transatlantic security debate of the 1960s, from which emerged the original flexible response strategy, its full effects were not to be felt until the 1980s. This is the broader context within which is set the present discussion of the conventional options available to the Alliance in the years ahead. Unless the existing dilemma is resolved, the likelihood will grow that NATO will eventually lack either an agreed nuclear *or* conventional strategy, as well as the commensurate military means to ensure the deterrence of conflict in Europe. This, of course, is the political purpose of the Soviet campaign of "active measures" being conducted in Western Europe and elsewhere against NATO force modernization. At the same time, the Soviet Union proceeds with its own vast armaments effort to codify Moscow's superiority or, in the case of the SS-20, monopoly in weapons systems, with redress denied to NATO either

by international agreement or by acts of self-abnegation by the Alliance or by one or more of its key members.

The result, furthermore, of the substantial Soviet military buildup that continues in the 1980s is the deployment by the Soviet Union of forces affording unprecedented flexibility for nuclear and conventional operations, conducted separately or, more likely, as part of a "combined arms offensive." Even before the end of the 1970s, some in the NATO planning community were asking whether the Soviet Union was attaining, or had already attained, a capability to attack NATO from a standing start, that is to say, without prior military mobilization that would act as a warning. If such a Soviet-Warsaw Pact force already exists, or is in the process of coming into being, the inference to be drawn is that the failure of the Alliance to defeat the Soviet first echelon will spell military defeat for the West. The enhanced flexibility of options that are available to the Soviet Union as a result of its force modernization of the past decade emcompass the use of conventional means against NATO, including attacks against NATO nuclear installations and stockpiles, thus reducing drastically the means available before NATO escalation to a first use of nuclear weapons.

There is little conclusive evidence, either in Soviet-Warsaw Pact military doctrine or in its force planning, to lead to the assumption, popular in NATO, that the first phase of a hypothesized conflict would be conducted exclusively with conventional weapons. The Soviet Union has not accepted the "firebreak" phenomenon inherent in the conventional-nuclear thresholds discussion that has shaped the thought of strategists, including the official policy communities, in Western Europe and the United States. Among the fallacies of the "no first use" of nuclear weapons school of thought in the United States is the contention that NATO, by self-denial of this option, can raise the nuclear threshold. The reverse may be the case. If its leadership believed that NATO would not be the first to resort to nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union might be tempted to attack either with conventional or nuclear means in the assumption that NATO might be self-deterred even from employing such devastating weapons in retaliation, an argument that is implicit, for example, in the Pastoral Letter of the American Catholic Bishops.

In another scenario, suppose the Alliance agreed to "no first use" of nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union launched a conventional attack, overrunning large amounts of NATO territory. In this

case the Alliance would still have available the option of reversing itself and actually using nuclear weapons first to avoid certain defeat. In such a scenario Soviet miscalculation of Western intent, based upon "no first use," would have precipitated an attack leading in fact to NATO first use of nuclear weapons, but under military conditions highly disadvantageous to the Atlantic Alliance.

The attempt to enhance NATO conventional options has as one of its laudable objectives the attainment, if possible, of a condition of "no early first use" of nuclear weapons in Europe. What remains, however, is the need to examine, in as great detail as possible, the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces in concepts such as the Airland Battle. To what extent can, and should, conventional technologies be deployed in place of nuclear systems, and for what types of missions? How do battlefield nuclear weapons fit into an emerging NATO military strategy for the Central Front? In the Federal Republic of Germany there are expressions of interest in a shift in emphasis from relatively short-range nuclear weapons (150 kilometers) to longer range (still battlefield) nuclear artillery and rockets (1,000 kilometers). What are likely to be NATO needs with respect to new-generation nuclear systems that have ranges beyond the immediate battlefield and yet shorter than the ranges of the Pershing II and GLCM? Last but not least, and especially in light of the incentives for preemption currently available to the Soviet Union, what steps can be taken by the Alliance to enhance the survivability of both its nuclear and conventional force structure in Europe? This is by no means a novel problem for NATO in the 1980s; however, its urgency has been heightened by the increased numbers and accuracy of Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces in the last decade.

THE TRANSATLANTIC POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP

Steps necessary to avoid military decoupling must be within the broader context of the transatlantic political relationship, which in turn involves domestic politics and pluralistic societies of member countries of the Alliance. Whatever the political-military problems that gave rise to, or flowed from, the December 1979 NATO "double track" decision, it represented what was deemed by member governments to be a necessary exercise in consensus-forming in support of nuclear modernization.

Whatever the elements of contradiction between the modernization of NATO nuclear forces in support of the military needs of the Alliance, on the one hand, and the negotiation of an arms-control agreement for their elimination, on the other, the NATO "double track" decision accorded with the consensual framework of the Alliance formulated as long ago as the Harmel Report of 1968. That report codified for NATO the notion that defense was the essential prerequisite for detente. In Winston Churchill's memorable phrase, "We arm to parley." But the original NATO consensus that only an adequate defense can induce the Soviet Union to enter an equitable agreement, presumably including arms control, had worn thin by 1979, and had been altered fundamentally by the early 1980s.

Instead, the failure of arms control negotiations to avert the need for NATO deployment of new systems had become the basis for the formulation of a NATO consensus on defense modernization. According to such logic, only in the event that arms-control negotiations do not yield an agreement for nondeployment of NATO systems can the modernization of Alliance defense capabilities go forward. The problems inherent in such an approach are magnified when the arms-control negotiations apply to systems that NATO has yet to deploy and to weapons that the Soviet Union has already begun to deploy. Such a transformation was already evident at the time of the neutron weapon controversy that faced the Atlantic Alliance in 1978.

Before the Carter administration decided not to produce the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW), NATO was in the process of evolving a consensus remarkably similar to the December 1979 "double track" decision on INF modernization. NATO would agree not to deploy the neutron weapon if the Soviet Union would not proceed with deployment of the SS-20—which had already begun. Of course, the unilateral American decision against the ERW had no discernible effect on the deployment pace of the SS-20—no more than a comparable decision not to modernize NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces would now have on Soviet policy.

Notwithstanding the role of the Carter administration, and especially of President Carter himself, in the breakdown of an emerging transatlantic consensus on the ERW, convoluted as it was from the initial idea of the Harmel Report, it was the United States that by the end of the last decade, and into the 1980s, sought to

elicit from European allies not only a greater commitment to their own security but also an agreed approach to relations with the Soviet Union. The trend toward political decoupling on a substantial number of issues that, in the final analysis, are directly related to the policies of one or more members of the Alliance toward the Soviet Union has accelerated in recent years.

THE ALLIANCE AND OUT-OF-AREA SECURITY ISSUES

Nowhere has this phenomenon been more evident than in out-of-area issues. It has faced the United States in particular as the security threat emanating from the problems of Central Amer has grown in intensity. The greater the growth of Soviet-Cuban activity in Central America, the more difficult it has become to achieve a transatlantic security consensus on this region and the more the policies of European allies and the United States have seemed to work at cross purposes. This is not to suggest that members of the Alliance have always found it impossible to collaborate in responding to security issues beyond the geographic perimeter of NATO and that greater understanding on the part of European allies to the strategic importance of Central America to the United States will prove to be impossible.

There are examples of US-European collaboration in out-of-area security issues. American assistance, indirectly given, to Britain may have been indispensable to the success of the Falklands War. The European Community was prepared, at least for the short duration of the conflict, to impose economic sanctions against Argentina. At the height of the tension in the Persian Gulf in the 1979–81 period, France deployed a naval capability in the Indian Ocean second only to that of the United States. An international peacekeeping force that has included units from the United States and other NATO allies—Britain, France, and Italy—has been stationed in Lebanon. As it considers the continuation or escalation of the US military presence in Lebanon, the Reagan administration will face the question of out-of-area contributions from France and Italy. An American domestic consensus on increased US military action presumably would be easier to sustain if two or more European allies had also made a substantial direct military contribution.

France has sent military units to Chad in an effort to help turn the tide of aggression from Libya's Colonel Qaddafi. Conceivably, the size and diversity of the membership of the Atlantic Alliance renders all but impossible the achievement of a NATO-wide consensus on out-of-area contingencies. Instead, the most that is realistically to be hoped for may be a "coalition of the willing" such as has been evident in the response of Alliance members to such situations in recent years. Clearly the need exists for the development on a contingency basis of a force consisting of capabilities drawn, as appropriate, from the military establishments of as many NATO members as might be willing to cooperate in such an endeavor.

The principal sources of armed conflict in the years ahead may be projected to lie in the Third World. The Soviet Union, with its surrogates and the increased power projection capabilities, especially maritime forces and the means for the airlift of supplies that Moscow will have available, will afford unprecedented means for the exploitation of the indigenous conflicts of Third World countries and regions. Such a trend places increased burdens upon the United States. Soviet-Cuban activity in Central America holds the potential to divert US capabilities from security commitments in Western Europe and East Asia to contingencies closer to home. In fact, a central element of Soviet strategy, it may plausibly be argued, will be to heighten tensions in Central America in operations of relatively low military risk and economic cost to Moscow but having a high degree of leverage on the ability of the United States to sustain commitments elsewhere. Stated in stark terms, for Moscow the road to political hegemony in Europe may be perceived to lie through Cuba and Nicaragua, if not through the exacerbation of other Third World tensions and conflicts holding out the possibility of heightening transatlantic discord and redirecting American capabilities at a time when European allies are unable or unwilling to allocate commensurately greater resources to their own defense.

THE TRANSATLANTIC POLITICAL-MILITARY COUPLING

Thus the question to be faced under emerging conditions is the extent to which transatlantic military coupling can be sustained if members of the Alliance go their separate ways on political issues with security implications vital to one or more countries, and especially to the United States. Thus far the political fabric of NATO has withstood, but in somewhat tattered form, the disputation

about the "divisibility of detente" that has had both geographical and functional dimensions.

The United States and West European Alliance members were unprepared to agree to a common imposition of sanctions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because such measures might somehow jeopardize the achievements of normalization of a decade ago in Europe. Such reluctance was greatest in the Federal Republic of Germany, which in terms of trade and technology transfer, as well as inter-German contacts, including access to West Berlin, had the most to lose. The extension of commercial credits by financial institutions in Western Europe and the United States to the Soviet Union itself and to other East European Communist states, as well as the development of other commercial links, had created a situation by the beginning of the present decade of "reverse" vested interests.

A decade ago, it should be recalled, it was the expectation of detente proponents that the extension of such contacts would lead to vested interests in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe sufficient both to sustain such relationships and to seek their extension into other issue areas deemed to be of importance to the United States, and on terms in accord with its basic interests. Instead, proponents of the termination of such relationships as the penalty for Soviet misbehavior encounter formidable resistance on both sides of the Atlantic for the allegedly greater penalizing effect that such action would have on the Soviet Union.

The measured US response to what President Reagan properly described as the Soviets' South Korean airline "massacre" may be explained in part by a "reverse vested interest theory" (e.g., the detrimental effect of a cancellation of wheat sales upon US farmers that would be even greater than its implications for the Soviet Union). If such arguments did not seem compelling on this side of the Atlantic in light of the domestic political and economic issues at stake, the price of a toughened American response would have been Alliance discord, for there was no visible West European interest in jeopardizing any important political or commercial relationships or heightening military tensions by the cancellation or postponement of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. In fact, as happened when the Carter administration imposed its grain embargo on the Soviet Union after the invasion of Afghanistan, the United

States had no assurance that the European Community, with its huge agricultural surpluses, would not have hastened to supply the Soviet Union with what it was denied in grain exports by the United States.

Last but not least, more than any other single issue, the transatlantic debate about the construction with Western technologies and investment loans of the pipeline to supply Soviet natural gas to Western Europe has symbolized differing transatlantic perspectives on the relationship between defense itself and directly related commercial sectors such as technology transfer and sales of natural gas. These, unlike the Soviet purchase of grain, help Moscow to accumulate rather than draw down reserves of hard currencies that make possible the purchase of advanced technologies having military applications for the Soviet Union. Such technologies, it has been argued persuasively in the United States more than in Western Europe, contribute to the further development of Soviet military power.

Thus the Atlantic Alliance remains divided on basic questions related to the response to a Soviet strategy that, compared to a generation or even a decade ago, is far more global in its overall dimensions. As the complexity of issues has increased to encompass far-flung regions that extend from Central America to East Asia and functional issue categories—grain sales, technology transfer, energy supply, trade, and the flow of investment capital—the difficulties inherent in devising an Alliance strategy have been magnified.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States and its NATO allies remain united by the realization of a shared interest in the prevention of the extension of Soviet hegemony over Western Europe. This was the concern that brought them together initially in the formation of the Atlantic Alliance. At the time of its founding, the political influence, the military power, and the economic strength of the United States, as numerous commentators have stated, were vastly greater relative to Western Europe and (except in conventional forces) relative to the Soviet Union. Member states seek maximum security at the lowest possible level of expenditures, actual force levels, and in ac-

ceptance of obligations outside the formal geographic area encompassed by the North Atlantic Treaty.

Increasingly, European allies, so it seems from the United States, wish to preserve whatever security benefits remain from an association with the United States while nevertheless placing some distance politically between their foreign policy and that of the United States. For its part, the United States finds unacceptable a security relationship that does not produce what it regards as an equitable distribution of defense burdens in support of interests deemed to be at least as important to European allies as they are to the United States itself. For a variety of reasons unrelated to the policy perspectives or changes of any single US administration, the willingness of European allies to accept the leadership of the United States has diminished without its replacement by a West European political entity capable of assuming whatever additional defense burdens would be essential in light of the changed security environment of the 1980s. In such circumstances resort to the old panacea of greater Alliance consultation or the reassertion of American leadership is even less likely to serve the needs of the Alliance in the years ahead than it did in the past.

Paradoxically, the preservation of the means needed to prevent the extension of Soviet hegemony represents the indispensable prerequisite to the pursuit of policies of maximum independence by Alliance members toward the Soviet Union. At what point, then, does unilateralism—American or European, together with policies that lead to increased disillusionment by one or more members with the Alliance itself or toward one or more members—undermine irreparably its basic military structure and political fabric? How far has NATO in the last decade gone toward such a situation? Can the Alliance anticipate and thus possibly avert causes of further discord despite its present full agenda of contentious problems? To address such questions is to begin a process that forms the indispensable precondition for slowing, if not halting, the disintegrative forces that in recent years have converged to create for the transatlantic relationship a series of simultaneous challenges unprecedented in its troubled history and which, taken together, do not augur well for the durability of the Atlantic Alliance in the remaining years of this century.

The Future of The American NATO Commitment

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Western Europe has been special for the United States, special enough to produce the defensive commitments central to the structure of NATO. Yet will it remain so? This is the question about which we will be worrying throughout this paper. To attempt to answer whether American commitments to Western Europe can persist, we will first have to ask ourselves what has made Western Europe, indeed all of Europe, ever become so special for the goals and commitments of American foreign policy.

It is possible to identify and outline at least three major interpretations of American foreign policy in general, interpretations contending with each other now, as Americans try to understand themselves and their role in the world. We will outline these interpretations, and then attempt to relate them to our interest in Western Europe.

A first interpretation to be considered, the most critical of American foreign policy, would be what could be called a "radical" or Marxist perspective. This would be a view that the United States is worse than most countries, in terms of being a threat to peace and the other good things of life, precisely because it is the most capitalist country in the world, thus the most burdened by the alleged internal failings and contradictions of capitalism. The domestic failings of the capitalist system, including a maldistribution of resources and unemployment of large numbers of workers, lead to imperialist adventures abroad in a fierce competition for the markets in which to dump surpluses of production, and thus lead to arms races and wars.

A second interpretation could be labelled the "power-politics" approach, assuming that all countries in the world are equally

guided in their foreign policies by a pursuit of power. This would be a view that the United States is the same as all other countries, "an ordinary country" in the title of a book by Richard Rosecrance,[1] with a statesman like Wilson or Acheson or Kissinger behaving no differently than a Bismarck or Clemenceau or Churchill.

The third interpretation would be what most Americans would have endorsed until quite recently as best describing their own country, what might be labelled the "American liberal" perspective. This would be a view that America is, and has been, better than other countries; having an unusually successful and appropriate model to offer the world, we have ventured out into the world mainly to help other peoples achieve the same happpiness by freely elected regimes, and by the economic successes that flow in the wake of such political democracy.

As noted, this liberal view would have impressed almost all Americans as the most apt interpretation of United States foreign policy, for all the years before World War II, and for most of the time since. The power-politics view was introduced and somewhat popularized in the years immediately after World War II, with the writings of Hans Morgenthau playing a central role here.[2] Such advocates of *Realpolitik* argued that they were offering previously naive Americans an antidote to shock and disappointment about the behavior of others, and an antidote to hypocrisy about themselves.

The "radical" view, whether it be of a Marxist or non-Marxist stripe, only began to attract a wider following during the Vietnam War, as many Americans (on campus and off) began to convince themselves that their country was imposing unnecessary troubles on the Third World, resisting the forces of "socialism" because the demands of American profit-margins somehow required such resistance. These were Americans who concluded now that political democracy was inappropriate for places like Vietnam or Cuba or Angola, as "economic democracy"—a more equal sharing of wealth—would be far more important than political democracy, than free elections or freedom of the press, with the latter "bourgeois" institutions having to be sacrificed if they got in the way of "socialism."

TESTING THEORIES OF US FOREIGN POLICY

How then do these interpretations of American foreign policy play out for the nature, and the durability, of American commitments to Western Europe? The radical interpretation does not normally so much relish being tested against Europe, since its favorite cases come in places like China or El Salvador or Guinea. Can one prove American capitalist selfishness and greed by the Marshall Plan? If Lenin's interpretation of international conflict among advanced societies (a conflict allegedly explaining World Wars and arms races) is to be believed, it surely was a short-sighted and foolish move for American industry to build up such a powerful trade rival. One remembers the hopeless task of the lone Communist member of the Wurttemburg Parliament in 1948 opposing the granting of the requisite approval for the delivery of Marshall Plan Aid. "The Americans will dump their surpluses on you, their surplus grain, their surplus butter, their surplus manufactures . . . ," he warned, to which all the rest of the Parliament responded by chanting "Great news; hurry it up; the sooner, the better."

As said, Marxists and radicals feel on more comfortable ground when snatching up US foreign-policy case studies for Central America, or for anywhere else in the Third World. This dichotomy, on which kinds of cases suit the radical or suit the liberal, will itself play an important role in the future development of American commitments, a point that we shall return to a little later.

The second of our interpretations, that of power-politics, might find Western Europe's value for the United States relatively straightforward to explain. The primary issue then is whether such a "realistic" set of categories really captures the entirety and the essence of American sentiments here. The NATO countries are valuable for the resources they offer, their raw materials (we now constantly encounter arguments that the Middle East and southern Africa are even more valuable here), but especially their industrial capacity for converting such raw materials. If the industrial potential and human energies of the West Europeans were to fall under Soviet control, this (once all of such resources had been digested, or in part wasted—the standard Communist pattern) would surely strengthen Moscow's option for developing military weapons systems; or it would increase Moscow's option for enhancing the

civilian living standards of the USSR (either or both of these being regarded by *Realpolitik* theorists as standard goals for ordinary countries.) While such a Soviet conquest of the European NATO countries would eliminate a troublesome trade rival for the United States (who would want to buy a Volkswagen made in a Marxist-run assembly plant?), the United States would still quite understandably—in power-politics terms—want to head off such an accretion of power for Moscow.

Another kind of power-politics consideration would point simply to the geographical space of Western Europe, rather than its resources or industry. One is better off defending his own home in someone else's backyard—an old adage of national self-interest, in a world of uncertain power distributions. Yet, persuasive as this might sound, it would clearly seem still more relevant to Central America than to Western Europe.

A last kind of power consideration is a little more psychological, and less economic or geographical. If we have once stated our willingness to defend an area, and then back out of such commitments, our commitments everywhere else will come under more scrutiny and challenge. The initial commitment to the defense of an area might be quite haphazard and accidental, but the continuation of such a commitment thereafter becomes very important. The American investment in the maintenance of the status quo in West Berlin illustrates this extremely well. The very existence of a Western enclave in Berlin looks in retrospect like a sleep-walking exercise, based on premises about continuing Allied cooperation after the defeat of Hitler's Germany, generating an unnecessary irritant for Soviet-American relations when this cooperation did not continue.

West Berlin is not an economic asset; it is rather a drain and liability for the economy of West Germany. West Berlin is not a buffer contributing to the defense of Western Europe, or the United States. (When the commitment to Berlin was established, the United States was also not particularly fond of the Berliners, or of Germans in general; in 1948 they still looked like "Nazis," with the experience of the Soviet blockade, and the US airlift, then changing this imagery substantially.) Instead the American commitment to West Berlin arose, and was continued, and has been continued to this date, because to surrender it might weaken American power (image is an ingredient of power) all around the globe.

Perhaps our commitment to all of Western Europe, and not just to West Berlin, might be derived in part from such psychological considerations of the precedent stemming from past commitments. Yet this factor probably plays a larger role in our commitment to South Korea, and in the retention of our enclave base at Guantanamo in Cuba, and even perhaps in the maintenance of the ban on Soviet nuclear deployments in Cuba, won in President Kennedy's "finest hour" in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

All of these power considerations—economic resources, geographical position, or the dangers of setting precedents of surrender—may thus not be unique enough to Western Europe to explain the depth of American commitments to NATO. As noted, they suggest that the United States be seriously interested in Western Europe, but that our attentions normally would be fixated elsewhere.

It is when we apply our third perspective, by which Americans generously and altruistically identify with the happiness and well-being of others, that the depth of the attachment to Europe begins to make more sense. Americans care about more than markets for their capitalist entrepreneurs, and about more than power. Europe is the mother continent for most Americans, in terms of genetic heritage, and it is the source of our language for all of us, English-speaking or Spanish-speaking. More importantly, Europe is the place from which we have drawn our culture and our philosophy, and our ideas about political freedom and democratic elections.

Americans may feel sympathy for all human beings abroad, eager to share with them the institutions and arrangements that have produced happiness within the United States. Yet it is perfectly normal psychologically to identify the most, vicariously, with people that resemble us, "people like us." Except for Canada and Australia and New Zealand (countries which would also be shielded by the same American military commitments and "nuclear umbrellas"—if they ever needed to be shielded) there are no places in the world that quite so much resemble our own country. Beyond the simpler psychological feelings of identification, the Western (and Eastern) European countries remain places where Americans assume that political democracy can work (even while the applicability of free institutions has been cast into more doubt for places like Vietnam, or El Salvador).

We typically are now able to list some eighteen to twenty-five countries in the world where free election systems still function, and the bulk of these remain in Europe. A few very radical Americans might question the appropriateness of such free elections—of political democracy—even for places like Britain or Denmark, even for the United States, but this would be a skepticism about liberal values which has gripped only the tiniest minority of Americans.[2] Far more Americans might now have their doubts about the workability or applicability of political democracy in the underdeveloped world, a conclusion which this author would regard as very premature and unfortunate, but which all the more serves then to explain why Europe is special, and why it may well remain special.

Our three broad interpretations of American foreign policy would each thus have to be measured against our pattern to date of committing ourselves to NATO's defense, as we extrapolate into the future the interpretation which best seems to explain the past. As noted, the radical interpretation is full of paradoxes where Western Europe is concerned. The material power-politics explanation is plausible, but it has some ins and outs, as Europe alternates between being a power asset, and power liability. Does having Western Europe on our side enhance our strength, or does it tie down our strength?

The liberal interpretation, that we are bound to Europe by philosophical values, and by ties of culture and heritage, is the most persuasive, for it readily acknowledges that Europe has been a "liability," an "entangling commitment," a commitment we wanted to make for its own sake, rather than as a means to ends anywhere else on the globe. Some of us still have aunts living in Europe, while others could not begin to trace their ancestry back to the crossings of the North Atlantic, but the bulk of us are far from forgetting the links across the ocean for which NATO is named.

THE MILITARY THREAT

Western Europe is special for being valuable, but it is additionally vulnerable, and it may be unique in combining such value and vulnerability. Geopolitically, one does not have to read Mackinder to perceive that the European side of NATO amounts to a peninsula sticking out from the Eurasian continent, inherently vulnerable to

invasions by whoever controls the central "heartland" of that continent. The forces mobilizable by the Soviet Union can ride or walk to Paris, while the American forces needed to redress the balance would have to come by sea or by air, logistically always a more demanding process.

The United States is committed to one other peninsula reaching out from Eurasia, South Korea, raising many of the same problems over the years on continuity of commitment, feasibility of conventional reinforcement options, and credibility of threats of nuclear escalation. Yet the American interest in Korea is much more explained by power-politics considerations of precedent than by liberal identifications with the people and lifestyle of the Republic of Korea. Having once shed the blood of young Americans in defending South Korea, we would fear the consequences of having the world see us back away from such a defense now, throwing away whatever was won in 1950. By comparison, the politics of South Korea hardly merit the label of political democracy. The energies of the Korean people obviously merit some admiration among Americans, and the growing community of Korean-Americans may produce new linkages in the future, but one wonders whether we could be persuaded to pledge a defense of Korea, if we had not already once carried out such a defense.

As noted, Australia and New Zealand are other places which are just as valuable to the United States by liberal perspectives, and so has become Japan, after the remarkable transformation in image and reality which occurred since 1945. Yet these places are not so geopolitically vulnerable, for they do not sit in the path of a plausible advance of Soviet tanks. Britain and Ireland are similarly valuable, but less vulnerable.

For the near future, the Persian Gulf area might creep into a similar status of high value, coupled with great vulnerability, such that all the tense lessons of uncertain commitments and hypothetical escalatory threats we extracted from NATO and from Korea would have to be applied there as well. Here the tie would not stem from any liberal identifications, as with Europe or Australia, or in considerations of the power of precedent as in Korea and our original commitment to West Berlin, but rather the more material power factor of the enormous oil reserves in the region. Our commitment to Israel in the Middle East region may then be exceptional, in

that it stems from the same altruistic motives of identification as apply in NATO. Israel is a "liability," rather than an asset, despite its unhappiness when any US government official ever phrases the situation this way. It is something we wish to shield against attack, merely because we love the people and admire the political style they set, rather than because of their contributions in oil or industry, or their sturdiness as some kind of strategic buffer. (Lest the radical explanation be forgotten, does anyone wish to argue that we defend Israel because we see it as a market in which to dump our surplus manufactures, or because American investment capital wishes to purchase and operate plantations there?)

We would define this "valuable-vulnerable" category in other terms as "the fifty-first states." When pressed by allies as to whether our commitments will persist in the future, we sometimes order a round of drinks and announce that "We Americans think of you (West Germans, Britishers, Australians, etc.) as the fifty-first state." Reassuring as this phrase may sound, one ought to probe it a little more deeply for meaning. It suggests that we would go as far in defense of such areas as we would go for California or Massachusetts, thus probably meaning that we would escalate to nuclear war in response to an attack on such areas. Conversely one can not imagine such a use of words, or such a likelihood of nuclear escalation, on behalf of Thailand or Zaire.

"Fifty-first states" become such because they are extraordinarily valuable to us. They also tend to become such because they are vulnerable, because the question of their survival gets posed when hostile neighbors present threats of armed assault.

Considerations of precedent then impose demands of continuity; the country which is threatened gets reassured, and then continues to be reassured into the future. Our linkage becomes a little circular, therefore. "Fifty-first states" get nuclear umbrellas extended over them. But the extension of the nuclear umbrella solidifies and continues the special "fifty-first" status.

DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN SELF-IMAGE

What would we then predict about the trends over time in such an American commitment to NATO? The Vietnam War worked to

destroy what previously had been a predominant (and therefore often unarticulated) American ideological consensus behind the liberal position. Almost every American, asked in 1948 whether the far corners of the world would be happier if they were governed in the same manner as Minnesota, would have responded affirmatively, whether the corner be Bavaria or Bulgaria, or Angola or Cambodia; and most of such Americans would have viewed their country's foreign policy as intended to facilitate such an ultimate spread of the free election system: of what we should call, to be precise, "political democracy."

Given the costs and frustrations and tactical deceits of the Vietnam War, however, a fair number of such Americans then shifted instead to accepting the radical interpretation (discounting the value of our model and thus distrusting all of our foreign policy) or to the power-politics interpretation (by which our policy should no longer be anything but selfish, i.e., should not even try to be high-mindedly meritorious of trust).[4]

As we move ahead in our foreign policy, in accordance with one or another of these theories about what this policy is *all about*, we will be enmeshed, moreover, in a dynamic process of seemingly confirming one or the other of such theories, compounding some of the new disagreements and confusions. Much of our discussion here will pertain to the possibility of the United States settling once again into some kind of stable and persistent view of its commitments abroad.

The United States has thus certainly gone through a change since the 1960s, but the nature and full dimensions of this change remain difficult to discern. If this paper were about the future of the American commitment to SEATO, rather than NATO, it might amount to a depressing account of a steady erosion of American commitments. But the topic here is NATO, not SEATO; and the argument in this paper is that a depression about an erosion or termination of the American NATO commitment could be very premature.

Equally premature would be conclusions that only power-political considerations will stimulate Americans from here on, or that the demands of capitalism have somehow been decisively proven as the source of all American foreign-policy decisions. As Americans

have remained at odds among themselves as to which of these interpretations fits our foreign policy best, the liberal commitment to contributing to the happiness of others retains a great deal of strength.

We shall try now to list the kinds of foreign-policy advice offered by the three perspectives outlined on America's role in the world. If the advice of the liberal perspective were to be followed, would this serve to reinforce the number of Americans accepting this perspective? If we begin with Europe, it will be argued here, this reinforcement would occur. But what if we follow the advice of the power-politics school instead? This may paradoxically pull our national consensus still further apart, by seemingly confirming the logic of the radical interpretation.

The radical advice for the United States is relatively simple for the moment, captured in a way by McGovern's campaign slogan of 1972, "Come Home, America." It would be to withdraw from Central America as well as Southeast Asia, and to withdraw from Europe as well. It does not amount to a simple and straightforward isolationism; if the United States could ever be turned around into a noncapitalist society itself, then we would be sending out the Marines to support revolutions of the left elsewhere, deposing the white regime in South Africa, deposing the army regime in Chile, etc. Until then, however, since the United States (by this interpretation) always does bad in the world, it should for the moment strive to do nothing in the world.

As was shown in Richard Nixon's smashing defeat of McGovern even in 1972, and by election trends ever since, the radical view has hardly come close to winning a consensus position in the United States. It rather merely influences enough of our people, and enough of our analysis, to confuse and prevent the establishment any more of anything else as a consensus.

The power-politics advice rather would be to forget everything except resources and position (and probably precedent), concentrating our efforts where they most relate to our "vital interests" (somewhat narrowly or tautologically defined), therefore probably concentrating on "our own backyard," in particular on Central America and Mexico.

The power-politics interpretation perhaps captures more Americans these days than the radical position. Since we failed to win any gratitude in this world for our sacrifices in Vietnam, and have been accused by many of being just "an ordinary country," many of us as Americans will conclude that we may as well conform to the accusation, "taking care of ourselves first." Yet the question is whether such a narrow outlook, on the applications of our influence in the world, can ever be consistent with the instincts of a majority of Americans. A selfish pursuit of only our "national interests" or our "vital interests" as an "ordinary country" might simply be against our national character. It might also paradoxically make us look *not* like an ordinary country, but like the radical caricature of the United States as an "unusually bad country."

If we follow the advice of our power-politics advocates of *Realpolitik*, for example, and concentrate our energies and attentions on Central America (thereby also concentrating much of the world's attention on Central America), we might preclude the establishment of some Soviet bomber bases in Nicaragua and El Salvador (with whatever strategic difference this makes—or does not make—in a world of intercontinental-range missiles, and oceans concealing missile-launching submarines). We may at the same time seem to be supporting some of the worst examples of selfish "ancient regime" landlords, thus seemingly confirming the radical charges that we always support economic inequality.

Central America, it would be contended here, is thus a loser for anyone trying to recapture that consensus and self-confidence that used to be such important underpinnings of American foreign policy. It pulls us into supporting former henchmen of the Somozas; it is a case made-to-order for the Marxist claiming that capitalistic vested interests explain all of American foreign policy. Trying to head off the establishment of leftist dictatorships, we will have great difficulty in finding and supporting any true supporters of free elections and free press and liberal institutions. We will instead, out of power-motives, wind up opposing economic justice, without accomplishing anything in the way of political liberty, opposing "economic democracy" without doing anything to support "political democracy."

Only a single country in the region, Costa Rica, has to date shown inclinations toward the kind of liberal and free society that

we care about. Nicaragua and El Salvador and Honduras and Guatemala have been something very different.

For purposes of getting Americans to feel good about their foreign policy again, we thus would need a region full of Costa Ricas. And we have one, of course, in the very NATO area we are discussing in this paper. For liberal purposes, a focus of Western Europe (*and* on Eastern Europe) is thus just the opposite of a concentration on Central America. It is an "easy case" for the liberal perspective, and a loser for the Marxists, just as Central America is a "tough case" for the liberals, and a winner for the Marxists.

If we pursue our liberal instincts, beginning once again with the area for which they are least open to challenge, we renew our trust in these instincts, and our self-confidence in the appropriateness of being active anywhere at all outside our borders.

For Central America, as for Southeast Asia, and earlier for China, many Americans have now all too often concluded that "They will lose their freedom under the Communists, but at least they won't be starving any more; and besides they wouldn't have any freedom under our allies either." In the European case, illustrated so very nicely by Poland, the juxtapositions are just the opposite: "They lost their freedom under the Communists, and they are worse off economically than ever; and they are people like us, perfectly capable of living well under a system of free elections."

With regard to Europe, the Europe of NATO and also the Europe of the Warsaw Pact, Americans can feel as they felt after World War II, with nothing to apologize for. The evidence is clear that Western Europe shares our satisfaction with the liberal political system and with the economic consequences of this political system. The evidence is similarly clear that Eastern Europe yearns for our political system, and for its economic concomitants.[5]

The Czechoslovak events of 1968 show us this. The Polish events of 1981 showed us the same. The election of a Polish Pope amounted only to a more spectacular reminder of some basic underlying facts, that East Europeans were "people like us" in their wants and inclinations, people greatly dissatisfied when these wants were frustrated by Soviet foreign policy, people hoping that

American foreign policy will do as much as it can to counterbalance Soviet power.

One should not exaggerate how bad life is in Eastern Europe. To this author, it seems far better than life in South Vietnam since the Communist takeover, as the European Communist regimes have been forced (or have even wanted) to temper Marxism's worst instrusions into their citizens' private lives.

Yet there is still much fault to find in the political and economic lifestyle of every one of these regimes, certainly when compared with their opposite numbers on the NATO side of the line. Life is not too poor in East Germany (with a per capita living standard considerably higher than that of the Soviet Union). Yet compare this standard with that of West Germany. And compare the relative political freedoms. We know how the comparison would strike most Germans if the Berlin Wall were to be torn down.

Life is not too drab, or too politically constricted, in Hungary. Yet compare what is tolerated in Hungary with what has been accomplished in Belgium or Denmark.

NATO may simply amount to our commitment to keeping Denmark from becoming like Hungary. This amounts thus to an argument that Americans will remain tied by liberal sentiments to the outside world, and that they will remain particularly tied to Europe, because Europe is the case which best exemplifies the relevance of such sentiments.

When the transplanting of our model of political democracy did not seem to "take," when it seemed doomed to be perverted or frustrated as in Vietnam or Nicaragua, we Americans were destined to lose some of our self-confidence, and enthusiasm for an active foreign policy. But we certainly still have something to offer for "people like us."

This author personally thinks it tragic that Americans have come to doubt the relevance of their institutions for the other corners of the world, because this can verge on a kind of racism, by which only Europeans (and the Japanese, as new "Europeans") are somehow "people like us," people "cut out" for the democratic process. Yet the fact remains that situations like Indochina and

Central America have worked to blur the relevance of free press and free elections for underdeveloped areas (although India might show how such free institutions can indeed be of value even in surroundings of economic poverty). The day may come when Americans are again confident that free elections are as important for India and Singapore and Cambodia and Nicaragua as they are for Belgium and Denmark and the United States; yet that day is now some distance off. But (happily) very few Americans would as yet entertain doubts about Belgium and Denmark.[6]

A LOOK AT THE POLLS

The bulk of what has been suggested here is conjectural, necessarily so, since we are venturing to predict the *future* of American commitments to NATO. Yet we can try to test such possibilities by the data we obtain in public opinion polls. Such data largely support the conclusion that NATO is not in any new trouble in the United States.

To begin, as noted, Europe is still special for Americans, coming out well ahead of other possible theaters on the American willingness to commit troops. Americans were asked the following question:[7]

> There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . .

The answers were as follows:

		Send troops	
Situations:		**Public**	**Leaders**
Soviets invade	1978	42%	81%
Japan	1982	51	78
Arabs cut off oil	1978	36	29
to US	1982	39	36
N. Korea invades	1978	21	45
S. Korea	1982	22	50
Leftist guerrillas about to defeat			

Situations:		Send troops: Public	Send troops: Leaders
government of El Salvador	1982	20	10
Iran invades Saudi Arabia	1982	25	54
Arabs invade Israel	1978	22	31
	1982	30	47
China invades Taiwan	1978	20	18
	1982	18	15
Soviets invade Poland	1982	31	6
Soviets invade West Europe	1978	54	92
	1982	65	92
Soviets invade China	1982	21	6

The extent to which the Vietnam War produced a low point of American willingness to entertain such commitments, with some of the damage here then being undone, is illustrated in the following longitudinal trends from 1972 to 1980: [8]

	Help Defend Japan with Military Force in Case of Attack by Soviet Union		Help Defend Major Allies with Military Force in Case of Attack by Communist China or Soviet Union	
	Favor	Oppose	Favor	Oppose
July 1980	74%	19%	68%	28%
Sept. 1979	64	26	54	35
May 1976	56	27	45	37
Jan. 1974	48	34	37	42
June 1972	52	32	43	40

One of the best benchmarks for American willingness to undertake foreign commitments has come on a poll question on defense spending (whether it should go up or down), asked many times over the years. The results show how the United States turned outward again from the Vietnam War to the election of Ronald Reagan (now turning backward only somewhat, as domestic spending cuts have occasioned second thoughts about Reagan's projected military spending increases): [9]

PUBLIC VIEWS ON DEFENSE SPENDING

	Date	Increase	Decrease	Maintain Current Level
	1950	64	7	24
	1960	21	−18	45
	1969	8	52	31
	1971	11	49	31
Feb.	1973	8	42	40
Sep.	1973	13	46	30
	1974	12	44	32
	1976	22	36	32
	1977	27	23	40
	1978	32	16	45
Sep.	1979	38	16	36
Dec.	1979	51	9	31
	1980	64	6	23
Jan.	1981	61	7	28
Apr.	1981	54	9	34
Nov.	1981	34	14	47
	1982	21	24	52

On the very specific question of whether NATO has outlived its usefulness, there is no evidence that such a sentiment is growing, or that NATO has some inherently finite lifespan in American tolerance. A poll asked the following question: [10]


> Some people feel that NATO, the military organization of Western Europe and the United States, has outlived its usefulness and that the United States should withdraw militarily from NATO. Others say that NATO has discouraged the Russians from trying a military takeover in Western Europe. Do you feel we should increase our commitment but still remain in NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely?

	1974		1978		1982	
	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders
Increase commitment	4%	na	9%	21%	9%	7%
Keep commitment what it is	50	na	58	65	58	79
Decrease commitment	13	na	9	12	11	12

	1974		1978		1982	
	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders	Public	Leaders
Withdraw entirely	7	na	4	1	4	1
Not sure	26	na	20	1	18	1

It certainly would seem inaccurate to assume that many or most Americans were sliding back toward attitudes that could be labelled "isolationist" as illustrated by the answers (figure 1) to the following questions: [11]

> Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we stay out of world affairs?
>
> Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read Item A) . . . are we spend-



Source: *Public Opinion* 5 (October/November 1982): 29.


Figure 1. American Public Opinion on the US Part in World Affairs and Related Expenditures

> ing too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)? . . . Military Armaments, Defense . . . Foreign aid.

The ideological torment we have been discussing is illustrated on some more recent questions about how Americans rate systems of government (government presumably for others, thus illustrating again the vicarious concerns that would be at the heart of liberal feeling). One wishes the same questions had been asked in 1945 and 1951, but the disillusionment and loss of consensus in Vietnam, and the partial recovery from that disillusionment, are evident (figure 2) in the responses to the question: [12]

> Question: Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about communism as a form of government . . . It's the worst kind of all; it's bad, but no worse than some others; it's all right for some countries; it's a good form of government.

Finally, on a more basic question, the United States and its NATO partners still show willingness to resist Communist attacks



Source: *Public Opinion* 5 (October/November 1982): 29.

Figure 2. American Public Opinion on Communism as a Form of Government

if they ever come. Perhaps people do not prefer to be dead rather than Red, but they are ready to try to be neither; and they are ready to *risk* war and death, rather than succumb to the Communist version of democracy (figure 3). The poll asked: [13]

> Question: Some people say that war is so horrible that it is better to accept Russian domination than to risk war. Others say it would be better to fight in defense of your country than to accept Russian domination. Which opinion is closer to your own?


REMAINING PROBLEMS

Before taking the American commitment to NATO too much for granted, however, we ought to work through a list of possible sources of trouble.

First, there are no new waves of immigration now, to renew the ties of kinship that may have gotten such fundamental identifications going in the first place. The economic boom which came along as a most welcome by-product of the liberal political system in the NATO area terminated the earlier pattern of Western European migrations across the Atlantic, while the border guards of the Iron Curtain stemmed any similar flows from Eastern Europe. Some observers might then conclude that this will end all the "special relationship" feelings within another generation or two, as the flow of family mail ends, as more and more Americans conclude that Europe is a distant and foreign place.

It should be stressed, however, that most Americans already have lost track of their cousins in Europe; it is not clear that our commitment to political freedom for a place like Norway depends on the Norwegian-American vote in Minnesota. Our cultural and philosophical commitment is probably deeper than all this, and thus less vulnerable to the most recent patterns of immigration.

Second, it is entirely possible that West Europeans will not identify with Eastern Europe as much as Americans do, with results that are confusing, and perhaps quite upsetting, for the linkages we are discussing here. This has already been illustrated in the differing responses to the suppression of Solidarity in Poland, where the average American was more upset than the average West Ger-



Source: *Public Opinion* 5 (April/May 1982): 39.

Figure 3. American Public Opinion on Willingness to Resist Russian Domination

man or Frenchman. In many ways, of course, this makes perfect sense, for a typical [illegible]an city is an amalgam of nationalities, while a typical European city is not. Americans may thus be more truly "European" than the Europeans, as *we* see the cultural whole, while those living back on the continent of Europe see only the parts. Germans see themselves as very different from Poles, while Frenchmen see themselves as very different from Hungarians. Standing off at a distance, at the remove of an ocean away, one realizes that the Europeans actually have a great deal in common, (as compared with the civilizations of other continents, perhaps), and this is "a great deal" that is also held "in common" with the United States.

Americans might be upset by parochial attitudes among the Europeans, just as we have been upset in the past when such parochial attitudes produced World War I and World War II. Yet one good feature of the Cold War has been that such intra-European ethnic differences and ethnic rivalries have been substantially deemphasized. Ideological considerations of freedom vs. Communism, of political democracy vs. economic democracy, have been trumpeted on both sides, pitting East German vs. West German, discouraging French-German rivalries and German-Polish rivalries. Americans may at times feel themselves *leading* a general European concern for the liberty of all Europeans, West and East, rather than following such a concern; but this kind of leadership role has not totally perplexed us in the past, and should not kill our interest in Europe for the future.

Third, it is inevitable that the economic interests of Western Europe will not be identical to those of the United States. Trade rivalries will persist, as everyone likes to find steady customers, and worries if someone else is beating him to such customers. The governments in all the democracies have moreover had to abandon any "hands off" attitudes toward their economies, being now expected to produce full employment and low inflation if they wish to be reelected. Given the complexities of the economic interrelationships, it may be difficult to maintain any kind of real trust among such democratic governments, whereby all of them resist (and are trusted to resist) the temptations of thrusting inflation and/or unemployment on to someone else, of playing "beggar thy neighbor."

When such economic disagreements are then compounded with

arguments about the economic costs of maintaining NATO's military defense, amid suspicions in the United States that the West European countries are relaxing too much and relying too much on American military strength, and not doing their fair share, the irritation that has always seemed to menace NATO commitments will persist.

The prosperity of Western Europe is a strong piece of testimony for the general advantages of the liberal political system, especially when compared with the failures of the Marxist regimes in Eastern Europe. Such prosperity has perhaps made Western Europe a troublesome trade rival for the United States, but very few Americans would resent or regret the West German economic miracle, or the rest of the European boom. Yet some Americans will see this now as a sign that Western Europe should take on more of the burden of its defense, perhaps all the burden. If the European NATO members are geopolitically vulnerable to attack from the East, they are economically capable of fielding some powerful military forces. Poland's economy is a mess, while that of Belgium is not; and economic prowess still converts indirectly into military prowess.

But we should note here that this is a very familiar issue by now, having emerged virtually with the completion of Europe's economic recovery after the Marshall Plan. It is still an argument among friends.

Lenin and his disciples would predict that arguments about who gets to sell automobiles will pit nations against each other, in crises such as the one which caused World War I; but anyone more committed to liberal thinking would regard the competition between German and American automobile manufacturers as a necessary and healthy part of the entire economic process. Americans like to be able to sell. But, for ideological reasons, they do not like to feel that they were able to sell only because some artificial restriction kept buyers from having any other choice. Competition is the proof that one deserved to sell, and Americans are really not sorry that they generated competitors by their generosity in the years after World War II.

Fourth, this "old issue" of NATO burden-sharing is matched by another "old issue," on the linkages of West European defense to threats of US nuclear escalation. Rather than mounting a large and

expensive conventional force to repulse any Soviet advance into Western Europe (what could be labeled a policy of "defense," or "deterrence by denial"), we have ever since the 1940s fallen back more into depending on threats of nuclear attacks on Soviet forces and the Soviet Union itself (what is more often labeled a policy of simple "deterrence," or "deterrence by punishment"). This has raised troublesome issues (for three decades already, ever since the Soviets acquired nuclear weapons of their own) about the rationality and credibility of such responses by the United States, and about the wisdom of a West European dependence on such threats. Reliance on nuclear escalatory threats has surely allowed the West Europeans to escape with lower military expenditures, and lower commitments of man-years to military service, thus importantly making possible the economic growth and prosperity which characterized the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Yet it has always included the prospect and possibility of nuclear war, and the tension and foreboding that come in living with such possibilities.[14]

In effect, we have been defending the West Germans by threatening to blow them up, along with their Soviet attackers, *if* the Soviets ever attacked. We have also been threatening to blow ourselves up in such a case.

West Germans and other West Europeans and Americans have reacted periodically by questioning and denouncing the apparent irrationality of this; and at other times they have settled back to be content with it, on the "rationality of irrationality" assumption that such threats are fine as long as they never have to be executed, that the Soviets will never attack a Western Europe they know will be destroyed as they conquer it (with Russia and the United States and much of the rest of the world also being destroyed in the same process.)

We are presently encountering at least another wave of such doubt and criticism about the rationality, morality, or wisdom of a reliance on nuclear deterrence, amid demonstrations against the deployment of cruise missiles and the Pershing II in West Germany, and parallel antinuclear demonstrations in the United States. Consistent with what was just said, it is possible (even likely) that this is merely part of an ebb and flow, which saw similar expressions of opinion after the Carte Blanche exercises in West Germany in the late 1950s. It is also possible, of course, that some-

thing deeper and more permanent will emerge, as the US NATO commitment which has been so heavily a nuclear commitment would be threatened and overturned, not because of any change now in the American sentiments about Europe, but because of new American and European aversions to the basic threat of nuclear war.

A fifth problem for a continuation of the American commitment to NATO will appear for those Americans with a historical memory that "entangling alliances" and overseas commitments have never been a normal part of our foreign policy, so that it is somehow "unnatural" for several hundred thousand American personnel to be stationed in Germany, so that this unnatural situation will have to end sooner or later. While very few people would endorse "isolation" anymore, quite a few might still put forward such an intuitive impression of what is "normal," regarding the American defense of Western Europe therefore as temporary and abnormal. These people would thus regard it as counter-constitutional that any foreign country be "the fifty-first state."

Such a view is a little difficult to categorize in terms of our trichotomy of liberal, radical, and power politics. It borrows from the liberals a memory that most of the overseas entanglements of the past would have involved participation in some foreign imperial regime's selfish quests for more power, with the United States being able to nurture and enjoy its own democracy only by staying clear of such intrigues. Side by side with our liberal identification with democracy abroad has thus been a traditional aversion to overseas military operations and commitments, a sentiment of "back to normalcy" and "come home, America," for years enshrined in the annual debate about the Mansfield Amendment, showing up now in other forms of discussion.

This view in turn borrows from the power-politics perspective a notion that it is natural for states to take care of themselves, rather than altruistically to make sacrifices on behalf of others, with the logical corollary that the European NATO states should now be carrying most or all of their own defense burden, rather than relying on American soldiers. The presence of American troops on the continent of Europe would thus be viewed as a temporary and abnormal arrangement, as perhaps a transitory adjustment to the temporary weaknesses of our allies after World War II, but surely not as some-

thing that can be continued endlessly into the future.[15]

This American memory of an absence of "entangling alliances" is so strong that one can only with difficulty argue against it. Yet there is much counter evidence to suggest—whenever it was *possible* for the United States to intervene with beneficient impact, throughout its history—that it has indeed intervened.

Rather than the more sweeping generalization that the United States has somehow been intent on isolation in all sectors, a narrower generalization has sometimes been substituted, that we were perhaps more interventionist in Asia for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even while we were "isolationist" with regard to Europe. If this was so, however, it was not because of lack of interest in events in Europe, but rather because of a great differential in how much impact Americans felt they could have in the two areas. In Asia and in the Pacific, the United States could play a balancing role. On the continent of Europe, however strong our vicarious involvement, we were too outweighed by the forces of the established powers.

Rather than being uninterested in the welfare of others, the United States has been a model for revolution ever since the success of its own revolution, by its very example destabilizing and threatening the ancient regime back in Europe and elsewhere, offering sanctuary and safe haven for those revolutionaries who had to flee when their uprisings were suppressed. The United States endorsed the French Revolution of 1789 when all the powers of Europe disapproved of it. It endorsed the Greek revolution against Turkey in 1831. It endorsed the revolutions in Germany in 1848. Any bias we had toward the Far East in our past allocation of energies thus comes not from what we cared about the whole world, convinced that any part of it could benefit from the form of government we had tested on ourselves), but rather from what seemed possible. Any bias we might have today toward Europe is (as noted) derived very differently, from a conclusion arising quite recently that perhaps only Europe and the transplants of Europe will be suited to this democratic form of government.

The United States intervened seriously in Europe, of course, as part of an effort to end World War I, and then again in World War II, and then ever since. This amounts to a rather prolonged period to

merit any label of "abnormal." If the United States retreated into a self-conscious return to isolationism after 1919, this was at least in part a fluke, the result of personality clashes between Woodrow Wilson and the Republican leadership of the United States Senate. Public opinion polling had not yet been begun in the early 1920s, but more informal opinion sampling suggests that a majority of Americans indeed favored joining the League of Nations.[16]

Another part of the American failure to accept the Versailles Treaty came in response, of course, to a disillusionment with our World War I allies, who in negotiating the treaty showed themselves more interested in petty territorial gains than in Wilson's theme of "making the world safe for democracy." If European conflicts were ever again to become as ethnic as they appeared in 1919, Americans might become disillusioned again, vowing to withhold support for either side. Squabbles about secret treaties, promising away places as obscure as Fiume, could never be as important as the institution of free elections and freedom of the press.

Yet, as noted, one of the unique features of the Cold War years is that such ethnic disputes have been substantially deemphasized. It is considerations of ideology which threaten Europe with war or conquest, rather than considerations of language and ethnicity. The Communist leadership (to its credit) has largely eliminated the kinds of ethnic feuds that used to pit Hungarians against Rumanians or Poles against Germans, much as the European Community experience, and prosperity of the NATO area, have similarly deemphasized such historical feuds. The vicious experience of Fascism and Naziism probably contributed the most, of course, to putting such considerations of ethnic nationalism beyond the pale.

What pits two armed camps against each other today is not whether Germans or non-Germans will get to be top dog, an old-fashioned conflict of selfishness, but rather an issue of comparative judgment on what is best for all people, for all Europeans. It would thus probably be a mistake to rate the altruism of the Soviet leadership as being any lower than the altruism of American liberals. Rather than merely living up to the power-politics interpretation of Russian national interests, the leaders of the Politburo most probably sincerely (alas, quite erroneously) believe that Poles and Germans and Frenchmen can be happier if governed on the style of

Byelorussia. Our problem in defending NATO, or in bringing liberalization to Poland, would be easier if the Soviets were not governed by such high-minded, but erroneous beliefs.

Americans, quite rightly, believe that Poland would be happier if governed like Minnesota or like Denmark. Soviet leaders, quite wrongly, believe that Poland and Denmark will be the happiest if governed along Marxist principles. From such beliefs springs much of the risk of war in Europe even since 1945. These beliefs also nurture a deeper commitment by the United States, for we are defending our NATO partners on very important issues, issues just as significant as those which enlisted us in 1917 and in 1941, issues far more important than what emerged in 1919 as the narrow concerns of Lloyd George and Clemenceau and Orlando.

Things would thus be very different if we were suddenly to hear West German or Belgian statesmen and citizens stressing how anti-Russian or anti-Polish they felt, rather than how anti-Communist. As long as the issue is one of ideology, rather than nationality, however, Americans are less likely to become disillusioned again with their European partners, or with the cause of NATO, and there is no "normalcy" of withdrawal here to retreat to.

In summary, for the entire history of the United States, its "normal" pattern has been to be quite engaged about any issues as important as the difference between political democracy and hereditary autocracy, or between political democracy and Fascism, or between political democracy and Marxist dictatorship. America has never been an "ordinary country" in this regard, because it was unique, after winning its independence, in its form of society and form of government, and in its role as a model for the world. Despite some more cynical commentators in other societies who would insist that the United States is an ordinary self-interested state, and despite the injunctions of some American power-politics-oriented theorists of international politics—that the United States *ought* to be exclusively self-interested and "ordinary"—this is not our character.

Sixth, and finally, as a worrisome problem on United States commitments to NATO, we must return once more to the uncertainties about the average Americans' self-image of their role in the world. The fundamental question is whether the liberal, the radical,

or the power-politics perspective best explains the successes and failures of American foreign policy since 1945, or since 1890, or for all of our history. In the days when we were almost monolithically inclined to accept the liberal interpretation here, we did not have occasion to discuss it, and hence accepted it silently and almost subliminally. The debate with other interpretations has brought the issues into the open, which is intellectually very desirable; but this has also meant that we now lack consensus, and are unpredictable as to where we are headed. If we engross ourselves more in Central America, trying to be "like all the rest" in looking mainly to national power, we (as noted) threaten to enhance the credibility and persuasiveness of the radical image of American foreign policy, leading us to see ourselves as "worse than most," with unforseeable consequences also for the depth and persistence of our commitments to Europe.

If nothing else, our commitments to NATO might become strained because the West Europeans themselves began more often to accuse us of being "like all the rest," or "worse than most," questioning our judgment, causing Americans then to resent an apparent lack of gratitude or solidarity. Those Americans who in the 1960s came to endorse US foreign policy interpretations stressing the alleged needs and drives of capitalism, or the inherent goals of power-politics, were matched by a number of West European scholars and ordinary people also endorsing such perspectives, less complimentary interpretations no longer suggesting that the United States was an unusually good country. Some of this simply reflected radical chic on European campuses, or a desire among older Europeans to uncover the same greedy self-service for America that had so often been demonstrated for the European powers. Yet much of it reflected the impact of the horrors and the frustrations of the Vietnam War. Far fewer Europeans would have twisted logic to see the 1944 liberation of France or the Marshall Plan as "power-politics," or as the workings of an exploitative and mercenary capitalism.

Conversely, the more we commit ourselves to Europe, to Western Europe and to Eastern Europe, the more we will remind everyone of the kinds of conflicts with the Soviet Union that reflect well on the United States, and which help to recapture the confidence and admiration of West Europeans. This is hardly because Europeans are so self-centered that they care only about their own

futures. As noted, West Europeans may not even care so strongly, on any selfish basis, about what happens in Poland or Czechoslovakia. It would rather be because the facts in Poland or Czechoslovakia so clearly support the American vision of the world, while any such proof of the American vision is less easily discerned in the current situation in El Salvador.

The logic of post-World War II United States foreign policy, and indeed of our policies during World War II and World War I, and perhaps for all of our history, is exemplified by our feelings about Europe. While it is reasonable to ask about the durability of our commitments to NATO, it is misleading to presume that such commitments are somehow "abnormal." The NATO commitment is much more truly in the "fifty-first state" category.

The Egon Bahr Line

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Egon Bahr has always remained in the shadow of his friend and political mentor, Willy Brandt, but he has been the intellectual exponent, proponent, and implementor of West Germany's and West Europe's *Ostpolitik*, or detente policy. I do not say American or even NATO policy of detente, because the United States has had a traditional distrust and predictable reserve toward the concept; and the compromise formula, "defense and detente," which the Alliance accepted in the Harmel exercise of 1967, was clearly one along geographic lines, the Europeans favoring detente, the Americans defense.[1] That basic difference has persisted and now lies at the root of our current difficulties with our West European allies.

In fact, the difference has widened at our initiative. By excising "detente" from the dictionary, as President Ford proposed, by instituting economic and political sanctions in reaction to Afghanistan, as Jimmy Carter attempted, and by seeking trade and credit sanctions in reaction to Poland, as Ronald Reagan has assayed, the United States has steadily raised the pressure on its European allies to ensure "solidarity" with an increasingly confrontational United States posture toward East Europe and the Soviet Union. Despite this pressure and in spite of the evident provocations by the Soviet Union, the West Europeans have remained consistent in their loyalty to detente and firm in their stand that both detente and defense must govern their relationship to the Warsaw Pact.

To understand this Euopean position, one must give Egon Bahr's conception of European security a more respectful analysis. For Bahr has had a more profound and sustained influence on the basic structure of European security than is generally understood. Because his conception (the Bahr line) has gained such influence among European social democrats, it constitutes not only the theoretical core of the challenge that faces the Alliance in this year of crisis, but also the ongoing challenge (in Toynbee's sense) for the al-

liance in its readjustment to the Soviet achievement of overall nuclear parity. It may well be a determinant of the shape of NATO in the 1990s. For Bahr's conception raises fundamental questions affecting the two structural fault-lines within the bipolar security system that are already strained—the relationship between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, and the relationship between the United States and its West European allies.

Characteristic of Bahr's thought is its consistency over time. For 25 years the principal thrust of his argument and the structure of his reasoning have remained surprisingly constant; his influence has waxed large as political developments in Europe have underscored the relevance and validity of his thesis. In contrast to its constancy, the step-by-step developmental nature of his conception has led him to present it in serialized form. A flair for felicitous timing has enhanced his image as a strategic/political seer.

The first major presentation of his conception, in July 1963, at the Evangelical Academy at Tutzing in Bavaria, dealt with intra-German relations, or *Ostpolitik*, looking toward the normalization achieved in the Basic Treaty of 1972.[2] The second, exactly ten years later—in July 1973, also at the Tutzing Academy—dealt with pan-European relations, including the role of the United States and the Soviet Union in European security, looking toward the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.[3] While a third speech in 1983 at the Tutzing Academy might have been appropriate, in view of the present involvement of the German Lutheran Church in the nuclear debate, the third step in Bahr's conception had already been presented in the Report of the Palme Commission and in a separate article in *Europa Archiv*, both entitled "Common Security." [4]

There are five basic principles in Bahr's conception of European security: two political in nature, *change through rapprochement* and *transformation requires stability*; one military/strategic in nature, *common security*; one ideological, *fruitful co-existence*; and the final one, *regional detente*, is a proposal for the future, a transitional step to his European security system.

CHANGE THROUGH RAPPROCHEMENT

The core of Bahr's conception is the axiom that, under conditions of nuclear parity, confrontation or tension in East-West relations tends to freeze or perpetuate the existing structure of those relations, e.g., the status quo. Conversely, relaxation of tension, or detente, tends to permit or facilitate change in the basic structure of those relations.

Underlying this axiom are a number of analytical perceptions. Bahr perceives that the fundamental dynamics of a bipolar security system, with two alliances facing one another across a common division line, are purposefully confrontational. The system itself, that is, is confrontational, in accordance with the intentions of the nation-states involved. All alliances are formed to meet a real, i.e., commonly recognized threat. A specific emergency situation is recognized and the response, the organizing of a group of states to meet the threat, provides those states a common basis for action, a polarization which gives direction to their joint policies and thus makes them manageable. The threatening state responds by gathering around itself a group of states and the bipolar system is crystallized and institutionalized. Alliances in this sense are useful, if not inevitable, structures in multistate systems.[5]

Once the bipolar system is formed, it becomes institutionally confrontational because neither alliance can be certain of the intentions of the other. Determining the threat each alliance represents to the other becomes the prerogative of the respective intelligence services, which thereafter analyze and disseminate the threat perception within each alliance. That threat perception, of course, is crucial for the continuing existence of the system; yet it is so imprecise and uncertain that each alliance is forced to assume the worst case. For this reason alliances operate on the dictum that one must be in position to counter the opponent's capabilities, not his intentions.[6]

Herein lies the inherent bias. The relationship between two alliances in a bipolar security system is of a zero-sum type, but the internal dynamics within each alliance requires each to exploit an exaggerated image of the, in any case, uncertain threat in order to maintain internal cohesion among its member states and to ensure required support from relevant population groups. Thus, it is

always easier to increase the stock of arms to build up to parity than to induce the other side to decrease its stock of arms to build down to parity. Similarly, it is always easier to respond with actions that tend to heighten the level of tension than to initiate actions that tend to lower that level. The consequence of this bias is that in both sets of alliance states there exists a steady secular trend toward increased amounts of resources being allocated to fill the "gaps" or to maintain the perception of parity on the military side, and a correspondingly decreased amount of resource devoted to conflict resolution or confidence-building measures—negotiations on the political side. In sum, the bipolar alliance security system tends to be a self-fulfilling mechanism.

The second underlying perception is that nuclear weapons capability or, more precisely, bipolar nuclear capability (parity is not required, merely substantial capability) has fundamentally altered the above-described system. Bahr perceived as early as 1963 that, in an era of bipolar nuclear capability, (a) sovereignty can only be defined in terms of the power of decision over the use of nuclear weapons, and (b) victory in the classic sense of imposing one's will over another state is no longer attainable in the case of nuclear states. The price of such an attempt would be self-destruction.[7]

The effect of these two underlying perceptions in combination produces in a nuclear bipolar system the apparent paradox that whereas the internal dynamics within each alliance can increase tension, exacerbate the degree of reciprocal hostility, and raise the level of armaments, such actions are without real effect on the basic structure of the bipolar system. The status quo is preserved because each of the superpowers (the major nuclear powers) is already too strong for the other to force or compel a change in the system. In this relatively stable system, any such action merely results in a counteraction over time by the other superpower to restore the balance.

Even more paradoxically, the bipolar nuclear system is no longer a clean zero-sum system because the emergence of substantial nuclear capability, and especially of parity, gives the two superpowers certain mutual interests—a mutual interest in avoiding war and a mutual interest in restricting the number of other states having control over nuclear weapons. They might even have, Bahr perceived, a mutual interest in preserving the status quo, i.e.,

in perpetuating their own leading role within their respective alliance systems, by generating on occasion an increased level of reciprocal tension. This element of mutual dependency Bahr termed "global partnership," and he asserted that it was more significant to each superpower than its alliance relationships.[8] The Suez Crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons are in Bahr's view all examples of this effect.[9]

Although he publicized such views early, Bahr is neither the originator nor sole proponent of them. His real contribution has been the development of the flipside of these perceptions; e.g., that change can only be accomplished by agreement between the two alliances or between states on both sides of the division line; that the exercise of nuclear sovereignty includes the decision by some states not to possess nuclear weapons; or that, in contradistinction to the mutual interests of the nuclear superpowers, small states within the two alliances have, potentially, certain mutual interests as well. In short, in contrast to the natural status quo tendency of the bipolar nuclear security system, Bahr's thinking is aimed at the feasibility of change.

This point is the key to understanding Bahr's security conception. It is not incidental that the first word in his basic principle is "change." Change is the end; detente is the means to that end. And the change Bahr has in mind is the eventual integration of Europe, to "restore to Europe its natural strength" among the world's powers.[10] This point explains Bahr's growing influence as well. As Europe consolidates it economic power, achieving gross production levels greater than those of the United States, it is searching for a means to consolidate its political power as well. Bahr's thought points the way for such change, and indicates the parameters within which such fundamental change in the system can be accomplished. His second principle addressed precisely this question.

TRANSFORMATION REQUIRES STABILITY

The second principle in Bahr's conception is deducible from the first: if fundamental change can occur only under conditions of detente, such change must necessarily be acceptable to both sides. If change can be accomplished only by agreement between the two alliances, it must, consequently, be controllable and balanced (pre-

serve the balance of power). It must preserve the stability of the bipolar security system.[11]

Stability in Bahr's conception has a political and a temporal dimension. Both equality (balance) and the recognition of equality (parity) are important in one dimension; continuity and process (as opposed to unilateral acts) are important in the other.

In 1973 in his second Tutzing speech, Bahr illustrated this principle by analyzing the process that led to the Basic Treaty of 1972 between the two Germanies. Bahr highlighted three specific elements. The first was the role of renunciation-of-force (nonaggression) agreements as the initial stimulus for the process. Although the specific political goal was the reunification of the Germanies, the facilitative precondition of detente had to be put in place through a series of bilateral renunciation-of-force agreements with the Soviet Union and other East European states surrounding the German Democratic Republic (GDR).[12]

The second element, balance or parity, required that East Germany be accorded in the negotiations a status that was recognized as equal to that of its Western interlocutor. Since recognition of the much smaller Soviet zone as a separate state de jure was politically unacceptable in West Germany at the time, equal nonsovereign entities of some sort had to be constituted before the Basic Treaty could be successfully concluded. Also illustrative of the application of this principle was the Soviet-West German Non-Aggression Agreement of 12 August 1970. Bahr noted that the derision which initially greeted the proposal for this agreement, due to the imbalance between a nuclear superpower and the tiny nonnuclear Federal Republic, was silenced by the observation that the USSR would be renouncing much more than the FRG.[13]

The third element, continuity and process, was illustrated by the gradual, step-by-step transformation process. From the outset, it was clear that reunification was not going to occur in a single treaty, on a certain day, or by a one-time decision. It would occur by a controlled process, through interim stages, with adjustments to be negotiated as required. Thus, rather than reunification, the interim stage of the Basic Treaty settlement was as far as the process could be pushed at that time.[14] Even at that, both sides realized substantial benefits.[14] West Germany secured rights for its

citizens to visit in the East and some families were reunited. East Germany was consequently accorded recognition as a state, and both Germanies were admitted to the United Nations.

Moreover, Bahr noted, in the agreements that were preconditions for normalization, the Soviet Union achieved German recognition of existing boundaries in Eastern Europe while the Western powers achieved recognition and definition of their roles and rights in Berlin. The Four-Power Agreement (clarifying the status of Berlin) and the Basic Treaty thus became elements in the wider European detente process—preconditions for the Helsinki Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[15] Transformation had been achieved; but the balance of power had been left unaltered.

The conditions of balance and process in the relations between the two alliances are not merely normative standards in Bahr's thinking; rather, they are objective imperatives of the bipolar nuclear security system. They are imperatives from which Bahr draws some strategic realities of wide-ranging significance. The first is that the United States cannot withdraw from Europe. Any unilateral withdrawal would start a destabilizing process in which the United States would lose eventually the ability to provide permanent security even for itself. Bahr states: ". . . as America does not want to put its own security at risk and historically to withdraw, it cannot flee its world-wide responsibilities." [16] Again, "There cannot be any doubt that the United States will never permit Europe to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union intact," Bahr concludes.[17] The opposite is equally true. The nuclear umbrellas have to remain in place over their respective alliances.

A second, even more significant, corollary to this requirement for stability, i.e., the imperative of balance and process in the East-West context, is that the emergence of an integrated, autonomous Europe must be based on both sides of the division line. The eventual unification of Europe, the restoration of Europe to its natural strength, can only be accomplished if it is trans-European in form.[18]

A third corollary is that unilateral actions affecting the security balance are destabilizing and harmful whether they are unilateral arming or disarming actions. German criticism of President Carter's decisions to deploy the neutron bomb, and later to withdraw it, was founded on this concern—that neither decision pro-

vided a process by which the system could adjust to the change.[19] European insistence that the modernization of theater or intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) be subjected to negotiations with the Soviet Union, e.g., NATO's "two-track decision" of 1979, was a direct result of this principle.

COMMON SECURITY

The military/strategic and arms-control side of Bahr's conception of security has a structure similar to that of the political side. The aim of this section, consequently, is to review the general thrust of his military and strategic thinking, underlining especially areas of uniqueness or unconventionality. There are four such areas that deserve to be considered under the general principle, *common security*. These are: (1) nuclear sovereignty, (2) deterrence, (3) global partnership, and (4) common security.

(1) *Nuclear sovereignty*, the concept that sovereignty in the nuclear age is defined in terms of the power of decision over the use or nonuse of nuclear weapons, is central to Bahr's conception.[20] The key idea is that both credibility and responsibility in the use of nuclear weapons flow directly from the decisionmaking process. In order to be counted a nuclear power, a nation-state must have the capability to produce, test, deploy, and use nuclear weapons, but even more importantly must have, and be perceived to have, the political will and authority to make the decision to use such weapons. While France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, as regards their own national weapons, have high credibility with respect to use of nuclear weapons, NATO weapons under two-key systems and/or North Atlantic Council release authority have a much lower level of credibility.[21]

The same can be said for responsibility (and the attendant risk) for use of nuclear weapons. Bahr is less convinced than most Western nuclear strategists that distinctions between strategic and theater weapons will be significant in any escalation scenario. The factors governing targeting of a responsive strike would not be whether the attack came from NATO Europe (thus placing all European NATO countries at risk) or from the United States. The critical factors for either side would be (a) where the nuclear weapons are actually located (since they are themselves priority tar-

gets), and (b) which state is responsible for the attack (in the sense of having made the final decision for their use).[22]

In Bahr's conception, thus, there is a clear and very significant distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states. And that distinction ought to be, in his view, maintained as cleanly as possible, both for reasons of credibility and for reasons of responsibility, or risk-sharing.[23] The dispersion of nuclear weapons, under two-key or committee release mechanisms, has questionable value as a means to enhance credibility, since the automatic escalation effect is offset by the less certain decisionmaking process. While such dispersion does share the risk, by virtue of the location factor, (a) above, it does nothing to enhance the sovereignty of the receiving allied state; on the contrary, it tends to bind that state more securely to the nuclear superpower.

While Bahr has no illusion that renouncing nuclear status would protect a state from nuclear attack, he points out that a state which decides not to produce nuclear weapons, not to permit them on its territory, or, in time of crisis, not to permit use of its bases or air space to nuclear-armed vessels or aircraft, is exercising in these decisions its own nuclear sovereignty. Such decisions, Bahr contends, would also benefit the bipolar security system by clarifying the factor of responsibility, and thus increasing the calculability of potential use of these weapons.[24]

(2) *Deterrence* is a concept for which Bahr has little respect. It is necessary in the absence of a better strategic doctrine, but Bahr recognizes that it can neither provide real security nor preserve for long the regime of restraint currently in effect. The greatest danger with deterrence is the delusion that it is security, i.e., the belief that it maintains the status quo.[25]

In actuality, deterrence is an unstable and self-contradictory system. In structural terms, it is a bipolar system of mutual assured destruction, which in common with the bipolar alliance system, has an inherent bias toward ever higher levels of arms build-up and tension. It is unstable because, although the technical balance on the military and arms-control side can be successfully maintained, the ever higher demands for resource allocation to this purpose eventually undermines the political consensus required for deterrence to function.[26] As population groups or, within an alliance, govern-

ments begin to question whether the arms build-up is defending the values of Western (or Eastern) society or has become an end in itself, balance on the political side of the system may be very difficult to control.

It is self-contradictory in that it contains as one basic element the horror associated with nuclear weapons and as another the credibility that they will be used. The more credibility one builds into the system, with radiation enhancement, precision guidance, or reduction of destructive power, the less deterrent effect the system has. In Bahr's view, deterrence is thus a transitional policy—a policy related to the process by which nuclear war is attenuated from the unthinkable to the thinkable, and then to the expected.[27]

The system of deterrence, therefore, can never by itself stop the arms race.[28] It can and characteristically does stimulate the negotiation of arms-control agreements—agreements that establish certain areas of mutual restraint, while leaving loopholes in which each side is permitted to seek advantage over the other. Such agreements should not be denigrated, however; they can serve to control the nature of the competition between the two alliances, or the two superpowers, and Bahr believes that during the deterrence stage arms-control policy on both sides should be directed at retarding the trend toward credibility.[29] Agreements should aim at maintaining the nuclear threshold as high as possible, since it is the horror factor, rather than the deterrence system itself, that prevents nuclear war. This means freezing or agreeing not to deploy battlefield weapons, tactical weapons, and theater weapons. And it means maintaining a balance of conventional forces to make resort to a nuclear response unnecessary.[30]

If the trend toward ever more sophisticated weapons credibility can be retarded, Bahr believes that at some point in the deterrence stage, a new way of thinking will take hold among elite groups or within the general population. The realization will spread that neither side can achieve an advantage that can be made decisive; neither side can defeat the other by use of force; and neither side can prevent the other from matching within a short period of time any marginal advantage one of them might have achieved. At that point, common security replaces deterrence, mutual agreed disarmament replaces mutual assured destruction, and disarmament agreements replace arms-control agreements.[31]

(3) *Global partnership*, or *mutual bilateralism*, is a characteristic of the bipolar deterrence system from which Bahr draws his most significant deductions. Within the deterrence system there exists another internal contradiction—that between the classical confrontational element (each side seeking to counter all the capability options available to the other with better ones) and a second element of mutual dependence between the two superpowers.[32] The contradiction is due in part to the disparity in nuclear arsenals between the two superpowers and all other nuclear powers; in part to the fact that these weapons are global in their reach, whereas the weapons of France, the UK and, qualifiedly, China are essentially theater weapons. This disparity in number, megatonnage, and reach has been increasing, not decreasing over the course of time.[33]

From this nuclear disparity, Bahr deduces that the United States and the USSR have a special relationship in the military/strategic area as in the political area that is neither mutualism (superpower condominium) nor pure confrontationalism, but is rather a compromise that he calls mutual bilateralism. Their common interest in the prevention of intercontinental nuclear war, in discouraging proliferation of nuclear states, and in ensuring the stability of the global balance, must always be of a different order than that of the European nations, either West or East. Their global partnership takes precedence over their roles in their respective alliances.[34]

Therefore, the United States can never represent the real interests of Western Europe in nuclear defense matters, any more than the Soviet Union can represent the real interests of Eastern Europe. In Bahr's view, it is essential, consequently, that Europeans have a means of formulating and of pressing their security views on their respective superpowers. His conception draws a clear and very significant division between the European members of NATO and the United States, with a parallel division between Eastern Europe and the USSR. He postulates, moreover, a regional set of common security interests that are shared by all European states in contradistinction to the global partnership of the superpowers. It is on the basis of this concept that Bahr perceives the Conference on Disarmament in Europe mandated by NATO's Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as a potentially vital forum for regional influence.[35]

(4) *Common security*, the stage or system beyond deterrence, is structurally a bipolar system in which both sides recognize that their own interest lies in the perpetuation of the strategic and military balance between them. It is still a confrontational relationship, but the systemic competition is waged only in areas of politics, economics, science, and culture. The political side of the deterrence system has become predominant and the military side is used only for maintaining the balance of potential force. Military forces serve as both a measure of the power of each state and an insurance guarantee in case the common security system should break down. Thus, common security does not mean the elimination of military power, nor any form of pacifism. It requires armed forces and a defense capability. States would still be superpowers, nuclear powers, and non-nuclear powers; the alliances would still be required. In short, the visible manifestations of the system would be practically indistinguishable from those of that in effect today; the change would be in the national will or objectives of the nations involved, in particular, of the superpowers.[36]

Common security could be defined as a shift in the relationship between the two superpowers in which the element of mutual dependency becomes dominant over the element of confrontation. It would be characterized by the mutual commitment to maintain the balance of potential force. Because the security of both sides would flow from that balance, it could be guaranteed at any level. In such a "security by agreement" system, it could be maintained by disarming as well as by arming and the bias for economic reasons would be toward balanced disarmament.[37]

FRUITFUL COEXISTENCE

No general conception of East-West security relations can avoid the issue of ideological confrontation between the totalitarian, Communist systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the democratic, capitalistic systems of Western Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, the Bahr conception formally attempts to do just that. It makes the fundamental assumption that neither side has changed its system nor intends to do so. Instead, each side believes its system will prove in the course of history to be the superior social system. Ideological differences, thus, cannot be changed or removed; what can be done is to subordinate them to the overriding interest in security.[38]

In the model case of the two Germanies, the Basic Treaty specifically recognized that deep divisions would continue to exist on basic questions. To use a Communist idiom, there was to be no ideological coexistence. What was accomplished in the normalization, however, was the amelioration of practical human problems, rights of visitation, reunification of families, and a substantially expanded bilateral trade. Such an approach Bahr termed "fruitful coexistence," in that it was something more than a mere commitment to avoid peace-threatening policies, i.e., a nonaggression pact. Nor was it, on the other hand, a form of convergence theory, because the two states remained separate entities, each organized to protect its value system in the continuing ideological competition.[39]

In the long term, however, Bahr recognizes that societies change and that the direction of that change is affected by the environment surrounding them. Recognition of this process is implicit in his argument that continued isolation of the GDR would simply have forced it into a "solidarization" with other Warsaw Pact states, at the cost of some ideological autonomy.[40] The Bahr line does not predetermine any ideological outcome with respect to East Germany and Eastern Europe. It aims only at their having a "fair chance," i.e., room to maneuver in evolving ideologically and politically. *Ostpolitik* (detente), by lowering the level of threat, provides a climate in which Soviet pressure is reduced and contacts with the West increased. It is in this sense that many Europeans attribute to *Ostpolitik* the liberalization in Poland and Hungary and the increased freedom of the church in East Germany during the 1970s.

As Bahr's conception demands balance, the principle also applies to Western Europe. An understanding of the current strains that afflict the NATO alliance starts with the perception that the West Europeans (and especially the social democrats) are now insisting upon a similar "fair chance" to evolve ideologically and politically on a course more independent from that of their American superpower ally.

REGIONAL DETENTE—BRIDGE ACROSS THE MIDDLE

Unlike the other four principles, the fifth principle of Bahr's security conception has not been given a specific title by him. *Re-*

gional detente or *bridge across the middle* represent attempts by the author to characterize the principle underlying a recent proposal by Bahr, which the latter calls simply "No Nuclear Arms in Non-nuclear States." [41] That specific proposal is given below exactly as published in an article in *Europa Archiv* and in the second annex to the Palme Commission report.[42] As the commentary which follows points out, however, this proposal, when placed in the context of Bahr's step-by-step evolution of a European security system, takes on much wider dimensions and significance. It represents the next move in the process of consolidating detente and of consolidating Europe.

If Bahr's 1963 presentation at Tutzing dealt with detente in the intra-German context, and his 1973 presentation focused on detente in the all-European context (including the roles of the superpowers in Europe), this proposal addresses the mutual interests of European nations in detente in contradistinction to the mutual global interests of the superpowers. It is intended clearly as a stimulus toward a superpower shift to common security and the proposal, were it to be adopted by the non-nuclear states in Europe, would provide them with a certain coercive structural leverage with which to push their respective superpower allies toward that decision.

The proposal has three points:

(1) All nuclear weapons should be withdrawn from European states which do not themselves possess nuclear weapons.

This means: Europe would not thereby become a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nuclear weapons would remain in the hands of the four states which already possess them. There would, however, be a zone free of nuclear weapons, threatened by or under the protection of the nuclear powers in possession of weapons of differing range which can be brought into use in the event of a conflict. But the danger of escalation would be reduced; since if there are no dangerous targets the use of dangerous weapons will become unnecessary. The entire discussion on whether wars can be limited and on lowering the nuclear threshold would become pointless.

(2) In the area of conventional forces, an approximate balance would be attained between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

This means: A nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe demands a balance of conventional forces, i.e., the elimination of that superiority in conventional arms against which nuclear weapons are currently held to be indispensable. Without the readiness to achieve a balance of conventional forces, there is no realistic prospect of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe, since neither side can be permitted to have the advantage over the other.

(3) Both alliance systems, with their obligations and guarantees, should remain unaltered.

This means: The alliances remain indispensable in the interest of stability and security. Their principle, that the violation of the frontier of one partner is to be considered as an attack on the security of all the others, also corresponds to the idea of common security. Common security can be achieved only with the alliances, and with their leading powers, certainly not against or without them. In addition, the neutral states of Europe are to enjoy the stability which is guaranteed by these alliances.

Withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from *states which do not possess them* is a formulation based on Bahr's distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states. States without the capability to produce, deploy, or politically use nuclear weapons, as well as states that have renounced their possession or use, are included in the non-nuclear category. This would, of course, include the two Germanies. The *four states* (in Europe) *which already possess them* refers to the US, USSR, France and Great Britain. Whenever the term Europe is used, it is in the sense of European security system, which includes both superpowers. Bahr's use of these nonspecific categories is intended to underline the important element of choice which states would have as to participating in the nuclear-weapon-free zone. For purposes of illustration, Bahr once postulated a nuclear-free zone consisting of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, West Germany, the Benelux countries, and Denmark. Furthermore, if Rumania, Bulgaria, and perhaps Yugoslavia wished to join the system, Bahr suggested that Italy, Norway, and perhaps Sweden might be included.[43] One other footnote, the balance of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would include French forces in France, despite its status outside the military cooperation in NATO.[44]

Here then is Bahr's proposal for a specific political change in the present security system of Europe, a proposal which requires agreement from both alliances, thus presupposing a substantial degree of detente for acceptance: *change through rapprochement*. Moreover, the change proposed would by its very nature transform the present European security system, removing some of its most contentious and dangerous features, e.g., the potential for surprise attack, forward defense to wage war on the opponent's territory, and the "use them or lose them" pressure with respect to tactical nuclear weapons.[45]

The change proposed is also a balanced and controllable proposition. As a precondition, a balance of conventional forces in the area would have to be negotiated, presumably in the MBFR forum. Moreover, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the non-nuclear states would have to be phased into the process of balancing conventional strength. That process Bahr admits could mean increasing the conventional strength of the non-nuclear powers in the NATO center, but he suggests that it could be accomplished as well by a draw-down of Warsaw Pact strength on its center.[46]

The proposal is balanced in a more fundamental sense—as it affects the ideological confrontation. If one looks at the three chokepoints around the Eurasian landmass at which Communist and Free World ideologies have been most sharply in conflict in the post-World War II period, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, one is struck by the fact that each was originally an identical geopolitical structure, a single nation divided into a communist and a noncommunist portion. Whether this model owed more to conscious decisions made in the postwar settlements or to the evolution of natural historical forces is beyond this discussion. Whatever the cause, the overlayering of nationalism and competitive ideologies was an attempt to hold both forces in check, a means of ensuring stability. In Europe, where the model is still in place, German nationalism has been held in check by the superimposition of the military forces and the strategic umbrellas of the bipolar alliance system. Conversely, German nationalism, bridging that ideological division line, has promoted stability and the peaceful resolution of conflict when it affected the intra-German border.

Bahr's conception of a European security system is fully consistent—structurally identical—with this post-World War II geopoliti-

cal model. Bahr perceived, in 1963, that the underlayer of German nationalism could be the bearer of a bridge across the ideological confrontation line—it was the "special German task" which the geopolitical situation had presented to the two Germanies.[47] In this proposal, and in his conception as a whole, he is suggesting that the developing sense of European nationalism, of European identity, can be the bearer of an expanded bridge across that ideological confrontation line.

Ancient fears of German militarism and more modern phobias derived from German economic strength are real factors in the European geopolitical balance, not only among the Soviets and the French. Bahr's proposal, accordingly, has been criticized as being merely a stratagem to achieve the reunification of Germany. But the proposal does not envision German reunification but rather German integration into a larger European nationalism. And until that larger Europe has emerged, Bahr's proposal preserves that basic postwar model's constraints on the two Germanies. They remain within their respective alliances and protected by their respective strategic umbrellas. Moreover, within the nuclear-weapon-free zone regime, they and the other members will have formally renounced any nuclear role.

The Bahr proposal underscores the strategic reality that the security line in Europe runs between the two Germanies. Whatever the balance of alliance forces on either side, the territorial line remains fixed. Consequently, in Bahr's conception any change that fundamentally alters the security system in Europe must be balanced on either side of that line. It thus represents a profound challenge to the aspirations of many West Europeans for a security system based upon the West European Union or the European Community.

Because of its insistence upon this fundamental balance, the Bahr proposal for *regional detente* contains the potential for a major shift of power from the two superpowers to a European consensus. Already a factor in our relations with our West European allies, it is the idea that the inter-European level of tension can be different from the US-USSR level, or as others have described it, the divisibility of detente.[48] If the level of tension is depressed by the Europeans at the center (detente-at-the-center) while the level of tension between the superpowers at the periphery remains high, the balance

of the system is not affected. The key, of course, is that the West Europeans are able to induce and to obtain similar or comparable action by their East European counterparts. In this concept lies a totally new model for relationships in the European area. We have endured an extended period of confrontation and tension, and we have tried a period of detente. Rather than return to confrontation, Bahr is suggesting a basis for legitimacy for a third model, one that reflects more appropriately the global interaction of the superpowers and the more regional focus of interaction of the European states.

As long as the bridge is maintained across the middle and the balance is preserved vis-a-vis both superpowers, the European states obtain from this detente-at-the-center model the possibility of seizing the initiative. Since the determination as to whether individual states renounce nuclear weapons will be by popular decision, at least in Western Europe, there is little the United States can do to oppose such decisions if a corresponding acceptance of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is forthcoming from East European states. Under those conditions, the Europeans themselves would set the terms of potential conflict in Central Europe.

During the past three years, the influence of the Bahr line has spread among all the social democratic parties in the northern, Protestant half of Europe, at the same time that it has become dominant within the German SPD itself. Bahr has been an advisor-participant representing the SPD in the Scanalux Group of NATO social democratic parties. The intermediate position of his security conception, between the unilateralism of the European peace movement in these countries and the traditional NATO line of the governments, has given these social democratic parties a swing-weight influence in the middle and has provided them with a basis for discourse with the European peace movement. When the current INF controversy is resolved, and the bipolar security system can once again resume its readjustment to Soviet achievement or overall nuclear parity, the Bahr concepts of "common security" and "no nuclear weapons in non-nuclear states" will be on the diplomatic agenda.

Chapter 4

Low-Order Violence in the International Milieu

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel will address the problems of international violence in the 1990s. The participants may wish to address the most likely form of violence which the international community of nations will face in the coming decade. Have the various revolutionary movements in the world changed their approach to violence and terrorism? What will be the types of weapons which a terrorist movement might employ in the future and against what targets? How can a country respond to such a threat? Where are the most likely places for such violence to emerge? How does the current experience in Latin America contribute to our ability to deal with low-order violence?"

Panel Summary

Terrell E. Arnold, Chairman
Department of State

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick L. Frostic, USAF, Rapporteur
National Defense University

Spirited, free-wheeling discussions characterized the deliberations of the panel on low-order violence. Indeed, at times, the debates were lively enough themselves to verge on low-order violence, it seemed to some participants. The current conflicts and tensions in Central America provided an immediate focus for the discussion. As might be expected, no general prescription for this continuing set of regional problems was developed. However, all of the participants recognized the importance of the growing threat of low-order violence to democratic society, and the challenge posed by this type of violence for national policy. Ways to address this problem were considered, and participants underscored the need for better public recognition of its dangers.

Stimulating and provocative papers were presented by Dr. Edward Luttwak and Mr. Neil Livingstone to initiate the proceedings. These papers raised several critical issues and served as good catalysts for discussion.

First, Dr. Luttwak took a critical look at the military forces, doctrine, and equipment that the United States uses to conduct counter-insurgency operations. He asserted that his analysis of US actions in El Salvador highlighted the deficiencies inherent in most of our efforts to cope with low-level conflict. The basic problem is that our armed services are designed to fight the "real" war—a major conflict with the Soviet Union—and that the prerequisites for armed forces in "real" war are different from those generated in counter-insurgency or other small-scale conflict situations.

Dr. Luttwak argued that US military assistance in Central America has been a reflection of the structures, doctrines, and

equipment of American military forces. Representatives from all of the services, he said, are each given a piece of the action, even though the total number of advisers is limited by law. To explain this point, he stated that because we view any conflict as a training ground for personnel in our military forces, we generate high turnover rates in personnel. As a result, our efforts lack the continuity necessary for a successful assistance program. The inevitable result, concludes Dr. Luttwak, is that our doctrine, equipment, and training do not effectively meet the requirements of counter-insurgency situations.

As a solution to the deficiencies he sees, Dr. Luttwak recommended creation of a new branch of the armed services designed and equipped for counter-insurgency operations. These special forces should be provided with the authority to conduct independent operations wherever necessary. Additionally, these forces must be independent of the current unified command structure to avoid the cumbersome, bureaucratic overhead Dr. Luttwak argues is characteristic of the American military.

In the panel's discussions, he noted that the reason we are focused on low-order violence is that we have been successful in deterring the "real" war. However, the means for success at one level do not necessarily provide the means for success at all levels. He went on to emphasize that public support for counter-insurgency operations will have to be "earned" in the future by successful operations in the field. Unless capability in the field is demonstrated through successes, Dr. Luttwak says that the American public will retain its reluctance to support American involvement in crises anywhere in the world.

Neil Livingstone focused his presentation on another aspect of low-order violence—terrorism. He predicted that terrorism will become an increasing problem in the future. Low-order violence is a very present danger in the world today, and that danger will grow. As an example, he noted that 46 armed conflicts were in progress at the time of the discussion and only one of these was a full-scale conventional war. The world, he said, is ripe for increased terrorism. Economic conditions, the relative "demodernization" of the Third World due to lags or failures in development programs, the vulnerabilities of modern society, and the ease with which terrorism can be

conducted, all contribute to the growing trend towards resort to low-order violence—terrorism.

Mr. Livingstone defined terrorism as the war of nonstate actors. It is a political act designed to intimidate society. Unlike guerrilla warfare, terrorism usually does not profess to have the support of the people. New weapons technology will contribute to the problem of terrorism. These developments will increase the scope and effect of terrorism dramatically in the future. He cited the havoc a terrorist can wreak today with a single phone call, or that a few individuals can produce with precision antitank weapons, as vivid examples of the growing consequences of terrorism. On an even higher scale would be the consequences of terrorist groups' employing weapons of mass destruction. While not impossible, he thought the chances of a terrorist group's acquiring and employing nuclear weapons are quite remote. However, he added that it is not farfetched at all to imagine terrorists using chemical or biological weapons. The consequences of such an action, he concluded, could be devastating.

Neil Livingstone's solution to the problem of terrorism is to treat this growing threat as a war of attrition and to take on the problem openly. Specific actions he recommended were:

- Supporting resistance forces around the world
- Rebuilding the American intelligence net
- Campaigning actively to seek out and destroy terrorists wherever they exist
- Training and equipping paramilitary forces to fight terrorism

Finally, he expressed belief that we must learn to work more effectively with existing governments, and we should learn that the time to press for "reform" is before and after—not during—a conflict.

The two presentations provided a serviceable launch vehicle for the discussions on low-order conflict. Needless to say, they provoked a wide variety of responses and divergent opinions.

Low-order conflict was defined by the panel to encompass the spectrum of violent action below the level of small-scale conventional war. This definition included terrorism by nonstate actors and the full range of guerrilla warfare. In addition to these commonly treated areas, the panel noted an increasing trend toward the use of terrorism by nation-states, particularly in the Middle East. There was a general consensus within the group that low-order conflict would be seen as a cheap way to pursue national and subnational objectives in the future. Further, the United States faces a pressing need to improve its capability to deal with low-level violence if we hope to avoid the threats to the stability of our nation and friendly governments posed by this type of conflict.

Defining low-order conflict and understanding its nature are an important first step. However, all the panel members agreed that the difficult part of the problem is to know what action a state should take in response to acts of violence, when to act, and where to act. These questions consumed most of the discussion time. Many differing opinions were expressed, but no coherent statement of policy was constructed from the panelists' diverse views.

All participants agreed that threats to vital national interests require a state to act decisively. However, no stock criteria were put forward for distinguishing vital interests from those of lesser priority.

One important observation was brought to light in the course of the debate. Although the necessity for action in a case where vital interests are involved is clear-cut, it frequently is prudent to act quickly in a crisis before the situation escalates to the point where vital interests are threatened. By taking quick decisive action, a low-order conflict can be brought to a successful end with a low expenditure of resources, possibly thereby avoiding a later need for major US involvement. All too often, the panel concluded, we have ignored situations until they reached a level of need for action so acute that no solution could be achieved at an acceptable level of commitment.

The panelists recognized a dilemma in this regard. While low-order aggression against a US ally can be dealt with at the least cost by a resolute early US commitment to nipping it in the bud, the early stages are when the public is least likely to support an ade-

quate US commitment. To compound the dlemma, as successive US administrations have found, it is difficult if not prohibitive to sustain a commitment to rescue allies beset by low-order guerrilla/terrorist assault when US involvement lacks unified public support. We are haunted by many ghosts from he past. One need only note the too-ready tendency to call El Salvador "another Vietnam" to recognize the difficulty of this problem. Doubts about the utility of the Iran rescue mission, the Son Tay raid, and the US involvement in Vietnam are part of the US national psyche today. They cause us to hesitate when a call for anti-insurgency action is sounded.

The panel noted that the American public is somewhat ambivalent. There is an inbred hesitation to support American involvement when a situation is less than threatening to clearly defined national interests. The public's reluctance is magnified when the outcome of American action is indefinite and the results are open-ended. Further, Dr. Luttwak reminded the panel that support can only be built through demonstrated success in the field. However, others protested that it is difficult to demonstrate success when action is prohibited or is tightly constrained by budgetary, temporal, or other limits on choice.

Despite the difficulties of securing public support for action, it was generally recognized that action is often necessary. Sometimes the national leadership will find it necessary to act with or without public support. While it was readily recognized that each situation is different, with its own risks and constraints, an ordered approach to evaluating the use of American national power to contain low-level conflict was outlined by the panel. The first step in the process is to determine the nature and extent of threat to US interests in the situation. Then an analysis of the instrumentalities available to bring the crisis to a conclusion should be conducted. This analysis should evaluate both immediate and long-term implications of the application of American power in the specific situation. Additionally, it must be determined if sufficient power can be applied to achieve the desired outcome in timely fashion and at an acceptable cost and risk. If action is justified by national interests and is feasibly achievable with the resources available, then everyone agreed that it should be carried out quickly and decisively.

In concluding the session, the panel on low-order conflict was unable to arrive at any concise set of recommendations for US

policymakers. However, several general observations were provided in the course of the deliberations.

- All of the members recognized the growing threat posed by low-order violence ranging from isolated acts of terrorism to large-scale guerrilla wars and the practice of state terrorism. The panel saw a real need to educate the public concerning the dangers posed now and in the future by low-order violence.

- Continued analysis is necessary to develop means to combat low-order violence. Additionally it was felt that we need a better understanding of the case where force is necessary and is likely to be effective.

- It was generally believed that the US armed forces will have to modify their forces, equipment, and doctrine to deal more effectively with low-order conflict.

- Though almost all of the participants endorsed the need for change in the organization and doctrine of the armed forces to cope with low-order threat, no specific prescriptions were evolved.

- Everyone agreed that when action is necessary, it must be quick and effective. Doubts persisted over the willingness of the American people to sustain support for long-term campaigns.

In the longer term, it was generally agreed that programs aimed at alleviating the root causes of low-order violence must be established or continued at all levels. Low-order conflict was seen to be a growing threat to democratic societies unless they learn to cope with it effectively.

Fighting Terrorism and "Dirty Little Wars"

N.C. Livingstone
Gray and Company

We have embarked upon one of the most difficult and complex periods of change the world has ever witnessed. In the space of a generation, science and technology are reshaping our lives, our work, our leisure time, and perhaps the very nature of societal organization and human values. Where the television revolution of the 1950s brought instantaneous information and experience to the American public, the computers of today permit them to collect, collate, and process that information with blinding speed, increasing the base of human knowledge at an exponential rate and expanding the boundaries of our consciousness. The science of robotics, once relegated to the pages of science fiction, holds out the promise of freeing mankind from the drudgery of physical labor. Instantaneous communications and jet travel have compressed time and space in a way unimaginable only a few years ago. Satellites are probing the heavens, and for the first time in human history, man has burst free from the parochialism of this planet.

But while we marvel at the rapidity of this change and revel in the satisfaction of new discoveries, they also carry a price. The satellites spinning overhead look down on a troubled world overflowing with conflict: Lebanon, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Chad, Iran-Iraq, Namibia, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, Peru, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Mozambique, all force reality on our new vision of the future. "Political violence is spreading around the globe as seldom before," writes Flora Lewis.[1] Simply put, our ability to produce change has outrun our ability to control it. Change has been accompanied by dislocation and upheaval. Old tensions have been exacerbated and new resentments created. The bleak winds of conflict are blowing across the political landscape, fanned by a prolonged global recession that has brought progress in much of the developing world to a standstill and the inexorable pressures of

population growth which have consumed new wealth as rapidly as it has been created.

In the opinion of Charles William Maynes, the Third World is being "demodernized." "Investment projects are lying idle, children are not being taught, disease is spreading, beggars are filling streets from which they have been absent for decades, people are looting food shops, and the middle class is being destroyed by bankruptcy and high interest rates." [2] According to some estimates, excluding China, there are more than a half billion unemployed or underemployed people in the developing world.

The Third World faces a debt crisis so severe that it could conceivably spawn dozens of revolutions and even topple the financial structure of the Western World. And if unfulfilled expectations and economic mismanagement have turned much of the developing world into a "hothouse of conflict," capable of spilling over and engulfing the industrial West, the West is plagued by its own sources of potential conflict. The changes being wrought by technology and the shift from industrial to information economies in many Western nations are producing disillusionment, alienation, and resentment among those left behind during the transformation. Urban nomads and squatters battle police in Berlin and other European cities; crime is turning whole sectors of some major cities into wastelands; and unemployed college graduates have sought to strike back at the societies they blame for their condition by joining terrorist groups in Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and other Western countries. Separatist movements in the United States (Puerto Rico), France, Yugoslavia, Spain, and the United Kingdom attempt to win converts by blaming economic and other inequities on the tyranny of the majority population and maintain that all will be better if only the minority controls its own destiny.

While the growth of new sources of conflict represents a serious and growing challenge to the West, the Soviet Union, beset by a ponderous and inefficient economy, sees in this discord an opportunity to redress the enormous economic disadvantage it labors under vis-a-vis the West. Indeed, in nearly every respect but its military technology, the Soviet Union is, for all practical purposes, a developing country. In the modern world, terrorism and guerrilla insurgencies are increasingly being used as a low-cost and deniable form of surrogate or proxy warfare by the Soviet Union and its al-

lies as a means of undermining the West, wearing it down, nibbling away at its peripheries, denying it the strategic materials and vital straits critical to its commerce. "The USSR," writes Ray S. Cline, "is still trying to see that the regions of the world where the international trading states get their resources continue to shrink as a result of the spread of Soviet control or influence." [3] The West is on the defensive and its response cannot be half-hearted or indecisive without running grave risks. Yet there is a serious and growing gulf between the wars the United States is prepared to fight and those it is most likely to fight during the coming decades, or those that the American public and its politicians are likely to approve.

The prospective battlefield of the next 20 years is more likely to be an urban wilderness of concrete and buildings, the tarmac of an international airport, or the swamps, jungles, and deserts of the Third World than the valleys and sweeping alluvial plains of Europe. And the threat of nuclear war, while always there, is still remote. The most plausible conflict scenario for the future is that of a continuous succession of hostage crises, peacekeeping actions, rescue missions, and counterinsurgency efforts, or what some have called the "low frontier" of warfare. Other names for it include subnational conflict, low-intensity warfare, and low-level violence. Much of it will have more in common with a "rumble" in an alley than with the clash of two armies on a battlefield. As Richard Clutterbuck has observed, old-style wars between conventional armies like the Iran-Iraq War, the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars, and the India-Pakistan conflict will still occur, but less frequently. In many respects, the recent Israeli invasion of Lebanon is a harbinger of things to come. The Israelis fought two enemies in Lebanon—the PLO and the Syrians—and each required a different strategy and a different type of warfare. The result was a war without form or shape, of shifting fronts and tactics, an improvised war that was half counterinsurgency and half conventional.

In the predominantly rural nations of the developing world, governments will be challenged by guerrilla insurgencies, and in the more urbanized industrialized nations, by terrorism. The spectrum of conflict is expanding, and those who do not understand this fact do not understand their time. And just as our expansive technology has created new sources of potential conflict, so too has it made the complex, interdependent, industrialized nations of the West more vulnerable to the emerging new conflict patterns of our time.

Ironically, our technology has made conventional warfare, not to mention nuclear war, too costly, too impractical, too destructive. Should a conventional conflict break out in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, there is no assurance that it could be contained; the fear has always been that the side which is losing will ultimately feel compelled to escalate the conflict into a nuclear confrontation. Terrorism and guerrilla warfare, on the other hand, possess none of these disadvantages. They tend to be cheap modes of conflict, easily containable under most circumstances, and require neither a high degree of sophistication nor training. And should a particular conflict no longer serve the patron nation's purposes, it is relatively easy—under most circumstances—for it to cut its losses and get out.

In years past, terrorism and guerrilla warfare tended to be characteristic of the early stages of any conflict; the ability to engage in guerrilla warfare usually meant the abandonment of most acts of terrorism, just as the ability to field a conventional army generally witnessed the abandonment of guerrilla warfare. However, today terrorism and guerrilla warfare increasingly are becoming ends in themselves, and conflicts often never graduate to more conventional stages. During the Vietnam conflict, the North Vietnamese reacted to the growing capability of the ARVN to wage conventional war by placing new emphasis on guerrilla warfare.[4] Certainly, for the purposes of the Soviet Union and its allies, terrorism and guerrilla warfare represent an effective, low-cost strategy for challenging the West and scoring gains in the Third World.

Terrorism, as we all know, does not involve traditional armies and tactics. The terrorist wears no starched uniform and often is organized without regard to military rank, though the terrorist's organizational structure is generally no less rigid. The recruiting grounds of terrorism are the streets of Beirut and the university campuses of Europe and Latin America; its West Points and Sandhursts are the training camps in Libya, the Soviet Union, South Yemen, the East Bloc countries, and Cuba. The textbooks used by terrorists are Soviet and American field manuals, and underground "bibles" like the Brazilian Carlos Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and the Red Brigades handbook, which are xeroxed and reproduced in dozens of variations and passed from group to group.

Terrorism differs significantly from other forms of warfare in some notable respects. The most obvious difference is that, whereas traditional warfare is most often institutionalized violence, perpetrated by state upon state, and therefore has a badge of legitimacy attached, terrorism is nonstate violence, committed by nonstate actors making war on the state or upon other nonstate groups. As such, it is usually regarded as illegitimate violence. This tendency to identify terrorism not as a form of warfare but as a criminal activity is reflected in US statutes. There is nothing called "terrorism" that is expressly a crime in the United States. Rather, acts of terrorism are punished under statutes dealing with murder, arson, bombings, extortion, air piracy, and so on. In recent years, Puerto Rican FALN and Black Liberation Army terrorists have proclaimed themselves as "political prisoners" and demanded to be treated as "prisoners of war," with international supervision of their trials and incarceration in special prisons, but to date their demands have fallen on deaf ears.

Terrorism differs vastly from formal warfare in being, above all, a political act designed not so much "to annihilate the enemy," as in Mao Tse-tung's definition of the essence of warfare, as to demoralize a society and force its authorities to overreact. The terrorists' wishful object in forcing overreaction is, they profess, to create the conditions for a "general revolt" or "revolution" convenient to themselves. The goal of terrorism most often is not to overthrow a particular state or political system, even if it were possible, but rather to intimidate the enemy, to make a political statement or to call attention to a particular problem or cause. And unlike conventional warfare, where self-preservation is essential to success, terrorism often achieves its purpose in the terrorist's willingness to give up his own life for the cause, although the number of terrorists actually willing to undertake a suicide mission is relatively small.

Another characteristic which sets terrorism apart from other forms of warfare is that traditional warfare is far more destructive than terrorism; this characteristic is consistent with the aim of the terrorist not necessarily to destroy, but to communicate. Relatively few lives have been lost to terrorism in the 20th century—only a few thousand during the last decade—whereas conventional warfare has claimed millions of victims. It is this destructiveness and expensiveness of regular warfare that accounts for some of the growth of terrorism. It is easier to mount a terrorist attack on an unsuspecting

businessman or an unguarded aircraft than to engage in conventional warfare. The equipment of terrorism is very inexpensive compared to the hardware and materiel needed to engage in conventional warfare, or even guerrilla warfare. In this sense, terrorism is perhaps the most democratic form of warfare. Practically anyone can afford to engage in it. As Brian Jenkins has observed, terrorism is warfare "without territory, waged without armies as we know them. It is warfare that is not territorially limited; sporadic 'battles' may take place worldwide. It is warfare without neutrals, and with few or no civilian innocent bystanders." [5] Also, terrorism is easy to engage in because often it is self-financing, especially in its early stages, by means of kidnapping ransoms, bank hold-ups, and like activities.

Guerrilla warfare, by contrast, generally attracts far less publicity than terrorism, largely because its battles are not waged in the media capitals of the West, but in the countryside of the chiefly rural nations of the developing world, far from the prying eye of the television camera. And while guerrilla warfare certainly incorporates various elements of terrorism, it also embodies features of conventional warfare: most often its targets have military value, it is generally waged on a larger scale than terrorism, and many of its tactics have a good deal in common with traditional concepts of warfare. Guerrilla warfare perhaps differs most from terrorism in that guerrillas, to be at all successful, must have a reasonable level of support from the people, "the sea in which they swim," but terrorists need not have any public support whatsoever. They can melt back into the populace of a large city without anyone's being the wiser.

THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TERRORIST WEAPONS

Just as technology is revolutionizing the face of the world we live in, creating new sources of tension, and a vast array of new vulnerabilities, so too is technology revolutionizing the weapons and implements of warfare. "The curve of the individual soldier's capacity for destruction is racing upward," writes Brian Jenkins, "propelled by the military research and development programs." [6] Thanks to the development of the semiconductor, new plastics and other synthetic materials, and advances in optics, explosives, and electronics, the weapons that can be carried into combat by a single

soldier are smaller, cheaper, lighter, easier to use, more portable, and more destructive than ever before. A lone soldier can today hold in his hands more raw firepower than that possessed by a whole regiment of Napoleonic-era soldiers. And almost as rapidly as new weapons are developed for the military arsenals of the world, they are finding their way into the hands of terrorists and guerrillas, by means of theft, unscrupulous arms dealers, and the largess of patron nations.

Perhaps the most modest and rudimentary terrorist device in the world is the price of a phone call. With 15 cents, from any pay booth in Washington, D.C., it is possible to threaten the life of a public official, or if the call is convincing enough, to force a jetliner to make an emergency landing or compel the evacuation of a crowded building. On the basis of a phoned-in bomb threat, a major bridge in suburban Washington, D.C., was shut down for almost 15 minutes during rush hour in January 1983 while police combed the area for explosives, causing a massive traffic jam. Armenian threats in Paris forced two jetliners to make emergency landings in July of 1983, and on 22 October 1981, trading was halted on both the Philadelphia Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade after an anonymous phone caller said bombs had been placed in both buildings. One does not have to be particularly sophisticated to make a telephone threat; in January 1983, a 12-year old boy was arrested in Virginia and accused of threatening to detonate a bomb at a local hospital unless he was paid $5,000. At last count, one could direct-dial 74 countries from the United States, thus giving one person in a phone booth an almost global reach.

Terrorist weapons in recent years have been as diverse and unusual as the crossbow used in the Hanafi Muslim takeover of the B'nai B'rith headquarters in Washington; tiny grenades hidden in film packs; boobytrapped 100-peso notes in Argentina; blow-guns with poisonous darts; a golf bag filled with explosives and gasoline by the IRA; briefcases with silenced submachine guns built into the frame; a two-foot snake, a cobra, mailed to a university official in India; and a compressed-air device secreted in the shaft of an umbrella which fired tiny pellets containing the deadly poison ricin used in assassinating Bulgarian exile Georgi Markov and in an attempt upon another. While terrorist weapons may be as rudimentary as a common household cleaner like Oven Off sprayed in an unwary victim's face; a Molotov cocktail; a hard lead pencil held to

the jugular vein of a stewardess; or a bomb made from ammonium nitrate, diesel fuel, and a blasting cap, many terrorist and guerrilla arsenals include shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles like the Soviet-made SA-7, which weighs just under 25 pounds and costs less than a thousand dollars to produce. Arab terrorists were apprehended during the past decade in both Kenya and Italy preparing to shoot down Israeli airliners with SA-7s, and insurgents battling the government of the white settler colony of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) probably used SA-7s to knock two Air Rhodesia airliners out of the sky. Chinese- or Soviet-built RPG-2 antitank grenade launchers were used in attacks on the US embassy in Guatemala City in 1982 and on the car bearing US General Frederick J. Kroesen in West Germany in 1981. During the mid-1970s, the IRA showed the press an M-60 machinegun which authorities speculate was one of several purchased from Middle East arms dealers.

Terrorist bombs are becoming ever more powerful and sophisticated, as witnessed in the explosion that destroyed the US embassy in Beirut in 1982. Some bombs are planted months in advance and left unactivated until needed. Others use thermometers or cold-sensitive circuits in tandem with time-delay switches to trigger an explosion if a chilling technique is used by bomb-disposal specialists to disarm the device.[7] Bomb making has been elevated to a high art, and organizations like the IRA have a master reference guide known, appropriately enough, as the "Bomb Book" which gives easy-to-follow, step-by-step directions for manufacturing explosive devices. In addition to a number of underground bomb-making guides, some of which are even available in leading bookstores, terrorists rely on Soviet and US military manuals for instruction concerning explosives.[8]

With respect to firearms, terrorists tend to favor small lightweight submachine guns and machine pistols, like the Wz63 manufactured by Poland and the .32 ACP caliber Vz61 Skorpion machine pistol produced by Czechoslovakia. Easily concealable and capable of laying down a good deal of fire at close range, such weapons are well suited to the urban terrorist's needs. Carlos, the so-called "Jackal," was known to carry a Wz63, and Skorpions were used in the abduction of Aldo Moro, the leader of Italy's Christian Democrats.[9] While almost all terrorist combat occurs within a range of 50

feet, weapons with increased range and accuracy are required by guerrillas.

Like their conventional counterparts, rural guerrillas have adopted the assault rifle as their basic weapon. Soviet and East Bloc Kalashnikov AK-47 and AKM models are perhaps the most common weapons in use by communist-supported guerrillas.[10] Thousands of M-16s abandoned by the US forces in Vietnam also are beginning to show up in large numbers in terrorist and insurgent arsenals, along with their civilian counterpart, the AR-15.[11] Among the more unusual firearms discovered in the possession of terrorists in recent years are 12-gauge pump riot shotguns and sawed-off shotguns; a gun hidden inside an ordinary camera, the barrel of the weapon behind the camera lens; and an eyeglass case that—if squeezed—fires two small-caliber rounds. Recent advances in ammunition have made contemporary firearms more deadly than ever before. Exploding handgun bullets made front-page news in the March 1982 attempt to assassinate President Reagan. The armor-piercing capabilities of small-arms have been viciously stepped up by KTW handgun loads—the notorious Teflon-coated bronze-jacketed "cop-killer" bullets designed to penetrate police woven body armor as well as heavily armored (hardened) cars.

Among the novel assassination attempts of recent years was an effort to kill by slow poisoning the plant foreman at the French Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear wastes reprocessing plant at La Hague in 1979 by slipping underneath the driver's seat of his car irradiated pieces of magnesium used to handle radioactive uranium bars. Had the foreman not been involved in a minor traffic accident that necessitated repairs to his car, the plot might not have been discovered until it was too late. An employee of the plant was charged with the crime, and while not technically a terrorist attack, it is representative of what techno-terrorists of the future could do. Indeed, given the range of weapons and opportunities available to them, it is not so surprising what terrorists have done, but what they have not done.

Indeed, if the past gives us any glimpse of the future, we are on the threshold of a world potentially more dangerous than could ever have been imagined, a world where a single individual with a disordered mind or a small group of terrorists could possess a weapon of mass destruction, capable of wiping out thousands, perhaps mil-

lions, of innocent people and blackmailing entire nations. Despite current popular fiction, that weapon is unlikely to be nuclear. There are three categories of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, and biological. Whereas it would take a gifted individual or group, operating under ideal conditions, with all of the requisite facilities, materials, and instructions—a virtual impossibility—to build a fissionable device, which in all probability would be a dud, any reasonably competent graduate-level chemist or microbiologist could, in the privacy of a garage or kitchen, produce toxic chemical compounds or deadly biological cultures, together with an appropriate vector or delivery device, sufficient to kill or intimidate large numbers of people. There is little or no regulation controlling access to and distribution of most deadly biological cultures in the United States; most are available—for less than the price of a "Saturday Night Special"—through the mail from medical supply laboratories, including the bacilli that produce both anthrax and botulin toxin. Similarly, many chemical weapons can be constructed with readily available ingredients, and the directions for manufacturing such devices are available to any resourceful researcher. Studies describing how to launch chemical attacks, including calculations governing wind velocity and dispersal patterns, can be found on some library shelves.

All of this may seem like the makings of an implausible work of fiction, yet so real is the threat that three years ago the Center for Disease Control was requested to provide ongoing assistance to the FBI's antiterrorist special operations team. The request was motivated by a series of alarming threats and verified incidents including the contamination of supermarket shelf products, attempts to poison urban water systems and swimming pools, and several actual incidents involving attempts to produce nerve agents and biological pathogens. Authorities in Paris discovered a terrorist laboratory engaged in the production of anthrax. Moreover, documents discovered in PLO bunkers in Lebanon last year leave little doubt that the Soviet Union has been training terrorists in the use of chemical weapons. France reportedly has provided Libya's Muammar Quaddafi with a ton of the nerve agent Tabun (GA), and one can only surmise to whom the Libyan dictator might have transferred it.

NEW TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

While technology has showered a plethora of new riches on contemporary society, the hazard of this good fortune is that it has also provided terrorists not only with new weapons but with a wealth of new targets, circumscribed only by their imagination and the weapons available to them. The more populous, complex, and urban Western nations have become, the more tenuous and fragile the slender lifelines on which they depend: water, electricity, sewers, communications, food production and distribution networks, transportation systems.

The loss, for example, of just 20 long-distance transfer facilities would incapacitate the entire long-distance telephone system in the United States. The destruction of a single pipeline computer center in New Orleans could shut down the flow of natural gas to much of the midwestern United States. As Hannah Arendt has observed, "bigness is afflicted with vulnerability." [12] Indeed, a handful of terrorists who know what they are doing and how the system works could paralyze a great city or cripple an entire economy. Until recently, this would have been impossible. "One hundred and fifty years ago if someone wanted to put out all the lights in a village, he had to go from house to house to do it," writes Walter Laqueur. "Now he blows up one generator and all the lights in the city go out." [13] Revolutionaries have been quick to seize upon this vulnerability. In Guatemala and El Salvador, candles on the dressers in most hotel rooms are a reminder of frequent efforts by guerrillas battling those two governments to sabotage power transmission towers and electrical generating facilities.

Ironically, the more complex our world becomes the more vulnerable it becomes to rudimentary, even primitive weapons. As Robert Moss has observed, it took a single mortar round to inflict $5 billion worth of damage on the US military base at Khe Sanh in 1968.[14] To put this in perspective, the damage done by one mortar round exceeded the combined gross domestic products (GDP) of Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Gambia, Niger, Swaziland, Togo, Malawi, Guinea-Bissau, Chad, Burundi, Upper Volta, Tonga, Somalia, and Rwanda. One high-velocity bullet aimed at the thin skin of the space shuttle's external fuel tank, which is filled with 1.5 million gallons of liquid hydrogen and oxygen, could disable the craft or cause it to explode. Similarly, one well-aimed PGM (preci-

sion guided munition) could turn a $50 million offshore oil platform—with as many as 30 separate wells—into a blazing inferno.

Terrorists of the future can be expected to strike at such high-consequence targets as pipelines, satellite ground stations, computers, refineries, LNG facilities, supertankers, and levees, dikes, and dams, as well as sporting events, technological showpieces like the Concorde, and the 1985 Japan Expo. Businesses which represent "the American way of life" like Coca-Cola, McDonalds, and Sears are also likely terrorist targets abroad.

National economies are more vulnerable than people. People are able to endure persistent hardship and omnipresent death and still maintain some sense of normalcy in their lives, evidence the people of contemporary Lebanon or the residents of London during the German blitz. However, when people are cold, hungry, and unemployed, when all of their dreams and aspirations are dashed, they become truly vulnerable; disillusionment sets in and they no longer possess the will to resist.

To illustrate the vulnerability of economies, one need only to recall the 1978 incident when Palestinian terrorists injected poison into Israeli citrus products destined for Europe. A number of people became ill, but no one died from the contaminated products. Yet the Israeli foreign exchange position was severely damaged as demand for Israeli oranges, grapefruit, and other citrus dried up. Israel's limping economy remains its Achilles heel; had the Palestinians pressed their effort to compromise Israel's exports, they might have more severely undermined its security than they were able to do over a period of years with terrorist and guerrilla attacks on its people, airliners, and buildings.

To cite another example, three separate attacks in 1981 by leftist guerrillas in Guatemala all but wiped out that nation's booming tourism industry. A hotel on beautiful Lake Atitlan was bombed, miraculously with no loss of life or serious injury. At one of Guatemala City's three major hotels, a pickup truck raced by during the dinner hour and a terrorist tossed a bomb underneath a parked car, which exploded. The most serious incident, however, occurred at Guatemala's national treasure, the Mayan ruins at Tikal, which is located deep in the jungle far north of the only high-

way. A band of guerrillas surrounded Tikal and rounded up all of the tourists, whom they proceeded to lecture on the "evils" of capitalism and the government. While the guerrillas were blowing up a museum at the site, some of the tourists fled in a truck. The truck was ambushed and two people were killed. News of the attacks spread like wildfire to travel agents in the United States and Europe, and within a matter of months tourism was down by more than 80 percent. The government—which had depended on tourism for hard currency—found it increasingly difficult to come up with the exchange needed to pay for the ammunition used by its hard-pressed troops battling the guerrillas.

In the future, the thinking man's terrorist or guerrilla will use herbicides, rural wildfires, and various biological agents to spread crop diseases and destroy a nation's cash crops, a particularly effective strategy in monocultures. The loss of a significant part of a nation's agricultural produce could create widespread hardship, even famine, and add to popular unrest against the central government. Any number of human antipersonnel agents or animal viruses could be used to deplete livestock herds. The inadvertent release of nonsterile Medflies (Mediterranean fruit flies) in California last year posed a major threat to that state's seven billion dollar (excluding livestock) a year agricultural industry, a fact that surely did not escape the notice of terrorists.

In El Salvador, guerrillas strike at bridges, ports, and railroads, in attacks designed to prevent products from moving to market and to disrupt ordinary commerce. Indeed, transportation systems—road, railroads, aviation, pipelines—are extremely susceptible to sabotage, and by virtue of their dimensions and complexity almost impossible to protect. Instead of hijacking aircraft or shooting them down, terrorists might conceivably try to disrupt civil aviation in the United States or abroad by interfering with beacons or radio communications. In 1981, for example, during the Air Traffic Controller's strike, there were several instances of pilots receiving false radio instructions.

TRENDS IN TERRORIST VIOLENCE

Contemporary terrorist groups are smaller, better trained, better armed, and more cohesive than ever before. This makes them more difficult to monitor and to penetrate, and places new demands

on Western intelligence agencies. With the support of patron nations and with increased training and experience, terrorists have a higher capacity for violence than ever before. Indeed, while the number of terrorist acts has leveled off in recent years, the number of serious incidents is increasing. This may be explained in part by the routinization of violence in the modern world. Terrorists must commit ever more dramatic and brutal acts of violence in order to thrust their struggles onto the front pages of the world's newspapers and ensure coverage by the electronic media. Coverage by both the print and electronic media is vital to the success of terrorism, for unless it is communicated to a wide audience, terrorism represents little more than a form of political masturbation.

The terrorist fulcrum has shifted from Europe and the Middle East to Latin America, which is today the site of more terrorist attacks than any other region of the world. The conflict in Central America is producing the largest number of terrorist incidents, but terrorist activity remains high in Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Argentina. Indeed, terrorism is on the rise in the developing world not only because of economic tensions and unfulfilled expectations, but because developing countries are far less prepared to respond to terrorist attacks than are the major Western powers.

While the United States is still terrorist target number one throughout the world, the Soviet Union and its allies are learning what it is like to be on the receiving end of terrorist violence. Soviet military personnel and advisers cannot move freely about Kabul, Afghanistan, without fear of being targets of bombing attacks and assassination. In August 1983, South African-backed rebels in Mozambique killed two Soviet geologists and seized 24 other Soviet citizens. The prospect of a general outbreak of terrorist violence in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, must surely give Soviet leaders nightmares. In September 1982, Polish terrorists seized the Polish embassy in Bern, Switzerland. Although the embassy was quickly retaken by a special Swiss anti-terrorist squad and the hostages freed, security was beefed up at other Polish embassies around the world. More than a dozen illegal underground organizations exist in Poland, and most are believed to be capable of violence. Airlines were the target of terrorists in Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia during the past year and in East Germany a gunman tried to force party leader Erich Honecker's car off the road.

Thwarted by Honecker's security force, the would-be assassin turned his gun on himself and committed suicide.

The past two years have witnessed a continued rise in the number of attacks on diplomats. Over 40 percent of all terrorist incidents against US personnel and facilities are aimed at US diplomats. The most serious such incident was the bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, which left 47 dead and scores injured. The targets, moreover, of terrorist assassination plots have steadily become more prominent personages. In recent years, terrorists have struck down Lord Louis Mountbatten; Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; Lebanon's President-elect Bashir Gemayel; the chairman of Italy's ruling Christian Democrats, Aldo Moro; and dozens of lesser officials and political figures. Both Pope John Paul II and Spanish General Joaquin Valenzuela, chief military aide to King Juan Carlos, narrowly escaped death and were severely injured in terrorist attacks. This should serve as a warning to those in power and act as an incentive for them to adopt tougher sanctions against terrorists.

Airline hijacking is in fashion once again. Nations whose aircraft have been seized by terrorists during the past two years include Honduras, Poland, France, Iran, South Yemen, China, Pakistan, Italy, India, the Soviet Union, Libya, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Colombia, Kuwait, Indonesia, Ireland, and the United States. Clearly the problem is of global dimensions. Lax airport security measures in many countries still permit would-be hijackers to board airline flights with near impunity. Even the United States, where tough antihijacking measures have been implemented, has experienced a recent epidemic of hijackings, most by Cuban refugees seeking to return home. Some have commandeered commercial flights by threatening to detonate small amounts of gasoline they have smuggled on board. It is only a matter of time before a hijacking someplace in the world leads to an aviation disaster. The problem will not end, suggests one observer, until we begin hanging hijackers at airports, an altogether improbable notion, however appealing it may be.

CONFLICT LANDSCAPE OF THE FUTURE

The zones of conflict will widen during the next decade, and

many individual conflicts will intensify. A brief conflict forecast follows:

Soviet bloc and allied states.[15] In Afghanistan, Moslem (Mujaheddin) rebels have fought 100,000 Russian troops to a standstill, despite the fact that the Soviets have a contiguous border and unimpeded supply lines. Soviet-backed proxy states are on the defensive in both Angola and Mozambique as South African-based rebels make strong advances in the countryside. The decades-old Eritrean secessionist rebellion against the central government of Ethiopia, now decidedly Marxist in its orientation, is likely to continue without resolution. Both Vietnam and Kampuchea have been harassed by insurgents, but neither guerrilla movement appears to be making any significant headway. Nicaragua is under attack by CIA-backed counterrevolutionaries; however, without increased US assistance over a long period of time, it is unlikely that the Sandinista regime will be toppled. In Eastern Europe, Poland remains vulnerable to internal conflict, and could conceivably be the first Eastern Bloc country to spawn a major terrorist movement.

Western and allied states.[16] Lebanon and Chad are both beset by civil wars with no end in sight. A large scale Soviet-, Cuban-, and Nicaraguan-backed insurgency currently threatens the government of El Salvador, and guerrillas are gaining momentum in both Peru and the Philippines. In Peru, the *Sendero Luminoso* (Shining Path) rebels are spreading a reign of terror throughout the countryside in what may be the most serious, largely unreported guerrilla conflict in the world. During the past year, both Guatemala and Thailand have scored major gains against communist-backed rebels, but the tide could turn against either government just as rapidly. Somalia, Morocco, Haiti, Pakistan, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Indonesia, Honduras, and Colombia all are plagued by insurgents, but none seems seriously threatened at the present time. Riots and civil disturbances have rocked Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Nigeria in recent months, and all four nations are characterized by conditions that could lead to organized and violent opposition. Among the nonaligned nations, Burma, India, and Yugoslavia are challenged by small incipient terrorist/guerrilla movements.

Late 1983 saw the PLO preparing to make a final stand in Lebanon, after having been driven from Beirut in 1982, only this time the enemy is the Syrians rather than the Israelis. While surviv-

ing elements of the PLO may feel compelled to launch new terrorist attacks to demonstrate to the world that "we are still here," it is unlikely that the governments that have taken in the remnants of the PLO will permit their territory to be used for launching terrorist attacks and incurring the wrath of either Syria, Israel, or the West. If a new outbreak of Palestinian terrorism occurs, it is likely to be the work of Abu Nidal's Black June or the Mohammed Boudia Commando, both of which have strong European bases.

The defeat of the PLO has severely damaged the infrastructure of world terrorism. Gone are many of the training camps and much of the materiel used to support other, generally Marxist, revolutionary movements. Communications between revolutionary groups have been disrupted. The largest terrorist safe haven has fallen, and it is unlikely that the PLO will ever again be able to mount the same kind of conventional military challenge to Israel.

In the baggage of the PLO as it fled from Beirut were dozens of terrorists from at least a score of allied revolutionary movements, including a rump unit of the Japanese Red Army (JRA). The JRA terrorists reportedly made their way to Italy and may have been responsible for the recent spate of anti-Semitic attacks there. This terrorist diaspora could contribute to an increase of violence in Western Europe and other regions of the world since the forced exodus of so many terrorists from Beirut, a large number having grown indolent and complacent in the Lebanese capital, will almost surely force renewed activism on the part of some. Moreover, it presents new problems for Western intelligence organizations, which had developed sophisticated networks of informers and electronic collection methods to monitor terrorist activities in Beirut. Very little went on in Beirut's circumscribed confines that some intelligence service was not privy to, and now new monitoring and surveillance systems will have to be devised.

The real threat from the PLO in the near future may be indirect. For more than a decade, the PLO has developed linkages to other terrorist groups, with increasing emphasis on those in Latin America. In return for training and weapons provided by the PLO during their struggle against the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas have thrown Nicaragua's doors open to their former comrades-in-arms. The PLO maintains a large embassy in Managua with a staff of more than 70, and PLO advisers instruct the Nicaraguans in

everything from equipment maintenance to military tactics. From its budget of approximately $800 million a year prior to being expelled from Beirut, more than $12 million was loaned by the PLO to the Sandinistas. Most serious of all, the PLO today operates three training camps in Nicaragua where revolutionaries from El Salvador and other Latin American countries receive instruction in guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics.

Perhaps the most ominous development with respect to terrorism since the beginning of the decade has been the dramatic escalation of Armenian violence against Turkey and its diplomats. Since 1981, Armenian terrorists have carried out more attacks than any other terrorist movement, and during the past decade, 36 Turkish diplomats have been murdered by Armenian terrorists, including one in the United States. The most recent attack was the work of an Armenian suicide squad in Lisbon, Portugal, in early August 1983. Four terrorists, the wife of the charge d'affairs, and a Portuguese police officer died in the blast.

The principal Armenian terrorist organizations are the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), which claimed responsibility for the Lisbon attack, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, and the Armenian Liberation Army. Authorities believe that there is some overlap in the various groups and that the actual number of Armenian terrorists probably is no more than a few hundred.

There is growing evidence that Armenian terrorists are predominantly Marxist and receive considerable support from the Soviet Union, which is intent on undermining NATO's eastern flank. Armenian terrorists have a long Marxist tradition, dating back to their 19th century leader Krisdapar Mikaelian, a self-proclaimed disciple of Karl Marx. It is significant that while the largest Armenian minority in the world resides in the Soviet Union, only Turkey is the target of Armenian nationalist attacks.

In Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army continues its unrelenting terror campaign against the British. The world was horrified by two particularly bloody attacks in London during the summer of 1982. In the first, a powerful nail bomb concealed in a car parked near Hyde Park was detonated as the Queen's Household Cavalry passed by. Four cavalrymen died and 22 other guards and

civilians were injured. A short time later, a second bomb went off underneath a bandstand in Regent's Park; six band members were killed and twenty-eight other musicians and civilians were injured.

In the past four years the IRA and the smaller INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) have trimmed their ranks, emphasizing tight, cohesive units characterized by a high degree of professionalism. Both organizations are Marxist in orientation with strong links to the PLO, the Basque ETA, and to other terrorist groups. Although the Irish Republic has stepped up cooperation with the British in an effort to control nationalist terrorism, the violence continues. In a disturbing development, this year voters in Northern Ireland elected a member of the Sinn Fein, the IRA's political arm, to the British parliament, its first seat in nearly thirty years. Through the use of informers, British authorities have made remarkable progress in capturing IRA terrorists and sending them to prison for long terms, and recent reports suggest morale is low and the IRA command structure is in disarray. It is probably for this reason that the IRA mounted its desperate prison break in late September from Maze Prison. Although 38 men escaped, more than half have been recaptured.

Basque separatist violence remains high in Spain, and efforts by the Spanish government to crush the Marxist ETA continue to be handicapped by the Mitterand government's reluctance to extradite suspected Basque terrorists or to suppress ETA activities on French territory. Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has pursued tough antiterrorist policies which have placated, for the time being, Spain's rightist military and paramilitary Civil Guards and defused as a potential campaign issue charges that the government's response to terrorism was irresolute.

One of the bright spots in the war against terrorism has been in Italy where the Red Brigades—which only two years ago seemed unstoppable—have suffered significant reverses in their efforts to undermine the always fragile Italian state. Although the Italian government was already beginning to make significant progress in its efforts to penetrate the organization and apprehend its leadership, the kidnapping by terrorists and subsequent rescue by Italy's special counterterrorist police of US Brigadier General James Dozier after 42 days of captivity may have sounded the organization's knell. Dozier, attached to NATO's southern headquarters

command, was kidnapped from his home in Verona, Italy, in December 1981, and spirited away to a secret location. Communications from the Red Brigades railed against NATO and the "installation of missiles" and indicated that the "pig Dozier" would be tried by a self-appointed "peoples" court. In the same communique, the Red Brigades identified themselves as part of an "organization of Communist combat" engaged in a war against "NATO's heartland in Western Europe." [17] After Dozier was rescued, the Red Brigades admitted they had suffered a defeat, but they vowed that "the liberation of Dozier will not succeed in stopping the current revolutionary progress.[18] Despite such rhetoric, however, Red Brigades violence has fallen off dramatically in recent months. Most of the Brigades' top leaders as well as their rank-and-file have been arrested and are now serving long prison sentences or awaiting trial.

Other groups to watch in the months ahead include the Red Army Faction in West Germany. It can be anticipated that the antinuclear issue and the deployment of US cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe will provoke more violence over the next 12 to 24 months.

And while the French government is cracking down on the outlawed terrorist organization, Direct Action, it is still reluctant to take all of the necessary steps to suppress and control terrorism within its borders. Perhaps the most serious threat to the United States in the coming decade is posed by Puerto Rican separatist groups, including the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), the Macheteros, and the Armed Forces of National (Popular) Resistance. It has been more than three years since the United States has experienced a major outbreak of Puerto Rican separatist violence, although four dynamite charges were set off in New York on 28 February 1982, wounding four police officers. The FALN claimed responsibility for the attacks. The FALN was dealt a severe blow in 1980 when 11 of its members were arrested in a Chicago suburb. New leadership is moving in to fill the void and new recruits have been trained; therefore, it can be anticipated that the FALN and its companion groups will not remain silent indefinitely. Similarly, the April 19 Movement (M-19) in Colombia—previously one of the most active terrorist units in the world—has suffered serious reverses in the past two years and no longer represents as much of a threat to the Colombian government as it once did. Antigovernment elements in Colombia, however, could coalesce into new terrorist con-

figurations in the future and renew their attacks on the government and the economy.

A NEW POLICY FOR THE 1980s AND 1990s

Neither our political nor our military establishment is properly attuned to the new realities of conflict in our time. We have not responded to the changing spectrum of conflict as rapidly or as thoroughly as the gravity of the threat would warrant. In this connection, the US low-level or unconventional war capability has always been something of a stepchild, an afterthought, within the defense structure, involving more improvisation than science. Indeed, our warmaking capability is still designed to fight general wars in Europe, rather than to engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism.

As a result of this preoccupation with formal warfare, the United States has enjoyed few military successes in the postwar period in the area of low-intensity or unconventional warfare. Symptomatic of this deficiency, Harvey J. McGeorge has noted, was the failure of United States hostage rescue attempts, in contrast to the successes scored by Israel, Great Britain, and West Germany. "In the past four decades the United States has mounted several large scale attempts to rescue hostages," writes McGeorge. "During these attempts scores of American lives were lost and tens of millions of dollars worth of equipment expended. Yet not a single hostage was returned to friendly hands as a result of these rescue efforts." [19] McGeorge reviews the failures of intelligence, organization, command decisions, and preparation during the Iran rescue attempt, the Son Tay raid, the *Mayaguez* incident, and the abortive Task Force Baum, which sought to liberate 1,500 POWs in German-held territory near the end of the Second World War. All 1,500 POWs freed and 293 members of the 294-man unit were killed or captured as they tried to reach Allied lines.[20]

This is not to suggest that the military is entirely to blame for these failures or for the lack of success in Vietnam. Quite the contrary. Indeed, much of the problem lies with the US political establishment that defines the mission of our armed forces, and with a public which is inherently fickle in its support and backing of anything less than a so-called "popular" war.

"After the disasters of the loss of Vietnam and the collapse of the Nixon presidency," writes Ray S. Cline, "the United States began to drift almost aimlessly in its strategic thinking."[21] Today we need to rethink our military and intelligence needs from the standpoint of the historic changes that are occurring in the nature and shape of contemporary conflict. The security of the United States and the rest of the Western World requires a restructuring of our warmaking capability, placing new emphasis on the ability to fight a succession of limited wars and to project power into the Third World. But before that must come a change in the world view of American policymakers and the American public, along with a recognition that what is at stake is nothing less than the survival of our country and way of life. In order to sustain our Nation over time we must exploit vulnerabilities elsewhere, and this includes influencing the internal events of other countries. However, without strong policy direction from Washington and requisite public support, based on a clear perception of the costs associated both with involvement and uninvolvement, it will be impossible for the United States to adapt successfully to the changing conflict environment.

Indeed, there is an inevitable political dimension to limited warfare that shapes both the nature of the conflict and the response. The scale of a nation's response to any challenge is an inherently political decision and, in a democracy like the United States, ultimately requires the acquiescence, if not the approval, of the people.[22] Yet the American people are confused by Central America and Lebanon. They are not sure why we are there and what we hope to accomplish by our involvement. Recent polls on American attitudes toward United States involvement in Central America found that while 64 percent of those polled felt that the situation in Central America is a threat to the security of the United States,[23] only 24 percent favored the introduction of more advisers and only 21 percent believed those advisers should be permitted to enter combat areas.[24] Such results clearly demonstrate the confusion that reigns in US global perceptions and is indicative of the loss of national will to act even when our security is threatened. This is perhaps the most damaging legacy of Vietnam.

As Clausewitz observed, warfare is, in its most elemental sense, nothing but a trial of strength.[25] As a rule, conflicts will be won by the side with superior resources. Superior strategy and tactics will delay an inevitable conclusion, but only temporarily. However, the

side possessing superior resources must be prepared to apply them from the onset of the conflict until victory has been secured. Unfortunately, the postwar history of the United States' involvement in low-level conflicts reveals that in virtually every instance there was a prolonged, incremental buildup, followed by a long war of stalemate and attrition. Ultimately the side which was prepared to hold on the longest, which had the most clearly defined sense of purpose, prevailed in the test of wills. As evidence of this national purpose, one need only recall Ho Chi Minh's boast that they would fight ten years, twenty years, thirty years or more, whatever it took to prevail in Vietnam. Today, by contrast, the US public and American policymakers will not accept wars of attrition; they only will tolerate short wars, and then only if there are not heavy combat losses. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., writes of the "repugnance of the American people toward a war of attrition." "All of America's previous wars were fought in the heat of passion," he observes. "Vietnam was fought in cold blood, and that was intolerable to the American people." [26]

There seems to be a lack of recognition in this country that police actions, peacekeeping missions, and counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations are all part of the same long, continuous war, a war composed of many small, often nameless battles of short duration in dozens of different venues against an unchanging enemy and its proxies and surrogates. Today the death of four Marines in Lebanon—while a tragedy—produces a firestorm of controversy, with weak-willed members of Congress demanding the withdrawal of all US peacekeeping forces. Similarly, the introduction of 55 US military advisers in El Salvador provokes a great outcry in the Congress and the media; yet there may be as many as 3,000 East Bloc military advisers in Nicaragua, a fact that is largely ignored. The Soviet Union pours ten times as much military aid into Nicaragua and Cuba as the United States provides to all Latin America, yet it is this country and not the Soviet Union that is consistently accused of "propping up unpopular military regimes" in the region. In another example, the French sent 500 crack troops labeled "advisers" to Chad and then moved them to the front and hardly elicited a yawn. Within days the force was greatly expanded and all pretense dropped that the men were advisers. In the political environment of the United States today, such an action would be virtually impossible.

The obvious question that must be asked is whether the United States is capable of fighting and winning limited wars and successfully engaging in low-level military operations. The answer is clear. The United States will never win a war fought daily in the US media or on the floor of the US Congress, where members attempt to micromanage conflicts rather than making overall policy and leaving the implementation of that policy to others. The conflict in Southeast Asia serves as clear indication of the hazards associated with too much publicity, as does the current US involvement in Central America and Lebanon. They have learned this lesson in Guatemala, where the Guatemalan government has restricted the press to the urban centers and prosecuted the war against the Marxist guerrillas with efficiency, brutality, and dispatch. Similarly, when fighting terrorism, several counterterrorist "superpowers" have adopted an informal policy which translates loosely as, "if nobody's looking, don't take any prisoners," thus eliminating the stimulus for new acts of terrorism designed to free captured confederates. While such recommendations would surely provoke an outcry from civil libertarians, the plain fact is that the United States is at war, and in wartime the only thing that counts is winning, because winning is surviving. The "dirty little conflicts" of our time are not pretty, but they are critical to Western security, and if we abrogate our ability to engage successfully in low-level conflict we lose our capacity to check Soviet expansion and maintain a liberal world order compatible with our national interests and security.

Unlike Henry Kissinger, who has maintained that limited war admits of no purely military solutions, and instead is part of a test of wills designed ultimately to forge a political outcome,[27] it is my contention that limited wars and other low-level conflicts can not only be won but that by winning such conflicts over time we can prevail in our strategic competition with the USSR. Indeed, the loss of a country to communism should simply serve as an impetus for us to take back another country. The main elements of such a policy are as follows:

- Support of resistance forces around the globe fighting the Soviet Union, its allies and ideological fellow-travelers. We should provide training, arms, and materiel to resistance forces in such places as Afghanistan, Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Nicaragua, and design psychological operations to buttress that resistance. If such support is right and in our

national interest, we should undertake the obligations and commitments openly, and whenever feasible without the stigma attached to covert operations.

- The United States should come to the aid of governments resisting Soviet- or proxy-backed insurgents or terrorists. This support should take the form of economic, police, and military aid, including supplying training to counterinsurgency and counterterrorist forces, the introduction of US military advisers, and—where feasible—the interdiction of arms and supplies to the hostile forces and the destruction of safe havens and external bases.

- In the words of Daniel Arnold, "Covert support of coups and countercoups must be justified both pragmatically and morally as a tool of foreign policy." [28] In this connection, the United States should not be afraid to use its power to shape and configure a global order which is not hostile to US security interests.

- Debate should be reopened on murder as an instrument of national policy. Just as the Israelis have hunted down those responsible for the Munich Massacre, so too should the United States consider special units to track down and kill terrorists whose actions have resulted in the deaths of American diplomats or other Government personnel. Such units could also interdict foreign terrorists preparing to launch attacks on the US mainland. Bounties could be offered for the heads of terrorists implicated in the deaths of Americans.

Within this framework, a number of specific observations and recommendations can be advanced with respect to beefing up our intelligence, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency capabilities.

Intelligence

Good intelligence provides the first line of defense against terrorism and is perhaps the most critical tool in successful counterinsurgency operations. It was, after all, good intelligence that permitted authorities to apprehend the terrorists in both Rome and Kenya preparing to shoot down jetliners with Soviet-made heat-

seeking missiles. The terrorist or guerrilla has the advantage of being able to choose the time and the place of his attack from an almost infinite universe of options, together with the mode of attack, and it is almost impossible for those on the defensive to guard every potential target, anticipate every weapon and set of tactics, and to be prepared 24 hours a day for an attack which may never come. While static defense is critical to any counterinsurgency operation, those who try to protect every asset and every potential target are likely to spread their forces too thin; as the old adage warns, "he who is everywhere is nowhere." Good intelligence will go a long way toward eliminating the inherent advantage possessed by terrorists and guerrillas.

Thus, the work going on to rebuild this Nation's intelligence establishment after the trauma of Vietnam, the so-called Church Committee hearings, and Admiral Turner's misguided stewardship of the CIA must be supported and encouraged. The paramilitary capability of the Agency must be restored. Congress must reform its oversight procedures to narrow the consultation requirements imposed on the intelligence establishment. Today all any congressman needs to do to abort a covert operation is put a little body English on a classified briefing and call a press conference.

Counterterrorism

Elite military units have always been the focus of a good deal of controversy. Some argue that such units tend to be romanticized and are antithetical to democratic traditions and notions of a citizen army. Other grievances include the problem of controlling elite units, in view of the fact that the existence of elite units often circumvents the normal chain of command.[29] It is also pointed out, for example, that the Marine Corps has no elite units (although it could be argued that the Corps is itself an elite unit) because such units have a tendency to siphon off the best people, to the detriment of the Corps in general. Nevertheless, elite units have utility when it comes to fighting terrorism. Such units can undertake extremely hazardous missions, which require a high degree of skill, training, and possibly even deniability. They also serve as laboratories for new weapons and tactics, a useful function in the constantly changing conflict environment. But most importantly, they act as counterweights against the complacency that often overtakes many military organizations and produces a paralysis when action is most

needed. Indeed, the hallmark of successful counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations is flexibility.

In this connection, more emphasis needs to be placed on developing and honing US counterterrorist skills, such as those first deployed by the Delta team in Iran. The mission, however, of elite multipurpose Delta-type units needs to be narrowed and made more explicit. Today such units are supposed to carry out antiterrorist operations like rescuing hostages as well as engage in conventional military operations including intervention in foreign conflicts, the protection of critical assets anywhere in the world, and rapid deployment to repel aggression. The sole function of such units, however, should be to combat terrorism, and to this end they should be trained and equipped far differently than more conventional forces.

The vast majority of US military equipment, for example, is still designed for the rigors and requirements of conventional warfare, and often must be modified for use in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency operations. "Fifty percent of all the equipment used in Vietnam by the Special Forces," observed one former Green Beret, "was civilian equipment." West Germany's GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppe-9) uses the most advanced antiterrorist equipment in the world, including special communications and tracking equipment, lightweight state-of-the-art body armor, specially-prepared Mercedes Benz and Porsche pursuit automobiles, custom-built French helicopters, and advanced weaponry such as the MP5K submachine gun and the Mauser SP66 sniper rifle. Attention to detail extends as far as the unit's clothing and shoes, which are designed not to have any zippers, buttons, or other hard surfaces which might audibly click or scrape and give away a member of the unit crawling along the fuselage of a hostage aircraft. The unit's computers contain the interior configurations of virtually any aircraft that might be seized by terrorists, and the blueprints of all major buildings and other facilities that might come under attack. The unit trains on full-scale mockups of potential targets, and as many redundancies as possible are built into each operation. When the GSG-9 retook a captured Lufthansa jetliner from terrorists at Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1977, not one, but two simultaneous distractions were used to gain a momentary advantage over the terrorists. Three British thunderflash grenades were set off near the plane and a bonfire was lit behind a sand dune in the distance. It turned

out that the bonfire was the superior tactic since the thunderflash grenades generated too much smoke.

Fighting terrorism calls for units characterized by leanness, mobility, and tactics which emphasize subtlety and surgical precision. Language skills and cultural knowledge must be improved so that such units can operate undercover in foreign territory and design operations fully consistent with local habits, conditions, and dialects.

US indecision in fighting terrorism extends to its relations with allies. War is the one activity where moderation is no virtue, yet many of those in Congress often seem more concerned by human-rights abuses on the part of nations combatting terrorist outbreaks than by the original terrorist outrages that precipitated the embattled government's reaction. This does not mean that the United States should prop up every corrupt dictatorship on earth, but it is to argue for standards of balance and objectivity in assessing conflict situations. Moreover, when the Congress, in 1975, brought an end to American training of foreign police forces it set in motion a new wave of torture and human-rights abuses. Any knowledgeable police or military official knows that torture is not the most effective interrogation technique; more sophisticated methods exist today which do not involve barbarity or defilement of human beings. But if foreign police and military units are denied knowledge of sophisticated techniques, they will inevitably resort, as one observer noted, "to putting a guy's balls in a vise," and thus fuel the vicious cycle of human-rights abuses.

The United States must help those confronting terrorist assaults with proper training and equipment so as not to foster a climate negative to the support of developing countries seeking to repel insurgent or terrorist attacks. The 1983 Foreign Assistance Act contains general authority for the President to furnish "assistance to foreign countries in order to enhance the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in international terrorist acts such as bombing, kidnapping, assassination, hostage taking, and hijacking." Provision is made in the program to ensure that the equipment and training is not used in ways detrimental to the advancement of human rights.

In keeping with this more enlightened attitude, it is time to cor-

rect such travesties as the refusal in early 1981 of an export license to Great Britain for the importation of 25 custom-made silencers for M-16s. Demonstrating a profound ignorance of modern combat, so-called "human-rights advocates" at the Department of State argued that such devices were solely assassination tools and would probably be "misused" by the British in Northern Ireland. As it turned out, when the Falklands crisis erupted, the British were compelled to use a pirated IRA silencer design for their weapons, a wholly inferior product to the American-made silencers.

Counterinsurgency

By far the overwhelming share of the US defense budget goes to sustain our nuclear deterrent and our conventional warmaking forces; this despite the fact that low-intensity warfare is likely to dominate the future conflict landscape. There is a built-in bias within the military establishment and among the substructure of defense contractors against any substantial shift of resources away from traditional procurement patterns or change of emphasis that would disrupt established careers and institutions based on a predominance of conventional warfare. This reluctance flies in the face of recent studies which indicate that "brushfire wars" are depleting America's military strength and that low-intensity conflict running the gamut from psychological warfare to Soviet-backed insurgencies and hi-tech terrorism "will constitute the greatest challenge to the Army."[30]

It was not always this way. Prior to the Second World War, this country's record in low-intensity conflicts was among the best in the world, ranging from its experience on the Western frontier to the Philippines, Cuba, and intervention in a number of Latin American countries. Ironically, the decline of America's unconventional warmaking capability began with its rise to world power in the postwar period, when proliferating new security commitments and the need to provide a nuclear umbrella to the free nations of the West put an emphasis on strategic and nuclear forces.

During the 1950s, we witnessed the rise of the techno-warriors as the United States shifted rapidly away from conventional forces to the concept of technological or "pushbutton" warfare, wherein our infantry would serve chiefly as a "tripwire" that, if attacked,

would produce a nuclear response. Military officers became managers and the classic military leaders of the past, at home in the mud and the elements, had little in common with launch-control centers and Robert McNamara. A "don't screw up" environment prevailed where promotion became predicated on an "uneventful watch" instead of on tenacity, audacity, leadership, and the ability to make things happen. As one observer put it: "The bean counters and paper shufflers took over." With the onset of the Vietnam War, we lacked the kind of leaders who could relate to the enemy and the new style of war that was being fought. We became obsessed with technological fetishism and neglected one of the most basic principals of war: simplicity.[31] We attempted to remake the ARVN in our own image, and when the United States withdrew the South Vietnamese were unable to fight the same kind of war we did. The best weapons are not always the most expensive or complex, particularly if they depend on elaborate maintenance structures and logistics support.

In Central America today we are, according to some reports, repeating many of the mistakes of Vietnam. Given the limitations of time and space, a short litany of the deficiencies will have to suffice.

- We have far too few advisers and they are rotated too often, instead of staying put for the "long haul," by contrast to Soviet, Cuban, and East Bloc advisers. Many of our advisers lack combat experience and few speak Spanish. Instead of captains five years out of West Point, officers with Vietnam experience and senior NCOs are needed.

- Many of the troops we are supporting lack basic military training and equipment. We are constructing obstacle and confidence courses instead of offering instruction on patrol formations and tactics. More emphasis should also be placed on techniques to demoralize and destroy the enemy such as sniping, raids, ambushes, and sabotage.

- Failure to carry the war to the enemy will result in another Vietnam. Even at the risk of widening the conflict, we must hit the enemy's sources of supply and sanctuaries. In Vietnam, only 60 tons of supplies a day were needed to sustain the guerrilla war in the south, and if any significant part of those supplies could have been denied the enemy, his ability

to wage war would have been severely undermined. The same is true in Central America.

- Incrementalism is a formula for disaster. Congress, and for that matter the American public, are unlikely to support a long and drawn-out conflict. While it runs many risks, we should seek a "quick kill," escalating the conflict as rapidly as feasible.

- Any attempt to "reform" the government of El Salvador at the same time that it is waging a war runs the risk of depleting valuable resources and undercutting its natural constituency. The time for reform is prior to the outbreak of hostilities or after the situation has been stabilized.

CONCLUSION

Many, both in this country and abroad, believe that the United States has lost what T. S. Elliot once called "the motive of action," which in the context of the modern world might be interpreted as the ability to perceive clearly our national interest and the will to take whatever steps are necessary to pursue it. It is vital that the American public and our policymakers be educated as to the realities of contemporary conflict and the need to fight little wars successfully today in the hope that we can avoid big wars in the future. Only when they comprehend what is at stake will we as a nation be able to develop the clarity of vision necessary to build and sustain a national consensus needed to underwrite a new policy for the 1980s and 1990s governing the application of force in low-level conflict situations. Only then, moreover, will our friends and allies be able to perceive and comprehend our global strategy for dealing with the rising tide of conflict in the world and develop confidence in it. In this connection, we need to show the world that we can still win limited wars, and there is no better place to begin than in Central America.

Similarly, terrorists must come to realize that they cannot strike at the United States and its citizens with impunity. While Soviet embassies and legations have escaped all but incidental violence in recent years, American embassies have been attacked in dozens of countries, the most serious incidents involving the seizure

of the United States embassy in Tehran, the sacking and burning of our embassies in Libya and Pakistan, and the bombing of the United States embassy in Beirut. It is time to adopt policies that ensure swift and sure retribution against those who attack our citizens and property. If it is our destiny as a nation not to be loved, then surely it behooves us to be feared, at least by the purveyors of violence and chaos.

Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare

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Ex clade, victoria? The old commonplace has it that from the deepest abyss of defeat as from the culminating point of victory, nations start on intersecting paths: the complacent winners to defeat, and the losers who have learned the lessons taught in blood and humiliation, to victory.

Actually, history scarcely upholds this commonplace. The defeated may not survive to learn, and of course empires are made by those among the victorious who do not become complacent. Now it seems that this country, already unique in so many other ways, may offer a new precedent to history and a new refutation of the commonplace: the complacent defeated certainly cannot aspire to victory.

Three allies and much of our international authority were lost in the Vietnam War as well as some blood and much treasure, and yet delusions of adequacy persist. Because of the characteristic ambiguities of that war, the nation though roundly defeated has nevertheless been denied the customary benefit of military defeat. Little was therefore learned in the experience, except for two false lessons.

First, the nation acquired its phobia for involvement in the most prevalent form of conflict, and the one form of conflict unlikely to lead to nuclear escalation. The toll that this irrational fear has exacted in interests large and small thereby left undefended has continued to grow, since the days of the Angola crisis.

Likewise, it appears that some members of the military profession have come to believe that the armed forces of the United States should not be ordered into war without a prior guarantee of irre-

vocable public support. They insist on a letter of credit of the sort that is demanded before shipping merchandise to dubious importers from lawless countries. The implicit belief is of course that there was no causal link between the manner in which the Vietnam War was fought and the increasing aversion of the decently patriotic among the public.

In an alternative formulation, the demand is that the armed forces should only be sent to war if "vital" national interests are at stake. In that case, it may be calculated, public support should endure, no matter how badly the war is fought.

Entirely normal and appropriate in the case of Switzerland or San Marino, which have issued no promises to fight in defense of any foreign country, that is of course a bizarre and impossible demand for the United States. Such tranquillity as the world enjoys is in significant degree assured by the defense guarantees which the United States has issued by treaty or otherwise to almost fifty countries around the world. In each case, to honor the promissory note the United States must stand ready to resist aggression even though the interests thereby affirmed can scarcely be deemed "vital," except in the rarest cases.

A protective quasi-global empire cannot elect to fight only when "vital" interests are at stake. That is the privilege of the less ambitious, and in our day neither Britain nor France has claimed exemption. (In 1968 the British Army celebrated its one year of the entire century so far in which no British soldier died in combat.) If, on the other hand, the notion of an imperial obligation to fight for less-than-vital interests is rejected, then in logic one can no longer claim an imperial-sized budget for the armed services, whose quasi-global scope must then be a mere facade, dangerously deceptive to all concerned.

Actually of course the lesson in point is quite another: it is an integral part of the duties of the armed forces to sustain public support by a purposeful and decently economical conduct of war operations. Luxuriant bureaucratic excess manifest in lavishly staffed headquarters and absurdly over-elaborate services and—more important—the futile misuse of firepower in huge quantities will in due course undermine public support for war even if very important national interests are at risk.

Conversely, the elegantly austere conduct of military operations will gain public support even if only very minor interests are at stake. Journalists who went to North Borneo to decry anachronism and suspect motives were instead captivated by the romance of elite troops at home in the jungle: after being briefed in rudimentary field headquarters manned by a handful of officers content to sleep in native huts, after going upriver in a motorized canoe with three quiet riflemen and a Dyak tracker, even hostile journalists could only write well of them, of the British Army in general, and of the campaign. By contrast, journalists who went to Vietnam favorably disposed (there were a few) could only find themselves antagonized by the experience.

They were first confronted by hordes of visibly underemployed officers reduced to clerical duties in sprawling headquarters, and then by scenes of gross tactical excess, the heavyweight fighter-bombers converging to bomb a few flimsy huts, the Air Cavalry helicopters sweeping a patch of tall grass with a million dollars worth of ammunition. Some observers could recognize tactical poverty in the very abundance with which the ordnance was used; others could detect the lack of any one clear-cut strategy in the generosity with which each service and branch was granted a role in the war; others still were simply disgusted by the wasteful disproportion between efforts and results. Public support cannot be demanded up front; it must be earned.

Certainly the large military lessons that Vietnam might have taught have remained unlearned. Notably, the multiservice command system whose apex is formed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) organization, and whose sublime Vietnam expression was that great bureaucratic labyrinth known as the "US Military Assistance Command—Vietnam" (USMACV), stands totally unreformed. Still today it ruthlessly subordinates the sharp choices which strategy unfailingly requires to the convenience of bureaucratic harmony between the services and their branches. The "unified" style of military planning and operational control is well suited for a landing and front-opening campaign on the scale of Normandy in May 1944. As soon as the scale is reduced, it results in grotesque over-elaboration easily dysfunctional.

The other unlearned lesson brings us to our subject: the defense establishment as a whole still operates under the implicit as-

sumption that "low-intensity" warfare is merely a lesser-included case of "real" war. That "real" war is itself of course an idealized depiction comparable to the Islamic vision of heaven or if one prefers, the Catholic vision of hell, and just as solidly based on empirical evidence. Unlike the wars now taking place in El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru and gestating elsewhere in Latin America; in Eritrea, Namibia, and indeed all around South Africa and in the ex-Spanish Sahara too in Africa; in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Lebanon, and the Philippines in Asia, the notion of "real" war is not corrupted by the intrusions of complex and greatly varied realities.

Instead that "real" war for which our weapons are designed, our forces structured, and our officers are career-developed (by rapid rotation in any little wars that might be available) lives intact and irrefutable in the pages of our doctrinal manuals, there resting undisturbed because no "real" war has been fought during these last thirty years—and of course one hopes that none will be fought during the next thirty years either. But still the high-intensity "real" war is obviously the very best of all possible wars for such technically accomplished armed forces as our own, so amply supplied with highly qualified, much-decorated, and well-educated officers whose sophistication would clearly be wasted in the sordid little wars that actually are.

For all its virtues, however, "real" war may not in fact embrace all the equipment requirements, all the operational methods and tactics, and all the organizational formats required for the effective conduct of low-intensity warfare. The latter can be a lesser-included case, but only for armed forces of a particular kind, and not our own.

ATTRITION, RELATIONAL MANEUVER, AND LOW-INTENSITY WARFARE

All armed forces combine elements of attrition on the one hand and relational maneuver on the other in their overall approach to war; their position in the attrition/maneuver spectrum is manifest in their operational methods, tactics, and organizational arrangements, but especially in their methods of officer education.

The closer they are to the theoretical extreme of pure attrition,

the more armed forces tend to be focused on their own internal administration and operations, being correspondingly less responsive to the external environment made up of the enemy, the terrain, and the specific phenomena of any one particular conflict. That of course is the correct orientation for armed forces close to the attrition end of the spectrum. Because victory is to be obtained by mustering up superior material resources, by their transformation into firepower, and by the application of the latter upon the enemy, armed forces of that kind should concentrate on their own inner workings to maximize process efficiencies all round.

The terrain counts only insofar as it presents obstacles to transportation, deployment, and the efficient application of firepower. As for the enemy, it is merely a set of targets which must be designated, located, and sometimes induced to concentrate. Accordingly, a well-managed armed force of this kind cannot logically be adaptive to the external environment; instead it should strive to develop an optimal set of organizational formats, methods, and tactics, which are then to be applied whenever possible with the least modification, because any modification must be suboptimal.

By contrast, the closer they are to the relational-maneuver end of the spectrum, the more armed forces will tend to be outward-looking. That too is the correct orientation for that kind of armed force. In relational maneuver, victory is to be obtained by identifying the specific weaknesses of the particular enemy and then reconfiguring one's own capabilities to exploit those weaknesses. Therefore the keys to success are first the ability to interpret the external environment in all its aspects, sometimes subtle, and then to adapt one's own organizational formats, operational methods, and tactics to suit the requirements of the particular situation.

Accordingly armed forces with a high relational-maneuver quotient cannot usually maximize process efficiencies and cannot logically develop optimal organizational formats, methods, and tactics. Instead each must be relational, i.e., reconfigured ad hoc for the theater, the enemy, and the situation.

There is of course no inherent virtue to either attrition or relational maneuver. Armed forces develop historically to their position on the spectrum, which changes over time, to reflect inter alia changes in the perceived balance of military power. The drawback of

attrition; i.e., its high cost, is balanced by the high risk which is the drawback of relational maneuver. In general, it is appropriate for the rich to opt for attrition while the poor who acquire large military ambitions had better also acquire a taste for relational maneuver, which offers high payoffs of low material cost, in exchange for corresponding risks. The trouble begins, ending the equality between the two approaches to war, precisely when it comes to low-intensity warfare. Then we find that as between armed forces of equal competence, the closer they stand to the relational-maneuver end of the spectrum, the greater will be their effectiveness.

That result follows inexorably by definition: in the degree that intensity declines, the relevance of attrition must decline also, simply because the targets become less and less defined, and more and more dispersed. Yet more important, the dominant phenomena of war become more and more insubstantial and untargetable: no even the most accurate of our precision-guided munitions can . aimed at an atmosphere of terror or at a climate of subversion. The obdurate pursuit of attrition efficiencies in a low-intensity conflict can only be futile. And the greater the volumes of the "throughputs" that are processed to generate firepower, the more the results are likely to be counter-productive by antagonizing the local population which must suffer collateral damage, by demoralizing the armed forces themselves, whose members must be aware of the futility, and by arousing opposition within the nation at home. For even the firmly patriotic cannot but react adversely to a great and costly disproportion between vast efforts and dubious results.

Without attempting to cite an exhaustive record it is by contrast interesting to note the success of the prototypical "relational-maneuver" armies when they have tried their hand at low-intensity operations. Now that the mists of wartime propaganda, and of the patriotic self-delusion of the occupied nations, have both been dissipated by serious historical research, the success of German counter-guerrilla operations in France, Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia has been duly recognized. As usual with the German army, relational organizational formats, and tailor-made operational methods, played a large role in these successes.

Similarly, the total absence of a documentary record should not cause us to overlook the outstanding success of the Israeli army in virtually extinguishing both guerrilla and terrorist activities in the

Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Again, novel operational methods tailored specifically to local peculiarities played a large role in the outcome, as did a great variety of specially designed relational equipment.

HOW NOT TO DO IT

In theory, armed forces endowed with competent leaders should adapt to diverse circumstances regardless of their original orientation. But in practice, as noted, the greater their attrition content, the more armed forces tend to be inward-looking, eventually reaching a point where they scarcely extend diplomatic recognition to the actual phenomena of any one particular conflict, especially if those phenomena are complex, ill-defined, and ambiguous—as is usually the case in low-intensity conflicts.

When, in addition, the armed forces also happen to have an exceedingly complex internal structure greatly over-officered, pervasively over-administered, and minutely regulated by inter-bureaucratic compacts between services and branches, all the rigidities that ensue will further inhibit adaptation. For one thing, the internal coordination of the diverse forces (and the accompanying office politics) will absorb much of the energy of staffs and commanders. Beyond that there is an even greater obstacle: in the nature of things, any sharply cut adaptive response is likely to attack the delicate fabric of bureaucratic harmony.

It was only logical, therefore, that in Vietnam USMACV should have developed into an impressively large headquarters devoted to the "equitable" sharing out of the war between the services and their branches. No organization so complex on the inside could possibly be responsive to the very varied and often exotic phenomena on the outside. Instead, under its loose and most generous administration, each element was allowed to perform in its own preferred style, often to produce firepower in huge amounts in spite of the great scarcity of conveniently targetable enemies.

Because the system has not been reformed to produce our own version of a nonservice/nonbranch General Staff, we can expect no better result in the future. Let the United States go to war, virtually any war, and we would again see the Air Force's tactical air bomb-

ing away and SAC too most probably; if there is a coastline anywhere near, the Navy will claim two shares, one for its own tactical air and another for the big guns of its gloriously reactivated battleships; none would dare to deny the Marine Corps its own slice of the territory, to be entered over the beach if physically possible even if ports happen to be most convenient.

Nor can the Army be expected to harm its own internal conviviality by failing to provide fair shares for all, armor even in the jungle, artillery even if the enemy hardly gathers, and so on. After all, a "unified" command and bureaucratized services can only reproduce their own image, and if the enemy refuses to cooperate by playing his assigned role in everyone's conception of a "real" war, the discourtesy will simply be ignored.

Just recently for example it was decided to have an exercise in Central America. Aside from both the Second and Third Fleets, legitimately present, room was found to employ both the Seabees and the Army Engineers, for a minor bit of well-drilling and such; both the Marines and the Coast Guard were deemed essential to train a few Hondurans in the handling of a few small boats; and of course the Marines figured again as a force, one that had to arrive on the scene by amphibious landing of course; and finally, to train another few Hondurans in counterguerrilla operations it was deemed essential to employ the Army's Special Forces and the Navy SEALs and a Special Operations detachment of the Air Force.

Undoubtedly the Hondurans should be grateful for such a varied generosity; one need only think of all the pleasant hours that their officers and men will pass in future years as they compare and contrast all those different procedures, diverse jargons, and contrasting doctrines that they saw applied to the same few tasks. There can be no greater affirmation of our national commitment to pluralism.

The "unified" method of military action yields for us all the economies typical of multinational alliances and also their typical degree of strategic coherence—without, however, supplying foreigners to do some of the dying.

But the "unified" style does have a surpassing bureaucratic virtue: it can justify large overheads for small operations. With a

sufficient degree of organizational fragmentation, the labor of coordination can become wonderfully complicated even if only minute forces are involved. Thus notoriously overstaffed headquarters are allowed, if only briefly, to experience the joys of full employment.*

FIGHT SEPARATE AND WIN

In theory competent military leaders should be able to adjust the practice of their armed forces to achieve an optimal position on the attrition/relational-maneuver spectrum, according to the relevant material military balances and the conflicts at hand. In practice, however, it is history (as fossilized by tradition) and also the collective self-image of the armed forces and the nation itself that determine the composition of the attrition/relational-maneuver mix. If, therefore, armed forces with a high attrition content must engage in low-intensity warfare, the best option is to create a separate force for the purpose.

Because the influences to be overcome are so pervasive, the more the dedicated low-intensity force is separate in every way from the rest of the armed forces, the greater its chances of success. In practice, when the attrition content of the armed forces is extremely high, it is not merely specialized units that are needed but rather a separate branch so autonomous that it begins to resemble a separate service. It certainly needs its own officer corps trained for the task *ab initio* and placed in a separate career track. Every instinct of bureaucratic efficiency is against that solution. But for armed forces inherently ill-suited for the conduct of low-intensity operations but which may be highly effective in other roles, the separatist solution is the only alternative to failure, or else severe deformations.

Certainly the attempt to change over to a relational-maneuver style merely to engage in low-intensity war must be disruptive and potentially dangerous. One can easily contemplate the conse-

* The headquarters and service units sent into Honduras in conjunction with the exercise attained impressive dimensions: 1,500 were assigned to support 3,500 (*Washington Post*, 24 August 1983, p A22). That is the sort of ratio that inspires the ill-concealed ridicule from the militarily competent among our allies.

quences that would have ensued if the United States had in fact won the Vietnam War in relational style, by converting its Army into an Asian constabulary.

On the other hand, it is simply unprofessional to try and fight a low-intensity war with forces structured and built for the opposite requirement. Consider how profound are the differences:

- Armed forces with a high attrition quotient are supposed to optimize standard operating procedures for worldwide application, because for them all wars are the same; *whereas*
  Low-intensity wars are all different, and each requires an ad hoc set of operating procedures. It follows that a primary task for the officers of the dedicated body is to develop one-place/one-time adaptive doctrines and methods.

- Armed forces with a high attrition quotient must treat all their personnel as interchangeable parts to maintain their efficiency; *whereas*
  Low-intensity wars usually require the persistent application of one-place/one-time expertise, embodied in specific individuals with unique attributes. Thus the normal practices of rotation cannot apply.

- Armed forces with a high attrition quotient operate within an arena of military action demarcated by externally-set political parameters; *whereas*
  Low-intensity wars are made up of political phenomena with a martial aspect. It follows that the senior officers of the dedicated body should have the particular aptitudes needed for the successful manipulation of the political variables. (In low-intensity wars victory is normally obtained by altering the political variables to the point where the enemy becomes ineffectual, and not by actually defeating enemies in battle.)

- Armed forces with a high attrition quotient must accord a dominant priority to logistics first of all, and then to the deployment, upkeep, and utilization of the best-available means of firepower; *whereas*
  Low-intensity wars cannot, by definition, be won by the efficient application of firepower. It follows that the officers of the dedicated body do not need the skills and aptitudes re-

> quired for the management of large-scale organizations and the efficient operation of advanced equipment. On the other hand they do need the ability to insert themselves into a foreign cultural milieu and to train and then lead local forces or native auxiliaries, who will almost always be equipped only with the simplest weapons.

The sublime irony is of course that the United States already has such a dedicated body, although not sufficiently autonomous to offer a separate career track. By nature "relational," by nature adaptive, the US Army Special Forces (SF) should be exactly what we need. Their very existence is of course an implied recognition of the fact that low-intensity war is not a lesser-included case; this contradicts the dominant orientation. Hence the existence of the SF has always been precarious.

At present, the SF are very weak bureaucratically because they are merely marginal when they should instead be autonomous and yet also accepted as an important part of the Army. From this all the other evils derive, including the SF's difficulties in attracting the more ambitious among the officer cadre, and the observed propensity of the "unified" commands and the JCS to push aside the SF as soon as a conflict begins to look role-enhancing to the bigger boys.

One possible solution is an act of political intervention—more sustained and effective than President Kennedy's initiative. Another and far superior solution is to create a broader framework in which the SF would naturally fit and from which it could draw support: a light infantry branch whose several divisions—much needed in any case—would have a pronounced relational-maneuver orientation and which would be outward-looking by nature.

One consequence of the SF's bureaucratic weakness, seemingly quite petty but in fact revealing and by no means unimportant, is vividly manifest in El Salvador. It is a typical assumption of inward-looking armed forces that their particular equipment preferences have universal validity. As a result, it is assumed that by appropriate selection from the standard inventory any particular war requirement can be met. More remarkably still, it is implicitly believed that the equipment developed to suit the needs and possibilities of the richest armed forces of the world will also fit the needs

of the motley forces which are our invariable allies in low-intensity wars.

For example, the US Army and Marine Corps both happen to favor the lightest, cheapest, and least capable of the automatic rifles on the world market. That is an understandable preference for armed forces which actually plan to fight their "real" wars by artillery and airpower. Under the inward-looking practice it is assumed as a matter of course that the same rifle will also be suitable for the army of El Salvador, for whom rifles and machine-guns provide virtually all the available firepower. Our late allies of Indochina were given M-16s, and now the troops of El Salvador receive the same flimsy and unsoldierly rifle, with the same millimetric tolerances that require standards of cleanliness unknown to peasants. Acres of computer printouts may prove the excellence of the weapon, but one should not expect high self-confidence from soldiers who are sent into action carrying a weapon that feels like a large toothbrush. But then of course there is no mathematical parameter for "feel," and no system preoccupied with "real" war can be expected to pay attention to such petty things as mere rifles.

Certainly if the SF had anywhere near the appropriate degree of autonomy, they would long ago have ensured the production of a sturdy steel and wood "military assistance" automatic rifle—a "USAK-47," similar to the Israeli AK-47 which has been embellished into the Galil. These would of course be demonstrably inferior to the M-16 by any respectable operational research (the Galil is downright absurd because of its heaviness), and yet the proverbial net worth could then be safely risked against an old copy of FM 100-5 on the wager that every self-respecting soldier in the Army would seek to have the same weapon.

Another obvious requirement vividly manifest in El Salvador is the production of a "military assistance" machine-gun more forgiving of human frailties than the M-60. That too is a perfectly good weapon of course, but rudimentary armies are better off with a magazine-fed light machine-gun less likely to jam.

Far more important of course is the strategic autonomy that would result from institutional autonomy. Low-intensity wars should belong to the SF unambiguously and fully, with other ser-

vice components coming in as needed under SF direction, to be the servants and not the masters.

In the terms of art, low-intensity wars would come under "specified" commands set up for the purpose and headed by SF officers. Then, one hopes, we would no longer see even the smallest Military Assistance Groups shared out between the different services; and we would no longer see the constant renewal of inexperience by the mindless enforcement of the principle of rotation even in cases where unique expertise vital for continuity is thereby dissipated.

It was not because of any deep-seated cultural defect in the nation as a whole, nor because of a lack of dedication, talent, or expertise in the armed forces that the Vietnam War was lost in the sequence of gross excess, public opposition, imposed withdrawal, and the final abandonment. It was rather the uniquely inappropriate organizational structure of multiservice armed forces, structurally dedicated to the conduct of "real" war in the attrition style, that condemned so many good soldiers to perform so very badly.

It is imperative now to achieve the drastic organizational remedy that will liberate the abilities and patriotic devotion so amply present among officers and their troops, to obtain the fruits of their dedication for the nation.

The British have had their resounding victory in the wastes of the remotest South Atlantic in a war fought to uphold the principle that Great Britain is still able to fight and win for its principles. The Israelis have had their victory, going all the way to their own Hanoi to root out and expel their own Viet Cong, persevering to the bitter end in the face of the evident displeasure of the USSR, CBS, NBC, and ABC. It is time that Americans too should agonize over the darker side of a victory well won, instead of having to seek consolation in the brighter side of defeat.

Chapter 5

America's Foreign Policy Options in East Asia: The Coming Decade

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"The papers will discuss possible future courses of action for the United States in regard to relations with Japan, the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Koreas, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. What should US force structure be in light of the possibly increasing defensive role of Japan? What are the PRC's relationships with its neighbors? The panel may also wish to address the question of technology and Japan's economic relationships in the region."

Panel Summary

Ambassador Richard L. Sneider, Chairman
New York

William N. Drake, Rapporteur
Defense Intelligence Agency

Panel deliberations began with a charge from the chairman to think in terms of developing a feasible US policy for the region that would take into consideration individual specific country problems and US objectives for the region as a whole. Of main concern to the panel were the twin issues of establishing a set of economic arrangements compatible with long-range US security interests in the region, and the mapping out of a range of strategic options that can guide US policy for the region in the coming decade. To this end the papers by Dr. William Heaton, Mr. Richard Freytag, and Dr. Michael Nacht addressing various aspects of this question were useful in determining the parameters for subsequent discussions and in highlighting the principal issues involved in US relations with the two central countries in East Asia—China and Japan—and the economic dynamism of the region generally.

Roughly a dozen key questions involving economic and strategic concerns were woven into and throughout the presentation of individual papers and the authors' elaboration of their main conclusions. Because of the centrality of these questions to the panel's recommendations for policy formulation the questions are summarized below:

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

- Is the US economy geared for further involvement and competition in East Asia?

- Will East Asia economic development threaten the US in the 1990s?
- Will the structural changes that are occurring in the economies of the region promote US economic objectives—i.e., market openness, accessibility, and increased trade?
- How can the US most effectively influence the interplay between economic and defense issues in the countries of the region?
- Will social and political instabilities growing from rapid economic development stimulate or retard additional US investment in the region? What should be the role of the US market regarding the region?

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

- What priority should the US accord the region?
- What is the nature of the Soviet threat to the region?
- What is the proper US military posture for the region?
- In what ways can the US demonstrate that it is a credible, reliable partner intent on remaining a Pacific power?
- Will the next decade prove more or less troublesome for US interests and involvement in the region?
- What should be the extent of US cooperation with China?
- What should be the costs to the US of the US-Japan Alliance?

Dr. Heaton's paper on Sino-US ties turned the panel's attention to bilateral matters in the coming years. The paper pointed out that as a result of recent events numerous reassessments of the Sino-American relationship have been undertaken. These efforts attempt to delineate the optimal scope and pace of American-Chinese cooperation in the context of managing continuing irritants and the in-

fluence of domestic politics in both countries on foreign policy. Dr. Heaton persuasively argued that analytical perspective has a great deal to do with how one evaluates the advantages that might accrue from future US ties with China as well as the measurement of progress achieved to date in the relationship. His paper identifies three major factors that will continue to influence Sino-American relations in the coming decade: the immutability of the Soviet Union as the principal threat to both countries, the issue of political stability and policy constancy, and the role to be played by other states in the region in shaping the direction and tenor of US-China ties.

In view of the narrow, specific bilateral issues—including technology transfer, trade, human rights, and legal questions—that constitute the stuff of routine interaction, it is not surprising that Sino-American relations will remain "mostly cooperative, but with many areas of friction and disagreement," as Dr. Heaton put it. The suggestions for policy offered by Dr. Heaton in the main agree with the conclusions reached in the broader seminar format. Given that policies in either country stem from both rational calculations of power and internal political dynamics, Heaton recommends that Washington avoid close security cooperation with Beijing while cautiously pursuing some dual-use technology cooperation and limited arms sales. Inflammatory rhetoric on sensitive issues such as Taiwan, human rights, or sticking points in trade relations must be muted, and ambiguity, not hostility, should become the prevalent state of affairs.

The panel's conclusions on an appropriate China policy mirrored those of Dr. Heaton to a certain extent. There was agreement on the wisdom of pursuing a "middle-course strategy" based jointly on economic *and* strategic premises and designed to promote stabilization and a pro-US inclination in PRC foreign-policy behavior. Attempts to roll back previous positions because of the problems stemming from earlier decisions must be avoided. Instead, the most effective approach will likely be to work within the limited framework desired by the Chinese and to encourage promotion of "stakes," "tied positions," and interest groups to enhance the durability of bilateral relations. In specific terms this approach condones the pursuit of technology transfer initiatives and economic assistance but not to the point of extending implicit commitments to the PRC defense posture.

Moving to the quandary of how best to pursue cordial economic relations in a changing East Asian environment, Mr. Freytag's paper provided much-needed "Keynesian lucidity and courage" in outlining options for US international economic action in four key areas: money, US markets, scarce goods and resources, and higher education. In his treatment of the political constraints on optimal national economic behavior, Mr. Freytag emphasized that the "political realities of the changing US role in the world economy can be seen as a part of the problem in encouraging unrestricted trade . . . and the realities of domestic political expediency will frequently conflict with otherwise optimal economic objectives."

The panel members were sensitive to the points raised in Mr. Freytag's paper. There was general agreement that the United States should take steps to exploit the political and economic opportunities afforded by its extensive involvement in the Pacific region. The priority accorded the region in terms of strategic planning and market expansion should be adjusted to merge with likely levels of future US involvement. The issue of technology transfer in the opinion of the panel must be closely scrutinized—in the short term regarding the newly industrializing countries (NICs) and in the longer term focusing on China. With certain qualifications, the operation of market forces should be encouraged. There was some sentiment expressed for the idea of promoting the development of "genuine regionalism" along the lines of a Pacific Basin Community concept. The utility of a new organizational structure dictating more high-level involvement in regional security and economic issues was broached but not generally endorsed. Several long-standing problem areas were touched upon in examining the importance of Pacific commerce to US interests: the lack of cultural affinity in reaching agreements on procedures and methods for economic interaction, the definitional problems surrounding "national security industries" and critical technologies, the advisability of linking economic leverage and political desiderata, and the question of reciprocity and burden-sharing. In summing up the economic segment, the panel in effect agreed that most of the issues debated deserved more thorough and detailed consideration in another venue better suited to arriving at specific policy recommendations.

When the issue of Japan was aired, the seminar became quite lively as it fully explored the best way to stimulate increased Japanese defense obligations under maximal economic and political

conditions, the most appropriate role for Japan, Japanese competition, the means to discourage Japanese neutralism or Gaullism, and related problems. Dr. Michael Nacht's paper, positing an increasingly assertive Japan carving out a major strategic role for itself in Asia, provided the impetus for a wide-ranging discussion of the essence of the US-Japan alliance. Central to Dr. Nacht's line of argument was his conviction that Premier Nakasone is much more than a transient political figure. Indeed, he views Nakasone as "actually trying to lead" and, if successful, capable of "trying to create a new political climate in Japan that will pave the way for a far more assertive and potentially more independent foreign and defense policy than has been witnessed in the postwar world." Dr. Nacht believes Nakasone is "seeking to legitimize a Japanese perspective that, once articulated, will set in motion irreversible forces that will long outlive his particular administration." Although not all members of the seminar were ready to accept this line of reasoning, there was total agreement that Dr. Nacht's paper and his explication of its main premises provided the proper kind of stimulation for rigorous examination of how best the US should handle this most important relationship with Japan. Despite the hazards of making predictions in international affairs, we must risk it, because policymaking is prediction. Dr. Nacht bore the burden of primary estimator on the question of developing a relevant US policy for dealing with Japan.

How to cope with increased Japanese economic, political, and technological competition, and how to balance cooperation with competition in the politics of economics while achieving mutual objectives complicate arriving at a realistic policy for the United States and Japan. The panel devoted itself to reducing the size of the obstacles in achieving such a policy. Fully cognizant of the operational constraints on the development of this type of policy, the panel nevertheless offered several suggestions and perspectives. It proposed as seven key objectives for US policy regarding Japan to:

1. Discourage Gaullism while allowing for growing assertiveness
2. Manage the relationship with minimal emotionalism
3. Avoid unnecessary economic dilemmas
4. Correct structural misalignments
5. Accommodate differences in "style"
6. Stop deterioration of perceptions of the other

7. Prioritize short-term and long-term goals carefully.

The panel was not of one mind on need to redefine what the United States wants of Japan in defense areas and the costs of upgrading Japanese capabilities. But there was consensus that the total US-Japan relationship is more important than its component elements, that problems in bilateral ties are crucial sources of change in Japanese strategic policy, and that management of Japanese assertiveness and "independence" is absolutely central to US interests. Several areas of uncertainty remain in dealing with Japan. The influence that domestic forces in both countries exert in the framing of policy outlooks is not totally understood. It is also not clear that the potential of Japan as a future major military power and as the "last untapped reservoir of strength for the West" is fully recognized and appreciated. The role that Japan would play in a conflict involving the US is uncertain. A variety of scenarios was offered by the panel members. A major point of disputation in this regard dealt with the nature of the Soviet threat to Japan and the region, Soviet perspectives of East Asia, the translation of Soviet military capability in the region into political capital, and the US presence and interests contrasted with local agendas and needs.

Realizing that much of the rest of East Asia had fallen victim to the lengthy considerations of China and Japan the panel sought to highlight several broad areas of concern that apply to all the other countries in the region. These are development economics, market openness, and the underwriting of regional economic cooperation; socio-political instabilities, prospects for evolution into third-generation authoritarian leadership, the feasibility of implementing desired policies, and the Soviet threat; and territorial issues, irredentism, Law of the Sea issues, and the utility of linkage approaches as a policy staple. Special consideration was given Korea, where the necessity of maintaining a credible US deterrent was emphasized. Taiwan's unique situation was acknowledged and the benefits of helping Taiwan modernize its military equipment and move toward self-sufficiency through technology transfers was alluded to. It was mentioned that three factors will continue to bear on US force posture in the region and should not be neglected. These are the impact of US-USSR ties (i.e., arms-control agreements, the outlook for conflict), stabilization of southeast Asia, and the necessity to demonstrate US resolve by unmistakable moves.

In sum, the subject matter assigned the panel was quite diverse and the notion of developing a regional policy a new idea. The panel diligently attempted to respond on both scores. This illustrated again the complexity of the Asian equation and re-emphasized the need to define with caution the nature of US goals in the region. The themes of alliance strategy and limited relations were frequently juxtaposed as the discussants grappled with the specifics of "management," "consolidation," "maintenance," "presence," and related terminology. The panel felt that the problem areas in future US policy for the region had been largely demarcated; however, the ingredients for a successful overall policy approach are yet to be combined. This effort must be continued if US policy in the coming decade is not to prove inadequate to the task.

America and China: The Coming Decade

Dr. William R. Heaton
National Defense University

The resumption of consultations between China and Soviet Union and the sharpening of Chinese rhetoric with respect to US policy around the globe have resulted in numerous reassessments of the Sino-American relationship.[1] Evaluations of the changing relationship generally fall into one of two categories. The first category adopts a "rational actor" approach in which both countries calculate their relationship based on the balance of power and specific interests.[2] According to this analysis, China senses that the Soviet Union has become less of a threat owing to preoccupation with problems in Afghanistan and Poland; therefore, it is no longer vital to form an anti-Soviet "united front" with the West. Moreover, China's disappointment with the United States on a variety of issues, notably technology transfer and Taiwan, has contributed toward China's loosening of its American ties. The "rational actor" approach also has the United States reevaluating the importance of the "China card" in dealings with the global strategic balance and relegating China to the role of regional power. The overall result is that both sides view the relationship as less crucial than previously deemed and gradually draw away from each other. There is always the possibility that changed perceptions could once again lead to a closer relationship.

Another analysis attributes changes in the relationship to issues of "bureaucratic politics." In this perspective, changes in Chinese policies are a consequence of alterations in the volatile power mix wrought by ongoing factional struggles at the highest level.[3] Since most of the key questions in China are domestic economic and social problems, the coalitions that win out on these issues also happen to make decisions on foreign-policy issues. China's move away from the United States is a result of Deng's compromises with his opponents; it is the price he pays for getting his way with respect to the succession problem and related domestic political issues.

Similarly, the US position stems from struggles between various factions within the Reagan administration and between the administration and Congress.

Both types of analysis can contribute to our understanding of what has happened in the relationship during the past few years. More importantly for this paper, it can suggest some things that we should look at in trying to understand what well may occur over the next decade. I will try to integrate both the "rational actor" approach and the "bureaucratic politics" approach in considering some ways in which the relationship has developed and will develop. I will then suggest some ways in which I think US policies can be creatively applied to affect the relationship between America and China favorably.

CHINA AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

In the decade following the issuance of the Shanghai communique, Sino-American relations developed in an uneven pattern. Steps toward normalization were made haltingly, the Taiwan issue being a principal consideration. China, for example, refused the effort made early in the Carter administration to establish normal diplomatic relations with the PRC while transferring the Liaison Office to Taiwan. Nevertheless, movement toward normalization of relations proceeded very quickly in the summer of 1978. Following the establishment of diplomatic ties on 1 January 1979, China and the United States entered a period of close cooperation—especially in rhetoric. This cooperation became even more close for a brief period following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. After the Reagan administration began, the relationship became more troubled, as indicated by a harshening of Chinese statements about US policy.

From a balance-of-power perspective, several factors shaped the nature of specific policies during the decade. The most important factor, which has been identified by nearly all those who have commented on Sino-US relations, was the increased perception of threat from the Soviet Union. The growth of Soviet military power globally, the buildup of Soviet forces along the Chinese border, and Chinese uncertainties about how the Soviet Union might use its military power to affect Chinese internal policies fed Chinese perceptions of insecurity. Under the concept of "a united front against

hegemonism" Chinese leaders combined Maoist ideological principles with balance-of-power *Realpolitik* to counteract Soviet pressure.[4]

In the early 1970s Chinese leaders pronounced a "three worlds" theory of relative power, and claimed that China, as part of the Third World, could form a united front with other developing countries to counteract the hegemonism of the superpowers. As the threat from the Soviet Union increased, Chinese statements increasingly focused on the Soviet Union as the "antagonistic contradiction" and became less selective on which countries qualified for united-front membership. The NATO alliance was viewed as an important component in containing Soviet hegemonism. Also, particularly after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, China called upon the United States, Japan, ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) countries, and Australia to form with China a united front against Soviet-Vietnamese hegemonism in Southeast Asia. Beijing insisted that Soviet-Vietnamese policy in Southeast Asia was part of an overall strategy of Soviet global domination and must be strongly resisted.

The manifestation of the new united-front definition in concrete policy terms included hastening negotiations with Japan to conclude a peace treaty in the fall of 1978, movement on the obstacles to normalization of relations with the United States, and efforts to upgrade relations with ASEAN countries while reducing support for the communist-led insurgencies in these countries.[5] Chinese leaders argued that China was doing its share to challenge the hegemonism of the Soviet Union and called upon other countries, particularly the United States, to make a greater effort to do likewise.

As is clearly evident from Chinese writings and statements, the Chinese perception of Soviet hegemonism began to shift in the early 1980s.[6] Instead of seeing Soviet power as an unabated expanding threat to China, it was now perceived as overextended in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, the view was that Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe, notably Poland, made it highly unlikely that the USSR would wish to embark on adventures against China. As Chinese perceptions of the Soviet threat altered so did Chinese policy. China became increasingly critical of US global policy and was willing to escalate irritants in Sino-American relations

to higher intensities. Chinese rhetoric over US arms sales to Taiwan increased, and issues over technology transfer, textiles, railway bonds, defecting tennis players and students, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) membership seemed to dominate their view of the relationship, rather than a common sense of global threat from the USSR.[7] Also, China not only opened the door for consultations with the Soviet Union but moved to improve party ties with various European parties—notably the French Communist Party—and also sought to improve state relations with Soviet Eastern European satellites.

Closely related to Chinese assessments of the Soviet threat is the Chinese calculation as to the role of the United States. Quite a few students of Chinese foreign policy believe that the urgency with which China pursued a cooperative relationship with the United States against Soviet pressure in the late 1970s was due to its belief that the United States was the only country strong enough to balance the USSR even though the Carter administration was not sufficiently firm in resisting Soviet expansionism. It became the duty of the Chinese, they felt, to "buck-up" the United States. Similarly, the argument is made that now that the United States under the Reagan administration has taken a firmer line against the USSR, the Chinese have more latitude for swinging the cudgel at both superpowers. Other students argue that the Chinese perceive that concessions can be gained from the United States by pressure. Since the United States needs China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, they argue that the United States will eventually bend to Chinese pressures.[8] They cite as evidence the 17 August 1982 agreement on arms sales, the decision to liberalize technology transfer, and US concessions in reaching a textile agreement with China.

The view that China remains uncertain about the United States was expressed by Huan Xiang, Director of the International Affairs Center of the State Council and a prominent spokesman on US affairs. Huan argued that the United States under Reagan "has scored some success in rebuilding American hegemony in the world" notably in developing its nuclear strategic arsenal, in intensifying its activities in Latin America, and in gaining a more favorable position in the Middle East. He also predicted, however, that contention between the United States and the Soviet Union would increase and that both would experience weakening of control

over their allies. Huan predicted that Western Europe would continue to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union, but that America would experience increasing friction with Japan. He also argued that while the United States had taken some limited steps to "pacify" US-Chinese relations, continued American interference in Chinese domestic affairs via the Taiwan Relations Act remained of great concern.[9]

While highly critical US policy, the Chinese have pulled up short of strong actions which could seriously damage the relationship. Initially, the Chinese insisted that they would downgrade relations if the United States did not agree to fix a date for the cessation of arms sales to Taiwan. Yet, when in the August 17 communique the US did not set a date, China did not downgrade relations. When the United States took steps to restrict Chinese textile imports following the failure to reach a textile agreement, China reacted by restricting US agricultural exports to China, but in commodities which had already declined considerably.[10] The US decision to grant political asylum to Hu Na resulted in the cancellation of some official exchanges, but the effect was limited. China continues to attach considerable importance to acquiring technology and to sending students to the United States. China deems the relationship with the United States sufficiently important that the Chinese leaders have tried to prevent irritants and problems from becoming major catastrophes.

There are, of course, other main factors that could be considered. Beijing's perceptions of the situation in the region, particularly relations with Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia, are of great importance. However, for the sake of brevity in our discussion here, I will summarize by saying that Chinese policies have been attuned to assessments of the relations of the two superpowers and the regional and global balance. Without judging the relative merits and faults of the Chinese assessments, our rational-actor model shows that Chinese perceptions have varied over time, and that policies have been geared to evaluations of superpower intentions and policies. The Sino-US relationship has been affected both positively and negatively as Chinese perceptions have shifted. In just one decade we have witnessed a jerky move toward the United States and now a jerky move back closer to equidistance between the superpowers (though I would argue China today is closer to the United States than to the USSR and is likely to remain so). From

the rational-actor standpoint, jerkiness is likely to remain a principal feature of Sino-American relations.

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS: THE IMPACT OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS

The shifts in Chinese policy are not merely changes in perception of the global and regional power equation. The past decade has witnessed sharp struggles among the Chinese leadership over policy issues including foreign policy. Indeed, factionalism among the Chinese leadership is an important variable that must be considered in any analysis. Though information on the exact composition and nature of groupings among the Chinese leadership is difficult to come by, much can be inferred by public statements, articles in the press, and so on.

My own view of factionalism in China is that there are few factions in the true sense. Certainly, it is not like Japan, where factions within the various parties have a formal character cemented by personal loyalties and the system of fund-raising and electoral districts. I see groupings in China as informal shifting coalitions; a degree of permanancy is imparted by *guanxi* (personal relationships), but coalitions sometimes form and dissolve on policy questions. The group which most closely resembled a true faction was the "Gang of Four" purged after Mao's death in 1976. The dynamic of shifting coalitions is brilliantly revealed by the downfall of Lin Biao in the early 1970s, the rehabilitation of Deng and other Cultural Revolution victims in 1973, the struggle against Zhou Enlai and Deng by the Gang of Four leading to Zhou Enlai's purge in 1976. Then, after the death of Mao, Hua Guofeng briefly emerged and attempted to consolidate his power, only to be undermined and eventually purged by a resurgent Deng, who is now attempting to have his preferred successors effectively installed. A number of students of China have categorized the various coalitions based on personal ties, policy preferences, position in the leadership (e.g. military, region, center), and even ideological outlook.[11] Without attempting to assign particular people to particular categories, I would like to suggest that there has been a good deal of bureaucratic infighting and that this has dramatically affected policy.

Specifically, since the death of Mao and the rehabilitation of

Deng Xiaoping, China has experienced a struggle between two modes of leadership. The Maoist mode is characterized by an emphasis on charismatic authority, normative incentives for economic development, and equality in social development. The Dengist reform alternative emphasizes routine bureaucratic authority, material incentives for economic development, and the acceptance of social distinctions based on productivity. Since his rehabilitation in 1978 Deng has incessantly waged war on the Maoist mode. In matters of political authority he has pushed for the renunciation of Mao's leadership style, fostered the rehabilitation of cadres previously denigrated during the Cultural Revolution—including redemption of the archenemy Liu Shaoqi—demanded the growth and consolidation of political institutions, and increasingly pushed to get the military out of civil decisionmaking. In economic affairs Deng has strongly supported the adoption of responsibility systems in agriculture and industry which have given individuals more leeway in making a living. The growth of responsibility systems is already provoking differences in wealth which in turn will have a social consequence.[12]

Deng's efforts have not been without opposition. He was able to get grudging acceptance of many of his proposals at the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, but it was several more years before he could purge those who advocated the two "whatevers," that is, those who were not receptive to rapid changes in policy. He finally succeeded in purging Hua in stages, as Premier in the summer of 1980 and as Party Chairman at the 6th plenum of the 11th Central Committee (CC) in 1981. Deng's most important priorities have been getting his chosen successors in place and reforming the party apparatus. He has made compromises in other areas to obtain his objectives. He joined in the closing of "Democracy Wall" and the clampdown on the dissident movement, which he had originally encouraged. He compromised with Chen Yun over economic management issues and supported the economic readjustment of the early 1980s though he was concerned about its implications for Chinese relations with Japan and the United States. He has also compromised over the questions of relations with the Soviet Union and the United States.

With respect to the issue of Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations, Deng apparently preferred close cooperation with the United States and strong opposition to the Soviet Union. In 1979 Deng clearly en-

visioned the United States as part of the united front against Soviet hegemonism. However, at the same time some of Deng's reforms were being criticized in 1980 during a period of economic reassessment and readjustment, the US presidential campaign brought up Taiwan. Deng apparently believed that the Taiwan question could be put on the back burner and resolved over a long period of time, but Taiwan was quickly made into a contentious issue among the Chinese leaders.[13] Over the next two years China became increasingly critical of US policy toward China and Taiwan and US global policy in general. This discontent reflects Deng's compromises with other leaders, as does the decision to seek consultations with the Soviet Union.

Thus we can see that important policy changes reflect struggles among the Chinese leadership. China's attitude toward US relations with Taiwan cannot be wholly explained by the rational-actor model of China's assessment of the superpower balance. It is more clearly understood when the dynamic of informal coalition politics is added in. China's move closer to equidistance between the two superpowers must also be understood in the context of internal debate over alternative policies. Later on in this paper when we begin to make predictions about the next ten years, it will be important to remember that changing coalitions among the leadership will have a decisive influence on what policies are adopted.

AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA

Just as Chinese perceptions of the United States must be considered from the standpoint of both the rational-actor and bureaucratic-politics approaches, so must one consider American perceptions of China. Both models help us to understand how the relationship has developed in the past decade. In his writings, Henry Kissinger has established that the principal impetus for US overtures to improve relations with China in the early 1970s was to balance the Soviet Union, "either to restrain it or to induce it to negotiate seriously."[14] From the rational-actor perspective, the development of US-China relations in the early 1970s demonstrated a conscious desire on the part of American leaders to tune relations with China to relations with the USSR. Generally speaking, a policy of "even-handedness" between the two countries was enunciated by successive administrations.

In fact, in spite of ups and downs noted earlier, the United States was gradually shifting to a policy of favoritism towards Beijing. During the Carter administration, the growing power of the Soviet Union made some argue that a more cooperative relationship with Beijing was necessary to balance the USSR. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, generally credited with the "China Card" formula, strongly pushed for strategic cooperation with China, particularly after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Debates between Brzezinski and Secretary of State Vance over the issue of security cooperation with Beijing continued throughout Vance's tenure, but prospects for heightened cooperation seemed to be growing.[15]

As noted previously, this trend peaked during the Carter administration and began to decline during the Reagan administration. While the Taiwan, textile, technology, and other previously mentioned issues were at the surface of the turnabout, an underlying conceptual factor was the view that the import of China in the global balance had been overstated. Or, as Ray Cline succinctly put it, "The China Card is a deuce!" China was increasingly viewed as a regional power, rather than a global power. The argument that an alliance with Beijing would gain weakness rather than strength was frequently heard. American officials portrayed Japan as the linchpin of American strategy and policy in the Pacific and relegated China to a secondary role.[16]

The argument over whether China should be counted as a global power or a regional power by the United States continues. Brzezinski for example argues that "China should be treated as a genuine global partner, not merely as a bilateral squabbler over secondary issues such as textiles or even Taiwan."[17] Similarly an article by Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser faulted the Reagan administration for assigning less importance to China in US global strategy and asserted that, "A properly managed US-Chinese strategic partnership will contribute to [the] global deterrence of the Soviet Union by increasing the likelihood of a coordinated two-front war should Moscow escalate a conflict."[18] On the other hand Ray Cline declares that the idea that China can be a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union is a "myth."[19] Similarly, Robert L. Downen calls for a "more realistic assessment of the part of US policymakers regarding the limited strategic value of our ties with the PRC. . . ."[20]

Whatever side one wishes to take in this debate, there can be little doubt that the rational-actor approach is crucial to an appropriate understanding of developments in Sino-American relations from the American perspective. Some of the issues that have emerged between the two sides in the past few years directly stem from a change in US perceptions about the role China might be expected to play in the global strategic balance. However, it is also important to touch on the bureaucratic-politics component. Indeed, the amount and openness of the literature in the United States on this component, particularly when compared with that available in China, inclines the student toward the latter approach. We are tempted to view the evolution of our China policy as the outcome of debate between Vance and Brzezinski (State Department vs. the National Security Council), or in the current administration between the ideologues in the White House and the bureaucrats in the State Department.

While there are numerous examples of the impact of bureaucratic politics on American perceptions of and policies toward China, I will mention only two. First, the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act and administration policies with respect to the question of arms sales to Taiwan reflect the outcome of wrangling between the White House, the Congress, and various executive departments. The decision on whether to sell an enhanced FX aircraft to Taiwan, to continue the licensing arrangements for Taiwan production of the F-5, or to discontinue the sale of either had to take into account congressional interests (including the representatives from districts in which the aircraft were to be licensed or manufactured), organized lobbies, government agencies, political parties, and so on. The ultimate decision to continue the licensing of F-5s was as much the outcome of bargaining among the various groups as it was a "rational" judgment based on how it would affect Sino-US relations. Likewise, the decision to grant political asylum to tennis player Hu Na involved the turf of a number of agencies, and while it was widely understood that the decision would likely harm Sino-US relations, at least temporarily, the pressure brought to bear from conservative supporters of the President caused him to overrule advice from other quarters.[21]

We could, of course, go on at length on the role of bureaucratic politics in American perceptions; but the two examples above amply illustrate the bureaucratic interplay that has always charac-

terized the American approach. As was noted above, because of the structure and availability of information, there is a tendency to apply the rational-actor approach when looking at the Chinese, but the bureaucratic-politics approach when viewing ourselves. Of course, nearly all of the bureaucratic actors invoke the rational-actor approach in making their case. Thus, officials in the State Department may argue that a decision to sell certain arms to Taiwan damages the overall US-China relationship and drives China closer to the Soviet Union, while others in the Congress argue that arms sales to Taiwan are necessary to promote US credibility in the region and are therefore favorable to the overall balance of power.[22] (Parenthetically, I would add that those of us in the Defense Department know that such arguments go on within agencies as well as between them.)

I conclude this section by reiterating that our perceptions, like those of the Chinese, will also be influenced both by rationally based calculations of the balance of power—globally and regionally—and by the outcome of debates among the decisionmakers. Since the two political systems are considerably different, there will be obvious differences in how these perceptions evolve, but it is important to keep both in mind as we attempt to predict certain developments in the future and suggest some approaches that might be adopted by the United States.

FACTORS THAT WILL AFFECT SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

If we reconsider the major factors which have influenced Sino-American relations in the past decade we can predict that most of them will continue to be relevant for relations in the coming decade. The first of these is that the Soviet Union will likely constitute the principal threat to both countries over the next ten years. The Soviet Union will continue to pose a global challenge to the United States. Also, though there will be continuing negotiations between China and the USSR and perhaps a continuing easing of Sino-Soviet hostility, Moscow will continue to constitute China's primary adversary.

The three fundamental conditions that China has stated as prerequisite for normalization of relations, namely Soviet troop reduc-

tions along the border (including withdrawal from Mongolia), Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and cessation of Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, are not easy for the Soviet Union to accept.[23] Even if these conditions were to be partially met, the USSR would still constitute the primary threat to Chinese security. Thus, from a balance-of-power perspective, Beijing must continue to seek means of counteracting Soviet pressure in the region. As long as the United States maintains its presence in the region, which it will almost certainly do in the next decade, the US will figure prominently in China's calculations.

Another factor which will modify the first is that neither government will enjoy stability over the coming decade and both will adopt policies reflective of political infighting and reassessed priorities independent of rational power calculations. In the case of the United States, we will have three more presidential elections between now and 1993. There is already discussion of a presidential visit to Beijing in 1984 as part of campaign strategy. Electoral politics aside, each administration has gone through a China learning phase. Early in the Reagan administration, Secretary Haig pushed hard for a cooperative security arrangement with China, but after his departure the importance of China was redefined. After a rocky beginning there now seems to be some headway in reversing the downward trend in relations, but there is no guarantee that present US policies will be maintained even if President Reagan is reelected.

But if there is a question of stability in the United States, how much greater is the one in China? Deng Xiaoping has been relatively successful in implementing administrative reforms and in getting his successors established. However, strong opposition at key junctures has forced Deng to compromise on many issues. We cannot be sure that Deng's reform structures will remain in place once he himself has departed the scene, which will almost certainly occur in the next decade. The Chinese Communists have not achieved a genuinely collective leadership since coming to power in 1949 and it is highly likely that Deng's successors will fight among themselves after he leaves. In this environment, Chinese policy will be heavily influenced by shifts in the ruling coalition as ongoing struggles for power are resolved or partly resolved.

The principal issue between the United States and China over

the next decade will continue to be Taiwan. I agree with Garver that China is likely to wage a political-psychological struggle with the United States on this issue while maintaining cooperation with the United States in balancing the power of the USSR.[24] By placing pressure on Washington over Taiwan, Beijing will hope to reduce US support for Taiwan and gain Taibei's acquiescence to Beijing's overtures. As Taiwan remains a contentious issue among the Chinese leaders it will be used by some groups as a political weapon.

It is my belief that the issue of Taiwan for the PRC is largely symbolic. The reunification of the motherland is a nationalistic concept, and nationalism has been a fundamental premise of Chinese Communist political legitimacy. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party has been jeopardized over the past few years by criticisms of past leaders such as Mao and Hua, and more recently by sensational exposures of wide-scale corruption. Consequently, the Chinese leaders can ill afford to give up a nationalistic appeal. Probably few Chinese really care whether Taiwan is brought back into the motherland or not; however, the Chinese Communist Party stands to suffer a loss of legitimacy, particularly among the politically active Party members, if it sustains much further embarrassment and humiliation over the Taiwan issue.[25] Deng's latest appeal to Taiwan concedes practically everything necessary for complete independence, except sovereignty.[26]

While there has been a great deal of criticism of the August 17 communique on arms sales to Taiwan, I believe it offers both sides a way to make the issue less volatile. The July 1983 announcement that the United States would supply $530 million worth of arms to Taiwan was met with only a mild protest, evidencing Beijing's desire to cool the issue. So long as the United States carries out its arms sales to Taiwan quietly and in accordance with the August 17 agreement, I believe it will be more difficult for ambitious Chinese leaders to use the issue as a bludgeon against others. Nevertheless, we should fully anticipate that internal political pressures on both sides will cause the Taiwan issue to simmer as an irritant in the relationship, though hopefully it will not boil over.[27]

A third factor will be the role played by other states in the region. Over the next ten years, Japan will become increasingly important to both China and the United States. While Japan's position will vary on a cooperation-competition continuum with both

countries, the relationship will probably become increasingly competitive overall. The Chinese leaders publicly assert that Sino-Japanese friendship is improving and will endure, but underneath there remain significant tensions. The Chinese press has been highly critical of what is perceived to be resurgent militarism in Japan. Furthermore, new activism by Japan in foreign policy combined with incentive for improvements in Japanese military capabilities is viewed with some suspicion in China.[28] Also, the territorial dispute between China and Japan could erupt quickly if a disaffected leadership group in Beijing decided to use it as a political weapon.

Concern with a resurgent Japan will likely cause Beijing to seek moderation in its ties with Washington. China will want alternative sources of technology so as not to become overdependent on either the United States or Japan. The Chinese leaders will also perceive that a US presence in the region will act as a constraint on Japanese rearmament. Consequently, we may expect that Beijing will see the United States as a counterweight to both the Soviet Union and Japan. While the United States may well continue to view Japan as being of greater importance than China to the regional and global balance over the next decade, increasing economic friction with Japan will produce bureaucratic pressures in the US Government to take actions which will trouble the American-Japanese relationship. Thus, the United States may come to view relations with China in a somewhat different light. Rather than viewing China primarily in the context of superpower balance, China may be increasingly viewed in the context of our relations with Japan. The United States will seek to compete with Japan for markets in China as the Chinese economy changes, and in another ten years the United States may well be looking toward China as a balance for Japanese political and military power.

Besides Japan, events in South Korea, and South and Southeast Asian countries will also influence Sino-US relations. Because of continuing Soviet pressure, China will be anxious to maintain a cooperative relationship with North Korea; the United States will not lightly ease its commitment to the South. If both Koreas are able to achieve stable successions, then Sino-American cooperation in easing tension on the peninsula is possible. The United States may encourage increasing contacts between China and South Korea and both sides may work to promote negotiations between the two Korean parties. However, there are many pitfalls, and the Korean

question will probably continue to pose difficulties for US-Chinese relations.

The United States has been supportive of the ASEAN countries in the Indochina conflict. The ASEAN countries want a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea but do not want the return of the Khieu Samphan-Pol Pot leadership. They are hopeful that Sihanouk can consolidate his position and emerge in a post-Vietnamese Kampuchea. Beijing believes that only pressure will get the Vietnamese out, and that the Pol Pot insurgents are the only viable force able to maintain pressure on the Vietnamese. For the United States, the solution of the Kampuchea question could ultimately contribute to denial of Vietnamese bases to the USSR. Several of the ASEAN countries believe that Beijing is a greater long-term threat to peace and security in the region than Hanoi. Consequently, increased US cooperation with China, particularly in the military sector, could complicate US ties with Southeast Asian countries. Also, if the present strategy of pressure against Vietnam to withdraw from Indochina does not begin to bear fruit in the next two or three years, the United States may conclude that Beijing's hard line is not in the ultimate long-range interests of America.

Besides the geopolitical factors that will influence Sino-US relations, we can expect that a number of specific issues will recur. I have already noted that such questions as technology transfer, railway bonds, textiles, human rights, and so on have entered the equation. The United States has made concessions on technology transfer and Beijing is waiting to see how these will be implemented in fact. We have reached a new textile agreement, and I fully suspect that the Huguang railway bonds case will be disposed of eventually. Nevertheless, I believe that issues of this kind will continue to come up from time to time. China is fully committed to maintaining a large number of students in the United States, perhaps the best approach to the long-term acquisition of technology.

The human-rights issues will probably become more troublesome. A significant number of Chinese students have already sought political asylum in the United States, and a number of dissidents have begun circulating periodicals critical of the PRC. The human-rights issue is one which has a strong political constituency in the United States, as we saw in the Hu Na case, and I fully suspect we will have more difficulty with the Chinese government over

such issues. If Deng's bureaucratic reforms are successful, China could become organizationally more like the Soviet Union; certainly, there is no indication that the regime plans to ease its suppression of dissent in the near future. Consequently I foresee that the human-rights question will be troublesome over the next decade; however, the degree to which it is troublesome will depend on the state of the relationship in other areas. In other words, if the Taiwan issue is quiet and if negotiations over technology transfer, textiles, and other questions are going smoothly, I suspect that the Chinese will be more tolerant of inevitable criticism from American groups on human-rights issues and will play down the issue of defections.

When we bring these factors together we come to the not surprising conclusion that Sino-American relations over the next decade will be mostly cooperative, but with many areas of friction and disagreement. China will view the United States as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union and increasingly to Japan. It will also see the United States as an important trading partner and as a source for technology. Beijing will likely want to maintain a healthy student exchange with the United States as part of its technology acquisition program. As for the United States, even though China may be relegated to a regional role rather than a global one, no administration will go so far as to alienate China altogether. The areas of friction and disagreement will emerge from the domestic political environment in both countries. Disputes over textile imports, international organization memberships, and other problems will remain low-key unless volatile issues like Taiwan or human rights are mobilized by political interests in each country as internal political weapons. As this writing, it appears likely that none of these issues is sufficiently strong to change the relationship from a primarily cooperative one to a primarily competitive or hostile one over the next decade. What might the United States do to try to keep the relationship primarily cooperative?

SUGGESTIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICY

In making recommendations for US policymakers, I will of necessity sound as if I have adopted the rational-actor approach. This is because I am now leaving the realm of analysis and entering the realm of policy formation. In doing this, I am optimistic that it is possible to adopt policies that will maintain cooperative relations with China in the best interests of the United States.

My first recommendation is simply that we take into account the fundamental conclusion of this paper: that policies in both countries stem from both rational calculations of power and internal political dynamics. All policies arrived at on the basis of rational calculations will be modified by domestic constraints. US policymakers must remember that our policies will influence what happens in Beijing. This is not to say that we should design our policies to support a particular group of decisionmakers in China, only that we must be aware that they will have an effect. In my view, rhetoric about our support for Taiwan and extensive publicity on arms sales provides ammunition for those who are against Chinese compromises on Taiwan. (It has done little to placate the dismay of the President's conservative political allies, either.) Therefore, I believe we should adhere to the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act, but do so without a great deal of hoopla and fanfare. We should especially avoid rhetoric that offends Beijing's sense of sovereignty.

More importantly, we must adhere to the President's pledge not to get the United States involved in the resolution of the Taiwan question between the two sides. The United States has said that the Taiwan question must be resolved by the two parties themselves, and we should leave it at that. Obviously, US economic ties with Taiwan and continuing arms sales will have bearing on how the two sides approach each other, but to offer to mediate or assist in negotiations would only get the United States more deeply involved and make it more likely that internal politics disrupt the present state of relations.

With respect to security affairs—the central theme of this conference—my recommendation is that Washington avoid close security cooperation with Beijing. While I do not believe that the China Card is a deuce, I do agree with those who believe that the United States has already made whatever gains it can in using China to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Closer security cooperation raises internal political pressure on both sides. It increases the prospects that opposition groups in both China and the United States will make the relationship a matter of political controversy and it sets the stage for a dramatic falling out later on. I hasten to add that a principal reason for lingering Sino-Soviet animosity now is their attempted close security cooperation of the early 1950s. Besides, close security cooperation with Beijing now raises concern among our other friends and allies in Asia, notably the ASEAN

countries. Low-key cooperation will maintain whatever value the relationship has in countering the buildup of Soviet military power, primarily the psychological value. Beyond this I do think that we can participate in some dual technology cooperation and even limited arms sales, but we should proceed cautiously.

The next decade in Sino-American relations will, it is hoped, be a decade of moderation. I have already suggested that because of the multiplicity of factors involved it will not necessarily be one of stability. Though there will be several difficult points of contention, I believe most of them can be weathered by gradualism and muddling through. While some have criticized ambiguity in the Washington-Beijing relationship, I believe that ambiguity is the natural state and that it need not be turned into hostility. Thus, our principal strategy for the coming decade should be to manage problems as they arise with an eye toward primarily cooperative relations. We can participate constructively in the modernization of China while avoiding excessive security cooperation; occasionally, this will demand concessions on our part, and it will also demand patience and at times firmness. Though this will be difficult, it offers the best hope for securing American interests over the next decade.

Economic Issues for the United States in Northeast Asia

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The economies of Northeast Asia include some of the world's most effective examples of how a nation should develop. From the early 1950s through the present, Japan has stood out among world economies in the pace of its economic growth. At the same time, Taiwan and South Korea have grown at a rate which, while not without cyclical slowdowns, has been the envy of other developing countries. Hong Kong, while much smaller and subject to the periodic booms and busts of a market economy operating with little government intervention, has similarly grown at an average rate of roughly 9 percent over the last two decades.

China is the exception to this development pattern, having grown at a much slower rate annually since 1949. Now in the 1980s, it seems resolutely embarked on a development course which should result in tangible progress by the end of this century.

This paper will:

- Examine the factors that have been and continue to be necessary for successful development in Northeast Asia and the ways in which countries have been able to achieve these factors.
- Discuss the importance of free trade in an open global marketplace.
- Review some of the current outstanding economic issues between the countries of Northeast Asia and the United States, and corresponding options open to the United States to affect economic change abroad directly.

STAGES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Every country must continue to move up the development ladder if it intends to meet the expectations of its people. As countries develop, here and elsewhere, light industry is supplanted by heavier manufacturing, human labor becomes more complex and mechanically assisted, and increasingly higher levels of technology are developed. Soon, smokestack industries are no longer efficient on a comparative international basis, and in turn give way to service-oriented economies and to high-technology industries. These changes are based on ongoing innovations stemming from major investments in research and development.

Rapidly developing countries tend to be characterized by a willingness to change. Expected benefits are perceived to be worth the inevitable domestic political problems and dislocations which result as the frictional adjustment process affects older sections of the economy. As this happens, obsolete industries become uncompetitive with other producers, while newer industries of greater comparative advantage take their place.

This adjustment process is exemplified by the retraining in the 1960s of Japanese textile workers. They were taught the skills of assembling electrical equipment components and their looms were exported to more efficient producers in Taiwan. In the United States, as one businessman recently pointed out, American manufacturers must "automate, emigrate or evaporate."

Japan already possesses some of the world's most modern production facilities. The country is continuing to jump to still higher levels of innovative technological production through heavy investments in basic scientific research.

South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are also endeavoring to emphasize higher levels of industrial technology, though from a lower base than Japan. Key to their continuing development, therefore, is the ability to acquire technologies already developed by Japan and the more advanced West.

China is presently undertaking basic industrialization. This will result in the expansion of productivity, better efficiency in its uti-

lization of resources, and improved infrastructure and organizational skills.

CAPITAL IN NORTHEAST ASIA

In Japan, capital has been and will continue to be readily available from all sources. Over the coming decade, a rate of capital formation from private savings in favor of higher rates of private consumption will be readily offset by the international commercial markets' willingness to lend.

South Korea has developed its economy through heavy borrowing abroad, and the country's foreign debt at the end of 1982 stood at $37.2 billion, ranking fourth among debtor nations. A continued ability to borrow abroad is important to the republic's growth rate.

China's leaders have conservatively managed their country's supply of capital, and accordingly have large amounts of untapped borrowing power available from commercial lenders abroad. A recurrence of domestic instability in China, or the prospect of a major Chinese military conflict, would inevitably shrink, if not dry up, its supply of foreign capital.

Hong Kong has self-funded most of its industrial development through domestic market borrowings, private flows of funds from abroad, and the profits of its entrepreneurial endeavors. Flight capital will continue to diversify out of Hong Kong to more stable investments abroad, and economic development will continue to be cautious, until the Chinese government has negotiated creditable assurances of its intentions regarding Hong Kong's political and economic future to the satisfaction of local Chinese entrepreneurs. This is likely to be resolved in the 1980s. Meanwhile, the Chinese government has stepped up the pace of its investments in the Colony, introducing fresh capital in the process.

Taiwan's conservative financial management over three decades has held the respect of international bankers and much of the overseas Chinese business community. Its foreign reserves are currently at record levels. Accordingly, capital for economic development will be readily available, unless serious new tensions develop over Taiwan's relationship with China.

THE DOMESTIC BUDGET EQUATION

Government budget deficits will be a growing issue in the years ahead for Japan, South Korea, and China, as well as the United States. No country in Northeast Asia has shown any predilection for expansionary money supply policies. Demands for increased infrastructure, including the costs of higher levels of defense, are the primary source of growing shortfalls between government revenues and expenditures. Inflationary pressures and heightened sensitivity to interest rates result as funds are borrowed to cover these deficits.

A failure to control government budget deficits will over time lead to slower or even negative rates of economic growth. Hong Kong requires increased levels of government spending to stimulate the economy whenever the Colony undergoes one of its periodic recessions. The government borrows little and historically raises funds for such spending by selling land to the private market. Hong Kong thus does not need to engage in deficit spending.

Taiwan is very conservative in both its monetary and fiscal policy, as a result of the experience its central bankers gained with inflation in China during the 1930s. This policy has served Taiwan well, and there is no reason for it to change.

LABOR IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Critical to development is an adequate supply of productive labor, sufficiently educated, technically proficient, and not unduly restricted by inefficient work rules. Throughout Northeast Asia labor is in ample supply. Traditional Japanese employment customs enhance the exceptional efficiency of its work force. Similar employment customs are found in South Korea and Taiwan. Hong Kong's free-enterprise economy has offset its generally higher labor costs by utilizing its productive flexibility. China's labor force is characteristic of a large socialist state in the early stages of development. Its costs and productivity are both relatively low.

The opportunity to educate selected future engineers, technicians, and managers abroad is especially important to China, South Korea, and to a lesser degree, Taiwan. The United States and Japan,

followed by Australia, have been and are likely to remain the main sources of such training.

NEW TECHNOLOGY

Steadily higher levels of productivity arising from improved manufacturing technology are needed by developing countries. Such know-how is usually most quickly and cheaply obtained through purchase, licensing, or theft, either directly or through reverse engineering, from the United States, Japan, and Western Europe.

The alternative for these countries is to invest directly in applied research, where the prospect of payback justifies the cost, or, in the case of Japan, to engage in both basic and applied research with the objective of achieving new breakthroughs.

MATERIAL RESOURCES IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Raw materials are not abundant throughout Northeast Asia, except in China, where very significant resources are being developed. Accordingly, the availability of material resources from China, Australia, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, as well as from the United States, Canada, and the Middle East, is critically important for the continued development of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

Northeast Asia's critical sea lanes stretch across the Indian Ocean to the Indonesian Archipelago, through which Middle Eastern oil is brought into the Pacific. They also include the Eastern Pacific access route through the Panama Canal. To this end, maintaining open sea lanes for access to and from Northeast Asia is extremely important. It critically affects not only continued development, but the economic survival of these countries.

MARKET ACCESS

Access to export markets abroad is also vitally important. For Japan, Taiwan, and to a lesser extent South Korea, much rapid and

effective economic growth has come from government-led efforts to emphasize export promotion rather than import substitution. Trade is the most crucial single issue for these countries. An increasing volume of trade is conducted within the region and the greater Pacific Basin, but trade with the United States and Japan is paramount.

Because of its size, the US economy is a powerful locomotive driving world economic demand. As a result, the economic health of the United States, together with its level of consumer and industrial demand, is a leading indicator of trade levels in Northeast Asia.

US demand, and the US appetite for imports, are in turn influenced by the relative degree of protectionist feeling and the level of interest rates—both now relatively high—as an inhibitor or stimulus to new investment. The effect of periodic recessions on levels of employment and production must also be taken into account.

Japan's economy is second only to that of the United States as a locomotive for Asian development. When the Japanese economy is strong, the resultant demand for imports acts as a catalyst causing business to be vigorous elsewhere in Asia. A slowdown has a ripple effect on other countries in the area as purchases are cut back.

Reflecting this pattern, Hong Kong real estate and stock markets typically boom and bust. These markets mirror the flow of funds into the Colony's economy, based on demands for its goods from Japan and the United States, as well as current market perceptions about the quality of future relations with China.

The nations of Northeast Asia have coped with cyclical economic ripples better than most developing countries. They rode out the OPEC shocks of the early 1970s by biting the adjustment bullet promptly: taking tough measures to pass along higher prices into domestic markets, and moving firmly to hold down their foreign debt. Such actions eventually paid off, in sharp contrast to measures taken by developing countries elsewhere who tried to ease the adjustment to higher oil prices by borrowing to help pay the cost differential. Countries which took this approach went significantly into debt to finance short-term fuel consumption. This used up their borrowing capacity, leading to constraints on their ability to borrow for further developmental needs.

Continued access to open markets is critical to these countries because, with the exception of China, foreign trade comprises a large portion of each country's GNP. They must, in effect, trade to survive; thus foreign markets are essential for their continued development.

DEVELOPMENT PROMOTES STABILITY

The engine of economic development is the engine of stability. Development is important in Northeast Asia, as elsewhere, because real inflation-adjusted growth is required to meet rising expectations over an extended period. Japan is an industrialized nation, and South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan are among the world's newly industrialized countries. These countries are trying to match Japan's success through heavy capital investment in plant and equipment, bureaucratic conservation, greater sensitivity to the marketplace, and an emphasis on export promotion rather than import substitution.

They, together with China, are part of a continuing economic development process. This process reinforces political as well as economic stability by improving the public's standard of living, and thus helping governments to gain more popular support to remain in power. Development also enhances global stability, giving each country a stake in additional industry, infrastructure, and wealth, which is at risk should an international conflict develop. In this sense, a developing country is analogous to a new middle class in its conservatism, born of having something to lose.

FREE TRADE AND OPEN MARKETS

The keystone for a successful United States economic policy in Northeast Asia must be unfettered world trade. The nations in the region are all traders, and if trade is allowed to flow freely, other differences and difficulties can be overcome. All other economic policies are secondary; free trade is the most effective single policy objective the United States can have with regard to Northeast Asia. If open markets can be maintained, the region will continue to prosper.

The United States needs to provide access to its markets to foster development in Northeast Asia. This, of course, presents domestic political problems as obsolete industries resist the problems brought about by the loss of comparative advantage. As the American economy evolves, the United States must cope with the growing obsolescence of its smokestack industry and the emergence of service-based businesses and highly technological industries as the country's new area of competitive advantage.

Long-range growth normally argues in favor of being more open and less restrictive, of letting market forces operate. Barring clear acts of dumping, virtually the only acceptable argument for being closed is national security. Under the aegis of defense needs, critical domestic industries may justifiably be protected from more efficient foreign competitors, while certain goods and processes with military applications may not be exported.

Excluding defense considerations, the continued emergence of free trade, together with the breakdown of restrictions on the free flow of capital, should be an important US goal. Governments can be capitalist or socialist, depending on philosophy and domestic politics, but over time, market-oriented economies will outperform others.

THE COMING DECADE

Over the coming decade, Northeast Asia will see slower growth in GNP and population, with a trend toward more older people in the population. Increased labor costs will provide an incentive for labor-saving devices. This will further the demand for higher technology, which in turn will aggravate the sensitive payments balance in a country like South Korea where new technological licensing costs will add to funds outflows.

A continued trend towards rapid urban growth will increase pressure on infrastructure, requiring higher levels of government expenditure and aggravating budget deficits in Japan and South Korea. In China, attempts by people to move from poor rural areas to relatively more developed cities have been officially resisted. However, the need for additional infrastructure to permit better transportation, and the development of the interior and far western

provinces will continue. Together with higher defense expenditures, this will further increase spending levels, which make deficits likely throughout much of the 1980s.

Ongoing government budget deficits in Japan, South Korea, and China will exacerbate inflationary pressures on prices and reduce the pace of economic growth.

Throughout Northeast Asia, higher educational levels and better flows of information will bring a greater awareness of opportunities and rising expectations. This, in turn, will lead to higher levels of consumption spending and less capital formation through savings. Consumption expenditures will mature with higher relative standards of living and larger amounts of disposable income available for comforts and luxuries. We will see greater sales of color televisions and home appliances in China, more automobiles in Taiwan, and improved housing in Japan.

Except in Japan and China, the region will see a trend towards letting market forces work with less guidance from central government planners. There will be a continued sensitivity to the availability and cost of fuel. Throughout the region, we will see a willingness to invest in the cost of diverse supplies and types of energy. Food should continue to become more plentiful and cheaper as techniques of production improve and import barriers, especially in Japan, are reduced. Despite greater trade competition from other countries in the region, an increased sense of regional commonality should continue to mitigate traditional nationalisms.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

The economic issues for Northeast Asia in the 1980s include relatively open trade and access to foreign markets, the continuing ability to borrow, domestic budget deficits, the impact of higher levels of defense spending, transfer of technology, educational policies, and continued access to raw materials. If free markets were allowed to function, all other issues would be capable of resolution.

The United States and Japan must look to each other as economic partners to further mutual development and consumption, and to promote open trade. Japan as a trading nation is a prime

beneficiary of unrestricted trade, but also an important source of friction, since its domestic markets appear subject to major restrictions against foreign imports. Typical of this are strict limitations on the import of US agricultural products including beef and citrus products. On the other hand, even if Japan were totally open, a major problem would still be the pressure by US textile producers and automobile and specialty steel manufacturers on Congress and the administration to limit Japanese imports.

The options for US policymakers in the years ahead include the alternative of a tougher line on trade and nontariff barriers, which would, however, introduce a fear of trade retaliation. This tougher line is dangerous to manage. When congressional and public opinion is heated up in the United States, it is not easy to cool it down. However, the Japanese know how to read the temperature of the US legislative process. Much can be accomplished by encouraging US and Japanese bureaucrats and politicians to talk to their counterparts in order to understand the economic and political realities in each country.

Questions of US arms sales to Taiwan and of Alaskan oil to Japan are both intense political issues. Each has complex ramifications which transcend economics. Taiwan will find other arms suppliers in the world market if the United States does not sell to them. By continuing such sales to Taiwan, the United States retains communications and some degree of control over the arms process, the drawback of course being the concern which such sales cause the Chinese government.

Alaskan oil, if sold to Japan, would go a long way toward correcting the current US trade imbalance with that country. US intracoastal shippers and other domestic interests, however, are arrayed against this sound economic proposition.

As the economies of Northeast Asia move from labor-intensive to capital-intensive production, it seems likely that limitations on the supply of development capital will slow GNP growth. South Korea, China, and Taiwan will continue to have substantial borrowing needs which must be met from abroad.

However, we must take into account pessimistic media coverage of the need to reschedule debt repayments in several large Latin

American countries, and talk in Congress of restrictions on foreign lending by US institutions. Consequently, there is considerable risk that less experienced international financial intermediaries will not be willing to lend for development as they have in the past. International lenders will need reassurance about the relative safety of continued lending. This will come through successful efforts to increase the World Bank's capital and lending capacity, and through new organizations like the Institute of International Finance chartered to increase both borrowers' and lenders' understanding of financial markets.

The marketplace is endlessly innovative. Its self-equilibrating forces draw forth new supplies of funds, as each momentarily unfilled demand for foreign loans causes willingness to pay higher interest, thereby covering implicitly increased risk premiums. Headlines have predicted imminent loan defaults in other parts of the world with gloomy forecasts of resulting financial panic. But only the most determinedly suicidal government of a borrower nation would announce a default rather than working out an arrangement for tiding it over its financial crisis; such arrangements would likewise be beneficial for the lending nations. For example, the nations might negotiate stretched-out loan payment terms in return for economic austerity and increased interest rates to the lenders. Otherwise, new lending stops and with it the hope of continued economic development.

A nation can avoid paying its debts only if it is prepared to either withdraw from the Western economic system and forego economic development, much as Burma did during the 1960s, or find a sponsor outside the Western economic system that is willing to pay for the country's continued economic development, much as the USSR has done for Cuba. As a result, US policymakers will have the option to give or withhold support for such lending, but borrowing needs will largely be met, albeit with higher interest costs to the borrowers and conditions of borrowing requiring slower growth.

Another economic issue is the budget deficits of Japan, South Korea, and China. Government budget deficits as domestic issues are not directly impacted by US policy; nonetheless, there are some areas of important peripheral influence.

One example is the US effort encouraging Japan to increase its

spending on defense in order to share a larger portion of the cost of protecting Northeast Asia. In complying, the trade-offs for the Japanese are to increase their deficit, to increase government revenues by levying new or higher taxes, or to reduce other government expenditures. In Japan, this trade-off will probably be made in favor of higher levels of defense spending. In South Korea and China, defense expenditures also figure in the budget deficit, and the trade-offs are the same.

The United States will need to encourage the transfer of technology to this region, not only from domestic sources, but from Japan and Western Europe. A willingness to provide new technology in defense-related areas must be weighed against the sensitivity of the technology, and by the closeness and tenor of the military relationship existing between the individual country and the United States.

The process of admitting students to American universities, especially from China, Taiwan, and South Korea, is important in view of the prospect that they will return to their home countries to contribute to development there. Experience and current control procedures set reasonable guidelines for screening applicants.

The importance of raw materials and other scarce resources for Northeast Asia means that the United States will need to help keep sea lanes open. Japan's agreement to take on these responsibilities within a radius of 1,000 miles will help free US forces to protect the vital routes beyond that distance. The economic well-being of the area and ultimately of the United States is a large part of the economic trade-off for those expenditures.

In the long run, Northeast Asia should become more self-sufficient in raw materials. The development of China's great mineral potential, the exploration of the Pacific sea bed, and the advent of new forms of energy and new materials substitutes are encouraging signs.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The US role in influencing world affairs has changed. That the United States cannot afford to do everything it would like to do will

remain an issue for the United States in Northeast Asia and elsewhere for the foreseeable future. Budget limitations, debt and deficits, too much private consumption, and savings insufficient to provide capital will increasingly require the United States to choose between affordable alternatives. This will mean higher levels of uncertainty for US leaders, and the discomfort of knowing that the variables needed to affect military and political solutions are less controllable.

The United States will thus increasingly need to lead by persuasion, negotiation, and compromise where we cannot afford to impose our preferred solutions directly. National policies will increasingly need to be built around joint efforts with our allies and other friendly nations. This changing role will be difficult to accept for those parts of the economy which are slow to adapt to world realities. They will apply political pressures to disrupt and delay economic change.

OPTIONS FOR ACTION

The United States has options for international economic action in four key areas: (1) money, (2) US markets, (3) scarce goods and resources, and (4) higher education.

American policymakers have the ability to influence events abroad by directly or indirectly funding various foreign activities, or alternatively by withholding capital. Examples include World Bank projects, approvals for Export-Import Bank financing, and a willingness to base military forces in a given location to generate significant funds flows there. Money is indirectly provided by encouraging US investment in a specific foreign country, and by providing insurance through the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation to help protect such investments.

Opening or restricting access to markets is a traditional lever of political expediency, though it is economically inefficient over the long term. The most common trade restrictions include quotas, nontariff barriers, embargoes, reciprocal tax treaties, most-favored-nation treatment, and reciprocity issues such as airline landing rights.

Access to scarce goods and resources is another option, but again political expediency can conflict with economic efficiency. Here, we are talking about oil and gas drilling rights, fishing rights, and the sale of otherwise restricted materials, such as an agreement to sell Alaskan oil to Japan. Economic sanctions fall into this category. However, experience repeatedly indicates that sanctions on the foreign distribution of strategic materials do not work over any extended period, unless the supplier nation holds a monopoly and tight control over its distribution channels.

Access to higher economic knowledge principally includes access to technology in its various forms. It also involves the granting of student visas so that a developing country can educate its students in the United States. US educational institutions have developed some of Asia's best engineers, economic planners, and managers.

CONCLUSION

Relatively open markets and free trade throughout Northeast Asia, and especially with the United States and Japan, are crucial elements for economic development and for promoting and maintaining stability in the area. Assured access to imports of raw materials and open access to foreign export markets are critical to the economic survival of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, and vital to the continuing development of all, including China. In the years ahead, trade barriers must be lowered and safe sea lanes maintained.

Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan stand out among developing nations for their economic success. However, the political realities of the changing US role in the world economy can be seen as a part of the problem in encouraging unrestricted trade.

Japan is also significant in its market restrictions. But the United States is more burdened by the size and maturity of its markets, by a slower rate of economic growth, and by an international trading sector which has less relative importance, and hence less influence on its economy, than foreign trade with Northeast Asia. Thus the efforts to achieve open markets will be made more difficult

by political pressures in the United States to resist economic change.

Over forty years ago, John Maynard Keynes pointed out that, "On the economic front we lack not material resources but lucidity and courage." Many options and policy alternatives are available to US policymakers. It is critical, however, to note that the realities of domestic political expediency will frequently conflict with optimal economic objectives.

Will the Pacific Alliance Endure?

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Suppose it were the year 2000 and we were meeting at the National Defense University to evaluate the major political, economic, and military changes in Northeast Asia over the last 20 years and the effect of these changes on US force structure in the region. Would any truly significant developments have occurred? Would we still be seeking to design burden-sharing arrangements between the United States and Japan? Would we be straining to see if creative accounting could demonstrate that Japan was spending more than 1 percent of its gross national product (GNP) on defense? Would the relationship between the United States and Japan indeed be the central feature of American security policy in Asia or would it have been supplanted by stronger Sino-American ties? Would the division of Korea have remained intact or would either new peace initiatives or a new armed conflict have shattered the 30-year stalemate on that resource-bare peninsula?

And what would the Soviet Union have been up to in this period? Would it have continued to build up its military forces in the Far East? (In 1983 these forces included 1 division on the Kamchatka Peninsula, 2 in Sakhalin, 15 in the Maritime Provinces, and 1 on the Japanese-claimed Northern Territories, as well as a Pacific Fleet numbering in excess of 800 ships supported by more than 2,000 land- and sea-based aircraft and about 30 percent of its nuclear missile force.[1] Are there circumstances which could lead the Politburo in Moscow to go to war in Northeast Asia or, alternatively, to seek rapprochement with their bitter adversaries in Beijing?

Predictions are hazardous, especially in international affairs. But policymaking *is* prediction. When our government formulates and then implements a major policy initiative it is presumably expecting certain conditions to materialize and, given these assumptions, is acting accordingly to further American interests within the constraints imposed by US domestic politics. The discussion that

follows is predicated on a set of assumptions concerning each of the major states in the region—assumptions that at this juncture seem most plausible to obtain over the next decade and perhaps to the century's end:

- Sino-American relations will continue to evolve slowly, modulated by a continuing but frustrating search to resolve the Taiwan issue. Because of China's inherent economic and military weaknesses, the leadership will be preoccupied with their enormous domestic agenda. Unless provoked by Vietnam, China will play a limited role abroad in political-military affairs.

- The Sino-Soviet relationship will remain largely adversarial. While probably a certain limited amount of feigned flirtation can be expected by both parties, primarily to capture American attention, the deep geopolitical and ideological differences between Moscow and Beijing will be too difficult to resolve.

- The Soviet Union will continue to build up its force deployments in Northeast Asia without any specific goal in mind other than to increase incrementally its coercive powers over the states in the region.

- The Korean peninsula will be tense but peaceful. Internal political reform in the South will be a more likely focal point for violence than a direct confrontation between the two Koreas.

- The US-Japan relationship will be of paramount significance for American interests in the Pacific. Managing the relationship will become more, not less, difficult. A combination of bilateral economic frictions and Japanese self-assertiveness, rather than the Soviet threat or debates over defense burden-sharing, will be of greatest influence in shaping both the Japanese and the American military postures in the coming decade.

It is this last point which will be explored more fully below.

THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION

The reader of this paper is no doubt aware of the various twists and turns in US-Japan relations since World War II: of the establishment of the Japanese Constitution; of the rise of Japan through the 1950s and 1960s to the status of a junior partner in a security relationship dominated by the American nuclear umbrella; of the emergence of burden-sharing as an issue by the mid-1970s in the wake of the American catastrophe in Vietnam and the establishment of the Japanese economic miracle; and of the various American "shocks" to Japan ranging from President Nixon's surprise visit to China in 1972 to the soybean embargo to President Carter's ill-advised abortive plan to withdraw US combat forces from Korea.

For the most part two parallel dialogues have dominated the bilateral relationship: (1) a high-profile debate over economic policies that has run the gamut from the lowering of nontariff trade barriers to dollar-yen exchange rate problems to the relevance of the Japanese economic model for the fashioning of an American industrial policy; and (2) a much lower-profile dialogue over the roles and missions of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, over Japanese budgetary levels committed to defense, and over the "free ride" argument more generally. The first dialogue is carried on among economists, businessmen, bankers, and government officials concerned with trade and treasury, and the second by the members of the much less numerous strategic studies community. What is less well appreciated however is the cross-talk between these two conversations and the long-term effects of this cross-talk on Japanese policy.

To illustrate the trend of developments let us review in some detail highlights of the US-Japan relationship of the past year as a basis for projecting forward.

REMEBRANCE OF THINGS PAST

Throughout the fall of 1982, despite numerous projections of the Reagan administration to the contrary, the American economy continued to weaken across a broad front. Unemployment nationally held at double-digit levels and pockets of the United States in Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia, and elsewhere witnessed depressed economic conditions not experienced since the Great Depression.

The steel and automobile industries remained particularly hard-hit and this weakness had a ripple effect throughout the economy. Housing starts were at record lows, which further depressed the construction industry. The pulp and paper industries in turn were severely hurt with the consequences of rapid rises in unemployment in the Pacific Northwest. Overall the economic psychology was one of pessimism and, in some spots, of fear.

In Washington, the Federal Reserve's tight monetary policies brought inflation down to modest levels of 3 to 4 percent but at the cost of maintaining extremely high short-term interest rates, which further discouraged business expansion. The Reagan administration's extraordinary budget deficits, reaching beyond $200 billion, came under intense criticism. Caused primarily by a combination of the pervasive economic recession, the tax cuts imposed in 1981 and early 1982, and the enormous real increases in the defense budget, these budget deficits stimulated an intense economic debate worldwide. Many agreed, for example, that the combination of high interest rates and unprecedented budget deficits, themselves interrelated, had produced a strengthening of the dollar that, despite its positive effects for the American tourist abroad, nevertheless greatly penalized US exports, which in turn only exacerbated America's trade imbalance.

These negative developments in the American economy and their impact on the global economic recession directly influenced the US attitude toward Japan. In times of economic weakness and pessimism, there is a natural tendency to search for scapegoats and to seek simplistic causes for highly complex conditions. In this sense Japan was a ready target. The bilateral trade imbalance was headed for a record level, surpassing $20 billion in favor of Japan; this imbalance became the prominent political symbol for all that was alleged to be wrong in US-Japan relations. The logic was put forth simply that the Japanese were a root cause of American economic difficulties. It was asserted that, whereas Japan flooded the American market with goods of all types, Japanese tariffs and nontariff trade barriers effectively restricted US exports to Japan to minimal levels. And by spending limited sums for defense—slightly less than 1 percent of GNP—the Japanese were indeed "free riders" who continued to enjoy the protection of American military guarantees generally and the US nuclear umbrella in particular. Yet simultaneously, Japan was aggressively taking on US industry in

almost all areas and, in many sectors, produced better and cheaper products. The arguments basically ignored the facts that (1) Japanese imports were a small contributor to American economic weaknesses, which were largely structural in nature and (2) the Japanese defense posture was to a great extent created by American directives that had their origins in the US-Japan security pact of 1960.

This is not to say, of course, that the criticisms of Japan in economic or defense matters were groundless. Indeed this author, in congressional testimony in the spring of 1982, urged a careful but sustained growth in Japanese defense capabilities over the next decade to meet strategic requirements and to satisfy American domestic economic pressures. But the acrimonious character of the charges against Japan, especially those emanating from Capitol Hill, placed the Reagan administration on the defensive and created pressure on the executive branch to produce changes in economic and defense policies in Tokyo.

It was not easy, however, for the Reagan administration to respond effectively. At the highest levels only Richard Allen, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, had specialized knowledge of and interest in Japan. When he was forced to leave office, ironically for accepting a Japanese gift, the top leadership in Washington was without Japanese expertise. Once George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as Secretary of State, complications in the Middle East and in US-Soviet relations were so time-consuming that US-Japan relations were accorded a lower priority. This left the Department of Commerce, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), one Japan specialist on the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and the relevant Assistant Secretaries in the State and Defense departments to shoulder the burden of formulating and implementing American policies toward Japan, largely in response to the pressures from Capitol Hill. These efforts were notably marked by: (1) a sharp division between economic and security concerns within the executive branch, although they had been inextricably linked by Congress; and (2) deep differences between the Commerce Department and USTR over how best to influence Japanese economic policies and the policymaking processes. The net result was that official American policies, embracing contradictory and inconsistent themes, were implemented sporadically and inefficiently, and had no organizational focal point to provide necessary coherence and coordination.

American frustration with Japanese behavior was also stimulated by the inability to deal effectively with then Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, a man of compromise with little in-depth knowledge of or appreciation for international affairs. Suzuki sought to defuse the free-rider argument in part by emphasizing the doctrine of "comprehensive security" which emphasized Japan's nonmilitary contributions to the security of East Asia and elsewhere (e.g., foreign economic aid to Pakistan, efforts to mediate conflicts in Southeast Asia). This approach, however, was seen by many in the United States, as well as in Japan for that matter, as a smokescreen meant to camouflage low levels of Japanese defense expenditures. Moreover, on the economic front, Suzuki primarily relied upon arguments stressing domestic economic and political constraints as a justification for not being able to respond to American pressure to liberalize trade barriers. Because of his political caution, his inability to articulate his policies in a persuasive fashion, and his limited breadth of vision and experience, frustration in dealing with Suzuki fueled American criticism of Japan.

A major consequence of these feelings in American domestic political terms was that *it became good politics to be anti-Japanese.* Critical and in some cases vicious anti-Japanese sentiments were voiced in the halls of Congress. Such conditions were reflected in former Vice President Walter Mondale's warning in the fall, as part of his developing presidential campaign, that the next American generation might be destined to clean up around Japanese computers. While Mondale was clearly pandering to his labor-union audience, he was striking a responsive theme among an important segment of the American electorate. Mondale subsequently backed off from this exceedingly unflattering prediction, but within the body politic there remains sufficient residual negative feeling toward Japan that it is likely to be exploited in the future by some Americans seeking public office.

In economic terms this sentiment was translated into the introduction of protectionist measures (e.g., domestic-content legislation) aimed particularly at Japanese competition. While historically there are, of course, numerous examples of protectionist legislation being introduced during prosperous economic times, it seemed plainly evident that the impetus in this case was to protect the failing American automobile industry and related sectors from their fiercely effective Japanese competitors. By the time Prime Minister

Zenko Suzuki resigned in October 1982, therefore, the American mood was infused with decidedly critical sentiment toward Japan which had behind it growing political and economic force.

SIGNS OF SOPHISTICATION AND OPTIMISM

Perceptions often lag behind reality and it may well be that the collection of negative attributes cited above did not fully reflect the forces already at work that were generating a more optimistic judgment of the bilateral relationship. One of these forces was the developing debate in the United States on a new industrial policy. As businessmen, scholars, journalists, government officials, and others began to search for answers to America's economic malaise, Japan naturally loomed large as a useful model for analysis and analogizing. But the more Americans probed the Japanese experience the more they developed cautionary judgments concerning the prospects for emulation. The work of Chalmers Johnson, the Hudson Institute, and others, demonstrated that rapid Japanese economic growth was based on far more than a fully synchronized relationship among government, industry, and the banking community. The fits and starts of the Japanese experience became more widely appreciated. Light was shed on the contemporary problems facing uncompetitive Japanese companies and industries. Growing attention was focused on the importance of unique Japanese cultural attributes—the group ethic, expectations of lifetime employment, and the like—in shaping Japan's approach to production, quality control, and marketing.

As the American debate on industrial policy gained momentum, there appeared independently the first signs of recovery in the American economy. In the first quarter of 1983, unemployment levels began to recede and numerous macroeconomic indicators began to reflect the first signs of the end of the recession. The very fact that optimism about the economy began to surface had a muting effect on American criticism of Japan. Congressmen felt reduced pressure from their constituents to find a scapegoat for their district's economic difficulties. Similarly, the executive branch, excepting perhaps the USTR and the Commerce Department, felt less of a need to exert influence on their Japanese counterparts to modify their policies and behavior according to American preferences. Moreover, by this time the White House had come to appreciate the

limited utility of "Japan-bashing" and had let it be known to both the Commerce Department and USTR that it was now in order to relieve American pressure on Japan—at least temporarily.

Of great significance, of course, in generating a more optimistic perspective about Japan was Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's visit to Washington in January 1983. To American eyes and ears, Nakasone possessed all of the features that Suzuki lacked. He showed himself to be highly intelligent, well informed, articulate in English, attractive in appearance, and especially attentive to economic and defense issues. Even prior to his visit to the United States, he set a tone conducive to American interests by being the first Japanese Prime Minister to make an official visit to Seoul and by concluding a $4 billion foreign-aid agreement with the South Korean government. This act very well may have been engineered in advance as a consequence of consultations between Tokyo and Washington and between Seoul and Washington, but its net effect was to place Nakasone's visit to the United States on a sound footing from the beginning.

On balance, Nakasone conveyed to President Reagan and his colleagues exactly what they wished to hear. He promised to reduce both tariff and nontariff trade barriers in order to correct or reduce the trade imbalance favoring Japan; this in turn would work to defuse the growing US political criticism of Japan. He committed himself to a more vigorous defense program, both in budgetary terms and in the missions that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces would agree to take on. And he promised a more enlightened, responsive, and assertive leadership posture that would be synchronous with US policy objectives. Indeed, Nakasone's bold comment in a press interview during his US visit that Japan is an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" was an explicit anti-Soviet remark that played well in Washington even if it raised a political maelstrom in Tokyo and anger in Moscow.

It remains to be seen whether the Prime Minister can deliver on each of these broad fronts. Nonetheless, at least temporarily, Nakasone offered a great deal of hope to the attentive public in the United States, considerably dampening criticism of Japanese economic and military performance.

As a consequence, the White House agreed to what amounted

to a moratorium on American pressure on Japan, on both the economic and military fronts. The Japanese Upper House elections were to be held in late June 1983, and the Reagan administration did not wish to make any moves which would weaken Nakasone's political base at home. In sum, the principal consequence of the Nakasone visit in January was to put American initiatives toward Japan on hold, at least until the fall of 1983, in order to determine the degree to which he would deliver on his promises.

By the early spring the American public debate on economic issues began to focus seriously on two principal points: the dollar/yen imbalance and Japanese industrial targeting policies. Influential American voices such as Fred Bergsten's identified these as the principal sources of difficulty in the bilateral economic relationship. In the process, Bergsten and others swept aside some of the myths concerning a Japanese government/industry/banking conspiracy aimed at bringing down the weighty American industrial empire. There were other positive developments as well. Japanese and American government officials began a dialogue on defense technology cooperation that at least held out the promise of generating a "positive-sum" relationship in the military sector. While the surface had only been scratched, a process of cooperation was set in motion that had the potential to be of great mutual benefit. Moreover, a number of highly publicized joint ventures were initiated in the commercial sector, including a General Motors/Toyota joint-production agreement for producing compact cars in California; such cooperation demonstrated to the American public that Japanese industrial strength could be married with American interests. In short, the Japanese seemed to be indicating a willingness to develop a political strategy associated with its economic activity and this was bound to be valuable in improving bilateral ties.

An additional positive sign was the re-establishment of the "Wise Men's Group," or US-Japan Advisory Commission, which had grappled previously with bilateral economic problems. This time the group's charter had been expanded to include security and political issues, a recognition of the growing interrelationship between economics and defense.

A final source of comfort stemmed from placing the bilateral relationship in a relevant context worldwide. As the year progressed, a large number of issues distant from East Asia once again began to

crowd out Japan from the American media and public attention. The Middle East flared up militarily and diplomatically and Secretary of State George Shultz was moved to remark that he could work full-time on this area unless he consciously planned his day otherwise. Nuclear arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union—both the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations—were the subject of considerable national and presidential attention. With the greatest explosive potential, Central America burst onto the national scene with enormous intensity. The prospect of American military intervention in El Salvador, and the carrots and sticks employed by the Reagan administration to reduce Soviet and Cuban influence throughout Central America while addressing the needs for social and economic reform in the region, occupied a considerable amount of bureaucratic energy as well as enormous public and congressional interest. And the various efforts at summitry in which President Reagan was or contemplated being engaged further served to divert media attention from US-Japan relations. In short, while this relationship is indeed of enormous political, economic, and security importance, it remained, as seen from Washington, a highly stable and largely successful enterprise in comparison with managing adversarial and other alliance relationships.

Similar distractions were prevalent in the defense area. When Secretary Weinberger visited Japan in 1982 and spoke of close military cooperation in the context of an improved Japanese military capability, the fact is that other matters claimed most of the Secretary's attention. The intense debate over the deployment of the MX missile in particular, and strategic force modernization more generally, got top priority in the Pentagon. A wide array of other issues—the 600-ship Navy, Central American contingencies, the role of peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, NATO conventional-force modernization, and new technologies associated with directed-energy space-based weapon systems—all claimed priority over US-Japan defense cooperation. On a relative basis, Japan just did not appear to require the attention of the high-level policymaking community.

PATTERNS AND CONCERNS

Reviewing these developments of the past year makes certain

patterns and concerns self-evident. Of striking significance remains the paucity of American knowledge about Japan at the highest levels in the United States Government. Except within USTR and the Department of Commerce, which often remain at odds with each other, few senior policy officials have a deep knowledge of Japanese affairs. This condition leaves too much room for error in policy management.

Second, the shakiness of the American economic recovery is very real. A sudden downturn in US economic activity could once again exacerbate American resentment toward Japanese efficiency and productivity. Ironically, even if the US economy continues to recover, the net effect could well be a continually strong US dollar and a larger trade deficit.

The uncertainty of the Japanese political strategy for economic activity is also a potential source of concern. If Japanese business strategy over the next decade in the computer field, for example, is based *solely* on acquiring the largest market share, the political repercussions for the relationship could be extremely adverse. The American public, having witnessed the decline of several major areas of industrial activity, is in no mood to relinquish the leadership position the United States has long held in large mainframe computers as well as in microprocessors. An overtly aggressive effort by Japanese firms in conjunction with government assistance to seize this position would be greeted by a broad spectrum of Americans as confirming the view that the bilateral relationship was far more competitive than cooperative. This realization in turn could strengthen segments within the United States who seek to redefine or remove US security guarantees for Japan.

Finally, the sustainability of Prime Minister Nakasone's policies and indeed of his position as head of government are themselves significant question marks. If Nakasone is able to manage his domestic and economic constituencies effectively and deliver on his promises to Washington, smoother bilateral relations lie ahead. Alternatively, a dramatic shift in policies to a more accommodationist line with domestic economic (especially agricultural) groups or the collapse of the Nakasone government in the wake of the conviction of former Prime Minister Tanaka, anticipated later this fall, could seriously undermine the basis for optimism which presently pervades American judgments about the future of relations with Ja-

pan. Indeed, the prospect of a continuing US-Japan misalignment of fiscal and monetary policies which would exacerbate the trade imbalance and strengthen the dollar are very real concerns which Prime Minister Nakasone must confront.

THE PRIMACY OF ECONOMICS

The day after Soviet fighter aircraft shot down the Korean airliner, Secretary of State Shultz went before the Shimoda Conference in Warrenton, Virginia, and underscored the primacy of economic interests in US-Japan relations.[2] He reviewed the familiar impressive statistics:

- Japan took 10 percent of total US exports in 1982, second only to Canada.
- The United States purchased 25 percent of Japan's total exports, by far the greatest market for Japanese goods.
- Bilateral trade in 1983 was expected to exceed $60 billion, more than triple the level of a decade previously.
- The combined GNP of the two countries accounts for about 35 percent of world GNP.

After reviewing modes of Japanese-American cooperation in a number of areas, Secretary Shultz outlined five "next steps," the first four dealing with economic cooperation: reaffirm commitments to free trade; create conditions for a more stable international monetary system; assist in the development of the less developed economies; and respond to a wide range of opportunities for cooperation throughout the world. Fifth, and last, he cited the need to quicken the pace for both Japan and the United States to fulfill their respective roles and missions in the field of mutual security. To be sure, this was a former labor economist and international businessman turned statesman offering his own prescription for strengthened relations. But his presentation also revealed an unassailable logic governing US-Japan relations: unless bilateral economic relations are managed effectively, protectionist legislation could not only trigger a breakdown of international trading practices but could also stimulate extreme nationalistic sentiments

in both societies which could severely damage the security framework as well.

THE LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE OF NAKASONE

As noted, Prime Minister Nakasone is in a somewhat precarious political situation and, although he made a fine initial impression in Washington, may have difficulty delivering on his promises to Washington. But this is an excessively narrow basis for assessing Nakasone's significance. He has already confounded most Japanese political pundits who saw him initially as a weak, transient figure. In fact, he is building substantial grassroots support and could well become the most significant leader in postwar Japan. In contrast to virtually all of his predecessors, it has been noted, "he is actually trying to *lead.*" [3]

In fact, Nakasone is trying to create a new political climate in Japan that will pave the way for a far more assertive and potentially more independent foreign and defense policy than has been witnessed in the postwar world. This development should surprise few, although it will no doubt surprise many. How long could Japan be expected to play a modest, quasi-pacifist role in international affairs once it had attained the rank of an economic superpower and acquired the self-confidence that naturally accompanies material success? Nakasone is seeking to legitimize a Japanese perspective that, once articulated, will set in motion irreversible forces that will long outlive his particular administration.

Moreover, Nakasone sees a certain historical inevitability for the re-emergence of Japanese political power. Consider these observations of his:

> History teaches us that civilizations shift gradually toward the periphery, creating new civilizations as they move. Flourishing civilizations have constantly moved toward the frontier: from Greece to Rome, from Rome to England, France, and Germany, and from Europe to the American colonies. Even within America itself, the torch of civilization advanced westward, from the Atlantic to the shores of the Pacific Ocean. The compass needle of history has swung from Mediterranean to Atlantic civilization. Now it is pointing toward the Pacific.

> Broadly speaking, European civilization has already passed its prime. It is committed to preserving the status quo; it is stagnating, losing its former vitality. American civilization, in contrast, is still full of vigor, but if it is to rise to new heights, it must find a new and different catalyst . . . . Today there can be no doubt that we are on the verge of a new economic and cultural sphere that, while centered on Japan and the United States, will encompass the Pacific shores in both the northern and southern hemispheres . . . . The Pacific Ocean is becoming the new and historic stage for the drama of human interaction and development.[4]

In short Nakasone has a vision of a dynamic, interactive Japanese-American relationship that is on the leading edge of world affairs in *all* respects. While there are many formidable obstacles standing in the way of the fulfillment of Nakasone's vision, the intrinsic economic and human assets that Japan possesses strongly suggest that he or his successors have a high likelihood of realizing some version of this incredibly lofty goal.

JAPANESE MODES OF THE FUTURE

Although he does not use the term, Nakasone clearly envisions a Pacific Alliance spearheaded by Japan and the United States which holds the political, economic, and military center of gravity in the future much as the Atlantic Alliance held it in the past. What choices does Japan face in getting from here to there? Assuming Japan retains its status as the world's second strongest economic power, it would appear to face three possible political-military alternatives: more-of-the-same; the West German model; and the French model. "More-of-the-same" is probably the pattern most Japanese and Americans currently expect Japan to follow. They point to Japan's military and economic vulnerabilities, to the strong elements of pacifism still prevalent in Japanese society, and to the seemingly pervasive Japanese desire to avoid unnecessary international responsibilities that would in any way jeopardize their economic interests.

Yet "more-of-the-same" seems in the long run to be an untenable pattern. With an unyieldingly belligerent Soviet neighbor, an impatient American ally constantly pressuring Japan to "do more," and a new generation of bright, proud, more assertive postwar Japa-

nese officials taking on increasing roles of responsibility, the means are at hand to move beyond the status quo. The West German model is one alternative. It implies the deployment of a powerful, credible, non-nuclear military force to defend the nation's territory. It implies very close cooperation with the United States on military affairs (including retention of US bases in Japan) and a more independent posture on economic and political issues. And it rules out military activities "out-of-area," or in this case outside the immediate proximity of Japanese home waters.

The French model, conversely, would move Japan into a totally different category: a nuclear weapons state, tied to the West but with a highly independent posture in economic, political, and military terms with no US troops on its soil, and with a willingness to engage in military activities external to Northeast Asia.

Indeed over the next two or three decades or less a transition may await Japan from "more of the same" to the German model or to the French model. What about a fourth prospect: emergence as a strong military power divorced from or even hostile toward the United States? This is *conceivable* but highly unlikely as long as the democratic political system prevails in Japan. The United States is simply too important to the Japanese in economic and military terms for any sensible leaders in Tokyo to turn their backs on Washington.

FORCE POSTURE IMPLICATIONS

For the foreseeable future, and that includes the coming decade, Japan's military role is likely to be restricted to one or more of the following options:

- Permit US bases in Japan to provide critical air and naval support for American military forces in the event they are engaged in a renewal of hostilities on the Korean peninsula.

- Utilize Japanese maritime and ground forces to deny the Soviet navy access to the Pacific Ocean by blocking the Korean, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits.

- Deploy Japanese naval forces to protect the sea lines of com-

munication near Japan and the Western Pacific, especially if the US Seventh Fleet were engaged in a conflict in the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean.

- Use the totality of Japanese military power to dissuade the Soviet Union from opening a Far Eastern front in the event of a US-Soviet conflict in Europe or Southwest Asia.

To fulfill these missions, the Japanese forces need to acquire enhanced air defense and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, improve the readiness of the Ground Self-Defense Forces to present a credible deterrent to a Soviet threat to occupy Hokkaido, and increase the quantity and quality of their surface navy. All these elements are cited in Japan's Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate (1983–1987).

Barring an unlikely rupture in US-Japan relations, it is unlikely that US naval and air power in the region will be dramatically affected by increased Japanese military capabilities for quite some time. American forces in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and the Marianas will not be markedly affected, assuming their services are not required elsewhere, given the present and projected Soviet threat in East Asia. Moreover, given the preliminary nature of US-Japan discussions on the transfer of defense technologies from Japan to the United States, it is unlikely that such developments would significantly affect American forces deployed in the area.

Overall, then, the bilateral relationship is:

- Especially sensitive to the feedback of economic frictions into the security debate.

- In need of a workable formula to permit a natural growth in Japan's political-military posture without producing adverse consequences in the region or in the United States.

- Unlikely to witness major alterations in the American force posture for several years to come.

In August 1983, *Time* published a special theme issue on Japan as "a nation in search of itself." We might add that whatever Japan finds will in large measure determine the future of the Pacific Alli-

ance. For it is self-evident that, despite many areas of strength, this bilateral relationship is fragile at important points and must be handled carefully if the entire package is to hold together. "Handle with care" should be a label permanently affixed to US-Japan relations.

Chapter 6

The United States and South Asia: India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

Panelists were challenged to address the following charter:

"This panel will consider the key implications for US policy in South Asia as they relate to the 1990s. The question of Afghanistan and the region's security, the difficulties of development, the key Indo-Pakistani relationship, and the US role will be discussed. The panel may wish to evaluate trends in the region and discuss how such future trends might impact on policy alternatives."

Panel Summary

Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen, Chairman
National Defense University

Lieutenant Colonel Terry L. Heyns, USAF, Rapporteur
National Defense University

This panel's authors, Selig Harrison, Richard Cronin, and Francis West, all raised issues which were of prime importance to this region of South Asia and provided the panel participants with much to discuss. As can be seen from the papers, the three authors deal with broad trends and interactions of US policy in the region in terms of US interests, US relations with each individual country and how this interacts with the other countries of the area, and with the security objectives of the region itself and of the United States.

Based on these three papers, the panel launched into a lively discussion. Because of the diversity of panelist backgrounds, there was no total agreement on any of the issues, but this was expected. Indeed, the composition of the panel was designed to promote a lively exchange of views and considerations. While not in total agreement, the panel noted that the region is not of salient interest to the ordinary US citizen. Indeed, US interest may even be said to be derived peripherally, which does not diminish the area's importance, but demonstrates that any influence the US has in the region of South Asia is limited. The limitation of US influence in the region is one factor American policymakers must keep in mind.

As a matter of convenience, the panel's discussion focused sequentially on each area country, beginning with Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN

While the panel could not come to an exact agreement on Soviet objectives in Afghanistan, panelists felt it useful to treat the present situation there as "stand-off" rather than "stalemate." The dis-

tinction here is more than semantic. Stand-off implies that the Soviets have the capability to prevail militarily, provided they are willing to pay the price. The panel recognized that even greater Soviet strength could be called upon and applied should the Soviets so decide. This would mean even greater casualties for both sides. Whether the Soviets would accept the cost is problematical, because the cost would have to be weighed against the objective of escalation. The panel could not agree that Soviet objectives are clear. While some members of the panel did believe that the Soviet goal was the "mongolization" of Afghanistan, others felt that such a goal was not obvious, at least at this stage of developments.

The contentious issue, of course, is how the United States should formulate a policy toward Afghanistan. The panel agreed that the Afghan people should be considered in any policy or settlement. The Afghan people are suffering a great deal. Not only are there many refugees outside of the country, there are many internal refugees as well. Many people from rural areas have moved or have been displaced by the fighting from the countryside, crowding into the cities. The panel discussed the possibilities of a framework acceptable to all sides. A minority said such an effort should be given a chance, while there is still time. Noting that a settlement might even preclude the Soviets' using Afghanistan as a strategic base, the majority of the panel was not optimistic, however. These felt that the chances of UN success were remote, and that how much influence the Afghans would have in any future government was uncertain. However, the Soviets know that if a government unacceptable to the Afghans is placed in power, the Soviets would have to remain there to keep this government in place. So the question of acceptability looms large in any settlement, especially since the Afghans cannot agree on a government among themselves.

Another possibility is that the Soviets do not wish a "Mongolized" Afghanistan, but rather a "Finlandized" Afghanistan. This view assumes that the Soviets do want to leave subject to some substantial conditions. Against much discussion ensued, with the greater number of panelists believing in light of their total military and nonmilitary effort that the Soviets were in Afghanistan to stay. Large numbers of Afghans are being sent back to the Soviet Union for training, the Soviets are active economically in the area as well, and they have shown no willingness to withdraw the civilian or military forces now in the country.

The panel summarized its view in the following way: (1) the Afghan people themselves should not be ignored in any settlement and should be taken into account when addressing policy options in the region, (2) the Soviets would only pull out of the country on their own terms and on the basis of what was acceptable to the Soviet Union, (3) in light of this, the United States should formulate policy with the goal of getting the Soviet Union out of the country, leaving a country genuinely neutral, and subject to the need of its being acceptable to the Afghan people. The panel left open the question of US involvement in the effort of the UN and the role of the other countries in the region. The view was expressed that the United States should work with the government of Pakistan on the Afghan question, should continue a dialogue with India, and should keep long-range objectives in mind when dealing with the area. In addition, bipartisan support should be elicited in the Congress and the issue of Afghanistan should be kept before the American people, as well as the Congress.

PAKISTAN

The panel's discussion of Pakistan dealt with its relationship not only with Afghanistan, but also with India. Noting the dangers involved if Pakistan obtains nuclear arms, the panel also expressed concern for the internal stability of Pakistan. The panel discussed the present arrangement that the US has with Pakistan, which cuts off US aid automatically in the event Pakistan acquires a nuclear weapons capability. The arrangement leaves no option open to the United States. Other issues, such as the sale of conventional weapons, are more flexible.

Generally, the panel held that sale of F-16s to Pakistan should not be seen as threatening the government of India, and that the sale did not change the relative military balance between the two countries. At this point, China was mentioned, for China, as well as the Soviet Union, affects many policy considerations in South Asia. In the military equation, India also must balance her relations with China with her relations with Pakistan. Vis a vis Pakistan alone, the military balance is in India's favor. With the present state of affairs in China, India's Chinese frontier is relatively calm. Therefore, in real terms, the F-16 sale did not at all appear to threaten India, notwithstanding the Indian press reaction. The panel generally sup-

ported the sale of the F-16s, symbolically important to Pakistan, recognizing however its implications for our relations with India.

The worst of all possible scenarios the panel raised was the break-up of Pakistan from internal disaffection. The panel agreed that it was in the interest of the United States to have a strong democratic Pakistan in the region and that the United States should encourage moves toward democracy by the Pakistanis, however limited our influence in this. However, the panel also noted that the diversity of Pakistani society presents certain difficulties in any move toward democratization. Certainly, the United States should not become involved in the internal affairs of Pakistan, but should express the desirability of a more democratic system as contributing to stability not only in Pakistan, but throughout the region. It was again stated that United States interests there are not direct but derived, so the United States has little real ability to influence events in the region and in Pakistan itself.

INDIA

With its large population, its military strength, and its reputation as the world's largest democracy, India has substantial influence in the area. India has acquired a new confidence in its role and has no real "enemy" which can cause it harm. This is in part because of the Indian military build-up which has been going on for some time, because of the divisive internal situation in China, and because of the acquisition of new technology. Relations between the Indian government and the government of the United States have seemed to improve recently, but a number of the panelists felt that this may be only cosmetic and that there are still substantial differences in US and Indian views. On Afghanistan, for example, the panel felt that India, while it may not see the Soviet intervention as a direct threat, still sees the situation as having changed. The Indians also feel that US policy aimed at the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will not succeed. In the case of China, the Indians acknowledge a much reduced military threat, especially in light of current developments within China. The Indians have some sense of unease about US efforts to sell greater technology to the Chinese, however. But in spite of this, the panel felt the Chinese-Indian rapproachment will continue to a degree. Future Sino-US relations are of concern however, for India would not like to face a nuclear-armed China with a greater technological capability.

In regard to Pakistan, the panel agreed that the Indians have said and genuinely feel that a disintegrated Pakistan would not contribute to stability in the area. Again, the relationship between India and China colors India's outlook on Pakistan. The Indians would be uneasy with closer ties between Pakistan and China.

The panel agreed that India prefers not to have any outside influence in the region, whether Soviet, Chinese, or American. The panel also took note of India's connections in the Third World.

The panel also felt that India's acquiring nuclear weapons would be a cause for concern. Several panelists noted that there is neither evidence nor expressed intention of India to acquire a substantial nuclear capability. Certainly, the Indians would oppose additional nuclear proliferation in the region. The panel noted that the Indians expressed concern less over the sale of the F-16s than over what it might suggest about US policy in the region. Pakistan raises considerable emotional feeling, which the United States must keep in mind in formulating its own regional policy.

The panel generally felt that US policy toward India was on the right track. The panel agreed that the United States should avoid cooling its relations with India in the process of opening up its relations with China. The United States should also have more of a recognition that India is already a democratic country. Another link between the two countries is the large number of Indian citizens now living in the US. Certainly this can increase the chances for friendly contacts between the two countries.

The United States and South Asia

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American policy in South Asia during the decades ahead should be designed to promote three critical, interrelated security objectives, to which other security objectives should be subordinated:

1. *A political settlement in Afghanistan that would lead to the withdrawal of Soviet combat forces while, at the same time, precluding or limiting the establishment of operational Soviet strategic bases there.* At present, the Soviet air bases at Bagram, Kabul, Qandahar, and Shindand have runways long enough to receive Bison bombers and other long-range strategic aircraft, but these facilities were built before the occupation and with earlier Soviet and American economic and military aid. Most American and other Western intelligence sources agree that Moscow has not yet taken a number of steps that would be necessary to expand its Afghan air bases sufficiently to support large numbers of strategic aircraft on long stopovers (e.g., the bases would need substantially lengthened runways for heavier aircraft, substantially expanded petroleum storage facilities and new hardstands for parking reserve squadrons). Instead, Soviet efforts to improve these bases have been primarily tailored to making them more effective as counter-insurgency bases for helicopters and tactical fighter aircraft and against the *mujahidin*.

The objective of forestalling the establishment of strategic bases in Afghanistan would be undermined by further escalation of the Afghan conflict. If the present escalation should continue, together with a growing polarization of Afghan political forces, Moscow would be likely to intensify its efforts to make Afghanistan a South Asian Mongolia governed by a monolithic Communist elite. This would necessitate an indefinite military occupation, which would no doubt be accompanied, in time, by the development of strategic bases. American interests would be better served by a negotiated settlement based on acceptance of a Finland-style security relationship between the Soviet Union and a less mono-

lithic client regime in Kabul. Such a relationship is implicitly envisaged in the United Nations draft agreement on Afghanistan currently under discussion between UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar and the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States, and the Soviet Union. After reviewing and analyzing the UN negotiations, Section I of this paper explores the possible content of a Finland-style security relationship between Kabul and Moscow.

2. *An improvement in American relations with India that would reverse the present drift to de facto Indo-Soviet military collaboration in the Indian Ocean.* Such an improvement would not be possible in the context of continued US sales of sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan, even if the US were to offer to sell comparable equipment to India.

New Delhi is seeking to achieve unchallengeable dominance over Pakistan for historically rooted psychological and political reasons explained in Section II of this paper. Pakistan, for its part, has attempted since its inception to obtain sophisticated military equipment from the United States in order to improve its balance of military power with India, albeit periodically cloaking this objective in the guise of other security objectives. The Indo-Pakistan rivalry is propelled by primordial indigenous forces beyond the control or management of Washington. Thus, the United States should maintain a scrupulous detachment from this rivalry, supporting large-scale multilateral and bilateral economic aid to both countries in accordance with their economic absorptive capacity, while refraining from sales of sophisticated equipment to both countries, as it did from 1965 to 1981. As Section II of this paper suggests, the United States may confront specific situations, such as the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 or the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, which may justify carefully circumscribed sales of military equipment for temporary periods to either India or Pakistan or both. But such sales should not be made if they would serve primarily to improve the position of either country in the Indo-Pakistan military rivalry (e.g. the sale of 155-mm howitzers to Pakistan would primarily be for use in plains warfare against India, whereas 105-mm howitzers would be more useful in mountain warfare along the Afghan frontier).

Above all, the United States should seek to avoid becoming the principal military supplier to either country. American policy

should encourage the diversification of military procurement by both India and Pakistan as part of a larger effort to minimize the present polarization of the subcontinent along the lines of the American-Soviet and Sino-Soviet rivalries.

Should the United States enlarge its military support of Pakistan, Indian hostility to the American presence in the Indian Ocean would be likely to grow, together with Indian reliance on Soviet support for Indian naval development. By contrast, an American policy sensitive to Indian power aspirations would provide a favorable environment for the continued use of Diego Garcia, if such a policy were accompanied by arms-limitation negotiations designed to achieve greater symmetry in the levels of US and Soviet deployments in the Indian Ocean.

It is often argued that Soviet policy toward South Asia is India-centered solely or primarily because Moscow wishes to outflank Beijing. (E.g., see Stephen P. Cohen's testimony in the House Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee hearings on the Soviet role in Asia, 28 July 1983.) This analysis suggests that Soviet interest in India would decline in proportion to any future improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. But it would be a grave mistake for the United States to base its South Asian policy on such an estimate. Soviet policy is based on a judgment that New Delhi is likely to grow in importance during future decades as the focal point of an increasingly coordinated South Asian regional power grouping. Soviet economic and military assistance policies are primarily designed to identify Moscow with Indian aspirations for regional dominance and thus to facilitate the development of a solidly anchored pro-Soviet lobby in India. Similarly, when the Soviet Union is forced to choose between India and other South Asian states on contested issues, Moscow either sides with New Delhi or carefully avoids positioning itself against Indian interests. At best, Moscow hopes to draw India into de facto military cooperation helpful to its interests in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. At the very least, Moscow seeks to forestall the possibility of a major reorientation of Indian foreign and security policies in the event that Washington, or Beijing, or both, should modify their present South Asian policies, which are perceived by New Delhi as hostile to Indian aspirations for regional dominance.

3. *The denial of Arabian Sea ports and other coastal facilities in*

Baluchistan and Sind to the Soviet Navy and Air Force. Moscow would be most tempted to seek and most likely to obtain such facilities as an accompaniment to the Balkanization of Pakistan, especially if such a Balkanization were to occur as the result of a polarization of Pakistani political life between Soviet-supported separatist forces and a Punjabi military regime with American and Chinese support.

Recent events in Sind have underlined the built-in conflict between dominant Punjabi and *muhajir* (immigrant) elites and the non-Punjabi ethnic groups indigenous to the areas that have made up Pakistan. During the 1950s and 1960s, the challenge to Punjabi-*muhajir* dominance by the Bengali majority in East Pakistan, working in concert with its Baluch, Pushtun, and Sindhi allies in the west, was the overriding factor that prompted the Punjabi-dominated armed forces to take over political power. More recently, with the Bengalis removed from the equation, Punjabi-*muhajir* dominance has been more firmly established than ever under the aegis of the armed forces. The fact that centralized authoritarian military rule serves to reinforce the control of the dominant ethnic group has aggravated ethnic tensions that would be difficult to manage even within a more representative political system allowing greater scope for accommodation between central and local authority. By the same token, the persistence of these tensions provides a rationale for continued military rule.

At present, the non-Punjabi minorities are not receiving substantial Soviet support, but the danger of a Soviet dismemberment strategy is growing as the Pakistani political crisis sharpens. American support for the Zia Ul-Haq regime has emboldened Zia to reject meaningful compromise with his opponents and is progressively driving opposition elements into an anti-American and pro-Soviet stance. Moreover, to the extent that Pakistani-American military and intelligence links grow, Soviet retaliatory pressures on Pakistan are likely to intensify. Already, as an accompaniment to its support of the UN negotiations on Afghanistan, Moscow has made thinly veiled threats to destabilize the Zia regime if Islamabad continues to cooperate with the United States, China, and Middle Eastern countries in channeling weapons aid to the *mujahidin*.

Defining American security objectives in South Asia in broader, nonmilitary terms, the United States should seek to pro-

mote secular, open societies and stable, unified polities in which economic expectations and economic achievements are in harmony. Even in the absence of Soviet influence, American interests would be jeopardized by the rise of anti-Western xenophobia rocted in religious fanaticism or in totalitarian political creeds of the right or left. It would be playing with fire to support Islamic fundamentalist forces in Pakistan or Afghanistan or Hindu nationalist forces in India in the name of anti-Communism. Similarly, just as it has been a mistake to side with the dominant Punjabis against aggrieved ethnic minorities in Pakistan, so it would be a blunder to seek to manipulate minorities in either Pakistan or India in order to gain leverage in dealing with dominant political leaders in Islamabad or New Delhi. The United States can only get burned by involving itself in internecine struggles within and between South Asian countries.

I. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

Significantly, the Soviet Union has been encouraging the United Nations to pursue its Afghanistan initiative, but it is not yet clear why. Skeptics argue that Moscow is merely using the UN dialogue to win legitimacy for the Babrak Karmal regime and to sow discord in the ranks of the resistance. In a recent article, I have suggested that Moscow may be playing a bold game of diplomatic brinkmanship to pursue these objectives, confident that the Reagan administration would not accept the type of settlement envisaged in the UN negotiations.[1] However, this interpretation does not rule out the possibility that the Soviet Union would be prepared to withdraw its forces under the UN scenario if the United States should adopt a positive attitude. There are many indications that Soviet attitudes on Afghanistan are ambivalent, and that the Andropov leadership is engaged in a major internal policy debate on the Afghan issue. The UN initiative has offered an opportunity for Moscow to find out whether it is possible to obtain what it regards as a favorable settlement in Afghanistan and, if so, on what terms. One reason for this exploratory attitude is that China demands a withdrawal as one of the preconditions for improving relations with Moscow.

On the diplomatic front, Moscow is paying a high price for its Afghan adventure, not only in relations with China but also in the Islamic world, especially in Iran, as well as in India, the West, and

even in Communist parties throughout the world. Moreover, the Soviet Union faces a continuing military and political stalemate in Afghanistan. While Moscow cannot be forcibly dislodged, neither is it likely to stabilize the situation soon. Soviet leaders are no doubt prepared to escalate their military presence if they have no alternative, regardless of the diplomatic costs, but before doing so they want to see what kind of a negotiated settlement is possible.

The UN initiative has now reached a perilous, make-or-break stage. After a year of intensive shuttle diplomacy, UN-sponsored "indirect" negotiations in Geneva in April and June 1983, have resulted in completion of the draft text of a "comprehensive settlement." Since Pakistan refuses to deal directly with the Soviet-installed Karmal regime, UN mediator Diego Cordovez has conducted the negotiations through separate meetings with the Pakistani and Afghan Foreign Ministers. Cordovez has also carried on unpublicized parallel meetings with high-level Soviet officials who were also present at Geneva and with ranking Soviet and US officials in Moscow and Washington. The nominal parties to the projected agreement would be Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United Nations, but the United States and the Soviet Union would have to endorse it in an auxiliary endorsement document before it could be implemented.

Under the draft agreement, a detailed document of some twenty pages, all "foreign troops" would have to be withdrawn from Afghanistan within a definite time period. Pakistan, for its part, would be required to terminate all of its support for the Afghan resistance, including weapons shipments to the resistance through its territory. Islamabad has never acknowledged publicly that it is aiding the resistance, and it would not be required to do so under the agreement. Instead, it would be committed to an exhaustive series of specific pledges of future good behavior, which would become operative as soon as the settlement goes into effect. These pledges are spelled out in a mutual noninterference clause to which Afghanistan would also be committed.

The language of the draft text as adopted in June 1983 was in virtually final form. No minutes of dissent were appended by either Islamabad or Kabul. However, there was one gaping blank space in the text: the duration of the time-frame for the Soviet withdrawal. This omission is of critical significance because both Pakistan and

Afghanistan stress that the agreement is a "package deal" in which all provisions of the text are "open" and subject to renegotiation until it has been finalized in its entirety.

Islamabad understandably attaches decisive importance to the time-frame as a test of Soviet intentions, insisting on a short period of four to six months as against the 18-month period suggested by Afghan government negotiators. Moscow and Kabul point to the mutual noninterference clause as their test of whether Pakistan is serious about concluding the agreement. As in all negotiations, each side wants the other to put its cards on the table first. Islamabad insists that agreement on the time-frame must be reached before it will commit itself formally to the noninterference clause, while Moscow demands such a commitment as a precondition for negotiating a compromise on the time-frame.

For Pakistan, the duration of the time-frame is a peculiarly sensitive issue because assistance to the resistance would be foreclosed during the disengagement period. Islamabad fears that a long disengagement period would maximize the danger that Soviet forces would carry out sustained predeparture military offensives against resistance forces. Soviet sources argue that a long withdrawal period is necessary not only for technical military and logistical reasons but also because an extended withdrawal period would give Moscow an opportunity to broaden the base of the Kabul regime in a gradual, face-saving fashion.

The most controversial aspect of the UN scenario is the fact that it does not provide for replacement of the Kabul regime. Under the draft agreement, the Babrak Karmal regime, which is accredited to the UN, could still be in place at the outset of the disengagement process and even following its conclusion. However, Karmal has become a symbol of the Soviet occupation, and it is difficult to see how a regime under his leadership could survive in the absence of a continuing Soviet force presence. It is generally assumed in Islamabad that Moscow has something up its sleeve. In order to fulfill its withdrawal commitments under the UN scenario, it is argued, the Soviet Union would have to reach an accommodation on its own with some of the more significant non-Communist tribal and political leaders in Afghanistan. The UN scenario implicitly assumes that such an accommodation would be easier in the atmosphere that would be created by a withdrawal agreement than it is at present.

Pakistan is insisting on the replacement of Karmal as a precondition for concluding the UN settlement in the form of a tripartite agreement (Kabul, Islamabad, and the UN). But Islamabad appears prepared to conclude such an agreement with a successor Communist regime under different leadership, just as it dealt with the Communist regime in Kabul led by Nur Mohammed Taraki and Hafizullah Amini prior to the Soviet occupation. In any case, even if Karmal is not replaced. Pakistan appears ready to proceed with the settlement on the basis of any formula which does not involve its recognition of Karmal.

Soviet diplomats state that Afghan Communist leaders are prepared to make significant changes in the Kabul regime in order to obtain Pakistani recognition. However, just as Moscow has balked at negotiating a compromise on the time-frame until it is convinced that Islamabad is serious, so Soviet sources stress that such changes in Kabul would come only when and if a final agreement is all but consummated. Given diplomatic recognition by Islamabad and termination of "foreign interference," these sources maintain, a Soviet client regime under new leadership could survive in Kabul even in the absence of Soviet forces. This is highly debatable, but it should be remembered that the UN agreement would not preclude either continued Soviet military and economic aid to the Kabul regime or Soviet military advisers. Moreover, Moscow classifies the Afghan revolution as "national democratic" rather than Communist, which means that the ruling People's Democratic Party in Kabul could conceivably be downgraded or phased out in accordance with Soviet success in finding non-Communist allies.

Following the April round of negotiations in Geneva, Pakistani, Soviet, Afghan, and UN sources talked hopefully of a one-year compromise on the time-frame issue leading to the possible implementation of the agreement in early 1984. The atmosphere changed abruptly, however, after Pakistani Foreign Minister Yakub Khan's meetings with Secretary of State Shultz on 25 May and with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 9 June. Shultz, in the presence of four other US officials, told Yakub and his advisers that the United States considered the UN agreement unworkable in the absence of some provision for the replacement of the present Kabul regime with a more representative government. The United States also objected to the fact that the auxiliary endorsement document, while providing for Soviet and US "support" of the Afghan-Pakistani

agreement in its entirety, would not directly and explicitly commit the Soviet Union to the clause governing force withdrawals in the agreement.

In Moscow, Yakub and Gromyko made no progress in resolving the impasse over the interconnected time-frame and noninterference clauses. Moreover, each side charged that the other had hardened its position on these clauses since the end of the April round and had resiled from previous understandings. Moscow said that Yakub had been constrained by Washington, while Pakistani officials suggested that an ailing Andropov, confronted by army opposition, had put conclusion of the Afghan settlement temporarily on "hold."

The June round of negotiations in Geneva, following Yakub's Moscow visit, failed to produce a breakthrough. However, it did result in adoption of the draft texts of both the Afghan-Pakistani comprehensive settlement and the auxiliary endorsement document. The negotiators agreed that the UN should present these texts to the US and Soviet governments in order to initiate "preliminary consultations" on the settlement with Washington and Moscow. Accordingly, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar formally transmitted the tests in mid-July.

As the *Economist* of London and the *New York Times* have urged in recent editorials,[2] the United States should make an active effort to bring the UN effort to a successful conclusion on the basis of the draft texts so far negotiated, subject to agreement on the time-frame. Regrettably, as matters stand, the United States appears to share some of the responsibility for the present slowdown in the negotiations. In principle, the United States affirms its support for the objective of an Afghan peace settlement. By all indications, however, the Reagan administration is not prepared to accept the type of settlement now being negotiated under UN auspices.

The underlying assumption of the UN scenario is that a face-saving agreement in Afghanistan cannot directly address the replacement or modification of the Kabul regime as a precondition for Soviet disengagement but must leave this to parallel processes of political accommodation before, during, and after the disengagement period. Similarly, the type of settlement being pursued by the UN would permit Moscow to maintain the pretense that its forces

intervened at the request of Afghanistan, and that it is for Kabul alone to give any international undertakings concerning the withdrawal of these forces. The initial US response to the draft text of the endorsement document would appear to reflect a US desire to strip away such pretence. This response is eminently understandable, given the ugly brutality of Soviet imperialism in Afghanistan. But Moscow is not likely to conclude a settlement that would call the rationale of its intervention into question and would appear to signify a retreat under duress.

The central objective of the United States should be to put the onus clearly on Moscow and Kabul for any breakdown in the UN negotiations. This can be accomplished by working to reach agreement with the UN on the endorsement document as soon as possible and by making clear, thereafter, that the United States is prepared to endorse the draft agreement as the basis for an Afghan settlement when and if Moscow agrees to a time-frame acceptable to Islamabad.

In the event that final agreement is reached on the ' comprehensive settlement," further negotiations would then ensue concerning the nature of the supplementary or companion agreements necessary to flesh out and give legal support to the settlement (e.g. a Soviet-Afghan treaty spelling out the details of Soviet force withdrawals, and a Pakistani-Afghan treaty incorporating the mutual noninterference pledges in the settlement). Such bilateral agreements would be necessary because the UN, as such, does not enter into treaties and the "comprehensive settlement" would not bind the parties concerned under international law, even though an agreement concluded under the aegis of the UN Secretary General and bearing his imprimatur would have enduring political importance.

It is evident from the above that an early Soviet withdrawal is not in prospect. Nevertheless, the United States should seriously pursue the search for a realistic settlement through the United Nations, recognizing that American interests lie in winding down the conflict. At the same time, Washington should continue its support for the *mujahidin* during the search for a settlement. As I have argued elsewhere, this support should go primarily to tribally based elements of the resistance, as distinct from Islamic fundamentalist elements, which depend upon a continuation of the Afghan conflict

for much of their political standing in Afghanistan as well as for their external financial support.[3]

As suggested earlier, the type of settlement envisaged in the UN negotiations is attractive to Moscow because it implicitly assumes the existence of a Finland-style security relationship between Moscow and a client region regime in Kabul following the projected withdrawal of Soviet combat forces.

Strictly speaking, the experience of Finland is not comparable to the tragedy in Afghanistan, since the Finns had a degree of political and military unity that the Afghans lack. But the parallel does suggest the type of security relationship with Afghanistan that the Russians are likely to expect as part of a settlement. Moscow withdrew its forces from Finland only after Helsinki agreed to a treaty proviso that in effect permitted the return of Soviet troops "in the event of Finland, or the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland, becoming the object of military aggression." To be sure, Article I of the 1948 Finnish-Soviet treaty did not give Moscow the unqualified de jure right to reoccupy Finland, but it provided for Soviet assistance to Finland "in case of necessity . . . on the granting of which the parties will reach agreement one with the other." Similarly, Article Four of the 1978 treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the Kabul Communist regime provides that "the High Contracting Parties shall consult with each other and shall, by agreement, take the necessary steps to safeguard the security, independence and territorial integrity of the two countries."

An agreement on continuation of the 1978 treaty is likely to be a sine qua non for Soviet acceptance of a political settlement in Afghanistan. While the UN draft agreement does not address this issue directly, it would leave in place a regime committed to continuation of the treaty. Soviet diplomats state that Moscow would like to broaden the base of the Kabul regime through an accommodation with tribal and monarchist elements, such as those identified with former King Zahir Shah, but they make clear that any new leadership in Kabul acceptable to the Soviet Union would have to accept the 1978 treaty or a reasonable facsimile.

As for the continuation of Soviet bases, Soviet sources are deliberately vague, often pointing to the fact that the Soviet Union retained its Porkkala naval base in Finland for seven years following

the withdrawal of its forces. The UN draft agreement provides for the complete withdrawal of Soviet combat forces but it omits any reference to Soviet advisers. Presumably, so long as Moscow continued to have a client regime in Afghanistan, Soviet military advisers could remain there, maintaining airfields, military communications, and other military facilities in military readiness. Moscow would thus be in a position to reintroduce its forces on short notice. Nevertheless, in the event of a future military crisis involving the movement of Soviet forces through Afghanistan, the United States would have much more warning time than it does now. A Soviet combat force withdrawal would clearly serve American security interests in South Asia by relieving the immediate military pressure resulting from ongoing Soviet force deployments and from the ongoing operational use of Soviet bases manned by Soviet combat forces.

With respect to Soviet advisers, it should be kept in mind that Moscow had some 6,000 military advisers in Afghanistan during the non-Communist Mohammed Daud regime. The fact that the UN draft agreement would not preclude the presence of advisers should not in itself be a barrier to US support of the agreement. What the United States should emphasize is the distinction between strategic bases and tactical bases. With this in mind, American negotiators should press for restrictions on the activities of Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan, together with UN-inspected limitations on any expansion or upgrading of military facilities there that could pose an offensive threat to neighboring states.

II. IMPROVING AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH INDIA

In Indian eyes, Islamabad wants to use the Afghan crisis as a means of bolstering its power position vis-a-vis New Delhi, just as it used the Cold War for the same purpose when it entered into its earlier, ill-fated alliance with Washington in the 1950s. Moreover, India sees the specter of a new American-Pakistani alignment as part of a larger challenge embracing China.

It should be remembered that Indian attitudes concerning the existence of Pakistan continue to be ambivalent. On the one hand, many Indian leaders stress privately that a viable Pakistan is desirable as a buffer against Soviet influence and that a Balkanization of

Pakistan could turn South Asia into a battleground of contending foreign interests. Pointing to Hindu-Moslem tensions in India, these leaders say that the absorption of additional Muslims would impose a grave strain on the Indian political structure. On the other hand, the partition of 1947 left deep wounds in the Hindu psyche. For most of India's Hindu majority, it was deeply exasperating that a Muslim state should be created in part of the motherland depicted in the ancient Hindu scriptures. Partition was accepted as an unavoidable expedient, but it was assumed that the new Muslim state would be short-lived and that India could "win back the seceding children to its lap." At worst, it was felt that Pakistan would eventually settle down as a deferential junior partner within an Indian sphere of influence.

The roots of this attitude lie in a long and bitter history. Beginning some seven centuries ago, Moslem armies began to invade India from central Asia, conquering the disorganized Hindus and establishing a series of strong dynasties of which the Moghul Empire is the best remembered. The Indo-Pakistan relationship today can be understood only in the context of powerful historical memories of lost glory on the part of the Moslems and equally powerful memories of past oppression and domination on the part of the Hindus.

What has been happening for the past century in the subcontinent has been basically a struggle over the terms of the power relationship between the Hindu majority and the Moslem minority. This historical process of adjustment has not yet played itself out. It did not end with the partition of 1947 or the 1971 Bangladesh war and the breakup of Pakistan.

Americans should be disinterested observers as this struggle unfolds. The United States cannot determine the terms of the power relationship between India and Pakistan and should seek to avoid getting caught in the middle once again as it did in 1965 and 1971.

To some extent it was possible for Indians to forgive and forget after the 1954 American military aid agreement with Pakistan. The United States was, after all, a newcomer on the Asian scene and had shown goodwill toward India through its economic help. President Eisenhower had given a formal undertaking to Prime Minister Nehru that American weapons were intended solely for use against

Communist aggressors, pledging that the United States would not permit their use against India. When Pakistan did turn its F-104's and Patton tanks against India, in 1965, the United States made good on its assurances, albeit tardily, by cutting off petroleum and spare parts to Islamabad and clamping an embargo on arms sales to South Asia.

This time, administration officials do not seek to justify American arms aid to Islamabad wholly in terms of the threat posed by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. On the contrary, they acknowledge that Pakistan wants American help primarily to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India, and they have pointedly declined to give either public or private promises to New Delhi that the United States would not permit its weaponry to be used in an India-Pakistan conflict.

In the US debate over the F-16 issue, many observers have asked why India should be afraid of its smaller neighbor, given New Dehli's inherently superior military potential and its growing defense production base. But fear of Pakistan does not explain the Indian reaction to the F-16s. Rather, India is outraged over what it regards as US interference in the evolution of a natural balance of power in South Asia. Indian generals are confident of their ability to subdue Pakistan in any protracted conflict and do not believe that Islamabad would launch an all-out frontal attack. Their concern is that Pakistan, armed with a highly sophisticated attack aircraft such as the F-16, might engage in more limited military provocations, forcing New Delhi to pay an unacceptably high price in order to win a military victory.

Pakistan, for its part, has its own ever-present fears of Indian intentions. These anxieties result not only from its military vulnerability as the smaller of the two countries, with one-eighth India's population, but also from the fact that it is a fragile multiethnic state torn by growing internal tensions.

India and Pakistan are inescapably enmeshed in a complicated love-hate relationship. They share many common elements of an overlapping cultural heritage and a nascent sense of South Asian regional identity that could conceivably draw them closer together in future decades. Viewed in historical perspective, however, the process of adjustment between Hindus and Moslems that began with Partition is still in its early stages. New Delhi and Islamabad

remain trapped in a vicious circle of enmity and distrust that is likely to continue for some time to come before there is an accommodation—or another explosion. For the United States, it would be the ultimate folly to get further caught up in this struggle, especially at a time when both countries are actively working to develop militarily applicable nuclear capabilities.

Instead of exacerbating Indo-Pakistani tensions and fostering a South Asian arms race, the United States should have encouraged the impulses for a concerted response to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan that were beginning to stir in New Delhi and Islamabad during the latter part of 1980. It should be remembered that encouraging signs of a mutual desire for improved relations were beginning to surface in New Delhi and Islamabad even after the United States and Pakistan began to discuss expanded military assistance. Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao made a significant visit to Pakistan as late as June 1981, in which he suggested that India and Pakistan should adopt a common posture toward the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan as part of a broader effort to forge more compatible foreign policies. Indian has "an abiding interest, even a vested interest in the stability of Pakistan," he declared, adding that given "the geopolitical situation in which both of our countries find themselves . . . we should develop an individual and, if necessary, a joint capacity to resist a negative impact on us by external trends and external elements."

Indian Foreign Secretary Ram Sathe also visited Islamabad during the spring of 1981 and was scheduled to make another visit until it became clear that the United States would be providing Pakistan with F-16s as part of its military aid package. India was reconciled in early 1981 to the prospect of US military assistance to Pakistan addressed to the military problems posed for Pakistan by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. For example, though New Delhi would no doubt have made pro forma protests, Indian public opinion would have been able to digest American sales to Pakistan of F-20 (F-5G) interceptors, light tanks, antiaircraft helicopters, and 105-mm and 120-mm howitzers, which would have a specific relevance to the mountainous Afghan frontier, as distinct from equipment intended primarily to improve Pakistan's balance of power with India, such as F-16s, M-48 tanks, 155-mm howitzers, TOW missiles, tank recovery vehicles and Huey Cobra assault helicopters designed for use against tanks. It was not the fact of a post-

Afghanistan US military aid package for Pakistan, as such, but rather the character of the package that produced such a sharp impact in India, providing ammunition for the hawks in New Delhi and setting in motion a chain reaction of suspicion and recrimination that has not yet fully abated.

While India and Pakistan are cautiously probing once again to find the bases for a relaxation of tensions, progress in the Indo-Pakistan dialogue has so far been extremely limited. Neither India nor Pakistan has shown a readiness for significant compromise on the key issues relating to a projected friendship treaty or "no war" pact, or to the creation of a military subcommission that could consider proposals for disengagement in sensitive frontier areas where the armed forces of the two countries now confront each other. The relationship between India and Pakistan is still a volatile one, peculiarly sensitive to the slightest shifts in the American posture toward the subcontinent.

When the F-16 decision was announced in 1981, a long-simmering debate in India over whether and when to allocate scarce foreign exchange reserves to a new generation of fighter aircraft was soon resolved in favor of spending some $650 million on 40 Mirage 2000s. Similarly, the hawks in New Delhi were given a new lease on life when, in December, 1982, just one month after President Zia Ul-Haq's visit to New Delhi, Zia induced President Reagan to upgrade the offensive capability of the F-16s by providing the ALR-69 radar system. Once again, demands have flared up for new Indian military procurement in the Soviet Union and elsewhere that would "put Pakistan in its place," and prospects for constructive evolution of the dialogue with Islamabad have since become more tenuous than ever.

There is a mistaken tendency in the United States to assume that the Indira Ghandi visit in August 1982 not only removed the specific issue of US military aid to Pakistan as a signficant factor in Indo-American relations, but also set the stage for a broader process of improvement in relations between New Delhi and Washington. In reality, the Indian government viewed the Gandhi visit as an exercise in damage limitation designed precisely to influence the implementation of US military and economic assistance policies that are viewed as increasingly insensitive to Indian interests. As a newly industrializing country likely to confront continuing balance of

payments problems resulting from its ambitious development efforts, India was particularly concerned by the initial opposition of the Reagan administration to major International Monetary Fund credits for India and by other evidence of the erosion of American support for multilateral aid efforts beneficial to India. New Delhi consciously muted its opposition to the F-16s as part of its effort to establish a more positive image in the United States and to moderate what it regards as a hostile attitude on the part of the Reagan administration.

More than a year after the Gandhi visit, there was a feeling of disappointment in India concerning its results and an increased sense of psychological distance from the United States. Far from drawing the two countries together, the Gandhi visit and its aftermath have reinforced the conviction in New Delhi that the United States places an overriding priority on what it perceives to be its interests in the Persian Gulf,[4] largely to the exclusion of its interests in South Asia, and that there are sharp limits on the possibilities for an improved relationship with Washington. New Delhi had hoped that the Gandhi visit would induce the United States to limit its future military support for Pakistan. Indian leaders recognize that the United States cannot renege on the explicit commitments already made to Islamabad. But New Delhi has been watching for signs of restraint in the implementation of the 1981 commitments as a pointer to whether the United States is likely to multiply its aid to Islamabad in the future. For this reason, India was stung by the ALR-69 decision and by the recent announcement of a $40 million sale of Harpoon missiles to the Pakistan Navy.

By the same token, New Delhi's hopes for a more benign US attitude toward Indian balance of payments needs have been dampened by US policies since the Gandhi visit concerning International Development Association credits for India, World Bank loans for Indian petroleum development, and Indian access to loans from the Asian Development Bank, policies which are seen as intended to induce India to borrow from private capital sources at much higher rates. This is not the appropriate place to deal directly with the Administration's foreign economic policies, but it should be recognized that the impact of US policies regarded as hostile in the economic sphere is intensified when these policies go together with military aid policies that strike at the raw nerves of Indian sensitivities with respect to Pakistan.

American policy toward South Asia should be based on a recognition that American and Pakistani interests are overlapping but not identical. While the two countries share a mutuality of interest with respect to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, their interests diverge with respect to India. This means that future US military assistance to Pakistan should be highly selective. As already noted, it should be designed to make a major contribution to Pakistan's Afghan-focused defenses while avoiding items that would serve primarily to bolster Islamabad's military capability vis-a-vis New Delhi. Thus, the United States could provide large-scale concessional credits and grants for the construction of a sophisticated radar defense system covering the long Pakistani-Afghan frontier, as well as for a variety of infrastructural and other economic needs related directly or indirectly to the defense of border areas of the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan (e.g. roads and airfields). Some infrastructural aid has already been planned but has been obstructed or delayed by competing outlays for F-16s and other costly hardware items. The United States could also sell Pakistan certain items of weaponry, such as helicopters, mountain artillery, light tanks and 105-mm or 120-mm howitzers. But it would not continue the sale of F-16s or other attack aircraft. American interests would be best served by encouraging Pakistan to deal with its India-related military needs, aircraft included, through commercial purchases from France, Sweden, Britain, and other Western suppliers.

To the extent that it relates specifically to the defense of the Afghan frontier, the continuation of limited US military assistance to Pakistan is likely to be necessary for an indefinite period. Even if the UN effort to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet combat forces should prove successful, Pakistan would continue to need a more effective defense posture along its long Afghan frontier. As noted earlier, the type of settlement likely to emerge from the UN dialogue could serve to relieve the direct military pressure in Pakistan and Iran posed by an ongoing Soviet force presence, but it would leave some form of Soviet client regime in place, and it would not foreclose Soviet military aid to the Afghan armed forces. Moreover, Moscow would be likely to insist on retaining some degree of military hegemony over Afghanistan through the continued presence of military advisers and some form of transitional base rights patterned after the Porkkala precedent in Finland.

Administration officials often explain their tilt toward Pakistan by arguing that India, with its extensive military reliance on Moscow, has already become a virtual Soviet ally and that the United States has nothing more to lose. But this is a dangerous oversimplification. India turned to the Soviets for arms in the 1960s only after the United States had started its military aid to Pakistan and only after New Delhi had made an unsuccessful bid for large-scale US military aid. Moreover, New Delhi has consistently attempted to offset its dependence on Moscow. As one example, key components of the Indian-style MiG-21 aircraft made in India under a Soviet license are imported from the West. In recent years, New Delhi has been gradually increasing military procurement in Western Europe. More important, India has rebuffed Soviet efforts to obtain special military facilities in Indian ports.

India's nonaligned foreign policy is, by its nature, flexible in the pursuit of national self-interest. It is not designed to achieve equidistance between the superpowers, but rather to make use of the superpowers in order to promote Indian interests, even if this means leaning in one direction or the other. For more than three decades, the Soviet Union has identified itself with Indian regional aspirations, while the United States has generally sided with Pakistan and China. India has adapted to this situation by frequently tilting toward the Soviet Union. Conversely, if the United States were to give greater recognition to Indian regional primacy, New Delhi would gradually modify its posture during the decades ahead, though it would take time for Washington to undo the mistakes of past decades.

So far, New Delhi has carefully stopped short of de facto military collaboration with Moscow, but it would be unwise to assume that such restraint will continue to govern Indian policy regardless of the nature of US policies toward Pakistan. As observed earlier, many politically conscious Indians were willing to forgive, though hardly to forget, American military aid to Pakistan in the 1950s as the product of US inexperience on the world stage. However, coming as it does after the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars, in which Pakistan used its US weaponry against India, the Reagan administration's resumption of military aid to Islamabad is viewed more darkly. At best, such aid is regarded as evidence of a growing divergence of geopolitical and strategic interests between Washing-

ton and New Delhi; at worst, it is seen as revealing deliberate malevolence.

An atmosphere of xenophobic resentment is now building up among many key military and political figures who could have a major voice in shaping New Delhi's regional military role in the decades ahead. Given continuing provocations in the form of multiplying American weapons aid to Islamabad, this atmosphere could lead over time to a variety of punitive, anti-American moves in the Indian Ocean designed to limit the American military presence or to constrain and harass American forces in their use of existing facilities, including Diego Garcia. As a starter, Indian diplomatic and political support for Mauritius in its claim to Diego Garcia has hitherto been pro forma, but New Delhi could easily convert this issue into a growing embarrassment for the United States.

Even if the United States were to taper off its military sales to Islamabad, New Delhi would no doubt continue to make significant military purchases from the Soviet Union. But this would not, in itself, be adverse to American interests in the context of a detached American posture toward the subcontinent in which a compatible Indo-American relationship would be developing side by side with continuing Indo-Soviet links. What makes the growing Indo-Soviet military relationship worrisome is not the resulting degree of Indian dependence on Moscow. As already observed, India has retained its freedom of action, offsetting its Soviet dependence with increasing arms purchases from Western countries. Close Indo-Soviet ties would become menacing to the United States only if Washington continues to array itself against Indian regional ambitions, prompting an Indian desire to retaliate in its own perceived interests.

Western images of Indian life have been dominated for so long by snake charmers, naked fakirs, and starving peasants that it is difficult for many Americans to grasp the extent of progress achieved by India since independence. Despite continuing poverty in the countryside and sporadic domestic political upheavals, India has built the ninth largest industrial economy in the world. It makes most of its own consumer goods as well as its own industrial machinery. It exports a wide range of industrial items from machine tools to power generating equipment and builds steel mills, oil refineries, and fertilizer plants in other Third World countries. In addition to its demonstrated nuclear capability, India has become the

sixth country to launch a space satellite with its own launch vehicle. With its growing military-industrial complex and the world's third largest pool of scientists and engineers, India is certain to play an increasingly significant regional military role, and an American policy that ignores this emerging reality would be dangerously short-sighted and self-defeating.

III. THE DANGER OF BALKANIZATION IN PAKISTAN

In the case of India, as I have elaborated elsewhere, the built-in interaction between centrifugal and centripetal forces is significant because it affects the pace of economic development and molds the shape of Indian political institutions.[5] But this interaction does not foreshadow the political disintegration of the Indian Union. By contrast, in the case of Pakistan, ethnic tensions pose a fundamental challenge to the existence of the Pakistani state, especially in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan.[6] Given the strategic location of Baluchistan and Sind along the Arabian Sea, the danger of the Balkanization of Pakistan should be treated seriously in American policy projections. The United States should recognize that its overidentification with Punjabi-dominated regimes, including the Zia regime, enhances this danger and increases the possibility that the Soviet Union will be tempted to seek access to Arabian Sea ports and other coastal military facilities.

Pakistan's ethnic arithmetic is difficult to establish in precise terms because the official census has not contained ethnic or linguistic data since 1961, and even these data were subject to controversy. However, by correlating the 1961 data with the 1981 census and with independent findings, it is possible to develop rough estimates which suggest that the Punjabis constitute 56.2 percent of the population, as against 14.9 percent for the *muhajirs* (immigrants), 12.5 percent for the Sindhis, 11.5 percent for the Pushtuns, and 4.8 percent for the Baluch.[7] Significantly, while the Baluch, Sindhis, and Pushtuns comprise less than 30 percent of the population, they identify themselves historically with ethnic homelands that make up 72 percent of Pakistan's territory. To the ideologians of Pakistani nationalism, it is infuriating that the minorities should assert proprietary claims over such large areas of the country despite their numerical inferiority, and Islamabad consciously seeks to obliterate regional and ethnic identities in order to pursue modernization pro-

grams addressed to what is viewed as the greatest good for the greatest number of Pakistanis. But to most members of the minorities, the disparity between their population and their territorial claims is irrelevant, since "Pakistan," i.e., the Punjabis and *muhajirs*, is perceived as having occupied and annexed their territories forcibly as an imperial power.

It is no accident that the smallest of the minorities, the Baluch, are the most alienated from Islamabad and the most responsive to secessionist appeals. Given their numerical disadvantage, the Baluch see no hope for achieving significant power in Pakistani politics even under a democratic dispensation. Only the Baluch have waged sustained armed insurgencies against successive Pakistani central governments, and only the Baluch have thrown up a broadly accepted leadership that is openly committed to achieving independence from Pakistan. As recent events in Sind have shown, however, the Sindhis are also bitterly resistant to Punjabi-*muhajir* domination. A united separatist movement is assuming serious proportions in Sind for the first time. As for the Pushtuns in the Northwest Frontier Province and their new allies among the Pushtun refugees from Afghanistan, separatism lurks beneath the surface in the latent demand for an independent Pushtunistan, but this has been sublimated by the uncertainties of the Afghan conflict.

Having analyzed the Baluch case in detail in a recent book,[8] I will focus here on the little-discussed background of Sindhi separatism, pointing up the potential interplay between Baluch and Sindhi politics. I will then conclude with an examination of the possibility of defusing separatist appeals in Pakistan through a return to electoral politics.

Demographic factors have closely linked the destiny of the Baluch in Pakistan with that of the neighboring Sindhis. Out of a total population of 19 million in Sind in the 1981 census, only 8.5 million are "original" Sindhis,[9] with the remainder divided between some six million *muhajirs* and Punjabis, 4 million Baluch and 500,000 Pushtuns. The Baluch subdivide, in turn, into 1.8 million relatively recent Baluchi-speaking migrants, centered in Karachi, and 2.2 million earlier migrants who have come over the centuries. Some of the earlier migrants, such as the Talpurs, established Baluch dynasties that ruled Sind. Most of these earlier migrants have melted into Sindhi life and can speak Sindhi. While they speak Baluchi at home

and function as a tightly knit ethnic bloc in local politics, this Baluch bloc has generally been allied with the "original" Sindhis in ongoing intraprovincial struggles with the *muhajirs*. The earlier Baluch migrants are generally sympathetic to the Baluch nationalist movement, but are less actively involved in it than the more recent migrants in the industrial slums of Karachi.

The presence of such a large Baluch population in Sind has led to intermittent collaboration between Sindhi and Baluch nationalist leaders. Mir Ali Ahmed Talpur, who later served as Defense Minister in the Zia Ul-Haq regime, told me in an August 1978 interview that "if worse should ever come to worst and Pakistan should disintegrate, the Baluch and the Sindhis would be together. They like each other and might well create a federated state of Sind and Baluchistan. But of course, we want Pakistan to survive." Two of Talpur's sons fought with Baluch guerrilla groups during the 1973–1977 insurgency. In Baluch eyes, many Sindhis proved to be fair-weather friends during the insurgency. Nevertheless, the idea of a Sindhi-Baluch federation has a strong latent appeal for Baluch and Sindhis alike, especially on economic grounds. With an already existing industrial base and a thriving, established port in Karachi, such a state would be much more viable economically than a separate Baluchistan. Similarly, with the natural resources of Baluchistan, it would be more viable than the independent Sind advocated by Sindhi nationalists.

Advocates of a Sindhi-Baluch federation base their case primarily on the overlap of Sindhi and Baluch populations in the border districts and the resulting interdependence of the two groups. Moreover, pointing to the heavy admixture of Baluch throughout Sind and Sindhi reliance on the local Baluch to counter *muhajir* power, proponents of a federation argue that the concept of a separate Sindhi political identity is extremely artificial. In this view, it would be even more difficult in practical terms to establish a Sindhi-majority province within Pakistan, or an independent Sindhi-majority state, than it would be to create a separate Baluch-majority state in the complex, multiethnic environment of Baluchistan, with its continuing influx of Pushtun and Punjabi settlers. The federation idea is presented as a way for Sindhis and Baluch alike to neutralize the power of their ethnic adversaries in some form of common legislature. The idea has significant support among both the Baluch in Sind and the "original" Sindhis, but there is also a strong parallel

movement led by Sindhi nationalists who emphasize the separateness of Sindhi historic and cultural identity and the need for some form of political recognition of this distinctive identity.

Sindhi nationalist writings contend that there has been a continuous Sindhi identity in the Indus valley for more than 5,000 years, dating back to the Mohenjodaro and Harappa civilizations. Sindhis have continually fought to preserve this identity, it is said, resisting the incursions of stronger Greek, Arab, Moghul, and British invaders who annexed Sind to their empires. Nationalist writings stress that Sind has been ruled, for the most part, by independent local Muslim dynasties except for the period of Arab rule from the 8th through the 10th Christian centuries, a brief interlude under Mahmud of Ghazni in the 11th century and Moghul rule during the 17th and early 18th centuries. The Sindhi golden ages highlighted in nationalist works were the 11th century Soomro dynasty and the period of Kalhora rule that lasted for more than a century between the ouster of the Moghuls in 1738 and the British conquest of Sind in 1843. Sindhi nationalists have their own folk heroes, notably Doda Soomro and Shah Bilawal; their own national epic, *Marro Mangar Mach*, and a national "poet-saint," Shah Abdul Latif (1690–1750), who chronicled Sindhi history in *Shahajo Risalo* (Book of Kings). Latif's work marked the beginning of the development of a Sindhi literature, though a Sindhi folklore had existed for many centuries. Nationalists emphasize that the Sindhi language has retained its own special character despite the efforts of the Arabs and the Moghuls to supplant it with Arabic and Persian. Much of the energy of the nationalist movement has been devoted to the defense of Sindhi as the medium of local education and government in the face of pressures for the introduction of Urdu, and to parallel efforts for the development of a pristine Sindhi free from Arabic and Persian influences.

The modern Sindhi nationalist movement began during the latter years of British rule with a successful campaign for the separation of Sind from the Bombay Presidency. Initially, Hindus participated in the Sindhi movement, which is based on a regional linguistic and cultural heritage in which Hindus have shared. Sind is a stronghold of Sufism, the mystical brand of Islam that has long attracted Hindu as well as Muslim followers. The creation of a separate Sind in 1936, with Karachi as its capital, gave the Sindhi Moslems a majority in their province, but the Sindhi Hindus continued

to control most of the business and professional life of Sind. Thus, in 1949, Sindhi Moslem leaders decided to support the Moslem League demand for Pakistan, hoping to extend their power by driving out the Sindhi Hindus.

As G. M. Sayed and some of the other Moslem leaders involved were to recall later, they failed to foresee that the majority of Moslem *muhajirs* (immigrants) from Hindu-majority areas of India would settle in Sind following Partition, and that the *muhajirs* would combine politically with a newly dominant Punjabi bureaucratic and military elite to impose their control on Sind at the expense of long-established local Sindhi and Baluch elites.

Soon after Partition, the new Pakistan government, under the leadership of the Moslem League leader, "Quaid-i-Azam" (Founder of the Nation) Mohammed Ali Jinnah, aroused widespread Sindhi resentment by detaching the city of Karachi and its environs from Sind and making it a federal district. In the eyes of Sindhi Moslems who had supported the Pakistan movement, this "dismembe ent" of the province symbolized the advent of Punjabi-*muhaji* ominance at the expense of the minorities. A Sindhi journalist charged that it had led to the abolition of the Sindhi language in city governmental affairs, the wholesale replacement of Sindhis in city jobs with Urdu-speaking employees, the shutdown of the Sindhi Department in Karachi University and a ban on the use of Sindhi in the university as an examination medium.[10] Some of these measures were later reversed but the memory lingered on. A *muhajir* journalist, seeking to explain "the defeatism and despair which have prevailed among a large section of the Sindhis over the last 25 years or so," concluded in a 1978 *Dawn* article that "the beginnings of this feeling can be traced to Pakistan's early days when Karachi was separated from Sind." This malaise became "more and more pronounced," he added, when Sind and other provinces were subsumed under "One Unit" embracing all of West Pakistan, and it was during this "One Unit" period that "a large group of the intellectuals and scholars of Sind came under the influence of G. M. Sayed," who advocated a sovereign and independent "*Sindhu Desh*" (Sindhi Homeland).[11]

To some extent, the termination of "One Unit" by Yahya Khan in 1970 and the re-establishment of the provinces tempered Sindhi discontent, especially when a Sindhi, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, took over

the leadership of what was left of Pakistan following the secession of Bangladesh. Bhutto's alliance with some elements of the Punjabi-*muhajir* establishment alienated the more militant Sindhi nationalists, but he skillfully played on the divisions in nationalist ranks, winning over some of Sayed's lieutenants to his governing Pakistan People's Party with various forms of patronage. In 1972, Bhutto pushed through legislation in the provincial Assembly making Sindhi the official language of Sind, which provoked violent *muhajir*-led riots. Ironically, in view of the Punjabi-*muhajir* support that had brought him to power, Bhutto's ouster at the hands of the military and his execution in 1979 made him a martyr to the Sindhi cause.

The post-Bhutto atmosphere in Sind has been marked by continuing tension, and the Zia Ul-Haq regime has kept a tight grip on the province, installing a more comprehensive network of local administration there than in any other province. Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, has been under almost continuous house arrest since his death. An index of the supercharged political climate in Sind during late 1982 was the fact that 36 Sindhi periodicals were banned. It was thus no surprise to objective observers that antigovernment upheavals erupted in Sind when Zia threw down the gauntlet in August 1983, serving notice that political parties would not be permitted to contest the "elections" projected for 1985, and that all candidates would have to be certified by an "Islamic Ideology Council" to be appointed by the incumbent military regime. Nevertheless, the 1983 Sindhi response to Zia's declaration demonstrated an unprecedented unity spanning leftist Sindhi nationalist groups and conservative elements who have long dominated the feudal environment of rural Sind, including powerful Moslem *pirs*, many of whom have hitherto been allied with Islamabad in order to preserve their economic position.

Sampling underground Sindhi literature, one finds vacillation between demands for a sovereign "Sindhu Desh" and a restructuring of Pakistan as a loose confederation in which a Sindhi-majority province, or a Sindhi-Baluch grouping, would enjoy the type of autonomy envisaged in Mujibur Rahman's 1970 "Six Point" manifesto. Moderates in nationalist ranks argue that confederal autonomy would enable Sindhis to achieve many of their demands, notably greater access to civil service and educational opportunities, and that independence could only be attained at the cost of enormous bloodshed. Advocates of independence respond that Sindhis can

only win economic control of their province from the *muhajirs*, develop the economic potential of Sind fully, and end the exploitation of Sind by struggling for full sovereignty with help from India, the Soviet Union, or both.

American interests in Pakistan would be best served by a compromise between moderate leaders of the minorities who favor the continuance of Pakistan, restructured along confederal lines, and moderates in the Punjabi-*muhajir* elites who recognize increasingly that Pakistan faces a serious threat of Balkanization.

What are some of the critical preconditions for a moderation of ethnic tensions in Pakistan and for movement toward a more stable constitutional order?

Even moderates among the leaders of the ethnic minorities emphasize that a return to participatory politics under the 1973 Constitution would not, in itself, bring political stability, unless the constitution were amended to incorporate safeguards barring the central government from forcibly ousting an elected provincial government unilaterally, as Bhutto did in 1973.

Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, a Baluch moderate, made a significant compromise proposal in 1980 that attempted to define the minimum safeguards sought by the minorities. In a memorandum to the Zia government, he called for reinforcement of the articles providing for equal representation of the four provinces in the Senate, and a concomitant strengthening of the Senate's powers, as the key to a workable federalism in Pakistan. By offsetting the control wielded by the more populous provinces in the lower chamber of the National Assembly, the memorandum said, such a reform would make central intervention acceptable under certain circumstances. It suggested that Islamabad could then be empowered to take over a province if "expressly authorized to do so for a specified and limited purpose, and for a specified and limited period of time" by a two-thirds Senate majority.

In my view, safeguards against arbitrary central government intervention are more critical to the minorities than the much-discussed issue of the division of powers between Islamabad and the provinces. The minorities are concerned not only with the substance of autonomy but also with the feeling of autonomy. This psychologi-

cal factor explains why they attach so much importance to the safeguards issue. It also underlies their emphasis on the need for a linguistic redemarcation of provincial boundaries that would give each of them majority control over a specific territory, together with explicit constitutional recognition of their distinctive ethnic identities.

As for the form that recognition of separate ethnic identities should take, there is considerable disagreement among the minorities themselves, but these differences do not appear to be irreconcilable. At present, most Baluch leaders demand recognition of four distinct "nationalities" in Pakistan, a concept which is anathema to many Pakistanis who believe in a monolithic Pakistani nationality. Some Baluch leaders, notably Bizenjo, link the "four nationalities" concept with a companion demand that the constitution include the right of secession. Thus, Bizenjo proposed a joint declaration with the *Tehriq Istiqlal* (Movement for Integrity) in 1980 calling for the right of secession in the event that the central government violated rights guaranteed to the provinces in the constitution. Conceivably, Baluch leaders would not insist on the right of secession if enough of their other major demands were met by Islamabad. However, that remains to be seen, since Bizenjo and others contend that a meaningful sense of autonomy requires acknowledgment of the residual right to secede. These Baluch leaders seek to legitimize the secession demand by citing language of the 1940 Lahore Resolution in which the Muslim League had foreshadowed its demand for Pakistan. Envisaging two Muslim states in the subcontinent following the departure of the British, the resolution called for a regrouping of "geographically contiguous . . . areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the northwestern and eastern zones of India . . . to constitute independent states *in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign*" (italics added).

Ataullah Mengal, a Baluch leader who currently advocates sovereign independence, has in the past called for a confederation based on complete parity for Baluch, Pushtuns, Sindhis, and Punjabis in both chambers of the National Assembly as well as in civil service and military recruitment, irrespective of population disparities. Pointedly withholding support for this position, Bizenjo's Pakistan National Party has specifically limited its demand for parity in the National Assembly to the upper chamber, which suggests that Mengal's approach to the parity issue may prove to be negotiable. At

the same time, all factions among the minorities are united in seeking radically upgraded representation in the civil service and the armed forces, and regard the Punjabi concessions made in this sphere to date as inconsequential.

Turning to an examination of the attitudes of Pakistani leaders, it is important to distinguish between General Zia and like-minded allies, who see little need for compromise, and others in the Pakistani power structure who would like to find a basis for accommodation but regard minority demands as extortionate.

For many Punjabi and *muhajir* moderates, minority demands for greater representation in the civil service, the armed forces, and the National Assembly would not be too difficult to swallow. Some influential Punjabi lawyers, judges, and bureaucrats have confided to me that they would welcome a Baluch, Pushtun, or Sindhi prime minister as a symbol of national unity in the event of a return to civilian rule. Many of these moderates are also cautiously optimistic concerning the possibilities for working out a constitutional settlement that would provide for increased autonomy to the provinces and for safeguards against arbitrary central intervention. With regard to the terms for such a settlement, however, even moderates are greatly disturbed by the extent of minority demands for economic autonomy. It is in the economic sphere that a constitutional compromise is likely to be most elusive, regardless of Pakistan's future political coloration.

Economic issues are likely to be peculiarly intractable because the same moderates who respect Western democratic values—and are thus sympathetic to minority pleas for greater equity—also tend to be the most avid proponents of economic modernization in Pakistan. These relatively Westernized, development-minded Pakistanis want to see rising living standards in Pakistan as a whole. They are just as disturbed by poverty in the Punjab as by poverty in the Baluch, Sindhi, and Pushtun areas, and their liberal instincts are just as offended by the ethnocentric attitudes of some minority leaders on issues relating to development as by the ethnic arrogance of many Punjabis and *muhajirs*. They favor development programs and policies that take fully into account the economic interdependence of the different regions of Pakistan. This approach makes them extremely unsympathetic to minority demands for exclusive control

over the natural resources that happen to lie beneath the soil of their ethnic homelands.

As for Zia himself, he has made unambiguously clear that he is not prepared for constitutional revisions that would give recognition to minority ethnic identities or to minority ethnic demands for provincial autonomy.[12] To the extent that the possibility for a stable constitutional compromise exists in Pakistan, such a compromise would presuppose Zia's replacement by an interim government that would facilitate a gradual and orderly transition to civilian rule.[13] The United States cannot and should not orchestrate such a compromise, but a more detached American posture toward the Zia regime would encourage and embolden the constructive forces in Pakistani society now seeking to assert themselves.

A constitutional compromise in Pakistan would directly promote American security interests by neutralizing the climate of militant separatism in Baluchistan and Sind that now offers such a tempting invitation to Moscow. More important, the emergence of a more representative government in Islamabad would also accelerate Pakistan's present efforts to seek a political settlement in Afghanistan, which would further help to forestall Soviet adoption of a Balkinization strategy.

The United States and South Asia: India

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South Asia will likely be an area of increased instability in the coming decade. Sources of instability include the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the fragile political structure of Pakistan and growing centrifugal forces in India, intraregional distrust and rivalries, painfully slow development, soaring external debt burdens, and an increasing risk of nuclear proliferation.

The influence of the United States on South Asia is quite limited. Recently, the US policy has focused on the short-term security needs of the more vulnerable and more strategically located state (Pakistan) but at the cost of antagonizing the larger power (India). The United States has at its disposal limited political and material resources to have an effective impact on the longer-term development of the region, whose size and problems are vast and intractable.

As long as the United States finds it necessary to give primary attention to the Soviet threat to its interests in the region, Indian and American perceptions are not likely to converge significantly. Nonetheless, a strong and stable India will indirectly serve important American security interests, while a weak or unstable India could endanger them. Twin danger points for US interests are Pakistan's inherent instability and the endemic India-Pakistan rivalry. Even more than in the past, the challenge for US policymakers will be to find ways to support Pakistan against the threat from the north without unwittingly undermining its fragile political balance or driving India into strategic collaboration with the USSR.

TRENDS IN US-INDIA RELATIONS

Given the events of the past few years, including the dramatic reversal of US policy towards Pakistan, Indo-US relations are prob-

ably better than one might reasonably expect. Both countries have repeatedly acted at variance with each other's interests or policy objectives. For its part, the United States unilaterally suspended nuclear exports; rearmed India's historic enemy with modern weapons; imposed trade sanctions; and actively opposed India's effort to obtain concessional financing for its growing trade deficit. India has reacted passively to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while vigorously criticizing the US naval buildup in the Indian Ocean; contracted for large quantities of arms from the Soviet Union; joined Eastern bloc nations in recognizing the Vietnamese-installed government in Kampuchea; and played a leading role in promoting demands by the less developed countries for revising the Western-dominated international economic order.

Both countries have avoided a breakdown in relations by seeking common ground on relatively minor matters of mutual concern or finding ways around seemingly impossible obstacles. They have maintained regular contact at the working level and held relatively frequent high-level political exchanges. These include the Carter-Desai exchange of visits in 1979, three meetings between President Reagan and Prime Minister Gandhi, including Mrs. Gandhi's first state visit to Washington in eleven years, and a number of meetings at the foreign ministers level.

The relative success of two American administrations in managing relations with India has given rise to what is probably excessive optimism about the future. Many experienced observers believe that India has quietly reappraised its security situation now that the Soviets are astride a historic invasion route to the subcontinent. Others have interpreted India's interest in American defense technology as providing opportunities for major arms sales. These expectations are based on a questionable assessment that New Delhi and Islamabad have seen the light and will join together to protect the region from Soviet expansionism.

Although it is troubled by the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India has not fundamentally revised its political and security perceptions. India has been more concerned about the indirect consequences of Soviet policy, such as the restoration of US security ties to Pakistan and embarrassment in the nonaligned movement, than about the intervention itself. India is, of course, a remarkably heterogeneous country. However, when

Mrs. Gandhi says that she apprehends no threat to India or anyone else from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, as she did on *Meet the Press*, she echoes the claims of most members of the Indian elite. Likewise, when she expresses concern about US "nuclear" forces at Diego Garcia, she speaks for many, if not most, Indians who have thoughts on such matters. And when she expresses concern about the sale of current-generation military hardware to Pakistan, that too is not simply rhetoric.

The most persuasive explanation for recent trends in Indo-US relations is that the United States, in a variety of conscious and unintended ways, has put India under considerable stress. India has reacted by seeking to relieve the pressure where it can and to improve the chances that Indian views might receive a hearing when decisions affecting it are made in the future. This strategy is complemented by important changes in India's economic policies carried out under the influence of a small group of generally pro-Western advisers to the Prime Minister. At the same time, both the Carter and Reagan administrations appreciated that while displeasing New Delhi was inevitable under the circumstances, India remained the most important power in the subcontinent and could be alienated only at peril to important American interests, such as the security of Pakistan.

This line of analysis sees recent Indo-US relations as a kind of damage limitation exercise on the part of both powers. They have moved carefully and purposefully to deal with specific bilateral irritants. For instance, Mrs. Gandhi's visit to Washington in July 1982 precipitated a compromise resolution of the issue of the Tarapur fuel supply, and during Secretary of State Shultz's July 1983 visit to New Delhi the remaining question of spare parts for the US-supplied reactor was settled. In essence, however, the countries have been simply marking time. Whether there can be anything to build on in the future that would lead to more positive cooperation depends on a number of variables and how they affect Indian policy.

INDIAN SECURITY PERSPECTIVES

As viewed from New Delhi, India's security system looks vastly different from the way it appears from Washington. India perceives a number of vulnerabilities that we do not recognize, and has aspira-

tions that we generally have regarded as at best unhelpful and at worst threatening to American interests.

Indian security preoccupations have both a military and a political component. Militarily, India seeks to maintain sufficient power to deal with a worst-case threat from China and Pakistan, as well as to carry out traditional "aid to the civil" law and order missions. The Indo-Soviet relationship is a key component of India's effort to maintain military superiority over Pakistan, deter China, and counterbalance the US military presence in the region and US security relations with Pakistan. Politically, India seeks to maintain paramount influence in Nepal and Bhutan—which lie between India and China—to compete with Pakistan for influence in the Persian Gulf, and to seek to ensure that Bangladesh and Sri Lanka do not become client states of external powers and that their internal problems do not spill over into the Indian political system. In the past dozen years India has acted in pursuit of these principles on numerous occasions.

Almost inevitably, India's security perceptions put it at variance with US policy in the region. Any US support of India's neighbors is perceived as undercutting New Delhi's influence, at a minimum, or—in the case of Pakistan—its military margin of superiority. Likewise, at the global level, US efforts to increase security cooperation with China are seen as compromising India's interests both because they enhance the potential power of a strategic rival and because of active Chinese support of Pakistan.

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES

Neither India nor the United States is likely to change its basic behavior in the next decade. The United States will continue to behave as a superpower, with worldwide security concerns, and India will continue to behave as a would-be dominant regional power. Within these parameters, however, a number of basic factors will determine whether their policies converge or diverge.

AFGHANISTAN

One very important factor will be the course of the present

bloody struggle in Afghanistan. After nearly four years the Soviets still face an uphill effort to create a viable pro-Soviet regime and establish an acceptable security situation. Rather than fading away, the Afghan resistance has grown in military effectiveness and acquired the recognizable stamp of a national liberation movement. In recent months, coinciding with an upsurge of resistance activity and a failure to seduce Pakistan into unilateral concessions in the UN-sponsored "indirect" talks at Geneva, the Soviet media have become more frank about the prospect of a long-term effort "to complete the Afghan revolution" and subdue the resistance.

At present, it is not unfair to say that the Soviet occupation per se does not directly menace vital Western interests. The 105,000 or so troops deployed by the Soviet 40th Army have their hands full. The question, however, is how long Moscow can or will fight a "limited" conflict in that unhappy country, and how long it will tolerate a situation that allows the resistance relatively unhindered access to refuge and support in Pakistan and Iran. Even now, the Soviets could gain full strategic use of Afghanistan in short order if they were to make a substantially increased military commitment.

So long as the Soviet generals and advisers can see some "light at the end of the tunnel," they may persuade the Politburo to tough it out with a relatively limited commitment of resources. Should the prospects of success under the present strategy grow dim, however, the worst fears of Islamabad and its friends, including the United States, may come to pass.

Serious pressure on Pakistan will intensify two other problems for US policy in the region: India-Pakistan enmity and the vulnerability of Pakistan to an internal breakdown.

INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

Although India-Pakistan relations are formally more substantive and complete than before, they are by no means "normal" in the accepted sense of the word and are presently in decline. Beginning in September 1981, when Pakistan entered into a six-year security support agreement with the United States, it sought to engage India in a dialogue about normalizing relations on the basis of a proposed nonaggression pact. In many respects, the effort initi-

ated by President Zia and carried out by two very talented and astute foreign ministers, Agha Shahi and Yakub Khan, was a brilliant stroke. It brought a suspicious India into discussions about alternative formulas for normalizing relations and guaranteeing each others' security. One positive result was the creation of a Joint Commission to build better ties in a number of areas such as trade, technological and scientific exchange, travel, and the like. The high points of the dialogue were President Zia's historic visit to New Delhi in November 1982, and the efforts of both countries to coordinate their positions and avoid conflict at the March 1983 meeting of the nonaligned foreign ministers, which was hosted by India.

Ultimately, however, the effort foundered on the shoals of mutual suspicion and distrust, and the domestic political problems of Zia-ul Haq and Indira Gandhi. Pakistan has reacted angrily to statements in support of Pakistani dissidents by Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao, and the governments have traded heated charges and countercharges. India has also bitterly criticized Pakistan's recently announced acquisition of the US Navy Harpoon antiship missile. To rally public support, both country's leaders have raised the cry of foreign interference. In view of President Zia's political problems and the constitutional requirement for national elections in India before January 1985, the prospects for any substantial improvement in relations is slight, and the possibility of a further breakdown is real.

PAKISTAN'S STABILITY

The increased tension in India-Pakistan relations is but one indication that President Zia's government may be running out of maneuver room. Zia's effort to create a new political order based on a limited return to civilian government while maintaining his own control at the top has touched off serious domestic turmoil. Thus far the disorders are localized in Sind, but there is no guarantee that they will not spread.

Pakistan's fragile political structure may come under more stress as a result of the apparent breakdown of the UN-sponsored indirect talks on Afghanistan. Not only is there the possibility that the Soviets may put more pressure on Pakistan to end its support of the resistance movement, but the suspension or end of the nego-

tiations may further weaken Zia by highlighting the prospect that the 2.8 million or so Afghan refugees are in Pakistan to stay. That conclusion could undermine confidence in the Zia government's policies, including its security relationship with the United States, and add pressures in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Punjab to the existing problems in Sind.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIA

Finally, when surveying the factors that will define the future geopolitical shape of South Asia, it is essential to include the prospect of nuclear proliferation. India has a demonstrated capability to explode a nuclear device and the industrial and scientific infrastructure to deploy a modest arsenal by the 1990s, or even before on a crash basis. Pakistan, by all accounts, is working hard to achieve a detonation capability and perhaps a few deliverable weapons.

Absent some radical changes in the security environment of South Asia, India will probably become a nuclear weapons power within the next decade, though not on the scale of China. However, India has important reasons for pacing its effort and not acting hastily. These include issues of cost, shortages of unsafeguarded nuclear materials and heavy water, and the desire to retain existing nuclear cooperation links.

While India has incentives to consider its nuclear option carefully, Pakistan is in a position to force the pace. Consequently, the timing of India's entry into the nuclear weapons club may principally be decided by what Pakistan does in the next five years. India has not expended precious resources to achieve conventional superiority over Pakistan only to see it negated by a Pakistani bomb. At a minimum, India will outbuild Pakistan in warheads and delivery vehicles.

The Reagan administration's policy towards Pakistan appears predicated on the calculation that US security support will deter Pakistan from going nuclear, at least for the duration of the six-year aid commitment. Uncertainties about Pakistan's rate of progress towards a nuclear explosive capability, however, raise the question of whether the premise has yet been tested. Moreover, if Pakistan already has a nuclear explosives capability, its calculations may be

changed if its internal political or external security situation becomes more unfavorable. The late Prime Minister Bhutto saw the "Islamic bomb" as a political trump card and President Zia may come to view it in the same fashion if his fortunes decline.

It would appear that little thought has been given in this country to the practical consequences of crossing the nuclear threshold in South Asia. Conceivably, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan could form the basis for a new stability in their relations based on classic deterrence considerations. Unfortunately, the visceral nature of their rivalry seems to make this outcome chancy at best. Moreover, the disparity in their resources and the vulnerability of Pakistan's capability, if it is demonstrated or deployed, suggests far more dramatic consequences. For India, the possession of nuclear weapons could give it the influence and prestige that it has long sought. For Pakistan, it is a game with far more risk.

INDIA'S FUTURE

Beyond the environmental factors noted above, a basic determinant of US-India relations will be India's success or failure in surmounting present problems. In recent years many South Asian specialists in and out of government have spoken optimistically about India's impending major-power status and the presumed positive implications for the United States. This line of analysis began during the period of the Janata coalition headed by Morarji Desai, when a number of indicators suggested that India was entering the economic takeoff phase and was moderating its close ties to the USSR toward "genuine nonalignment," and before Afghanistan heated up US-Soviet polarization and forced regional countries to choose sides. In 1978, India had $7 billion in hard currency reserves, 20 million metric tons of foodgrain buffer stocks, rapidly increasing grain production, and a favorable trade position.

The situation changed rapidly following the 1979 cycle of petroleum price increases and other factors. India is now running a serious balance of payments deficit on the order of $6.5–7.0 billion per year (a relatively small part of which is due to costly efforts to diversify its sources of military hardware and compete with technology being acquired by Pakistan). Two successive bad monsoons

have cut foodgrain stocks to a worrisome 15 million metric tons, and put India back into the grain markets (including significant purchases from the United States). For a variety of reasons not counting weather, agriculture specialists think foodgrain output may have reached a temporary plateau of 130–135 million metric tons (MMT), which is not enough to keep pace with an annual population growth rate of about 2.1 percent.* Industrial output continues to increase erratically, handicapped by basic weaknesses in the state-run coal, electrical power, and rail transport sectors.

Adding to these troubles, India's often-vaunted political stability is increasingly threatened. Assam, on India's northeast frontier, has been in virtual revolt in protest against immigration from poverty-stricken Bangladesh. The Punjab, India's granary and vital frontier with Pakistan, is the scene of a communally based autonomy movement among the Sikhs, who constitute a bare majority of the province's population. In the South, Prime Minister Gandhi has suffered a series of electoral defeats and faces a broad political revolt against her policy of centralizing decisionmaking in New Delhi.

This litany of troubles does not tell the whole story, however. Despite its problems India retains a growth economy. It has an extensive and diversified industrial base, and a national infrastructure that would be the envy of many countries with better growth and per-capita income figures. Finally, it has tough and practical-minded leaders with an ability to make difficult decisions, and an efficient, well-equipped and competently led military establishment. India is a long way from major-power status, but within its own sphere it is the power to contend with.

One cannot conclude this discussion of India's prospects without addressing the obvious question of whether India requires a continuation of the Nehru dynasty for stability, and whether US-India relations might better flourish under different leadership. As for the former, it is not clear that Mrs. Gandhi has led well, but since her earlier fall from grace she has generally enjoyed the confidence of

* As of October 1983 US agricultural specialists consider Indian forecasts of 140 or more MMT for 1983-84 as overly optimistic. US Dept. of Commerce, *Foreign Economic Trends and their Implications for the United States; India*. October 1983. FET 83-087

the country in regard to her economic and foreign policies. The main challenge has come in central government relations with the states, and in her increasingly centralized dominance of the Congress Party machinery.

It is increasingly doubtful whether she can transfer the mantle of power to her son, Rajiv. India's rough-and-tumble political scene demands toughness and popular appeal, as well as family connections. Thus far Rajiv has demonstrated only the latter. Should he fail to succeed his mother, India will have no lack of aspirants. A succession struggle could lead to a long period of unstable governments. On the other hand, the need to find a stable majority could also inject a healthy element of compromise and decentralization of authority.

In US-India relations, Prime Minister Gandhi has certainly been a factor in her own right. She has ruled so long that her attitudes towards the United States seem almost synonymous with India's as a whole. The Desai interregnum introduced a new and welcome tone into US-India relations, but generally continued the existing relationships between India and the two superpowers. While dealing with Prime Minister Gandhi may have its unique frustrations, it is questionable how much India's basic policies would change under a different leader.

PROSPECTS FOR US-INDIA RELATIONS

This is not a time when the United States can form conceptually satisfying options for dealing with South Asia. In a model world, a strong India and a militarily weak but stable Pakistan might well be the best outcome. As a practical matter, however, the United States does not have the option of detaching itself from Pakistan and supporting India as the dominant power. The Soviets are in Afghanistan, a ıd the United States has made the predictable commitment to support the country that appears most vulnerable to future aggression. So long as Pakistan remains the touchstone of US-India relations from New Delhi's standpoint, the prospects for close relations with India will remain dim.

At the same time, the United States cannot ignore India's perceptions and its ability to upset US policy in the region. Unfor-

tunately, despite efforts to maintain a dialogue and improve ties in the economic and technological spheres, New Delhi believes that its interests are under heavy pressure from Washington, both militarily and economically. India is especially sensitive about what it sees as an increasingly pervasive American influence with the smaller states of the region, especially Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, strategic ties to Pakistan and a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean. On the economic front, New Delhi is perplexed by American opposition to Indian loans from the concessional lending agenices and, most recently, to its bid for borrowing $1-2 billion from the Asian Development Bank. The fact that the United States has simultaneously supported China's access to World Bank loans and its membership in the International Monetary Fund only adds to the belief that US policy is hostile to India.

Admittedly, the United States has sought to ease India's concerns and smooth over a variety of perceived injuries. However, it has generally done so ineptly or belatedly, leaving the apparent lack of forethought to speak for itself.

Although difficult to manage, it is possible for the United States to support Pakistan and still maintain fruitful ties with India. The price for the United States is greater consideration of India's concerns and a willingness, where appropriate, to smooth India's objections not just with policy pledges and reassurances but with concrete support in other areas. For India, the price of better relations with the United States is a better appreciation of our legitimate security interests in the region and a better understanding of the domestic limits of US flexibility.

Advocates of better relations in both countries face a credibility problem because of mutually poor images that each state generates among the other's public. Polls sponsored by the United States Information Agency consistently show that urban and educated Indians regard the Soviet Union as a better friend than the United States. If such polls were taken here, the result would certainly show that Americans view India as a better friend of the USSR than of the United States. Both countries have difficult tasks to build greater public support for closer ties. High visibility political contacts help, but ultimately the public of each country must see positive benefits from adjusting national preferences.

The United States and South Asia: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran

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The focus of this paper is upon trends and conditions in the region as they affect US national security and geomilitary interests. With the exception of Iran, the region is characterized by extreme poverty and subsistence economies, with strenuous efforts by India and Pakistan now successful in reaching self-sufficiency in food production. Throughout the region, the political currents of tribal and religious loyalties and hatreds run strong and deep. While major medium-term threats to US interests exist in the region, the US ability to influence the course of events directly is limited.

INDIA

For decades, US observers have acclaimed the remarkable political triumph of India: establishment and continuation of a democracy amidst tribal religious strife and terrible poverty. The United States has given to India more economic aid than to any other country in the world—over ten billion dollars in the last three decades. In 1982, India was the fourth largest recipient of US economic aid and among the top recipients of aid from all the developed countries. However, now that China is about to claim a share of aid from the World Bank and other international funding sources, India's claim to the lion's share will be in doubt. The politics of aid are such that the competition could lead to a further muting of India's political rhetoric, lest that affect the decision of donor nations.

There has been no substantial difference in US aid flows to India between the Carter and the Reagan administrations, indicating at least a general tolerance of India's political and economic policies. Unlike the other nations of South Asia, India is currently not of major significance to US foreign policy or national security interests. India has ended up weakening its moral authority in the Third

World by appearing first to countenance the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then, when political pressures mounted, belatedly to chide the Soviets. The result was a diminution of India's moral credibility, a serious blow for a country which rested its demand for international attention upon superior political virtue, as distinct from geographical position, natural wealth, economic dynamism, or military power.

India's financial support from the Soviet Union has not been trivial, having amounted since 1954 to an estimated total of $3 billion and a pledge of $800 million in Soviet credits for India's Sixth Economic Plan (1980-85). Over 1,500 Soviet military technicians are stationed in India and Soviet military sales to India over the past five years have averaged over $550 million a year. With twice as many troops and three times the defense budget of Pakistan, India can hardly explain the strength of its military forces in terms of self-defense requirements. Neither can India thus account for its development of nuclear weapons capability. This occurrence—and the lack of response to it in terms of any reduced aid flows or political actions—set a precedent of grave long-term consequences.

India is a "nonaligned" country with a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union, signed in the fall of 1971. The motivation for the alignment may have been to offset China's support for Pakistan and the US "tilt" toward Pakistan. Whatever the initial motivation, India under Indira Ghandi probably will continue to align its international policies in support of Soviet policies, as when Mrs. Ghandi said that Soviet troops in Afghanistan "aren't threatening anybody." Such geopolitical attitudes will be a nuisance, more than a serious impediment to the US conduct of foreign policy, although why India ranks so high as a recipient of US aid is not clear. The most serious medium-term problem relates to India's belief that Pakistan is working to develop a nuclear weapons capability, which could be delivered by the F-16 aircraft.

PAKISTAN

A country whose 80 million people have an average per-capita income of $300, through a combination of geography and doughtiness Pakistan is a substantial factor in terms of American security interests. It has given shelter to four million Afghan refugees, while

avoiding the growth, PLO-style, of a state within a state. Soviet pressure is unremitting, because the Soviets believe that without Pakistan's fortitude, the logistics necessary for large-scale Afghan resistance would not be available. For all its bombast, Iran has been of little consequence in the Afghanistan struggle. Afghan refugees overwhelmingly prefer Pakistan to Iran, which is five times richer, and the Pakistani government is extremely careful to avoid explaining why and thus give Iran any excuse to stir up the clergy in Pakistan, where Islam is a central factor in societal cohesion.

Relations between the United States and Pakistan had been strained for several years, until Secretary of State Haig made a strenuous personal effort to convince President Zia that American foreign policy had a modicum of constancy. In addition to its support for the freedom of Afghanistan, Pakistan had strong religious, economic, and military ties in the Gulf. Tribesmen from Baluchistan routinely served under British seconded officers in Oman's Dhofar province, abutting South Yemen; Pakistan's military schools were oversubscribed with officers from the Gulf states; and Pakistani units served in Saudi Arabia.

The military aid—actually loans at 9 to 12 percent interest—requests by Pakistan of Secretary Haig centered around a squadron of F-16s, which the Defense Department did not want to agree to supply. To Pakistan, the F-16s—which were delivered due to Haig's perserverance—had a symbolic value far in excess of their objective military value. To a military and to a nation with little modernization, the F-16s were the symbol of competence in handling the world's highest technology, a demonstration that Pakistan had skills equal to those of any nation; and a reminder that Pakistani pilots and crew chiefs walked away from US Air Force schools with the highest ratings.

While the Pakistanis repeatedly reminded US officials of the Soviet threat—and there were constant verbal bullyings, border overflights, and occasional strikes inside Pakistani territory—the American gesture at a modicum of Pakistani force modernization had some implications for India as well. China was and remained Pakistan's main silent military patron, exercising an additional restraining influence upon India. But after the arrival of the F-16s, India as well as the Soviet Union had to recognize that the United States took seriously the integrity of Pakistan.

There was sharp questioning in Congress about Pakistani plans for a nuclear weapon, and Pakistan declared it had no such intention. In addition to the United States, Israel has cast a wary eye at the nuclear energy program of Pakistan, a nation with extremely strong Islamic ties. It would be a disaster for US-Pakistan relations if Pakistan built a nuclear weapon in response to that of India.

Assuming that does not happen, US-Pakistan relations should continue to improve gradually. The United States may increase its economic aid or offer its military loans on concessional terms Pakistan can afford, if the suggestion by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci is accepted that the United States adopt a foreign aid system which allows senior policymakers to know how much aid a country is going to receive, and on what terms.

A US military presence in Pakistan is unlikely. The steam has gone out of US defense efforts to build up a heavy presence in Southwest Asia. The countries in the region do not want it and the strategic rationale is weak in that a local defense against a serious Soviet campaign would be the wrong war in the wrong place, diverting forces from more critical regions in a war which could not stay localized. For its part, Pakistan is a nonaligned nation (whatever that means) and is relucant to stir up domestic and external (including Iranian) opposition by permitting overt US access to military facilities. On the other hand, the United States has not stressed the need for any military support for Pakistan. Instead, the US effort—through diplomatic and political support and modest economic and military aid—has been to encourage Pakistan in its firm opposition to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN

Clearly the Soviet Union underestimated the ferocity of the Afghan tribes and the endurance of the support, especially from Pakistan, given to the Afghan freedom fighters. In 1979 Afghanistan was a country of ten million; today, there are fewer than six million in country, plus 100,000 Soviet troops. The Soviets control the air and the towns, and that is all. No Soviet convoy, regardless of size, is safe and no Soviet patrol ventures safely outside any town. There is no evidence that the Afghan resistance is weakening. The most persistent request of the resistance has been

for a light, mobile anti-helicopter weapon with a long range, preferably out to five miles.

The Soviet strategy appears to be to crush the spirit of the Afghan tribes, as distinct from occupying territory or negotiating a mutually acceptable solution. The main Soviet tactics are garrison occupation and concentration of enormous firepower on selected targets, which forces the population to flee the areas under attack and prevents the resistance from establishing secure anti-Soviet zones. For the most part, the extensive refugee camps inside Pakistan have not been attacked, since to do so would draw the Pakistanis into the fighting. Thousands of young Afghans have been sent to military schools inside the Soviet Union, in the expectation that as they are returned to serve several years from now in the Afghanistan army, they will reinforce its loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Neither the Soviets nor the Afghan resistance movement show signs of fatigue. In 1982, militarily the Soviets registered no significant advances, except in forcing more refugees into Pakistan. For the foreseeable future, the war will be a stalemate. The Soviets are waiting for the physical or moral collapse of the resistance, or the erosion of support for the resistance by some of the countries of Islam and of the West. If this erosion does not occur, there is a good chance the Soviets will eventually (say, in the late 1980s) be willing to reach a political settlement with the resistance.

IRAN

Unlike Pakistan, Iran has not been of significant assistance in the face of the plight of the Islamic people of Afghanistan. Instead, the Khomeini government continues to pursue energetically its goal of asserting quasi-religious/quasi-political control over the Gulf states and much of the Middle East. The central challenge to Iran is the outcome of its three-year war with Iraq. Saddam Hussein's colossal miscalculation in attacking Iranian oil-rich regions in 1980 has yet to cause his downfall, but the war is far from over.

Iraq has shown an incredible inability to employ its numerically impressive tactical air, acquired mainly from the Soviet Union. Generalship and strategy on both sides have been on a par with World

War I, as has the style of fighting: massed troops, massed artillery, armor used as mobile pillboxes, massed attacks, massed machinegun fire, and mass slaughter—Iraq's soldiers, deserving better leaders, have fought well on the defense, especially once driven back inside Iraq.

The logistic lines of Iraq, cut off from Gulf shipping, depend upon Jordan, which for geopolitical reasons has been staunchly supportive. The Jordanians are quite explicit about the dangers to them, to the conservative Gulf states, and to American interests if an Iranian victory resulted in an accommodationist Iraq supporting an axis between Syria and Iran.

For their part, the Iranians until lately have substituted religious fervor for military common sense. After driving the Iraqi forces from Iran, for the past year the Iranians have concentrated on attacking Iraq. Their campaigns seem designed to ram head-on against Iraq's force redoubts, seeking to break the Iraqi army physically or psychologically. The results have been the deaths of thousands of Iranian boys who believed it was their religious duty to wrap themselves in their death shrouds and run across minefields under machinegun fire to clear paths for the regular Iranian army units. Suspicious of army officers, Khomeini's clique of ayatollahs has resorted to a scheme of frequent transfers of senior army officers to avoid the emergence of officers with charisma, respect, and political power. Strategy and tactics have suffererd accordingly. The war is one of national will and sacrifice, rather than of maneuver, planning, or compromise negotiations for political gain. North Korea has emerged as the major arms supplier for Iran, in return for oil, so Iran does not lack for small arms, armor, and artillery. Iranian tactical air is in short supply and being hoarded, because resupply for the F-4s, F-5s, and F-14s has not been easily arranged.

It is a war of attrition whose outcome apparently will be decided by economics, not by strategy, not by technology in the form of weapons, and not by maneuver. Iraq initiated the war from a perceived position of military and economic strengths. Its citizens were comparatively prosperous and its armed forces were overstocked with equipment. The principal reason was the export of two million barrels of oil a day, through the Gulf and through pipelines across Syria and Turkey. Only the Turkish pipeline, pumping about

700,000 barrels a day, remains open. Iraq's petroleum earnings dropped from about $25 billion in 1980 to less than $9 billion in 1982. The same was true of its foreign exchange reserves, dropping from about $20 billion in 1980 to near zero today.

Press reports place the costs of the war to Iraq at about a billion dollars a month in foreign exchange expenditures. If the entire domestic economy for 15 million people needs, in austerity, only half that amount each month, then Iraq will have exports of about $9 billion and imports of $18 billion. With its foreign exchange reserves exhausted, its commercial creditors refusing to extend more credit, its currency already devalued, Iraq cannot afford to continue the current tempo and style of the war. Relying on aid, given for reasons of self-interest, from the Saudis and other Gulf states, will probably not close the financing gap, because the Gulf states practice conservative fiscal policies and are less willing to give away oil revenues when they have agreed to a quota system which places a ceiling on their total revenues.

Iran, on the other hand, with a population more willing to sacrifice and imbued with nationalistic fervor, is exporting about 2 million barrels a day, bringing in over $20 billion this year and even adding to its foreign exchange reserves.

As Iraq has come to recognize its bleak prospects in 1984, press reports indicate efforts to acquire aircraft and missiles to strike the Iranian oil facilities. This would be a desperation threat to force negotiations. Even if Iranian oil exports were curtailed, Iran's financial situation is such that it could continue the current level of warfare for quite some time.

Iran has aimed its counterthreat not at Iraq, but at the Gulf states and the West, claiming it might stop the passage out of the Gulf of all oil tankers if Iraq receives or uses the equipment it is allegedly trying to buy. Regardless of the credibility of that particular threat, Iran appears absolutely determined to prosecute the war as a means of asserting and extending its leadership and its vision of pan-Islam fundamentalism. The Ba'athists in Iraq, on the other hand, appear united against this threat and it could well be that, even if Saddam Hussein were not in charge, the new ruling clique would still be Ba'athist and anti-Iranian.

In summary, the regional problem which may prove most pressing for US interests is the Iranian war against Iraq. In 1984 the major problem confronting Iraq will be a lack of money. The Iranians should have an incentive to continue the military pressure, while Iraq, becoming more desperate, is willing to entertain more desperate measures to achieve a ceasefire.

Endnotes

CHAPTER 2

Pike, "American-Vietnamese Relations"

1. The major bibliographic source for this article is the Indochina Archive at the University of California, Berkeley, File 7-A, Vietnam Foreign Relations (US), approximately 15,000 pages of documentary material, of which about 5 percent deals directly with the subject of formal diplomatic relations, the remainder dealing with issues between the two countries and a history of contacts since the end of the Vietnam War. Early material on the subject circa 1976-77, was more voluminous but of less value in terms of today's policymaking. See Herman Kahn and Thomas Pepper, *United States Relations with Vietnam*, Hudson Institute Report, December 1976, and by way of contrast *Vietnam: 1976*, a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Senator George McGovern, March 1976. The best single source of material on this subject probably is the US Congress. *U.S. Aid to North Vietnam*, House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 19, 1977, a Committee on International Relations Print. *Claims Against Vietnam*, House of Representatives report dated 30 April 1980, outlines the legal issues involved with US nationals' losses incurred through nationalization in Vietnam; also information on Hanoi assets frozen in the United States. *Indochina*, a report released by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 21 August 1978, contains a 150-page study by the author entitled "Vietnam's Future Foreign Relations," which includes a chapter on U.S.-Vietnamese relations. *Adjudication of Claims Against Vietnam*, by the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 27 July and 25 October 1979, contains background material on losses by US individuals and companies through nationalization of property in Vietnam and on Hanoi assets frozen in the United States. *Claims Against Vietnam*, a House of Representatives report dated 30 April 1980, outlines the legal issues involved. See also *Relations with the United States*, a Congressional Research Service Vietnam Study, April 1982, pp. 63-69. For representative arguments on immediate recognition of Hanoi see "For Normalizing Relations With Hanoi" by Richard Walden and Gary Larsen in the *New York Times* 29 April 1982; also "Diplomatic Relations With Vietnam Should Be Restored" by Rank Price, *National Vietnam Veterans Review*, March 1982.

2. In strict interpretation of diplomatic protocol, Hanoi owes the United States at least an apology for violating the agreements signed with the United States in February and March 1973. The Paris Agreements, whatever else was their meaning (for instance the extraordinary concession of

allowing Hanoi to keep 40,000 troops in someone else's country) clearly stipulated no force augmentation, yet virtually the entire North Vietnamese army was in South Vietnam near the end of the war (April 1975). This represented a total breach of our agreement.

3. In some instances this relation is only nominal; one envoy with such an arrangement appeared twice in Hanoi in three years, on arrival to present his credentials and for his farewell call upon departure.

4. The other four are Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Finland. In some instances these countries have picked up economic aid projects dropped after Vietnam invaded Kampuchea. In some cases assistance appears to be only token, for the purposes of quieting domestic criticism.

5. See the author's *Experiences of Various Countries in Dealing With Vietnam*, a study prepared for the US Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, January 1979. For a hilarious account of diplomatic life in Hanoi see "Waiting for the Fruits of Victory" by Siegfried Kogelfranz in *Der Spiegel*, 3 and 13 Feb. 1978.

6. In mid-1973, as part of the Paris Agreements arrangements, representatives from the United States (Agency for International Development) and the DRV held a series of technical-level meetings in Paris. The two sides discussed US economic assistance to Vietnam to which the United States had agreed as part of the "binding up the wounds of war" effort in the Paris Agreements. Among the documents coming out of these meetings was a Hanoi-supplied list of desired US-assisted reconstruction aid. The price tag on the list totaled about $3.25 billion. Another document was a White House memorandum (that may or may not bear Richard Nixon's signature, the matter being in doubt) in which the United States acknowledged this level of economic need, and implied that the United States would make such money available. However, at these meetings and in various other ways (including Kissinger press conferences), the United States stressed two points; that the executive branch representatives in Paris did not have the authority to commit the United States to granting $3.25 billion, since this power is reserved to the Congress; and that the United States considered any economic assistance for North Vietnam dependent on Hanoi's military restraint in the South. In any event, because of these conditional qualifications, there never was a clear and legal US debt obligation. (*Editor's note*: For a different view of this demarche, see Allan E. Goodman, "The Case for Establishing Relations with Vietnam," in this volume.)

7. The United States during this period also acquiesced (by refraining from veto) in UN membership for Vietnam; it also pledged to end trade restrictions and other embargo measures once diplomatic relations were established.

8. Some critics have argued that the United States is to be blamed for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea on the grounds that recognition would have restrained Hanoi. An examination of Hanoi's motives and purposes in attacking Kampauchea suggests that US recognition was an irrelevant

matter. Actually the United States can count itself fortunate—it escaped the embarrassment of a Vietnamese act of war at about the time the new US ambassador would have been arriving in Hanoi to open formal relations.

9. Other factors also had contributed to the slowdown of movement toward establishing relations. These include the refugee exodus, Hanoi's decision to join CEMA and its signing a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR, and the rise of influence of a small but powerful group of Congressmen who, in the name of the resolution of casualties issue, signaled the White House that it faced a heavy political battle in Capitol Hill centering around the MIA question.

10. The concern here must be with institutions, not individuals. Almost certainly there is no place in the future governing structure of Kampuchea, whatever it becomes, for either Pol Pot or Heng Samrin personally. Both are total anathema to almost all Khmer. Probably other top figures on both sides will also have to go.

11. The British Hanoi-watcher, Denis Duncanson, has done some calculations on this and concludes that even with the best political settlement in Kampuchea, it will remain almost a mathematical impossibility for the society to produce in less than a generation sufficient leaders, technicians, or bureaucrats, so completely decimated is its middle class. See "Who Will Govern Cambodia," in *The World Today* (London), June 1982.

12. Not all agree on this. A common view in influential circles in the United States and Europe is that Soviet moves in the Pacific in the last decade are the result of a natural concern for a region that increasingly affects Soviet interests and that its actions there are normal and not aggressive. Some contend that the United States and the USSR actually have little to quarrel over in Southeast Asia.

13. See the author's "Policy Dimension on the Indochina POW-MIA Issue," a Policy Planning position paper dated August 1979 (copy in the Indochina Archive, University of California, Berkeley). See also the SRV White Paper "On the Question of Americans Missing in the Vietnam War," Hanoi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1980.

Goodman, "The Case for Establishing Relations with Vietnam"

1. In 1977, when the text of this letter was released by the Department of State, Mr. Nixon declared that such aid would then be "immoral" because of North Vietnam's "flagrant violations of the Paris agreement." For a different view of this demarche, see Douglas Pike, *American-Vietnamese Relations*, in this volume.

2. For details, see Douglas Pike, "Vietnam, A Modern Sparta," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, April 1983, pp. 33–39.

3. Larry K. Niksch, et al, *Vietnam's Future Policies and Role in Southeast*

Asia, a study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate (97th Congress, 2d session), April 1982.

4. At present, the United States has no diplomatic relations with 11 other countries although in two, "interest sections" manned by US Foreign Service officers represent a step closer to making diplomatic recognition possible.

5. For an analysis of the evolution of this trend in US policy, see L. Thomas Galloway, *Recognizing Foreign Governments*, (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1978).

6. A good account of the diplomacy of this period and the domestic political backdrop against which it was conducted can be found in Marjorie A. Niehaus, *Vietnam: Problems of Normalizing US-Vietnamese Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 1978).

7. For a detailed account, see *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Stanford, Cal., Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

8. See the observations of Congressman George Davidson, a member of the US delegation that visited Hanoi in January of 1980 in *Asian Security Environment: 1980*, report submitted by a Special Study Mission in Asia, Committee on Foreign Relations, US House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 2d session (May 1980), pp. 37-40.

9. Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1967), pp. 438-442.

10. See US Congress Senate Committee on the Judiciary. *Aftermath of War: Humanitarian Problems of Southeast Asia*, 94th Congress, 2d. session, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 17 May 1976.

11. A fourth reason for establishing relations with Vietnam might be commercial. I have not indicated this in my list of reasons because with the present world oil glut the need to develop Vietnam's offshore oil fields is much less compelling than it was in 1974-75 when US companies paid (to the Saigon government) record premiums for exploration rights. So also is the potential profit represented by the sale of US spare parts for Vietnam's basic industries. Whether Vietnam could be a significant market for US goods in the future is virtually impossible to forecast now.

12. For a recent look at who may favor what, see Carlyle Thayer, "Vietnam's New Pragmatism," *Current History* (April 1983).

13. Reported in the *Monitor* on 3 March 1983.

14. Niksch, et al., pp. 16, 48-49.

CHAPTER 3

Quester, "The Future of the American NATO Commitment"

1. Richard Rosecrance (ed.), *America as an Ordinary Country* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976).
2. Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (Fifth edition) (New York: Knopf, 1978).
3. For illustration of the questioning of liberal democratic values even for the United States itself, see Michael Parenti, *The Anti-Communist Impulse* (New York: Random House, 1969).
4. Our loss of American self-confidence in the value model of political democracy is outlined in Ole R. Holsti, "The Three-Headed Eagle: The United States and System Change," *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 23, No. 3 (September, 1979), pp. 339-359.
5. For a discussion of some of the same issues, see Klaus Bloemer, "Freedom for Europe, East and West," *Foreign Policy*, No. 50 (Spring, 1983), pp. 23-38.
6. For this author's more extended discussion of a "double standard" by which Europe and the more developed world is seen as appropriate for a system of free elections, but the non-European underdeveloped world is not, see George H. Quester, "Consensus Lost," *Foreign Policy* No. 40 (Fall, 1980), pp. 18-32.
7. Polls cited in John E. Reilly, *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 1983* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1983), p. 31.
8. Polls cited in Alvin Richman, "Public Attitudes on Military Power, 1981," *Public Opinion* Vol. 4, No. 6 (December/January 1982), p. 45.
9. Polls from Reilly, *op. cit.*, p. 28 and Richman, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
10. Reilly, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
11. Polls presented in *Public Opinion*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (October/November, 1982), p. 29.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Polls presented in *Public Opinion*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (April/May, 1982), p. 39.
14. On the continuing debate about American commitments to nuclear escalation, see McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Spring, 1982), pp. 753-768, and Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz-Josef Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 5 (Summer 1982), pp. 1157-1171.
15. For a European view anticipating such an exhaustion of the American commitment, see Hedley Bull, "European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 874-892.
16. On the disillusionment of Versailles, see Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1944).

Reinertson, "The Egon Bahr Line"

1. William Hyland, "The Soviet Union in the American Perspective: Perceptions and Realities," *America's Security in the 1980s*, Christoph Bertram, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 109).
2. "Egon Bahr: Wandel durch Annäherung," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, August 1963, pp. 654-656; "Deutschlandfrage. Berlinstatus. Deutschland (West-). (Ost-)." *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 15 July 1963, pp. 10700-10701.
3. Egon Bahr, "Renunciation of Force and the Alliance," *Europa Archiv*, English edition, July 1973, pp. 243-254.
4. Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, *Common Security; A Blueprint for Survival*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 182-183; Egon Bahr, "Gemeinsame Sicherheit; Gedanken zur Entschärfung der nuklearen Konfrontation in Europa," *Europa Archiv*, 25 July 1982, pp. 421-430.
5. Interview with Dr. Uwe Stehr, Bundeshaus, Bonn, West Germany: 7 March 1983.
6. Egon Bahr, *Was wird aus den Deutschen?* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1982), pp. 211-212.
7. Bahr, "Renunciation of Force," p. 250; Bahr, "Wandel durch Annäherung," p. 654; "Renunciation," p. 249; "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 422.
8. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 425.
9. "Renunciation," p. 248.
10. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 423.
11. "Renunciation," p. 249, 251.
12. Ibid., p. 244, 247.
13. Ibid., p. 244.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 247-248.
16. Ibid., p. 250.
17. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 428.
18. "Renunciation," pp. 246, 254.
19. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 422.
20. "Renunciation," p. 250; "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 428.
21. Interview with Klaas de Vries, Parliament Building, The Hague, Netherlands: 5 October 1982.
22. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," pp. 423-424.
23. Ibid., p. 429.
24. Ibid., pp. 424, 428, 429.
25. Ibid., pp. 424-425.
26. Ibid., p. 426.
27. Ibid., pp. 424-425.
28. Ibid., p. 425.
29. Ibid.

30. Ibid., p. 427.
31. "Renunciation," p. 252; "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 422.
32. "Renunciation," p. 250; "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 425.
33. "Renunciation," p. 253.
34. "Renunciation," p. 253; "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 425.
35. *Was wird aus den Deutschen?* pp. 211-212.
36. "Renunciation," p. 252. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," pp. 422-424.
37. "Renunciation," pp. 251-252; "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 422.
38. "Renunciation," pp. 250-251.
39. "Renunciation," pp. 246, 251.
40. "Renunciation," p. 245; *Was wird aus den Deutschen?* p. 220.
41. This title has become associated with the proposal cited in 4 above.
42. See footnote 4 above.
43. Walter F. Hahn, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: the Grand Design of Egon Bahr," *Orbis*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter 1973), p. 871.
44. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 427.
45. Ibid.; *Was wird aus den Deutschen?* p. 232.
46. "Gemeinsame Sicherheit," p. 427.
47. "Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik," p. 654.
48. George Schwab, ed. *Ideology and Foreign Policy; a Global Perspective* (New York, Cyrco Press, 1978), p. 2.

CHAPTER 4

Livingstone, "Fighting Terrorism and 'Dirty Little Wars' "

1. Flora Lewis, "The Habit of War," *New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1983.
2. Charles William Maynes, "If the Poor Countries Go Under, We'll Sink With Them," *The Washington Post*, September 18, 1983.
3. Ray S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 150.
4. Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy*, (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 172.
5. Brian Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," *Survival*, (July-August 1975), p. 160.
6. Brian Jenkins, "High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technology on Low-Level Violence," in *The Other Arms Race: New Technologies and Non-Nuclear Conflict*, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Uri Ra'anan, and Geoffrey Kemp (eds), (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., no date), p. 98.
7. Harvey J. McGeorge II, "The Kinetics of Terrorism," to be published in *World Affairs*, (Summer 1983), p. 15 (draft).
8. This author discovered a copy of the *Anarchist Cookbook* at the Book Annex in Washington, D.C.
9. See Neil C. Livingstone, *The War Against Terrorism*, Chapter 6, "Terrorist Weapons: Today and Tomorrow," (Lexington, Mass.; Lexington Books, 1982), pp. 97-124.
10. *Brassey's Infantry Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Armies*, Second Edition, J.I.H. Owen (ed.), (London: Brassey's Publishers Ltd., 1979), p. 54.
11. U.S.-made Claymore mines, also presumably from stockpiles left behind in Vietnam, are being used by Communist-backed guerrillas in Central America. In many cases, they are set up alongside a roadway and then detonated as the intended victim's car passes by.
12. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1977), p. 84.
13. Walter Laqueur, quoted by David M. Alpern, "More Outrages," *Newsweek*, 26 December, 1977.
14. Robert Moss, "International Terrorism and Western Societies," *International Journal*, (Summer 1973), p. 418.
15. For a breakdown as to which camps the nations of the world fall into, see: *The War Atlas*, Michael Kidron and Dan Smith (eds.), (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), Figure 16.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Red Brigades communique, (xerox).
18. *Ibid.*
19. Harvey J. McGeorge II, "Plan Carefully, Rehearse Thoroughly, Execute Violently," to be published in *World Affairs*, (Summer 1983), pp. 1-2 (draft).

20. *Ibid.*
21. Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
22. See Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds), Book 8, Chapter 3, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 585–594.
23. ABC News–*Washington Post* poll, reprinted in *National Journal*, September 10, 1983, p. 1862.
24. Gallup Organization poll, reprinted in *National Journal*, September 10, 1983, p. 1862.
25. Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
26. Summers, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
27. Henry Kissinger, "The Problems of Limited War," in *the Use of Force*, Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds.), (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).
28. Daniel Arnold, discussion in conjunction with a paper presented by Theodore G. Shackley entitled, "The Uses of Paramilitary Covert Action in the 1980's", reprinted in *Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action*, Roy Godson (ed.), (Washington, D.C.: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), p. 160.
29. Eliot A. Cohan, *Commandos and Politicians*, (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), p. 70.
30. Bob Dart, "Proxy Wars to be Challenge to U.S. Military Might, Study Says," *Atlanta Journal*, April 20, 1983.
31. Summers, *op. cit.*, pp. 159–164.

CHAPTER 5

Heaton, "America and China: The Coming Decade"

1. Some articles of interest include Robert A. Scalapino, "Uncertainties in Future Sino-U.S. Relations," *Orbis* (Fall 1982), pp. 681-96; also by Scalapino, "In Quest of National Interest—The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," 28th Bernard Moses Memorial Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, 28 October 1982, University of California, 1983; Allen S. Whiting, "Sino-American Relations: The Decade Ahead," *Orbis* (Fall 1982), pp. 697-719; Donald S. Zagoria, "Gauging the Sino-Soviet Thaw," *The New Leader* 29 November 1982, pp. 3-5; Edmund Lee, "Beijing's Balancing Act," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1983), pp. 27-46; Harry Harding, "Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1983, pp. 1-19; John F. Copper, "Sino-American Relations: On Track or Off Track?" *Asia Pacific Community*, Summer 1982, pp. 13-24; Robert G. Sutter, "Future Sino-Soviet Relations and their Implications for the United States," JX1428 China D, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 30 December 1982.
2. For example, Thomas Robinson states: "Since China has been the weakest of the three [superpowers], it has had to accommodate its general international orientation and many of its specific policies to power realities within the triangle. Thus, for Beijing, the most important questions have always been: which of the superpowers is the greater enemy? and is the danger so high that major compromises must be made with the other?" "China's Dynamism in the Strategic Triangle," *Current History*, September 1983, p. 241.
3. On factionalism in Chinese politics see Lucian Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981). Pye has reservations about the application of factional politics to foreign affairs (see pp. 34-6). Michael Ng-Quinn also argues that analyzing factions has limited utility in understanding Chinese foreign policy. He maintains that the best approach is using the international system as the level of analysis, in his "The Analytic Study of Chinese Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, June 1983, pp. 203-24.
4. William Heaton, *A United Front Against Hegemonism: Chinese Foreign Policy into the 1980s*, Monograph 80-3, National Defense University, March 1980.
5. William Heaton, "China and Southeast Asian Communist Movements: The Decline of Dual Track Diplomacy," *Asian Survey*, August 1982, pp. 779-800.
6. Qi Xin, "From Strategic 'Alliance' to U.S.-China Bilateral Relations," *Chi-Shi Nien-Tai* [The Seventies] April 1983, pp. 51-4; Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) #4005, pp. 77-84. Also see Xing Shugang, Li Yunhua and Liu Yingna, "Soviet-U.S. Balance of Power and Its Impact on the World Situation in the 1980s," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* [International

Studies], January 1983, pp. 25-31: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, China, 21 April 1983, pp. A1-A12.
7. "Eliminate Obstacles in Sino-U.S. Relations," *Wen Wei Po*, Hong Kong, 20 February 1983, p. 2; Daily Report/China, 24 February 1983, P. W1-W2. Also see "Chinese Ambassador to the USA on Sino-US Relations," *Beijing Review*, 16 May 1983, pp. 14-15.
8. Thomas Robinson, "Choice and Consequences in Sino-American Relations," *Orbis*, Spring 1981.
9. Huang Shuhai, "Huan Xiang Reviews Current International Situation," 2 parts, *Ta Kung Pao*, Hong Kong, 16, 17 August 1983; Daily Report/China, 19 August 83, pp. W1-W7. Also see A. Doak Barnett, "China's International Posture: Signs of Change," *China Briefing 1982*, ed. by Richard C. Bush (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1983), pp. 85-102.
10. In July 1983, a new textile agreement between China and the United States was signed, and in August, China lifted its embargo of US agricultural products. Trade in the first half of 1983 had declined from the same period in 1982.
11. A recent example of factional groups is that of Victor C. Falkenheim, who categorizes the groups as diehard leftists, conservative reformers, and liberal reformers, "Political Reform in China," *Current History* (September 1982), p. 259.
12. For an excellent analysis of Deng's reform policies see H. Lyman Miller, "China's Administrative Revolution," *Current History* (September 1983), pp. 270-74. Also see Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972-82," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1982, pp. 1-19.
13. On the development of the Taiwan issue see John W. Garver, "Arms Sales, the Taiwan Question, and Sino-U.S. Relations," *Orbis*, Winter 1983, pp. 999-1035.
14. Henry A. Kissinger, "What Should Come Out of This Trip," *Washington Post*, 30 January 1983, p. C8.
15. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983).
16. Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S.-China Ties: Lower Expectations," *New York Times*, 2 February 1983), p. 3.
17. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Convincing Europe and China," *New York Times*, 31 January 1983, p. 25.
18. Banning Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "The Strategic Importance of Sino-American Relations," *USA Today Magazine*, July 1983, pp. 15-16.
19. Ray S. Cline, "U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia," *A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia: The 1980s and Beyond*, ed. by Ramon H. Myers (Palo Alto: Stanford, 1982), pp. 1-15.
20. Robert L. Downen, "The Shifting Foundation," paper prepared for 20 May 1983 workshop of American Bar Association at Stamford, Connecticut, p. 26.
21. Developments in the decisions pertaining to the FX and Hu Na cases have been obtained through numerous discussions with US government

officials and involved parties.

22. A major debate within the US government has been over the issue of security cooperation with the PRC, and, more specifically, over the prospect of arms sales to China. For example see the papers and discussion in "The Implications of U.S.-China Military Cooperation," a workshop sponsored by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Congressional Research Service (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 1982).

23. In an interview with *Mainichi Shimbun* on 15 August 1983, CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang stated that it would take 20 or 30 years for China and the Soviet Union to normalize their relations completely and that the era of close Sino-Soviet cooperation of the early 1950s would never be restored.

24. Garver, "Taiwan," p. 1030.

25. For a discussion of this position see William R. Heaton, "Assessing the U.S.-China Connection," unpublished manuscript, Washington, D.C., National War College, 1983.

26. Deng's latest offer was made in a meeting with Professor Winston L.Y. Yang of Seton Hall University. See Yang Li-yu, "Deng Xiaoping's Latest Concept on Peaceful Reunification," *Chi-Shi Nien-Tai* [The Seventies], 1 August 1983, pp. 17-19; Daily Report/China, 4 August 1983, pp. W1-W6. An abbreviated version of the key points is in the *New York Times*, 21 August 1983, p. 20. Hu Yaobang confirmed to *Mainichi Shimbun* that Deng's statement was the collective position of the Chinese leadership.

27. The Chinese approach to Hong Kong is related to the Taiwan question. While China has said that it would recovery sovereignty over Hong Kong by 1997, Chinese leaders have tried to assure Hong Kong residents and foreigners that no measures will be adopted to damage Hong Kong's economic well-being. Beijing believes that a satisfactory resolution of the Hong Kong issue could help its appeal for the reunification of Taiwan.

28. In addition to the controversy over Japanese textbooks and films, Chinese media have been reporting more general "unfavorable" trends in Japan. A *Xinhua* commentary on 20 August 1983 entitled "A New Trend on the Japanese Political State," noted an "adverse current." The commentary observed that there was a movement within the Liberal-Democratic Party to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, that members of the Diet were making regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, that Prime Minister Nakasone had pushed for a drive to make Japan a "big political power," and that Japanese arms exports to the United States and other countries were increasing. The commentary said that these trends were of "grave concern" to the Japanese people and were causing worry abroad. Daily Report/China, 23 August 1983, pp. D2-D3.

Nacht, "Will the Pacific Alliance Endure?"

1. *Asian Security 1983* (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1983), pp. 84-86.
2. George Shultz, "Japan and America: International Partnership for the 1980s," United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., September 2, 1983.
3. Quoted in Urban C. Lehner, "Nakasone Stirs Pride of the Japanese as He Firms up Ties to West," *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 September 1983, p. 1.
4. Yasuhiro Nakasone, "Foreign Policy and Constitutional Views," *Journal Of International Affairs*, Summer 1983, p. 4.

CHAPTER 6

Harrison, "The United States and South Asia"

1. Selig S. Harrison, "A Breakthrough In Afghanistan?" *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1983, pp. 13-14.
2. "Time To Go," *The Economist*, 18 June 1983; "Promises at the Khyber Pass, The *New York Times*, 9 July 1983, p. 20.
3. Selig S. Harrison, "Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?", *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1980-81, pp. 178-81. See also "A Breakthrough In Afghanistan?", *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.
4. See my testimony before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, US House of Representatives, 23 September 1981, for an analysis of the factors contributing to the Reagan administration's resumption of US military aid to Pakistan. See also my testimony before the same subcommittee on 9 March 1983.
5. Selig S. Harrison, *India: The Most Dangerous Decades* (Princeton University Press, 1960).
6. Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981.
7. According to preliminary 1981 census findings made available by the Pakistan Embassy in Washington, the population of Pakistan in 1980-81 was 83.7 million, including 47.1 million in Punjab; 13.1 million in the Northwest Frontier Province and the Tribal Areas; 19 million in Sind and 4.3 million in Baluchistan. However, in order to take into account the *muhajir* and Baluch population in Sind and to allow for government-sponsored resettlement programs and interprovincial migration throughout the country, I have also drawn on 1961 Census data. See *Census of Pakistan: Population 1961*, Vol. 3, West Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Karachi, especially the language tables (Statement 7-B, p. IV-46) and tables showing the composition of the population by birthplace (Statements 4.2, p. II-43, and 4.4, pp. II-49). The latter tables showed that the *muhajirs* constituted 14.9 percent of the population in 1960-61.
8. *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, op. cit.
9. Together with Sindhi-speaking Baluch, domiciled in Sind for centuries and largely absorbed into a composite Sindhi bloc socially and politically, this figure becomes 10.5 million, i.e., 12.5 percent of the total population of Pakistan cited on p. 2.
10. Fazul Sulleman, "Sind's Agony," *Frontier Guardian*, Peshawar, 26 August 1972, p. 15.
11. Mazhar Yusuf, "Political Undercurrents in Sind Today," *Dawn*, 22 November 1978.
12. See *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, op. cit., pp. 150-155, for a detailed discussion of Zia's views.
13. Akber Y. Mustikhan, a Baluch businessman identified with moderate Baluch leader Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, presented a detailed plan for such an or-

derly transition in "A Plan for Solving the Political Impasse," *Dawn*, Karachi, 10 July 1983, p. 15. An earlier 1980 version is discussed in *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, op. cit., p. 90.

The Tenth
National Security Affairs Conference
October 7–8, 1983



Conference Director COL John E. Endicott (center) greets conference cosponsors: the Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (left), and LTG Richard D. Lawrence, President of the National Defense University (right).



COL John E. Endicott (left) and the Honorable Delbert L. Spurlock, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (right), review the program.




Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage opens the conference with remarks on the current international environment.



Dr. Hans Mark, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, gives the keynote address on the US role in the world.



MG C. D. Dean, Commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (left), greets a conference participant.



Panelists scan the fourteen major discussion papers that were made available prior to panel sessions.



Panel 1 Chairman, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson (center, rear), guides discussion of the pros and cons of normalizing relations with Vietnam.



MG Perry M. Smith, Commandant of the National War College (far left), chairs Panel 2 discussions on the role of NATO in the 1990s.



Chairman of Panel 3, Terrell E. Arnold (far left), listens as Dr. Edward N. Luttwak makes a point on the panel topic of how to deal with terrorism.



Panel 4 Chairman, Ambassador Richard L. Sneider (right), led discussion of US policy in East Asia.



Panel 5, led by Ambassador L. Bruce Laingen, Vice President of the National Defense University (center, rear), explores US options in South Asia.

Biographical Notes

CONFERENCE COSPONSORS

RICHARD D. LAWRENCE, Lieutenant General, US Army, President of the National Defense University, October 1983, and previously Commandant of the US Army War College since July 1982. Lieutenant General Lawrence received his B.S. degree from the US Military Academy, followed by an M.S. in mechanical engineering from the University of Southern California and a Ph.D. from Ohio State University. Lieutenant General Lawrence served as the Military Negotiator on the US Delegation to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Talks, and thereafter led a joint Secretary of Defense team to assist Saudi Arabia and North Yemen in defense planning. With troop commands in various armor and cavalry units in the Federal Republic of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam, he also served as Chief of the Systems Integration Team, Main Battle Tank Task Force, whose work evolved as the MI Abrams tank. His numerous other assignments have involved liaison with Navy and Air Force Missile Systems programs and weapons systems analysis. Born in Texas, his military education includes basic and career courses at the Armor School, and courses at the Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He is coauthor of a book on US force structure in NATO.

HONORABLE RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. A US Naval Academy graduate, Mr. Armitage earned a B.S. degree in engineering. As a naval officer, he served three in-country tours in Vietnam, after which he was a counterinsurgery instructor at the Naval Amphibious School. He left active US Navy service in 1973 to accept an advisory position with the US Defense Attache Office in Saigon. Later a Pentagon consultant, he then served successively on the staff of the US Defense Representative to Iran; as administrative assistant to Senator Robert Dole of Kansas; on the 1980 Presidential National Security Transition Team; and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. Between terms of government service, he has been a Washington-based consultant specializing in Southeast Asian affairs.

DISTINGUISHED GUEST

HONORABLE HANS MARK, Deputy Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. In his present post since 1981, Dr. Mark previously served as Secretary of the Air Force and Under Secretary of the

Air Force. He earned an A.B. in physics from the University of California at Berkeley before earning his Ph.D. in physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was chairman of the University of California Nuclear Engineering Department and administrator of its Berkeley Research Reactor until joining NASA in 1969 as director of its Ames Research Center. German-born, Dr. Mark has taught at MIT, Boston University, and the University of California. Besides many professional articles, he coauthored *Experiments in Modern Physics* and *Power and Security*, and has served as consultant to the President's Advisory Group on Science and Technology.

CONFERENCE ORGANIZERS

JOHN E. ENDICOTT, Colonel, US Air Force, Director of Research, Director of the National Security Affairs Institute, and Publisher, NDU Press, National Defense University. He holds a B.A. from Ohio State University, an M.A. (history) from Omaha University, and an M.A. (international relations), M.A.L.D. (law and diplomacy), and Ph.D. (international relations) from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Before his present assignment, Colonel Endicott was Associate Dean, National War College (1981-1983). Earlier, he served successively as Assistant Professor of Political Science, US Air Force Academy and Chief of the International Relations Division and Planning and Programming Officer, in the Headquarters Directorate of Plans in the Pentagon. He is the author of *Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical and Strategic Factors* (Praeger, 1975), and coauthor, editor, and contributor of a number of professional and technical works and articles.

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CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

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WALTER ANDERSEN, Department of State.

TERRELL E. ARNOLD, Minister-Counselor, Department of State, and the Deputy Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, Department of State. He received his A.B. degree from Stanford University and an M.A. in political science, economics, and history from San Jose State. Mr. Arnold also completed a year of graduate study in economics at the University of California, Berkeley, and is a graduate of the National War College. Mr. Arnold entered the Foreign Service in 1957. His overseas assignments include Cairo, Calcutta, Colombo in Sri Lanka as Deputy Chief of Mission, and Manila. He also served as Senior Inspector in the Office of the Inspector General, Department of State. Mr. Arnold served as Consul General in Sao Paulo from 1978 to 1980. Recently he completed a tour as the Director of International Studies and International Affairs Adviser to the Commandant of The National War College.

DR. ROBERT J. ART, Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations, Brandeis University. Dr. Art received his A.B. degree from Columbia University and Ph.D. degree from Harvard University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute of Strategic Studies. He is coeditor with Robert Jervis of the series "Cornell Studies in Security Affairs," Cornell University Press. He is also the author of "Fixing Atlantic Bridges," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1982, and "The Role of Military Power in International Relations" in *National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues*, B. Thomas Trout and James E. Harf, editors (Transaction Books, 1982).

WILLIAM J. BARNDS, Staff Director, Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Barnds received his B.B.A. and M.A. degrees from the University of Michigan. He received an LL.B. from Georgetown University. Mr. Barnds served as a Professional Staff Member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1979 to 1981, and as a Senior Research Fellow, the Council on Foreign Relations, from 1966 to 1979. From 1952 to 1966 he worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Barnds is the author of *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers; The Two Koreas in East Asian Affairs; China and America: The Search for*

a New Relationship; and *Japan and the United States: Challenges and Opportunities.*

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Abbreviations

ABM	antiballistic missile
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASALA	Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asia Nations
ASW	antisubmarine warfare
ATBM	antitactical ballistic missile
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
ERW	enhanced radiation warhead
FALN	Armed Forces of National Liberation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FM	field manual
GDP	gross domestic product
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GNP	gross national product
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces
INLA	Irish National Liberation Army
IRA	Irish Republican Army
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JRA	Japanese Red Army
KAL	Korean Airlines
LNG	liquefied natural gas
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction
MIA	missing in action
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NIC	newly industrializing country
NSC	National Security Council
OJCS	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PAVN	People's Army of Vietnam
PLO	Palestine Liberation Army
POW	prisoner of war
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRK	People's Republic of Kampuchea

SAC	Strategic Air Command
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SF	Special Forces (US Army)
SPD	Social Democratic Party (West Germany)
SRV	Socialist Republic of Vietnam
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN	United Nations
USMACV	US Military Assistance Command—Vietnam
USTR	United States Trade Representative

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